New York Law Review

Tag: Related Charges

  • People v. Grant, 91 N.Y.2d 989 (1998): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    91 N.Y.2d 989 (1998)

    When a suspect is represented by counsel on one charge, questioning on a separate charge is impermissible if it is purposely exploitative and designed to elicit incriminating responses on the represented charge to pressure the suspect to confess to the unrepresented crime.

    Summary

    Jonathan Grant was arrested and interrogated about a homicide and assault in Schenectady, NY, while already represented by counsel on a gun possession charge in Brooklyn. He made incriminating statements that he later sought to suppress. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the two charges were not so interwoven as to automatically taint the interrogation, the trial court needed to determine if the questioning about the Brooklyn charge was purposely exploitative, designed to pressure Grant into confessing to the Schenectady crimes. The case was remitted for that determination.

    Facts

    Grant was arrested for a homicide and assault in Schenectady related to a May 9, 1993 incident. Prior to this, he had been arrested in Brooklyn for possessing a 9mm Glock pistol and was represented by counsel on that charge. Schenectady police knew of the Brooklyn charge and his representation. During interrogation for the Schenectady crimes, police questioned him about the Brooklyn gun charge, eventually eliciting admissions about possessing the Glock. He then gave two statements implicating himself in the Schenectady shooting.

    Procedural History

    Grant’s motion to suppress the statements was denied by the trial court, and he was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals based on the “relatedness” of the charges. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Cohen. Grant then argued that the questioning about the Brooklyn charge was purposely exploitive. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division decision and remitted the case to the trial court to determine if the questioning was, in fact, purposely exploitive.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the questioning by Schenectady police about the Brooklyn gun possession charge, while Grant was represented by counsel on that charge, was discrete or fairly separable from the Schenectady crimes and was “purposely exploitive” and “designed to add pressure on defendant to confess” to the unrepresented crime.

    Holding

    No, the Court of Appeals did not make a determination if the questioning was purposely exploitive, because that issue had not been properly preserved at trial. The case was remitted to the trial court to determine whether the questioning by Schenectady police was purposely exploitive and designed to add pressure on defendant to confess to the unrepresented crime, based on the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged its holding in People v. Cohen, which addressed the issue of questioning a represented suspect on a new matter. The Court stated that suppression is required where the represented and unrepresented crimes are so thoroughly interrelated that questioning on one will almost necessarily elicit incriminating responses on the other. It further stated that a statement may be subject to suppression where impermissible questioning on a represented charge was, when viewed as an integrated whole, not fairly separable from otherwise permissible questioning on the unrepresented matter and was, in fact, purposely exploited to aid in securing inculpatory admissions on the latter.

    The court found that the Appellate Division erred in ruling the issue waived because it was not raised at trial. Instead, the Court remitted the case back to the trial court to determine if the questioning was purposely exploitative and designed to add pressure on Grant to confess to the unrepresented crime, applying the law as articulated in People v. Cohen. Judge Titone dissented in part, arguing that the record clearly showed the questioning was exploitative and a new trial should be ordered.

    Judge Titone noted, “the only inferable purpose for engaging in the impermissible line of questioning was to use it as leverage to obtain admissions regarding the Schenectady murder.” Further, “By asking defendant about his possession of the murder weapon, Sims pressured him into either giving incriminating responses regarding his own use of that weapon in the Schenectady shooting or giving false exculpatory answers regarding his possession that could later be exploited in further interrogation.”

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    Once a defendant is represented by counsel on a charge, even if that charge is unrelated to a new investigation, police cannot question the defendant about the new investigation in the absence of counsel if they are aware of the prior representation.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was arrested and arraigned for criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, he was questioned about that crime and two rapes. He had counsel in connection to one of the rapes from a prior investigation. The Court of Appeals held that statements relating to the stolen car charge were inadmissible because his right to counsel had indelibly attached after arraignment on that charge. Further, because the police knew he had counsel on the prior rape charge, questioning on other matters, including the new rape charge, was precluded. The plea to the rape charge which was based on the erroneous denial of suppression was vacated, as was the other rape charge because the plea agreements were integrated.

