New York Law Review

Tag: reckless disregard

  • Frezzell v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014): Defining “Reckless Disregard” for Emergency Vehicle Exemption

    Frezzell v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014)

    To establish liability against the driver of an emergency vehicle under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the driver acted with “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” requiring proof that the driver intentionally committed an unreasonable act disregarding a known risk with conscious indifference to the outcome.

    Summary

    Police officer Frezzell sued the City of New York and officer Tompos after a collision between their patrol vehicles while responding to the same emergency call. Tompos was driving against traffic on a one-way street. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Tompos’s actions did not constitute “reckless disregard” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. The Court emphasized that Tompos slowed down, his lights and siren were activated, and he attempted to avoid the collision, and that the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of fact that would meet the heightened “reckless disregard” standard.

    Facts

    On September 20, 2006, Officers Tompos and Brunjes responded to a radio call about a foot pursuit of an armed suspect. Tompos drove their patrol car against the flow of traffic on a one-way street with lights and siren activated. Officer Frezzell, responding to the same call, drove his patrol car in the opposite direction on the same street. The two vehicles collided, resulting in injuries to both officers. Frezzell then sued Tompos and the City of New York.

    Procedural History

    Frezzell sued Tompos and the City of New York, alleging negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Frezzell had only alleged negligence, which was insufficient under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted Frezzell leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in operating his patrol vehicle, officer Tompos acted with “reckless disregard for the safety of others” as required for liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e)?

    Holding

    No, because the evidence demonstrated that officer Tompos slowed down as he turned onto the one-way street, his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren were activated, and he took evasive action to avoid the collision. Therefore, his conduct did not amount to reckless disregard of a highly probable risk of harm “with conscious indifference to the outcome”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 grants emergency vehicles certain privileges but does not protect drivers from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court reasoned that “reckless disregard” demands more than a lack of due care. Liability requires evidence that “ ‘the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow’ and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome” (quoting Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]). The Court considered the precautions taken by Tompos against his duty to respond to the emergency situation. The evidence showed Tompos slowed down, was driving below the speed limit, and attempted to avoid the collision. The Court found no material question of fact regarding whether Tompos’s emergency lights and siren were activated. Regarding the plaintiff’s argument that an ESU vehicle obstructed Tompos’s view, the court determined that this amounted, at most, to negligence. Finally, the court stated that whether Tompos should have responded at all is an issue beyond the scope of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. The court concluded that because the plaintiff failed to prove reckless disregard the defendant was entitled to summary judgment.

  • Kabir v. County of Monroe, 16 N.Y.3d 217 (2011): Scope of Reckless Disregard Standard for Emergency Vehicle Operation

    Kabir v. County of Monroe, 16 N.Y.3d 217 (2011)

    The reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies only when the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle engages in conduct specifically exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b); other injury-causing conduct is governed by ordinary negligence.

    Summary

    A deputy sheriff, responding to a burglary alarm, rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle while looking at his mobile data terminal to find cross streets. The plaintiff sued, alleging negligence. The defendants argued that the “reckless disregard” standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applied because the deputy was responding to an emergency. The Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard applies only to conduct specifically privileged under § 1104(b) (e.g., speeding, running a red light). Because the deputy’s inattentive driving was not a privileged act under § 1104(b), the ordinary negligence standard applied. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on liability.

    Facts

    Deputy DiDomenico, while on routine patrol, received a dispatch to respond to a stolen vehicle report. He then received a second dispatch requesting backup for a burglary alarm, categorized as a high-priority call. While driving in traffic, DiDomenico looked down at his mobile data terminal for 2-3 seconds to view cross streets, as he was unfamiliar with the location. When he looked up, he realized traffic had slowed and he rear-ended Yasmin Kabir’s vehicle, which was stopped at a red light.

    Procedural History

    Kabir sued Monroe County and DiDomenico, alleging serious injury. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the reckless disregard standard applied. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the reckless disregard standard applied only to conduct privileged under § 1104(b) and finding the deputy negligent. The Appellate Division granted the defendants leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies to all injury-causing conduct of drivers of authorized emergency vehicles involved in emergency operations, or only to conduct specifically privileged under § 1104(b).

