New York Law Review

Tag: recreational use

  • Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, 28 N.Y.3d 1041 (2016): Navigability-in-Fact and the Requirements for Summary Judgment

    <strong><em>Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown</em></strong>, 28 N.Y.3d 1041 (2016)

    A determination of a waterway’s navigability-in-fact is fact-intensive and not always resolvable as a matter of law, particularly when conflicting evidence on material facts exists, thus precluding summary judgment.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Mud Pond Waterway was navigable-in-fact, and thus open to public use. Both parties requested summary judgment, presenting conflicting evidence on the waterway’s historical and prospective use. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the determination of navigability is fact-intensive and the record contained conflicting evidence on material facts such as historical use, ease of passage, and potential commercial utility. The court emphasized that the trier of fact must weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility to determine if the waterway is navigable. The order of the Appellate Division was modified, denying defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    Plaintiffs own property in the Adirondack Mountains, adjacent to the William C. Whitney Wilderness Area. The Mud Pond Waterway, within the Wilderness Area, crosses plaintiffs’ property. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation constructed a carry trail to bypass the Waterway. Defendants claimed the Waterway was navigable-in-fact, making it open to public use. The parties submitted extensive evidence including documents, maps, and videos. They sought a determination of navigability as a matter of law.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    The Supreme Court expressed reluctance to grant summary judgment, citing the need for factual findings. The Appellate Division granted the parties’ mutual request to resolve the matter as a question of law. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision granting summary judgment based on the parties’ mutual request.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the Mud Pond Waterway is navigable-in-fact and open to public use.

    2. Whether summary judgment was appropriately granted given the nature of the evidence presented and the factual disputes.

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. The Court did not answer the question of navigability in fact.

    2. No, because material questions of fact remained and precluded the granting of summary judgment.

    <strong>Court's Reasoning</strong>

    The court reiterated that a waterway is navigable-in-fact if it provides practical utility as a means of transportation. The court referenced prior precedent holding that recreational use is a proper part of the navigability analysis. The court highlighted that the parties presented conflicting evidence on material facts concerning the waterway’s historical and potential commercial utility and public use. The court underscored that summary judgment is inappropriate when material issues of fact are in dispute or multiple conclusions could be drawn from established facts. The court emphasized that determinations of navigability are highly fact-specific and that such factual disputes must be resolved by the trier of fact after weighing evidence and assessing credibility.

    "On this record, we must decline the parties’ invitation to award judgment as a matter of law. … As material questions of fact remain, neither party has demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, and the competing evidence must be weighed and the credibility of the witnesses must be assessed by a factfinder."

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case emphasizes the importance of a thorough factual record when seeking summary judgment, especially in cases involving fact-intensive determinations like navigability. It highlights the limits on a court’s ability to resolve complex factual disputes as a matter of law, even when both parties request it. Attorneys should be cautious about seeking summary judgment when material facts are disputed. The case instructs that factual disputes should be resolved by the trier of fact after weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. This case provides guidance on how courts will determine the validity of public access to waterways and the evidentiary burden in such cases.

  • Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998): Defining Navigability to Include Recreational Use

    92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998)

    A river is navigable-in-fact if it has a practical utility for trade or travel, and evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining navigability.

    Summary

    Adirondack League Club (ALC) sued the Sierra Club for trespass after members canoed down a portion of the South Branch of the Moose River running through ALC property. ALC claimed the river was private property, while the Sierra Club argued the river was navigable-in-fact, granting public easement. The Court of Appeals considered whether recreational use can be part of the navigability analysis and whether factual questions existed about the South Branch’s navigability. The Court held that recreational use is a valid factor in determining navigability but found unresolved factual issues preventing summary judgment.

    Facts

    1. ALC, a private club, owns 50,000 acres including a 12-mile stretch of the South Branch of the Moose River.
    2. In June 1991, Sierra Club members canoed down this section of the river, requiring several portages around obstacles.
    3. ALC sued for trespass, claiming the river was private property.
    4. Defendants argued the river’s navigability granted public easement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of ALC. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Sierra Club, the State, and the Adirondack Mountain Club, finding the South Branch navigable-in-fact. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining if a river is navigable-in-fact.
    2. Whether factual questions exist regarding the South Branch’s navigability, precluding summary judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because evidence of a river’s practical utility for transport need not be limited to evidence of its capacity for the movement of commercial goods; practical utility for travel or transport remains the standard.
    2. Yes, because conflicting evidence exists regarding the river’s capacity for use without artificial augmentation and its ability to sustain commercial boating or canoeing operations. The court stated it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the historical log drives on the South Branch were not accomplished by use of dams and other artificial augmentation of the river flow.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The court reviewed the common-law standard of navigability-in-fact established in Morgan v. King, emphasizing the river’s “practical usefulness to the public as a highway for transportation.”
    2. The court reasoned that while historically, practical utility was measured by a river’s capacity to move goods to market, evolving circumstances warrant considering recreational use as a form of practical utility for travel.
    3. The court emphasized that it was not broadening the standard for navigability-in-fact, but merely recognizing that recreational use fits within it, clarifying that boaters can make use of the common-law easement.
    4. Addressing property rights concerns, the court noted that riparian owners retain their rights, subject only to the long-recognized navigational servitude, and they cannot claim a taking because they never owned the easement.
    5. The court found that conflicting evidence regarding historical log drives and recreational use prevented summary judgment. It noted that ALC presented evidence suggesting artificial augmentation was necessary for logging, while the Sierra Club presented evidence of recreational use.
    6. The court concluded that the record presented issues of material fact that must be determined in a plenary trial.
    7. The dissenting judge argued that summary judgment was appropriate based on the undisputed evidence of the river’s historic use for logging and recent use by recreational canoeists.

