New York Law Review

Tag: rebuttal evidence

  • People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Rebut Extreme Emotional Disturbance

    People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012)

    When a defendant raises the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, evidence of prior uncharged crimes or bad acts is admissible to rebut the defense, provided the evidence is directly relevant and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling his roommate. He raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, claiming the act resulted from a mental illness caused by prior sexual abuse. The prosecution introduced evidence of a prior similar strangulation committed by the defendant to rebut this defense. The New York Court of Appeals held that this evidence was admissible because it was directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance and showed a possible premeditated intent to target gay men, undermining the loss of control element of the defense.

    Facts

    Defendant strangled his roommate, Victor Dombrova, during an argument where Dombrova asked him to move out. Defendant admitted to the police that he “lost it” when Dombrova made sexual advances. He also admitted to a similar prior homicide, strangling Kevin Bosinski in Buffalo after Bosinski made sexual advances towards him. Both Dombrova and Bosinski had been told about the defendant’s history of sexual abuse. The police investigating Dombrova’s death discovered that the defendant was wanted for questioning in Buffalo concerning the Bosinski homicide.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Before trial, he indicated he would raise the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People moved to introduce evidence of the Bosinski homicide to rebut the defense. The trial court granted the motion. The jury rejected the extreme emotional disturbance defense and convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged murder is admissible to rebut the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a murder trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence is directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance, and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Molineux rule, stating that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if it only demonstrates the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged. However, such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a specific material issue other than criminal propensity, such as motive, intent, or absence of mistake. The court applied a two-part inquiry: first, identifying a material issue other than criminal propensity; and second, weighing the probative value against the potential for prejudice.

    By asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant placed his state of mind at the time of the killing directly in issue. The prior homicide was relevant because it tended to disprove the defendant’s claim of a “loss of control.” The court stated, “[t]his highly probative evidence is directly relevant to defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense in that it has a logical and natural tendency to disprove his specific claim that he was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the Dombrova homicide”. The similarity between the two incidents suggested a possible premeditated intent to target gay men. Even though the Bosinski and Dombrova homicides shared strikingly similar characteristics, and it can be argued that the admission of the Bosinski statement is overly prejudicial propensity evidence, “it is equally true that the repetition, duplication and similarity of defendant’s acts have a direct bearing on the question of premeditated intent”. The Court found the evidence highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice. The Court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997): Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Crimes as Rebuttal Evidence

    People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997)

    Evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity unless it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact; additionally, rebuttal evidence must counter some affirmative fact the defendant attempted to prove.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes. His defense was that an informant planted the drugs in his closet. The prosecution called a rebuttal witness who testified that eight months prior, the defendant had sold her drugs from his apartment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the rebuttal testimony was inadmissible because it only demonstrated the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs and did not refute his claim that he had been framed. The Court held that the prior uncharged crime evidence was inadmissible because it didn’t address a material issue raised by the defense.

    Facts

    Police, assisted by an informant, obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment. During the search, police found drugs in the defendant’s bedroom closet. At trial, the defendant claimed that the informant planted the drugs to frame him. After the defense rested, the People called a rebuttal witness. The witness testified that approximately eight months before the search, the defendant had sold her drugs, retrieving them from a back room of his apartment. The defendant objected, arguing that the testimony lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, finding the evidence relevant to “the issue of knowledge and weight.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on narcotics-related charges in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting rebuttal testimony regarding a prior uncharged drug transaction when the defendant’s defense was that the drugs were planted, and the testimony served only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs rather than to rebut a specific fact affirmatively asserted by the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the rebuttal testimony concerning an alleged drug transaction eight months before the events for which he was convicted did nothing to refute defendant’s claim that he had been framed, but merely tended to show his propensity to sell drugs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible if it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. Furthermore, evidence offered in rebuttal must counter “’some affirmative fact’” which defendant attempted to prove (quoting People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, quoting Marshall v. Davies, 78 N.Y. 414, 420). In this case, the defendant’s defense was that he never possessed the drugs found in his closet; he claimed they were planted. The Court found that while evidence of prior uncharged crimes may be relevant to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake, these elements were not at issue in the defendant’s case. The Court reasoned that “whether defendant intended to sell the drugs, knew of their weight, or mistakenly or accidentally sold or possessed the drugs was never placed in issue by defendant.” The Court concluded that the rebuttal testimony did not refute the defendant’s claim of being framed and instead, merely demonstrated his propensity to sell drugs, violating the rule against using prior uncharged crimes as propensity evidence. The court cited People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 118-119.

  • People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335 (1982): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements Made to Attorneys in the Presence of Police

    People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335 (1982)

    A defendant’s spontaneous statement to an attorney, overheard by a police officer, is admissible if the statement was not the product of interrogation and was not intended to be confidential due to the presence of third parties.

    Summary

    Jean Harris was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of Dr. Herman Tarnower. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement she made to her attorney over the phone, which was overheard by a police officer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statement was spontaneous, not the result of police interrogation, and was not protected by attorney-client privilege because it was made in the presence of a third party and a police officer. The court also addressed issues related to rebuttal evidence and the denial of a motion to close pretrial hearings.

    Facts

    Jean Harris was accused of intentionally killing Dr. Herman Tarnower, her former lover, out of jealousy. After her arrest, Harris was read her Miranda rights, waived them, and made statements to the police. She requested to call an attorney. While making the call in a room with a police officer and another person present, Harris stated, “Oh, my God, I think I’ve killed Hy.” This statement was admitted into evidence at trial.