    Holding

    No, because the reckless disregard standard in § 1104(e) applies only to conduct privileged under § 1104(b). Other injury-causing conduct of a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that § 1104(e) refers to “[t]he foregoing provisions,” which include the privileges listed in § 1104(b) (stopping/parking anywhere, proceeding past red lights/stop signs after slowing, exceeding speed limits, and disregarding regulations governing directions of movement). The Court rejected the argument that § 1104(e) creates a reckless disregard standard for all injury-causing conduct, even if not privileged. The court noted that the legislative history of § 1104 supports the view that the reckless disregard standard is limited to accidents caused by the exercise of a privilege identified in § 1104(b). The court clarified its prior decisions in Saarinen v. Kerr and Szczerbiak v. Pilat, stating that those cases addressed the meaning of the reckless disregard standard itself, not its applicability to conduct outside the scope of § 1104(b). The Court emphasized that if the conduct causing the accident is not privileged under § 1104(b), the standard of care is ordinary negligence. The Court held that the deputy’s conduct of looking away from the road was not a privileged act, and thus ordinary negligence principles applied.

  • Ayers v. O’Brien, 14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010): Emergency Vehicle Standard of Care When the Operator is the Plaintiff

    14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, which provides a reckless disregard standard of care for drivers of emergency vehicles, cannot be used offensively by the emergency vehicle operator to prevent a comparative fault defense when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A Deputy Sheriff, Ayers, was injured when his patrol car was struck by O’Brien while making a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. Ayers sued O’Brien for negligence. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. Ayers moved to dismiss the defense, arguing that as an emergency vehicle operator, he was only liable for reckless disregard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and he had not acted recklessly. The New York Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard only applies when the emergency vehicle operator is a defendant, not when they are the plaintiff. The comparative fault defense was reinstated.

    Facts

    On July 31, 2005, Deputy Sheriff Ayers was on patrol. Ayers made a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. While executing the U-turn, Ayers’ patrol car was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by O’Brien.

    Procedural History

    Ayers sued O’Brien for common-law negligence in New York State Supreme Court. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. The Supreme Court granted Ayers’ motion to dismiss the comparative fault defense. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the defense. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reinstating the defense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the reckless disregard standard of liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies in determining the culpable conduct of the operator of an emergency vehicle when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) is intended to protect emergency vehicle operators from liability, not to provide them with an advantage when they are the ones bringing the lawsuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) was designed to give emergency vehicle operators the freedom to perform their duties without being unduly hampered by the normal rules of the road. Citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994), the court reiterated that the purpose of the statute is to prevent emergency personnel from being deterred from taking calculated risks to save lives or property due to the fear of civil liability for “a mere failure of judgment.” The court emphasized that the statute “precludes the imposition of liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of recklessness.”

    However, the court found that allowing Ayers to use the statute to shield himself from a comparative fault defense would be an inappropriate extension of the statute’s purpose. The court stated that Ayers’ interpretation of the statute would “shift the responsibility for any contributory negligence on the part of an emergency vehicle operator to the driver of another vehicle whom the emergency vehicle operator sues.” This would lead to unfair results, such as an emergency vehicle operator recovering full damages from a minimally negligent defendant even if the operator’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the legislature intended such a “financial windfall” when it enacted the statute. The Court stated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) “cannot be used as a sword to ward off a comparative fault defense” and should only apply when the emergency vehicle operator is sued or countersued.

  • Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000): Duty of Care for Vehicles Engaged in Road Work

    Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000)

    Vehicles engaged in work on a highway are exempt from the rules of the road, and their operators are liable only for conduct that demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of care applicable to vehicles engaged in highway work under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Two separate cases were consolidated. In the first, a street sweeper caused a dust cloud leading to a collision. In the second, a snowplow turned unexpectedly, colliding with a car. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 1103(b) exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road, limiting liability to reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation and that the standard of care should be consistent with that applied to emergency vehicles.

