New York Law Review

Tag: recidivism

  • People v. Rivera, 12 N.Y.3d 118 (2009): Constitutionality of Discretionary Persistent Felony Offender Sentencing

    12 N.Y.3d 118 (2009)

    New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment or due process because the enhanced sentence is based solely on prior felony convictions, and the judge’s consideration of a defendant’s history and character is within a statutorily prescribed sentencing range.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of burglary. Because of his extensive criminal history, the prosecution sought to have him sentenced as a persistent felony offender. Rivera challenged the constitutionality of New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme under Apprendi and Cunningham. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the sentencing scheme, finding it constitutional because the enhanced sentence was predicated solely on prior felony convictions, a fact that Apprendi specifically exempts. The court emphasized that the sentencing judge’s discretion to consider a defendant’s history is exercised within a range already authorized by statute.

    Facts

    Police responded to a burglary report in an apartment building. They encountered Rivera, who matched the description of one of the perpetrators, leaving the ransacked apartment. Rivera attempted to evade the officers and was subsequently arrested. A search of Rivera’s bag revealed burglary tools and stolen property. Rivera confessed to acting as a lookout in the burglary.

    Procedural History

    Rivera moved to suppress his confession and the evidence, arguing an illegal stop, but the motion was denied after a hearing. A jury convicted him of third-degree burglary. The prosecution then moved to sentence Rivera as a persistent felony offender. Supreme Court determined Rivera was a discretionary persistent felony offender and sentenced him accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment and due process rights as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Cunningham v. California.

    Holding

    No, because New York’s sentencing scheme is a recidivist sentencing scheme, meaning the enhanced sentence is based solely on the fact of prior convictions. This falls under the exception articulated in Apprendi. Any further considerations made by the sentencing judge are for discretionary purposes, within a sentencing range already authorized by law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished New York’s scheme from the California Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) at issue in Cunningham, which was found unconstitutional. The California DSL allowed a judge to increase a defendant’s punishment based on facts found by the judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard, thus violating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as articulated in Apprendi. New York’s sentencing scheme, however, only allows for an enhanced sentence based on prior felony convictions, which the Supreme Court has specifically exempted from the Apprendi rule. The court reiterated its prior holdings in People v. Rosen and People v. Rivera, which established that prior felony convictions are the sole determinant of eligibility for recidivist sentencing. Once eligibility is established, the sentencing court may then consider the defendant’s history and character to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted, but this determination is discretionary and occurs within a statutorily prescribed sentencing range. Quoting Blakely v. Washington, the court noted that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent judges from “exercising discretion…in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.”

  • People v. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d 205 (1984): Adjudication as Persistent Violent Felony Offender

    People v. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d 205 (1984)

    A defendant may be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender based on multiple prior violent felony convictions, even if the sentences for those convictions were imposed on the same date.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant can be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender when prior felony sentences were imposed on the same date. The Court of Appeals held that multiple prior violent felony convictions are sufficient for persistent violent felony offender status, regardless of whether the sentences were imposed separately. The dissent argued that the majority incorrectly imported a requirement of separate sentences from the persistent non-violent felony offender statute, which is explicitly inapplicable to violent offenders.

    Facts

    The defendant, Morse, was convicted of robbery in the first degree and burglary in the first degree. He had two prior convictions for robbery in the first degree stemming from 17 separate indictments for 17 different robberies committed on different days. The sentences for these prior convictions were imposed on the same date.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Bronx County, sentenced Morse as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, remitting the case for resentencing, holding that the defendant could not be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender because the prior sentences were imposed on the same date.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant with multiple prior violent felony convictions can be adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender if the sentences for those prior convictions were imposed on the same date.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute requires multiple prior violent felony convictions but does not explicitly require that the sentences for those convictions be imposed separately.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the persistent violent felony offender statute (Penal Law § 70.08) requires multiple prior violent felony convictions but does not contain a requirement that the sentences for those convictions be imposed separately. The court contrasted this with the persistent non-violent felony offender statute (Penal Law § 70.10), which explicitly states that convictions prior to imprisonment for any of those convictions are deemed only one conviction. The court emphasized that the persistent violent felony offender statute explicitly excludes the provisions applicable to persistent non-violent felony offenders. The court found the legislative intent was for the violent offender statute to be stricter, allowing enhanced sentencing whether or not the offender had been incarcerated and released multiple times. The dissent stated, “[A]n irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included [in the latter] was intended to be omitted or excluded”. The dissent pointed out differences in sentences authorized and the definition of qualifying predicate convictions between the violent and nonviolent offender statutes, supporting the argument that the violent scheme is intended to be stricter and not require multiple separate sentences. The dissent concluded that the majority was amending the statute rather than interpreting it, as the statutory language requires only multiple prior violent felony convictions, not multiple separate prior sentences.