New York Law Review

Tag: Recreational Use Statute

  • Bragg v. Genesee County Agricultural Society, 84 N.Y.2d 544 (1994): Landowner Immunity and Suitability for Recreational Use

    Bragg v. Genesee County Agricultural Society, 84 N.Y.2d 544 (1994)

    General Obligations Law § 9-103 grants landowners immunity from ordinary negligence claims by recreationists using their land for enumerated activities if the land is suitable for such activities, and suitability is judged by the property’s general characteristics, not temporary conditions.

    Summary

    Bragg sued Genesee County Agricultural Society for injuries sustained while motorbiking on its property, an abandoned railway bed. The Society claimed immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103, which protects landowners from negligence liability when recreationists use their land. Bragg argued the land was unsuitable for motorbiking due to excavation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute applies if the land is generally suitable for the activity, regardless of temporary hazards. The Court clarified that suitability should be assessed based on the overall nature of the property, not specific, transient conditions. This decision reinforces the legislative intent to encourage landowners to open their property for recreation by limiting their liability.

    Facts

    Genesee County Agricultural Society owned an abandoned railway bed. In 1988, the Society’s president allowed a trucking company to excavate gravel from the railbed. The president knew off-road vehicles used the property but did not instruct the contractor to post warnings. By September 1990, the excavation created a 10-foot deep hole. Plaintiff Bragg was injured when he drove his motorbike into the excavation.

    Procedural History

    Bragg sued, and the Society asserted General Obligations Law § 9-103 as a defense. The Supreme Court denied Bragg’s motion to dismiss the defense and granted summary judgment for the Society, finding the statute applicable and no evidence of willful or malicious conduct. The Appellate Division affirmed. Bragg appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103’s immunity applies if the property was generally suitable for the recreational activity, even with a temporary hazardous condition.
    2. Whether the suitability of the property for recreational use should be determined solely by the condition of the land at the time of the accident.

    Holding

    1. Yes, General Obligations Law § 9-103’s immunity applies because suitability is judged by the property’s general characteristics, not temporary conditions.
    2. No, suitability should not be determined solely by the condition of the land at the time of the accident because the statute removes the obligation on the landowner to keep the premises safe or warn of hazardous conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that General Obligations Law § 9-103 aims to encourage landowners to make their land available for recreation by limiting their liability for ordinary negligence. The Court reaffirmed the “suitability” test established in Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., requiring the land to be the “type of property which is not only physically conducive to the particular activity or sport but is also a type which would be appropriate for public use in pursuing the activity as recreation” (Iannotti, 74 N.Y.2d at 45). However, the Court clarified that suitability should be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not based on temporary conditions or isolated hazards. Requiring landowners to inspect and correct transient hazards would effectively reinstate the common-law duty of care, undermining the statute’s purpose. The Court stated, “If this language is to have any force, suitability must be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not portions of it at some given time. Any other test, which requires the owner to inspect the land, to correct temporary conditions or locate and warn of isolated hazards as they exist on a specific day, would vitiate the statute by reimposing on the owner the common-law duty of care to inspect and correct hazards on the land.” The court found no evidence of willful or malicious intent on the part of the defendants to negate the immunity.

  • Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 39 (1989): Recreational Use Statute and Unsuitability for Recreation

    Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 39 (1989)

    A property owner is not immune from liability under the General Obligations Law § 9-103 (recreational use statute) if the property is unsuitable for the specified recreational activities due to the owner’s own use creating a potential for serious injury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) was immune from liability under the recreational use statute for injuries sustained by a plaintiff who was struck by a train while walking on Conrail’s right-of-way. The Court held that Conrail was not immune because the property was unsuitable for recreational use due to the inherent danger posed by the active railroad tracks. The decision hinged on the determination that the property’s primary function as an active railway, with its attendant risks, outweighed any potential recreational suitability, thus precluding the application of the statute’s immunity provisions.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Iannotti, was injured when struck by a Conrail train while walking along Conrail’s right-of-way. The right-of-way was used by pedestrians as an alternate travel route and by Conrail employees for servicing the tracks. The area was not officially designated for recreational use and presented inherent dangers due to the active train traffic.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Conrail’s motion for summary judgment based on the recreational use statute. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Conrail. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Conrail was not immune from liability under the recreational use statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Consolidated Rail Corporation is immune from liability under New York General Obligations Law § 9-103 (the recreational use statute) for injuries sustained on its property when the property is deemed unsuitable for recreational use due to the inherent dangers associated with its primary function as an active railway.

    Holding

    No, because the right-of-way of a main line of a national railroad network used by freight and passenger trains is singularly unsuitable for recreation because the defendant’s own use of those premises created the potential for serious injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the recreational use statute was intended to encourage landowners to open their property for recreational use by limiting their liability. However, this immunity does not apply when the property is inherently unsuitable for recreational activities due to the owner’s own use creating a high risk of injury. The Court emphasized the importance of suitability as a threshold requirement for the statute’s application. The presence of active railroad tracks, with the continuous movement of trains, created an environment too dangerous for the property to be considered suitable for recreational activities within the meaning of the statute. The court highlighted that there was no legislative intent to immunize railroads from liability for negligently inflicted injuries resulting from public presence on such dangerous property. Judge Simons, in his dissent, noted, “defendant’s property, the right-of-way of the main line of a national railroad network used by the freight and passenger trains, was singularly unsuitable for recreation because defendant’s own use of those premises created the potential for serious injury.” The Court’s decision effectively limits the scope of the recreational use statute, preventing its application in situations where the inherent nature of the property’s primary use poses significant risks to recreational users.

  • Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446 (1986): Applicability of General Obligations Law § 9-103 to Supervised Municipal Parks

    Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446 (1986)

    General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowner liability for recreational use of property, does not apply to claims against a municipality for negligence in the operation and maintenance of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Dean Ferres was injured while riding his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park in New Rochelle. He sued the city, alleging negligence. The city argued that General Obligations Law § 9-103 shielded it from liability. The Court of Appeals held that § 9-103 does not apply to a municipality’s duty to maintain a supervised public park, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage landowners to open their property for recreational use, an incentive that is not needed for public parks already open to the public. Applying the statute to a supervised municipal park would drastically reduce the municipality’s responsibility without serving any discernible public interest.

    Facts

    Dean Ferres rode his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park operated by the City of New Rochelle. The park was a suburban, regulated facility with a Recreation Supervisor and staff, including a parking area, guard house, beach, and other recreational amenities. Ferres sustained injuries as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Ferres sued the City of New Rochelle for negligence. The trial court refused to dismiss the complaint based on General Obligations Law § 9-103, and the jury found in favor of Ferres. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City of New Rochelle appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to a claim based on a breach of duty by a municipality in the operation of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage private landowners to open their property for recreational use, and this purpose is not served by applying it to supervised municipal parks already open to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the sole purpose of General Obligations Law § 9-103 is to induce property owners to permit persons to come on their property for specified recreational activities, by granting them immunity from liability. The statute offers two inducements: (1) immunity from the duty to keep the premises safe and to warn of hazards, and (2) assurance that by giving permission, the owner does not assume a duty of care to invitees. The court stated, “It would be contrary to reason to assume that the Legislature could have intended that the statute apply in circumstances where neither the basic purpose of the statute, nor, indeed, any purpose could be served — as in the case of the supervised park here where the municipality has already held its recreational facility open to the public and needs no encouragement to do so from the prospective immunity offered by the statute.”

    Furthermore, the court analyzed the legislative history of the statute, noting that it originated in the Conservation Law to encourage landowners to allow hunting, trapping, and fishing. Subsequent amendments expanded the scope, but the underlying purpose remained the same: to encourage landowners to open their properties for recreational use. The court emphasized that applying the statute to a supervised city park would result in a drastic reduction in the municipality’s responsibility without a corresponding public benefit, which is inconsistent with the statute’s aim of encouraging landowners to permit recreational activities.

    The court distinguished this situation from cases where § 9-103 appropriately applies, such as hunting or fishing on private land where the landowner’s permission is given in return for statutory immunity. In contrast, a city park is already open to the public, and the municipality has already assumed a duty of reasonable care. “If the statute is applied in such case, the result is an immediate reduction of this higher duty to one which requires the municipality to do no more than refrain from a malicious act or omission. The municipality would give up nothing but gain immunity.” The court also found that the statute’s application would be arbitrary based on the activity in which the injured person was engaged. The court concluded that the broad reading urged by the defendant, which produces such an unreasonable result, should be avoided.

  • Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983): State Immunity for Recreational Use of Land

    Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183 (1983)

    New York General Obligations Law § 9-103 protects the State from liability for injuries sustained by individuals using state-owned land for recreational activities, absent willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowners’ liability for recreational use of their property, applies to the State of New York. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does apply to the State, shielding it from liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreation, unless the State acted willfully or maliciously. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, instead finding it imposed a single standard of care.

    Facts

    In Sega, the claimant was injured while hiking in the Catskill Forest Preserve when a pipe railing she was sitting on gave way. The railing had been previously damaged, but state employees determined no repairs were necessary after visually inspecting it. In Cutway, the claimant was injured while riding an all-terrain vehicle on state-owned land when he struck a steel cable gate that was difficult to see. The State had posted a sign barring public vehicles but did not warn specifically of the cable.

    Procedural History

    In Sega, the Court of Claims found the State not negligent. The Appellate Division considered General Obligations Law § 9-103 and found no willful or intentional act by the State. In Cutway, the Court of Claims found the State 80% liable based on negligence, despite the application of § 9-103. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to the State of New York, thereby limiting its liability for injuries sustained on state-owned land used for recreational purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of § 9-103 includes “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises,” without limiting it to private landowners, and refers to Environmental Conservation Law provisions concerning state-owned lands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the unambiguous language of § 9-103, stating that it applies to “any owner, lessee or occupant of premises.” The court found no reason to limit the statute’s scope to private landowners, especially considering its reference to ECL provisions related to state-owned fishing and hunting preserves. The court rejected the argument that the statute codified common-law principles of premises liability. Instead, it established a single standard of care, requiring a plaintiff to prove a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. The court noted that the policy of New York is to determine a landowner’s duty of care based on foreseeability, not on rigid classifications like trespasser, licensee, and invitee, citing Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233. The Court stated: “On its face, section 9-103 imposes a single standard. We see no reason to reintroduce confusion and conflict by interpreting’ the statute as a retention of the common-law classifications.” In Cutway, the State may have been negligent, but there was no evidence of willful or malicious conduct. In Sega, even presuming all evidence was presented, there was no proof of willful or malicious failure to warn. The court reasoned that the standard under § 9-103 “requires a graver act than mere negligence before liability may be imposed”.