    Facts

    In Riley v. County of Broome, Betty Riley collided with a street sweeper operated by Garwood Young, a Broome County employee. The sweeper was moving slowly, creating a cloud of dust. In Wilson v. State of New York, John Wilson’s car collided with a snowplow operated by William Hunt. The snowplow made a sudden turn across Wilson’s lane during a snowstorm with poor visibility.

    Procedural History

    In Riley, the trial court instructed the jury that the recklessness standard applied under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Wilson, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim after trial, holding that the recklessness standard applied and the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts “hazard vehicles” engaged in highway work from all rules of the road, or only from the stopping, standing, and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202(a)?

    Whether the applicable standard of care for vehicles engaged in highway work is ordinary negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute’s plain language exempts all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road.

    2. Reckless disregard, because the 1974 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) explicitly references reckless disregard, and the legislative history indicates an intent to align the standard of care with that of emergency vehicles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) is clear: all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” are exempt from the rules of the road. The Court rejected the argument that designated “hazard vehicles” are only exempt from stopping, standing, and parking regulations. The Court stated, “the statute nowhere states that ‘hazard vehicles’ are a distinct class from ‘work vehicles,’ nor does it deny ‘hazard vehicles’ the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work.”

    Regarding the standard of care, the Court relied on its prior holding in Saarinen v. Kerr, which interpreted identical language in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) (regarding emergency vehicles) as imposing a recklessness standard. The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s specific reference to “reckless disregard” would be unnecessary if the intended standard was ordinary negligence. The Court stated, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’.” The Court also referenced the Attorney General’s memorandum, which explicitly stated that the amendment “extends the standard of care presently applicable to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under § 1104 * * * to persons engaged in maintenance and hazardous operations”. Despite acknowledging concerns that extending this lesser standard of care was unjustified, the court deferred to the Legislature and made it clear that “Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.”

  • Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505 (1994): Reckless Disregard Standard for Emergency Vehicle Exemption

    Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505 (1994)

    Emergency vehicle drivers are exempt from certain traffic laws, but they can only be held liable for injuries caused by their actions if their conduct demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of liability for drivers of emergency vehicles who cause accidents while exercising their statutory right-of-way. A motorcyclist sued the City of Elmira for injuries sustained when a fire truck, responding to an alarm, collided with him. The New York Court of Appeals held that the driver’s actions did not constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e). The dissent argued the driver took unjustified risks and failed to properly observe traffic conditions. The ruling clarifies the high bar for establishing liability against emergency vehicle operators acting within their statutory privileges.

    Facts

    The driver of the City of Elmira’s fire engine was responding to a general fire alarm. The driver was traveling at 10-15 mph with sirens and flashing lights. The driver proceeded through a red light. The Plaintiff on his motorcycle failed to yield the right of way, despite other traffic stopping and collided with the fire truck.

    Procedural History

    The Plaintiff sued the City of Elmira. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and the City appealed. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision and the City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the driver of the fire truck acted with “reckless disregard for the safety of others” as required to impose liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), considering he was responding to an emergency and operating his vehicle with lights and sirens.

    Holding

    No, because the driver’s actions, while potentially negligent, did not rise to the level of reckless disregard as defined by law. The court emphasized that emergency responders must be able to make quick decisions without fear of liability unless their actions demonstrate a conscious disregard for a known and substantial risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 provides exemptions for emergency vehicles to allow them to respond quickly to emergencies. However, § 1104(e) states that these exemptions apply “only when the driver of such vehicle is involved in an emergency operation and when he or she sounds an audible signal when necessary and the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red light visible from at least five hundred feet.”
    The court stated that to establish recklessness, a plaintiff must show that the driver disregarded “a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” A simple mistake in judgment or a momentary lapse of care is insufficient.
    The court acknowledged that the driver’s uncertainty about the traffic light color and his failure to see the motorcyclist raised questions about his judgment. However, these factors alone did not demonstrate the required level of culpability for recklessness. The court stressed that emergency responders make split-second decisions under pressure and should not be second-guessed unless their conduct demonstrates a clear disregard for known risks. The court distinguished this case from *Abood v. Hospital Ambulance Service*, where the ambulance driver failed to sound the siren at all, thus creating an unreasonable risk.
    The dissenting opinion argued that the driver’s actions did demonstrate a reckless disregard for safety. The dissent emphasized that the driver was unsure of the light color, accelerated into the intersection, failed to properly scan traffic, and never saw the plaintiff. The dissent argued that these actions showed a disregard for a known risk of causing a collision.
    The court noted the emergency vehicle had the siren on and flashing lights going, and other cars had stopped. “Here, defendant’s driver’s undisputed use of the required visual and audible warning devices, coupled with his slow rate of speed and his failure to violate any other traffic rule or departmental policy were actions consistent with the statutory mandate that an emergency vehicle driver proceed in a nonreckless manner.”

  • Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994): Standard of Care for Emergency Vehicle Operation

    Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994)

    A police officer’s conduct in pursuing a suspected lawbreaker may not form the basis of civil liability to an injured bystander unless the officer acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the standard of care applicable to drivers of emergency vehicles under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e). The Court of Appeals held that an officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit is liable to an injured bystander only if the officer acted with “reckless disregard” for the safety of others, not merely with negligence. The court reasoned that this higher standard is necessary to protect officers’ ability to make quick decisions in emergency situations, furthering the legislative intent behind granting emergency vehicles certain privileges under the law. This standard requires a showing that the officer intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character, disregarding a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, with conscious indifference to the outcome.

    Facts

    Officer McGown observed Kerr’s van fish-tailing and squealing its tires, then running a stop sign. McGown activated his emergency lights, but Kerr fled. McGown pursued, activating his siren. Kerr drove into oncoming traffic and ran a red light. McGown intended to radio for help but before he could, Kerr collided with Saarinen, who was seriously injured. Tests revealed Kerr had been drinking.

    Procedural History

    Saarinen sued Kerr and the Village of Massena, alleging McGown was negligent and the Village had inadequately trained him. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Village, finding no evidence of McGown’s recklessness. The Appellate Division reversed, finding sufficient evidence of recklessness and inadequate training. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the Village’s motion for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. What is the standard of care applicable to drivers of emergency vehicles under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) for injuries to third parties resulting from a high-speed pursuit?
    2. Can the Village of Massena be held liable for negligent training or for adopting a discretionary pursuit policy?

    Holding

    1. No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) requires a showing of “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” which demands more than a showing of a lack of due care under the circumstances.
    2. No, because the Village’s choice to adopt a discretionary pursuit policy is a matter of governmental policy that may not be reviewed in a personal injury action founded on negligence without a showing of irrationality, which was absent here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the plain language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) explicitly refers to “reckless disregard,” indicating a higher standard than ordinary negligence. The Court highlighted that emergency situations demand quick decisions, and applying a standard of ordinary negligence would lead to judicial “second-guessing” of split-second decisions. The possibility of liability for a mere failure of judgment could deter officers from acting decisively to save life or property. The “reckless disregard” test, requiring more than a momentary lapse, better encourages swift action while protecting public safety.

    The Court found that McGown’s actions did not meet the “reckless disregard” standard. Exceeding the speed limit was privileged under the statute. Other factors, like wet roads, possible traffic, and McGown’s speed, were insufficient to establish recklessness. McGown’s speed of 60 m.p.h. was not excessive on relatively empty streets. The Court emphasized the officer’s duty to stop Kerr, whose erratic driving posed a threat to public safety.

    Regarding the Village’s liability, the Court found no evidence that changes in training would have altered the outcome. The Village’s discretionary pursuit policy was a matter of governmental policy not subject to review in a negligence action absent irrationality, which was not shown here. Citing McCormack v. City of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 808, 811, the court reinforced the principle that policy decisions regarding resource allocation and public safety strategies are generally immune from negligence claims. The Court noted that the Village’s policy, while discretionary, was not inherently irrational and was therefore protected from judicial review in this context.