New York Law Review

Tag: Rehearing and Review

  • Matter of Jamie R., 6 N.Y.3d 138 (2005): Limits on Rehearing and Review for Insanity Acquittees

    Matter of Jamie R., 6 N.Y.3d 138 (2005)

    An insanity acquittee classified as suffering from a dangerous mental disorder and confined to a secure facility cannot challenge that placement decision for a second time via a rehearing and review proceeding; the only issue for rehearing is whether any confinement is warranted.

    Summary

    Jamie R., an insanity acquittee, sought a second review challenging his secure facility placement. He argued that a jury in a rehearing and review proceeding could revisit the dangerous mental disorder determination. The Court of Appeals held that rehearing and review is limited to the fundamental question of whether any confinement by the Office of Mental Health (OMH) is warranted, not the specific placement within OMH facilities. The Court emphasized that challenges to secure placement should be pursued through a direct appeal of the initial placement order, and this interpretation balances public safety with individual rights.

    Facts

    Jamie R. was charged with assault in 1998. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial due to paranoid schizophrenia. He later pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, becoming subject to CPL 330.20. In 1999, he was classified as a track two patient (mentally ill, but not dangerous) and placed in a nonsecure facility. He was discharged twice but readmitted due to disruptive and threatening behavior. He was arrested multiple times for off-premises incidents, including assault and harassment. Due to these escalating issues, OMH sought to reclassify him as a track one patient (suffering from a dangerous mental disorder) and place him in a secure facility.

    Procedural History

    In 2003, Dutchess County Supreme Court granted OMH’s application to reclassify Jamie R. as a track one patient and ordered placement in a secure facility. Jamie R. did not appeal this order. Instead, he filed a petition for jury rehearing and review in New York County Supreme Court. The jury found that Jamie R. was mentally ill but did not currently pose a physical danger. The Supreme Court initially ordered a transfer to a nonsecure facility but then resettled the order, denying the recommitment application altogether. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the Dutchess County Supreme Court’s recommitment order. Jamie R. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an insanity acquittee, found to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and consequently placed in a secure facility, can challenge that placement decision a second time through a rehearing and review proceeding under CPL 330.20 and Mental Hygiene Law § 9.35.

    Holding

    No, because the scope of a rehearing and review proceeding is limited to determining whether any confinement by the OMH is warranted, not the specific type of facility. This determination of dangerousness and facility placement should be challenged via direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Matter of Norman D., which held that an insanity acquittee could not challenge their track one classification in a rehearing and review proceeding. The Court reasoned that CPL 330.20 (16) incorporates Mental Hygiene Law § 9.35, which limits the scope of rehearing and review to the “question of the mental illness and the need for retention of the patient.” This language does not encompass the “dangerous mental disorder” determination that justifies track one classification and secure facility placement. The Court highlighted that track status is unique to insanity acquittees and inapplicable to civil patients, meaning the legislature did not intend for it to be reviewed during civil-style rehearing. The Court noted that the legislative intent of CPL 330.20 was to balance public safety and individual rights; allowing a second challenge to facility placement would undermine this balance. Further, this ruling maintains procedural parity between insanity acquittees and civilly committed patients, who do not have a right to rehearing and review for administrative transfer decisions. The Court emphasized that the dangerous mental disorder determination is still subject to judicial review through a direct appeal under CPL 330.20 (21) and periodic retention hearings.

  • In re Norman D., 3 N.Y.3d 152 (2004): Rehearing and Review Cannot Change Track Status of Insanity Acquittee

    In re Norman D., 3 N.Y.3d 152 (2004)

    An insanity acquittee’s track status, as determined by the initial commitment order, governs the acquittee’s level of supervision and can be overturned only on appeal from that order, not by means of a rehearing and review.

    Summary

    Norman D. was designated a “track one” insanity acquittee after being found not responsible for arson due to mental disease. He sought a rehearing and review, arguing that since he was now mentally ill but not suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, his track status should be changed to track two. The Court of Appeals held that track status, determined by the initial commitment order, can only be challenged via appeal of that initial order, not through a subsequent rehearing and review. The court reasoned that the rehearing and review assesses the acquittee’s current mental state, while track status is determined closest to the time of the crime to ensure public safety based on the acquittee’s potential dangerousness at that time.

    Facts

    Norman D. set fire to his family’s trailer home in April 1997.

    In February 1998, he pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

    In June 1998, after an initial hearing, the court determined he suffered from a dangerous mental disorder and designated him a “track one” insanity acquittee, remanding him to a secure psychiatric facility.

    In July 1998, Norman D. petitioned for a rehearing and review of his commitment order.

    By April 2001, all parties agreed that Norman D. was no longer suffering from a dangerous mental disorder, but was mentally ill.

    Procedural History

    Following his plea, the County Court designated Norman D. as a track one acquittee after an initial hearing.

    Norman D. sought a rehearing and review of this commitment order.

    Supreme Court upheld the original track one designation, finding it supported by credible evidence, even though Norman D. no longer suffered from a dangerous mental disorder.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the rehearing and review proceeding was not the appropriate vehicle for reviewing track status.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an insanity acquittee’s track status can be changed based on a rehearing and review under CPL 330.20 (16) when the acquittee is later determined to be mentally ill but no longer suffering from a dangerous mental disorder.

    Holding

    No, because track status is determined by the initial commitment order and can only be challenged on appeal from that order, not through a rehearing and review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that track status designation is unique to insanity acquittees and is critical in determining the level of judicial and prosecutorial involvement in decisions regarding confinement, transfer, and release. A track one designation subjects the acquittee to ongoing court supervision and requires a court order for any transfer to a nonsecure facility, furlough, release, or discharge. Track two status places the acquittee under the Commissioner of Mental Health’s supervision, making it less restrictive.

    The court outlined the two ways an acquittee can challenge orders affecting their liberty: a rehearing and review or seeking leave to appeal. The rehearing and review is a de novo evidentiary proceeding assessing the acquittee’s current mental state, ensuring that the supervision conditions are appropriate at the time of the new proceeding. An appeal, however, reviews the lower court’s determination based on the record at the time of the earlier proceeding.

    The court stated that challenging the original track status is permissible only through the appeal process. The court reasoned that the track status is fixed at the initial commitment hearing, closest in time to the crime, to best protect the public welfare and the acquittee’s safety. As the court noted, an acquittee “may seek permission to appeal [his or her track status] to an intermediate court, which has the power to modify the acquittee’s track status if the evidence presented at the initial commitment hearing does not support a finding of dangerousness. However, the rehearing and review proceeding…is not designed as a substitute for appellate review of the initial commitment order.” (309 AD2d at 149-150).