New York Law Review

Tag: reinstatement

  • Lazzari v. Town of Eastchester, 20 N.Y.3d 217 (2012): Mandamus to Compel Reinstatement Under Civil Service Law § 71

    Lazzari v. Town of Eastchester, 20 N.Y.3d 217 (2012)

    When a civil service commission directs a municipal employer to reinstate an employee under Civil Service Law § 71 based on a medical officer’s determination of fitness, the employer must immediately reinstate the employee, and any challenge to that determination must be made through a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the Town of Eastchester and Westchester County over the reinstatement of a town employee, Mr. Lazzari, after a disability leave. The County’s Department of Human Resources (DHR) directed the Town to reinstate Lazzari based on a medical examination finding him fit for duty under Civil Service Law § 71. The Town refused, demanding the medical report. The Court of Appeals held that the Town was obligated to reinstate Lazzari immediately upon the County’s directive and that its remedy was to challenge the DHR’s determination through an Article 78 proceeding. The court also affirmed the award of back pay to Lazzari.

    Facts

    Mr. Lazzari, an employee of the Town of Eastchester, injured himself in October 2006 and ceased working. He was examined by the Town’s physician and an independent orthopedic surgeon, both of whom found him unfit for duty. Consequently, the Town terminated his employment in November 2007, advising him of his reinstatement rights under Civil Service Law § 71. Lazzari sought a review of his medical condition by the Westchester County DHR, which directed him to an independent physician. This physician found him fit to return to work. The DHR then directed the Town to reinstate Lazzari. The Town refused to reinstate Lazzari without receiving a copy of the medical report. The County refused to provide the report. Lazzari then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to compel his reinstatement.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court initially granted Lazzari’s petition, ordering the Town to reinstate him. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring DHR to be joined as a necessary party. Upon remittal, the Supreme Court again granted the petition, ordering reinstatement and back pay. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Civil Service Law § 71 did not require DHR to provide the Town with the medical report. The Town appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal employer is required to immediately reinstate an employee pursuant to a directive from the civil service commission or department under Civil Service Law § 71, or whether the employer can demand documentation of the employee’s fitness to resume work before reinstatement.

    Holding

    Yes, the municipal employer must immediately reinstate the employee because Civil Service Law § 71 mandates immediate reinstatement upon the civil service commission’s directive, and the proper avenue for challenging the directive is a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Civil Service Law § 71 requires immediate reinstatement when a medical officer, selected by the civil service commission, certifies an employee’s fitness for duty. The court found that a letter from the Civil Service Commission informing the Town that a medical officer had “certified” Mr. Lazzari fit to return to work was sufficient under Civil Service Law § 71. The Court emphasized that the statute does not explicitly require written medical certification. The Court rejected the Town’s argument that it was entitled to the medical report before reinstating Lazzari, stating that the Town’s proper recourse was to initiate a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to challenge the DHR’s determination. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where employers have wide discretion in employment matters, such as the Superintendent of State Police. The Court stated, “Civil Service Law § 71 does not give the Town the responsibility or power to police the performance of the County’s statutorily mandated duties.” Regarding back pay, the Court found no meaningful distinction between an unlawful removal and an unlawful refusal to reinstate, thus entitling Lazzari to back pay under Civil Service Law § 77.

  • Matter of Henly v. D’Apice, 68 N.Y.2d 813 (1986): Provisional Employee’s Right to Reinstatement

    Matter of Henly v. D’Apice, 68 N.Y.2d 813 (1986)

    Provisional employees in New York generally lack a right to reinstatement or back pay, even if their termination is in bad faith, unless specific statutory or constitutional violations are present.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a provisional employee of the State Division of Probation is entitled to reinstatement and back pay after a jury found he was discharged in bad faith. The New York Court of Appeals held that provisional employees, appointed under Civil Service Law § 65, generally do not have a right to reinstatement or back pay upon termination, regardless of the employer’s motive. The court emphasized that provisional appointments are temporary and do not confer the same rights as permanent employment, unless a constitutional or statutory violation occurred during the termination.

    Facts

    Henly was employed as a provisional employee with the State Division of Probation. He was subsequently terminated from his position. Henly challenged his termination, alleging it was done in bad faith. A jury determined that Henly’s discharge was indeed in bad faith.

    Procedural History

    Henly initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement to his position and back pay. The Appellate Division ruled that Henly was not entitled to reinstatement or back pay, despite the jury’s finding of bad faith discharge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a provisional employee, terminated in bad faith, is entitled to reinstatement and back pay.

