New York Law Review

Tag: Receiving Stolen Property

  • People v. Lo Monaco, 37 N.Y.2d 463 (1975): Thief and Receiver Are Not Accomplices Absent Prior Agreement

    People v. Lo Monaco, 37 N.Y.2d 463 (1975)

    Under New York law, a receiver of stolen goods is not automatically deemed an accomplice of the thief in the underlying larceny, unless there is evidence of a prior agreement or arrangement between them to commit the crime.

    Summary

    Lo Monaco was convicted of petit larceny for stealing jewelry. At trial, Lo Monaco, a receiver of stolen goods, testified against the defendant in exchange for immunity. Lo Monaco testified that he bought the jewelry from the defendant, who said it came from the “south shore.” The defense requested a jury instruction that Lo Monaco could be considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that Lo Monaco was not an accomplice because there was no evidence of a prior agreement or arrangement between him and the defendant, preserving the distinction between the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of stealing jewelry from a residence. Police were led to Lo Monaco, a known receiver of stolen goods, by a confidential informant. Lo Monaco testified that he bought jewelry from the defendant at the defendant’s apartment after receiving a phone call about stolen property. The defendant told Lo Monaco the jewelry came from the “south shore” near Woodmere or Lawrence. Lo Monaco admitted to buying jewelry from the defendant on multiple occasions, but stated there was no prior agreement regarding this particular theft.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of petit larceny after a jury trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that Lo Monaco could be considered an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under CPL 60.22, a receiver of stolen goods is automatically considered an accomplice of the thief in the underlying larceny, thus requiring corroboration of the receiver’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 60.22 was not intended to eliminate the distinction between the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property in the absence of a prior agreement or arrangement between the thief and the receiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the definition of “accomplice” under CPL 60.22(2), which states an accomplice is someone who participated in the offense charged or an offense based on the same facts or conduct. The court acknowledged that Lo Monaco could be viewed, in a literal sense, as participating in an offense (criminal possession of stolen property) based on the same facts as the larceny. However, the court emphasized that statutes should be interpreted in light of their purpose, not just their literal wording. Quoting Justice Learned Hand, the court stated, “There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.” The court noted the unique relationship between a thief and a receiver, emphasizing that the crimes are typically separate in time and components. Historically, New York law had addressed this relationship specifically. Following People v. Kupperschmidt, which held a thief was an accomplice of the receiver, the legislature enacted section 1308-a of the Penal Law, explicitly stating a thief was not an accomplice of the receiver. This was carried over into section 165.65 of the new Penal Law. The court concluded that CPL 60.22 was not intended to eliminate this established separation between the crimes of theft and receiving. The court stated, “We cannot agree, therefore, with the proposition urged on us that CPL 60.22 (subd. 2, par. [b]) automatically makes every receiver an accomplice of the thief notwithstanding the absence of proof that the receiver procured or otherwise aided or abetted the thief in the commission of the larceny.” The court noted that had there been any evidence of a prior agreement between the defendant and Lo Monaco, the result would have been different.

  • People v. Marino, 271 N.Y. 317 (1936): Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Stolen Property Transactions

    People v. Marino, 271 N.Y. 317 (1936)

    Evidence of other similar transactions involving stolen property is admissible to prove a defendant’s knowledge that the property in question was stolen, even if the transactions did not involve the same thief or victim.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of receiving, concealing, and withholding a stolen Buick automobile. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction based on the admission of evidence that the defendant possessed and sold other stolen cars around the same time, under similar conditions, but not from the same thief. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that such evidence is admissible to prove the defendant’s knowledge that the car in question was stolen. The court reasoned that evidence of similar transactions is relevant to prove guilty knowledge, even if the thief is unknown or different, and that the focus should be on whether the circumstances suggest the defendant knew the property was stolen.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with violating Section 1308 of the Penal Law by receiving, concealing, and withholding a stolen Buick automobile owned by Joseph Bichelman. The defendant sold four cars, including Bichelman’s, to Frank Wicks for prices far below their reasonable value. The defendant also sold stolen cars to others, including Richard Jansen. Jansen testified that the defendant admitted dealing in “hot cars” (stolen cars). The defendant had no apparent place of business besides his home. The defendant denied knowing the prosecution witnesses or selling them cars.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction based on the admission of evidence regarding other stolen cars, citing People v. Doty. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of the defendant’s involvement in other similar transactions involving stolen automobiles is admissible to prove the defendant’s knowledge that the Bichelman vehicle was stolen, even if those other transactions did not involve the same thief or victim.

    Holding

    Yes, because evidence of other similar transactions is admissible to prove guilty knowledge when the circumstances suggest a natural inference that the defendant knew the property was stolen, regardless of whether the transactions involved the same thief or victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 1308 of the Penal Law does not require that the thief be specified or even known for a person to be guilty of receiving, concealing, or withholding stolen property. The key element is knowledge that the property was stolen. The court distinguished People v. Doty, stating that its holding should not be interpreted as a rigid rule, but rather as an application of the general principle that similar transactions are admissible to prove guilty knowledge. The court stated, “[T]o warrant the introduction of such evidence there must be such a connection of circumstances as that a natural inference may be drawn that if the prisoner knew one article was stolen he would also be chargeable with knowledge that another was.” The court noted the increasing prevalence of the second-hand automobile trade and reasoned that the same principles applicable to forged bills and counterfeit money should apply to stolen automobiles. The court found the evidence that the defendant sold other “hot cars” around the same time, coupled with his failure to make reasonable inquiries about the seller’s legal right to sell the cars, highly probative of his knowledge that the Bichelman car was stolen. Furthermore, the court quoted Funk v. United States, emphasizing the importance of adapting rules of evidence to facilitate the successful development of truth based on experience. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions supporting the admissibility of evidence of other stolen property transactions to prove guilty knowledge, even without the same thief or victim. Finally, the court emphasized that the defendant’s denial of any transactions with the witnesses who testified against him further supported his guilt, given the other evidence presented.