  • Albright v. Metz, 88 N.Y.2d 656 (1996): Landowner Immunity and Recreational Use Statute

    Albright v. Metz, 88 N.Y.2d 656 (1996)

    New York’s General Obligations Law § 9-103 grants immunity to landowners from ordinary negligence claims when individuals are injured while engaging in recreational activities on their property, provided the land is suitable for such activities, and this suitability is determined by factors including past recreational use and the land’s general characteristics.

    Summary

    Albright sued Metz for injuries her son sustained while motorbiking on Metz’s property, a former gravel mine and landfill. Metz claimed immunity under General Obligations Law § 9-103, which protects landowners from liability for ordinary negligence when their land is used for recreational activities. The court held that the property was suitable for motorbiking, considering its past use for that purpose and its general characteristics, despite its status as a regulated landfill. The ruling affirmed landowner immunity, emphasizing the legislative intent to encourage recreational land use. The court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is the general suitability of the property, not temporary conditions. Metz’s contracting company also qualified for immunity as an “occupant” of the land.

    Facts

    Metz owned a property that was previously used as a gravel mine and later as a landfill under a DEC permit. Active mining ceased in 1989 or 1990. In April 1991, Albright’s son rode his dirt bike onto the property, as he had done before, and fell approximately 35 feet into the landfill bed after his bike went over an earthen berm. Many people had ridden motorbikes on the property for years prior to the incident.

    Procedural History

    Albright sued Metz and his contracting company. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on General Obligations Law § 9-103. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the property suitable for motorbiking and thus providing immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing evidence of past recreational use. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 extends immunity to landowners for injuries sustained on their property during recreational activities, specifically motorbiking, when the property is a regulated landfill but has been used for such activities in the past?

    Holding

    Yes, because the property was suitable for motorbiking, evidenced by its past recreational use, and the DEC regulations governing the landfill did not preclude recreational use of the berm where the injury occurred. The relevant inquiry is the general suitability of the property, not temporary conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-prong test from Bragg v Genesee County Agric. Socy. and Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp.: (1) the plaintiff must be engaged in an activity identified in section 9-103, and (2) the plaintiff must be recreating on land suitable for that activity. Motorbiking is a protected activity. To determine suitability, the Court considered whether the property is physically conducive to the activity and appropriate for public recreational use. Past recreational use is a substantial indicator of physical suitability. The court found that the DEC regulations were targeted at preventing unauthorized dumping, not banning recreational use of areas distinct from the landfill itself. The court quoted Bragg stating: “The statute removes any obligation on the landowner ‘to keep the premises safe * * * [and] to give warning of any hazardous condition * * * to persons entering for [recreational] purposes’ (General Obligations Law § 9-103 [1] [a]). If this language is to have any force, suitability must be judged by viewing the property as it generally exists, not portions of it at some given time.” The court reasoned that imposing a duty to inspect and correct temporary conditions would vitiate the statute. The court further stated: “The premise underlying section 9-103 is simple enough: outdoor recreation is good; New Yorkers need suitable places to engage in outdoor recreation; more places will be made available if property owners do not have to worry about liability when recreationists come onto their land.” The court also held that Metz Contracting qualified for immunity as an “occupant” because it managed the property in accordance with DEC regulations as Metz’s agent.

  • Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 985 (1983): State’s Duty to Maintain Safe Recreational Areas

    Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 985 (1983)

    When a state invites the public to use its land for recreational purposes, it has a duty to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition or to warn users of potential hazards.

    Summary

    Claimant Sega was injured while wading in a lagoon specifically reserved for swimming on state-owned land. He tripped on a rusty, jagged pipe embedded in concrete just below the water’s surface. The Court of Appeals held that the State had a duty to either inspect and remove hazards from the swimming area or to warn swimmers of potential dangers. Because the State had neither inspected the lagoon nor posted warning signs, and the hazard had been present for at least four years, the court found the State liable for Sega’s injuries. This case highlights the balance between the State’s responsibility and the public’s assumption of risk in recreational settings.

    Facts

    The State owned an island with an adjacent lagoon specifically reserved for swimming. The State provided amenities such as picnic tables, barbecue pits, and outhouses on the beach. A rusty, jagged pipe embedded in concrete was located in the lagoon, rising to within two inches of the water’s surface. The pipe had been in this condition for at least four years. Claimant Sega, a 10-year-old boy, tripped on the pipe while wading in the lagoon and cut his leg.

    Procedural History

    Sega sued the State in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims initially found the State liable. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the interlocutory judgment of the Court of Claims, finding the State liable.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State, by inviting the public to swim in a designated area, had a duty to maintain the area in a reasonably safe condition or to warn users of potential hazards.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State, as a landowner, must act as a reasonable person in maintaining its property in a reasonably safe condition, especially when inviting the public for recreational use. This includes either inspecting for and removing hazards or providing adequate warnings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State, having waived its sovereign immunity, is subject to the same liability rules as private citizens. Quoting Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, the court stated that a landowner “‘must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.’” Because the State specifically reserved the lagoon for swimming and provided amenities, it invited the public to use the area. Given the rusty pipe’s presence for at least four years, the State had a duty to inspect and remove hazards or warn swimmers of the risk. The Court emphasized that “inviting the public to swim there does” create a duty, whereas “mere ownership does not give rise to the duty”. The Court distinguished this situation from allowing swimming in primitive areas where users would not expect the State to have removed all hazards. The court also noted that the state is not “an insurer, liable for every injury no matter the nature of the hazard or how long it has been in place. There must be some proof that the potential danger reasonably could have been neutralized and that its existence was or should have been discovered by the State.” Here, the hazard was foreseeable, and the State failed to take reasonable precautions, making it liable for the claimant’s injuries. No dissenting or concurring opinions were mentioned.