    Holding

    No, because appointments made under Civil Service Law § 65 are provisional and do not grant an expectation of tenure or rights typically associated with permanent employment. Provisional employees can be terminated at any time without charges, reasons, or a hearing, unless the termination violates a constitutional provision or statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the nature of provisional appointments under Civil Service Law § 65. The court stated, “Appointments made pursuant to Civil Service Law § 65 are provisional in nature; provisional employees have no expectation of tenure and rights attendant thereto except under the limited circumstances specified in Civil Service Law § 65 (4)… and therefore they may be terminated at any time without charges preferred, a statement of reasons given or a hearing held.” The court distinguished provisional employees from permanent employees, emphasizing the lack of job security for provisional appointees. The court acknowledged that other remedies may be available if the termination violates a constitutional provision or statute but found those remedies (reinstatement and back pay) were not applicable in this case. The court cited previous cases such as Matter of Becker v New York State Civ. Serv. Commn., Matter of Haynes v County of Chautauqua, Matter of Riggi v Blessing, Matter of Benon v LaGuardia, Ranus v Blum, and Matter of Brathwaite v Manhattan Children’s Psychiatric Center to support its conclusion that provisional employees lack the same protections as permanent employees.

  • Kaufman v. McCall, 70 N.Y.2d 704 (1987): Incidental Damages in Article 78 Proceedings

    Kaufman v. McCall, 70 N.Y.2d 704 (1987)

    In a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, an award for lost salary can be considered incidental to the primary relief sought, such as reinstatement, depending on the specific facts of the case.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of incidental damages available in Article 78 proceedings under New York law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, emphasizing that lost salary could have been awarded as incidental damages in a prior Article 78 proceeding if the plaintiff had prevailed in obtaining reinstatement. The court distinguished this case from situations where the primary relief of reinstatement is no longer available. The determination of whether damages are “incidental to the primary relief sought” is fact-dependent.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Kaufman, was terminated from his employment at Queens College. He initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking rescission of the termination letter and a declaration that he was a tenured faculty member.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether lost salary can be awarded as damages incidental to the primary relief sought in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

    Holding

    Yes, because under CPLR 7806, lost salary can be “incidental to the primary relief sought by petitioner” if the primary relief, such as rescission of a termination letter and reinstatement, is granted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that had Kaufman prevailed in the prior Article 78 proceeding, he could have been awarded lost salary calculated from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement. The court relied on CPLR 7806, which allows for damages that are “incidental to the primary relief sought.” The court distinguished this situation from cases like Matter of Schwab v Bowen, 41 NY2d 907, 908, where damages could not be awarded because the primary relief of reinstatement was no longer available. The court stated, “Whether damages are ‘incidental to the primary relief sought’ depends upon the facts of the case.” The court also distinguished Davidson V Capuano, 792 F2d 275 noting that compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees plaintiff is seeking under 42 USC § 3988 cannot be deemed incidental to relief plaintiff was satisfied in prior article 78 proceeding. The key factor is the availability and nature of the primary relief sought in the Article 78 proceeding.

  • Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981): Termination of Disabled Employee Under Civil Service Law

    Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981)

    An employee continuously absent from and unable to perform their duties for one year or more due to a disability may be terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 without a pre-termination hearing unless there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the petitioner’s termination under Civil Service Law § 73 was valid. The petitioner, an employee continuously disabled for over a year, was terminated without a hearing. The Court found that the petitioner failed to raise the veteran status argument in lower courts and that § 73 is constitutional. The Court reasoned that a hearing is only required when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute. The Court also held that the petitioner’s application for reinstatement was insufficient to mandate reinstatement on his preferred date.

    Facts

    The petitioner was an employee who was continuously absent from his position for more than one year due to a disability. The Department terminated his employment pursuant to Civil Service Law § 73. The Department called to his attention in its termination letter of his right to reinstatement depended on making application for a medical examination by a doctor selected by the department. The petitioner sent letters to the department on January 28, 1978 and May 22, 1978.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing before termination and that he was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978 rather than August 1, 1978. The lower courts rejected his arguments. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the termination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner, as a veteran, was protected by Civil Service Law § 75 from termination without a hearing.

    2. Whether Civil Service Law § 73 is unconstitutional because it permits termination without a hearing of an employee continuously absent from and unable to perform the duties of his position for one year or more by reason of a disability.

    3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978, rather than August 1, 1978.

    Holding

    1. No, because the argument regarding veteran status was not raised in the lower courts and the record lacked evidence to support it.

    2. No, because a hearing is only required under § 73 when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and in this case, the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute.

    3. No, because the petitioner’s application for a medical examination was insufficient to require reinstatement on June 6, 1978; the statute did not give the petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the petitioner’s argument regarding veteran status was not properly before the court because it was not raised in the lower courts. Regarding the constitutionality of § 73, the Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Economico v. Village of Pelham, stating that “only when there is ‘some factual dispute impacting upon the employer’s right to discharge’ is a hearing required by that section and that hearing may, in the absence of demonstrated serious hardship, be held posttermination.” The Court determined that no such factual dispute existed in this case, as the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians established his continuous disability. The court also found that “by the many written statements by petitioner and his physicians filed with the department petitioner has obviated any question that he was continuously disabled for the requisite period.”

    Regarding the reinstatement date, the Court found that the petitioner’s letters were insufficient to constitute a proper application for a medical examination, as required by § 73. The first letter assumed the right to continued sick leave and the second simply stated his availability for an examination on a specific date. The Court emphasized that “[t]he statute did not give petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.” Because of this, the petitioner failed to show what caused the department’s failure to reinstate him prior to August 1, 1978, or whether or when he was in fact examined by a department doctor.