    Facts

    Ms. McE reported a rape to police. Bartolomeo was represented by counsel for this charge in court proceedings related to a lineup.
    Ms. P reported being raped. She gave the license plate number of the car used, which was found to be stolen. Police found Bartolomeo asleep in the car, arrested him, and arraigned him on criminal possession of stolen property. He was not represented by counsel at this arraignment.
    Bartolomeo was then questioned about the stolen car and both rapes, making incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Bartolomeo was indicted on two counts of rape and one count of criminal possession of stolen property.
    The County Court suppressed statements about the stolen property and the Ms. P rape, but admitted statements about the Ms. McE rape.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted the suppression motion in its entirety.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements relating to the stolen car charge were admissible when Bartolomeo had been arraigned on that charge without counsel.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. McE rape were admissible when Bartolomeo had counsel for that charge from a prior proceeding, even though it was a different investigation.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. P rape were admissible given the illegal questioning about the stolen car and Bartolomeo’s representation by counsel on the Ms. McE rape charge.
    Whether the pleas to both rape counts should be vacated if one plea was based on an erroneous denial of suppression.

    Holding

    No, because Bartolomeo’s right to counsel had indelibly attached after the arraignment on the criminal possession charge, and he could not be interrogated on that charge without counsel present.
    No, because counsel having once entered the proceedings in connection with the charge under investigation, Bartolomeo could not waive his right to counsel in the absence of that attorney. The police and District Attorney were aware of the representation.
    No, because the questioning was an integrated whole where the questioning about the criminal possession was “so interrelated and intertwined” with the questioning about the Ms. P rape. Additionally, the defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.
    Yes, because the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that once the right to counsel attaches, interrogation is prohibited unless counsel is present. This protection extends to questioning on matters that are “so interrelated and intertwined” with the charged crime. Because Bartolomeo had counsel on the McE rape charge, the police knew or should have known he had counsel and could not question him on any matter without counsel present.

    The Court cited People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979) stating questioning on other matters was precluded when the defendant was known to be represented by counsel. “Moreover, as defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.”

    The Court also agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the plea agreement was integrated, meaning that if one plea was vacated, both must be vacated. This ensures fairness and prevents the prosecution from benefiting from a plea bargain that was based on flawed evidence. “Inasmuch as the plea to the “McE” rape count was based on an erroneous denial of suppression that plea must be vacated. Additionally, we agree with the Appellate Division, and for the reasons stated in the opinion of Justice Guy T. Mangano, that, although the plea to the “P” rape count was made after suppression, nonetheless the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.”

  • People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979)

    Once an attorney has been assigned to represent a defendant, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime, even if unrelated, in the absence of counsel.

    Summary

    Rogers was arrested and assigned counsel. The attorney notified the Sheriff that Rogers was not to be questioned without counsel present. Subsequently, the police questioned Rogers about a different crime. The New York Court of Appeals held that questioning Rogers about a different, but related, crime without his lawyer present violated his right to counsel. The Court emphasized that once representation begins, questioning is prohibited even on separate matters. The Court also addressed the defendant’s request to represent himself, stating the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the implications of self-representation.

    Facts

    Rogers was arrested and arraigned on burglary charges. Counsel was assigned to represent him. Rogers’ assigned counsel sent a letter to the Sheriff instructing that Rogers not be questioned without counsel being present. While in jail on those charges, police questioned Rogers about a separate but similar burglary that occurred at the same location (Tanner Building Company) a week earlier. Rogers made incriminating statements during the interrogation about the second burglary.

    Procedural History

    Rogers was indicted on both incidents in the same indictment. Rogers moved to suppress the statements made during the interrogation. The trial court denied the motion and also summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself. Rogers pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rogers appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated the defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about a different crime than the one for which he was being held, after counsel had been assigned and had instructed the police not to question him in the absence of counsel?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s request to represent himself?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once a defendant is represented by counsel, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime in the absence of counsel, especially where the charges are related.

    2. Yes, because a defendant has a right to represent himself, and the court must conduct an inquiry to determine if the defendant is aware of the consequences of self-representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the police violated Rogers’ right to counsel because he was represented by counsel at the time of the interrogation. The fact that the police officers questioned Rogers about a different crime was a “technicality of little significance” because both incidents involved burglaries at the same location and were closely related in time. The Court cited People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, in support of its holding. The Court emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the need to protect a defendant’s right to counsel once it has been invoked. The court found the charges to be sufficiently related, noting “the Grand Jury considered the charges together, and the defendant was indicted for both incidents in the same indictment.”

    Regarding self-representation, the Court held that the trial court should not have summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself, citing People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10. The Court stated that the trial court must make further inquiry to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of representing himself. The Court noted the fact that Rogers may intend to present an insanity defense does not preclude him from representing himself, as long as he is competent to proceed, citing People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351.