New York Law Review

Tag: Redacted Confession

  • People v. падшие, 68 N.Y.2d 1046 (1986): Admissibility of Redacted Confessions in Joint Trials

    People v. падшие, 68 N.Y.2d 1046 (1986)

    In a joint trial, a confession by one defendant that implicates a co-defendant is inadmissible against the co-defendant unless it can be effectively redacted to remove all references to the co-defendant without prejudice to the confessing defendant; the prosecution must prove that the defendant made the statement and that the redaction is effective.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, suppressed a joint statement, and ordered a new trial for the defendant. The defendant was jointly tried with another individual on drug charges. A police officer testified about a joint statement made by both defendants. Because the statement was inadmissible against the co-defendant due to lack of notice, the trial court redacted it, substituting singular pronouns for plurals. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to establish that the statement was actually made by the defendant or that it could be effectively redacted without prejudice to the defendant. Therefore, the admission of the redacted statement was erroneous and warranted a new trial. The court also clarified that retrial on counts not considered by the jury would not violate double jeopardy principles.

    Facts

    The defendant was jointly tried with a co-defendant on drug charges related to the possession of cocaine and marijuana. An arresting officer testified at a Huntley hearing about a joint statement made by the two defendants just before their arrest. According to the officer, both defendants stated that the marijuana bag was theirs and that they had been selling marijuana through a peephole for a man named Oswald, and that they were getting high. The prosecution sought to introduce this statement at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court permitted the redacted joint statement to be admitted into evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty on one count. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the admission of the redacted statement was prejudicial and violated his rights.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a redacted joint statement where the prosecution failed to establish that the defendant made the statement and that it could be effectively redacted without prejudice to the defendant.
    2. Whether retrial on counts not considered by the jury due to a guilty verdict on another count violates double jeopardy principles.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecution failed to establish that the statement was made by the defendant and that it could be effectively redacted without prejudice to him. By changing the pronouns and attributing the entire statement to the defendant, the jury was misled into believing that all admissions were made by him, which was not proven.
    2. No, because jeopardy was never terminated by acquittal or dismissal of those counts. The jury did not consider those counts, so retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that before the redacted evidence could be received, the People had to establish that the statement was made by the defendant and that it could be effectively redacted without prejudice to him. The Court cited People v. Wheeler, 62 NY2d 867, 869, People v Boone, 22 NY2d 476, 486 and People v La Belle, 18 NY2d 405, 411. The police officer testified that he could not ascertain which admissions were attributed to the defendant because both suspects spoke simultaneously. Because no other evidence established the speaker, the People failed to meet their burden. “By changing the pronouns and permitting the officer to testify at trial that defendant made the entire statement, the jury was led to believe that all of the admissions had been made by defendant when in fact the People had not established that he made any of them.”

    Regarding the double jeopardy claim, the Court relied on People v. Jackson, 20 NY2d 440, holding that when a jury is not given the opportunity to return a verdict on some offenses charged, its failure to do so cannot be construed as an acquittal barring retrial. The court noted that the judge instructed the jury that they did not have to consider the remaining counts if they found the defendant guilty on count one, and the jury followed that instruction. Because jeopardy was never terminated by acquittal or dismissal of those counts, retrial would not violate double jeopardy principles, citing Richardson v. United States, 468 US 317, Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 US 294, and People v. Jackson.

  • People v. Russell, 71 N.Y.2d 1016 (1988): Preserving Objections to Redacted Confessions

    71 N.Y.2d 1016 (1988)

    A defendant must object to the admission of a co-defendant’s redacted confession at the time it is offered into evidence to preserve the claim for appellate review; a pre-trial motion to sever is insufficient if the defendant does not renew the motion after the court rules on the confession’s admissibility.

