New York Law Review

Tag: Recording Act

  • Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 223 (1991): Restrictive Covenants and Chain of Title

    Witter v. Taggart, 78 N.Y.2d 223 (1991)

    A property owner is only bound by a restrictive covenant if it appears in a deed of record in the conveyance to that owner or their direct predecessors in title, absent actual notice or other exceptional circumstances.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a restrictive covenant in a deed to a “dominant” parcel, which does not appear in the direct chain of title to an adjacent “servient” parcel, burdens the servient property. The New York Court of Appeals held that, absent actual notice or other exceptional circumstances, a property owner is only bound by restrictions appearing in their direct chain of title. This decision reinforces the importance of clear, accessible property records and protects bona fide purchasers from hidden encumbrances, promoting certainty in land ownership and use.

    Facts

    Witter and Taggart owned neighboring properties separated by a canal. Witter’s property was conveyed from a common grantor (Lawrance) in 1951 with a restrictive covenant preventing the erection of structures on Lawrance’s retained land that would obstruct Witter’s view. Taggart’s property was later conveyed by Lawrance’s heirs in 1962, with no mention of the restrictive covenant. The Taggarts built a 70-foot dock on their property. Witter sued to compel the removal of the dock, claiming it violated his scenic easement protected by the restrictive covenant in his chain of title.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the Taggarts, dismissing Witter’s complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the restrictive covenant in Witter’s chain of title was outside the Taggarts’ chain of title and did not constitute binding notice. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a restrictive covenant recited in the chain of title to Witter’s land, which appears nowhere in the direct chain of title to the Taggarts’ land, burdens the Taggarts’ property?

    Holding

    No, because a purchaser is only bound by restrictions if they appear in some deed of record in the conveyance to that owner or that owner’s direct predecessors in title, absent actual notice before or at the time of purchase or other exceptional circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the principle established in Buffalo Academy of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., that a landowner is only bound by restrictions appearing in their direct chain of title, absent actual notice or exceptional circumstances. The court emphasized that New York’s recording act aims to protect innocent purchasers and provide a public record of conveyances and encumbrances. The recording statutes only charge a purchaser with notice of matters in the record of the purchased land’s chain of title back to the original grantor.

    The Court reasoned that imposing a duty to search outside the direct chain of title would undermine the purpose of the recording acts and place an unreasonable burden on prospective purchasers. It stated that “[i]n the absence of actual notice before or at the time of * * * purchase or of other exceptional circumstances, an owner of land is only bound by restrictions if they appear in some deed of record in the conveyance to [that owner] or [that owner’s] direct predecessors in title.”

    The Court distinguished Ammirati v. Wire Forms, explaining that it involved a landlocked parcel with an affirmative easement by necessity, putting the servient owner on inquiry notice. The Court clarified that its affirmance in Ammirati did not mean that a deed conveying a dominant parcel is considered part of the chain of title of the retained servient land.

    The court further stated that the grantor may extinguish a covenant when the grantor conveys retained servient land to a bona fide purchaser who takes title without actual or constructive notice of the covenant because the grantor and dominant owner failed to record the covenant in the servient land’s chain of title.

    In its holding, the Court emphasized the importance of definiteness, certainty, alienability, and unencumbered use of property, which would be undermined by restricting the Taggarts due to Lawrance’s failure to include the covenant in the deed to his retained servient land.

  • Lacustrine Fertilizer Co. v. Lake Guano & Shell Fertilizer Co., 82 N.Y. 476 (1880): Recording Act and Constructive Severance of Land

    Lacustrine Fertilizer Co. v. Lake Guano & Shell Fertilizer Co., 82 N.Y. 476 (1880)

    An unrecorded conveyance of an interest in real estate, such as the right to remove marl, is void against a subsequent purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration, and the doctrine of constructive severance cannot be applied to defeat the rights of such purchasers under the recording act.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over ownership of marl deposits. Torrey, the original landowner, excavated marl and deposited it on his land. He then sold the land to Spaulding, excepting the marl with a right to remove it within ten years. Torrey later conveyed the marl to Barnum, but this conveyance was unrecorded. Torrey reacquired the land and sold it to Evans, who had no actual notice of the Barnum conveyance. The court held that the unrecorded conveyance to Barnum was void against Evans, a subsequent good faith purchaser, and that the marl was real estate subject to the recording act, not personal property due to constructive severance.

    Facts

    Between 1851 and 1853, the State excavated marl from land owned by Torrey during canal construction. The marl was deposited on the banks of the cut. In 1865, Torrey conveyed the land to Spaulding, excepting the marl deposits with a ten-year right of removal. In 1866, Torrey conveyed the marl to Barnum. This conveyance was not recorded. Torrey reacquired the land in 1869 through foreclosure. In 1874, Torrey’s devisees conveyed the land to Evans. Evans had no actual notice of the conveyance to Barnum. The plaintiff, deriving title from Barnum, sued the defendant, who succeeded to Evans’s title, claiming ownership of the marl.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term dismissed the complaint, and this appeal followed to the Court of Appeals of New York. The Special Term originally dismissed the case arguing a legal action was needed to determine title before an equitable injunction could be issued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, though on different grounds, focusing on the application of the recording act.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the marl, after being excavated and deposited on the land, remained part of the real estate?
    2. Whether the conveyance of the marl from Torrey to Barnum was a conveyance of real estate within the meaning of the recording act?
    3. Whether Evans was a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the prior unrecorded conveyance to Barnum?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the marl remained part of the real estate because it was incorporated into the soil and intended to remain permanently.
    2. Yes, the conveyance of the marl was a conveyance of an interest in real estate under the recording act because it involved the sale of a part of the soil.
    3. Yes, Evans was a good faith purchaser because he paid valuable consideration and had no constructive notice of Barnum’s unrecorded deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the marl, once deposited on Torrey’s land, became part of the realty. The exception in Torrey’s deed to Spaulding was a reservation of an interest in the land, terminable after ten years. The subsequent conveyance to Barnum was a conveyance of an interest in real estate. Because the Barnum conveyance was unrecorded, it was void against Evans, a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. The court rejected the argument that the marl became personal property through constructive severance, stating that such a theory would undermine the purpose of the recording act, which is to protect bona fide purchasers. The court emphasized that “the term ‘conveyance,’ as used in that act, ‘shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned; or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity.’” They distinguished growing crops from standing timber or marl deposits, noting the latter are interests in land and subject to the recording act. The court also noted that Evans’s status as a good faith purchaser protected subsequent grantees, regardless of their knowledge of the unrecorded conveyance, citing Wood v. Chapin. The court also noted the trial court could have refused to hear the equitable action until the legal title was settled in a pending replevin action. The court noted: “We think it must be a general rule that the owner of land cannot, by agreement between himself and another, make that which in its nature is land, personal property, as against a subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, there having been no actual severance of the subject of the agreement, when the subsequent grant was made, and we are also of opinion that, in the case supposed, the doctrine of constructive severance cannot be applied to defeat the rights of subsequent purchasers under the recording act.”