    Summary

    Russell was convicted of rape and sodomy. At a joint trial with his co-defendant Bailey, Bailey’s redacted confession, referring to “another person,” was admitted. Russell had made a pre-trial motion to sever, which was denied as premature but he did not object to the admission of the redacted confession at trial until after the jury was instructed. The New York Court of Appeals held that Russell failed to preserve his claim regarding the admission of the confession because he did not object when it was offered into evidence. The court emphasized that a pre-trial motion to sever, without a subsequent objection to the specific evidence, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    Russell and Bailey were charged with rape, sodomy, and unlawful imprisonment of a 14-year-old girl. Bailey confessed to the crimes, implicating himself and Russell. Prior to trial, Russell moved to sever his trial from Bailey’s. The trial court denied the motion as premature, allowing renewal. After a Huntley hearing deemed Bailey’s confession admissible with redactions referring to “another person,” Russell’s counsel sought “verification” that the court would not grant severance. The court verified that it would not and added that the confession would be redacted to remove references to Russell by name. Russell’s counsel did not object and waited until after the jury was instructed to question the redaction’s efficacy and renew the severance motion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Russell on all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the unlawful imprisonment conviction. Russell appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of his motion to sever was reversible error because Bailey’s redacted confession was admitted at trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant preserves a claim regarding the admission of a co-defendant’s redacted confession by making a pre-trial motion to sever, or whether the defendant must object to the admission of the redacted confession at trial when it is offered as evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to object to the admission of the co-defendant’s redacted confession at the time it was offered into evidence, thus failing to preserve the claim for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection when the evidence is offered. The court stated, “The purposes and requirements of the preservation rules are not satisfied by intertwining and piggy-backing distinct procedural steps of the criminal proceeding, as for example severance motions and evidentiary submissions.” Russell’s pre-trial motion to sever, made before the admissibility of the confession was determined, was insufficient. After the Huntley hearing, when the court ruled on admissibility subject to redaction, Russell’s counsel did not renew the motion to sever or object to the redaction. His silence was construed as acquiescence. The court noted that the objection after jury instructions was too late for preservation purposes. The Court found that any evidence admitted without objection that may have linked Russell to Bailey’s confession was inconsequential and did not amount to prejudicial error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v.дный Jones, 61 N.Y.2d 868 (1984): Admissibility of Redacted Confessions in Joint Trials

    People v. Jones, 61 N.Y.2d 868 (1984)

    When a co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement contains incriminating references to another defendant, its admission in a joint trial violates the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, unless effectively redacted to eliminate any jury interpretation that incriminates the non-confessing defendant.

    Summary

    Jones was convicted of second-degree murder in a joint trial with his brother. The brother’s pre-trial statement implicated Jones in the robbery leading to the victim’s death. Jones moved to sever his trial, arguing that admitting the confession violated his right to confront the declarant. The trial court denied the motion, deeming the confession sufficiently redacted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the redacted statement still incriminated Jones because it referred to another participant, and given that the brothers were being tried together, the jury would likely interpret the references as pertaining to Jones. The court held that the admission of the confession was prejudicial error.

    Facts

    1. Jones and his brother were jointly tried for second-degree murder.
    2. The brother made a pre-trial statement implicating Jones in the robbery that resulted in the victim’s death.
    3. In the redacted statement, references to Jones by name were removed; however, the statement contained references to another participant in the crime.
    4. Examples of such references included: “We got to the track”; “I said [deletion] let’s watch the cashiers window to see if somebody made a big hit and we will roll them”; and “we did not talk about the shooting that night”.

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court denied Jones’ motion to sever his trial from his brother’s.
    2. Jones was convicted.
    3. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the matter for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of the co-defendant’s redacted statement, which contained references to another participant in the crime, violated Jones’ right to confrontation.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion to sever his trial from that of his brother.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because given that the two brothers were being tried for the crime together, the confession could only be read by the jury as inculpating defendant.
    2. Yes, because the co-defendant’s statement was not admissible on the joint trial, and defendant’s application to sever his trial should have been granted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Bruton v. United States, holding that admitting a co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement incriminating another defendant in a joint trial violates the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, unless the co-defendant testifies. The court acknowledged that a confession can be admitted if effectively redacted so that the jury would not interpret its admissions as incriminating the non-confessing defendant (People v. Smalls; People v. Boone). The burden of effective redaction is on the prosecution.

    The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s argument that the jury might have viewed the references to another participant as referring to a third, uncharged individual. The court stated, “The possibility that the jury may have viewed the incriminating references in this manner is insufficient to eliminate the prejudice to defendant from the use of this statement upon his trial. Given that the two brothers were being tried for the crime together, we believe the confession could only be read by the jury as inculpating defendant”.

    The court concluded that admitting the statement was prejudicial error and that it could not say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Jones was entitled to a new trial.