    Procedural History

    Harris was convicted of second-degree murder and weapons possession. She appealed, arguing that the admission of her statement to her attorney, as well as other trial errors, warranted reversal. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction. She then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission into evidence of a statement made by the defendant to her attorney, overheard by a police officer, violated her right to counsel or the attorney-client privilege.

    2. Whether the prosecution’s use of certain evidence in rebuttal denied the defendant a fair trial.

    3. Whether the denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude the press from pretrial hearings denied her a fair trial.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to exercise a peremptory challenge to a sworn juror based on information acquired after the juror was sworn.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statement was spontaneous and not the product of an interrogation environment, and the communication was not intended to be confidential due to the presence of third parties.

    2. No, because the rebuttal evidence was offered to contradict the defendant’s testimony and disprove her alternate state of mind.

    3. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the failure to close the pretrial proceedings.

    4. No, because CPL 270.15 specifically states the circumstances under which a juror, once sworn, may be challenged for cause, and those circumstances were not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of police interrogation after the right to counsel had been invoked. The court emphasized that the police had honored Harris’s request to speak with an attorney. The court noted, “it must ‘be shown that they were in no way the product of an ‘interrogation environment’, the result of ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent’” (People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d 648, 650). Further, the attorney-client privilege did not apply because the statement was made in the known presence of a police officer and another person, indicating a lack of intent to keep the communication confidential. Regarding the rebuttal evidence, the court found it was proper to contradict Harris’s testimony about her phone conversation with the victim. The court cited Marshall v. Davies, 78 NY 414, 420, stating that rebutting evidence is “evidence in denial of some affirmative fact which the answering party has endeavored to prove”. The court also found that the denial of the motion to close pretrial hearings did not prejudice Harris because the information was already public. Finally, the court held that the trial court properly denied the request to exercise a peremptory challenge against a sworn juror based on information learned after the juror was sworn, because challenges after swearing are limited by statute to challenges for cause. The court stated that the defense had not demonstrated that “such a relationship between the juror and the Assistant District Attorney as rendered the juror unsuitable for service”.

  • Matter of Leirer v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 37 N.Y.2d 783 (1975): Admissibility of Rebuttal Evidence in Election Law Cases

    Matter of Leirer v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 37 N.Y.2d 783 (1975)

    In election law proceedings, a court has discretion to admit rebuttal evidence addressing deficiencies in signatures on designating petitions, even if those deficiencies were not initially raised, provided the evidence is within the scope of the pleadings.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over the validity of signatures on designating petitions for an election. The Board of Elections initially found the respondents short of the required number of valid signatures. At the hearing, the petitioner only relied on this initial deficiency. The respondents then restored a number of previously rejected signatures. However, on rebuttal, the petitioner presented evidence that a significant number of signatures were invalid due to duplication. The Court of Appeals held that the Special Term court had the discretion to allow this rebuttal evidence, as it was within the pleadings and became necessary only after the respondents attempted to overcome the initially alleged deficiencies.

    Facts

    The Suffolk County Board of Elections initially struck 650 signatures from the respondents’ designating petitions, leaving them 37 signatures short of the 2,000 required. The petitioner, in his initial case, focused solely on this 37-signature deficiency. The respondents then presented evidence to restore signatures previously rejected for technical irregularities, such as improper notary designations, missing date lines, errors in the jurat, and incorrect ward election district designations.

    Procedural History

    The case began as a proceeding under Section 330 of the Election Law at Special Term. The Special Term initially directed the Board of Elections to verify a list of signatures challenged by the petitioner on rebuttal. After verification, the Special Term reinstated the Board of Election’s original determination, finding the respondents’ petitions invalid. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Special Term’s original order and judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Special Term court erred in allowing the petitioner to present evidence on rebuttal regarding signature duplications not previously raised by the Board of Elections.
    2. Whether the petitioner’s Section 330 petition adequately alleged signature duplications, thereby making the rebuttal evidence admissible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Special Term had discretion to allow the rebuttal evidence, especially since it addressed issues raised by the respondents in their attempt to overcome the initial signature deficiency.
    2. Yes, because the Section 330 petition alleged duplications, and even if it had not, the court had discretion to allow the proof on rebuttal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the petitioner’s rebuttal evidence, which showed 164 invalid signatures due to duplication on designating petitions, was admissible. The court emphasized that the respondents failed to adequately offset these duplications with substitute valid signatures from the 650 initially stricken by the Board of Elections. The court found that the Section 330 petition did allege duplications, making the rebuttal evidence within the scope of the pleadings. Even if the petition had not explicitly alleged duplications, the court held that it was within the Special Term’s discretion to allow such proof on rebuttal. The court noted that the rebuttal evidence became necessary only after the respondents attempted to overcome the initial signature deficiencies found by the Board of Elections. The court stated, “The proof had not been necessary until respondents had, on their case, overcome the alleged deficiencies in signatures (37) found by the Board of Elections.” This demonstrates a pragmatic approach, allowing for flexibility in presenting evidence to ensure the accuracy and validity of designating petitions in election law cases.

  • People v. Johnson, 47 N.Y.2d 882 (1979): Harmless Error and Explanation of Collateral Admissions

    People v. Johnson, 47 N.Y.2d 882 (1979)

    A defendant who makes admissions on cross-examination about a collateral matter should be allowed to offer rebuttal evidence to explain those admissions, but the erroneous exclusion of such evidence can be deemed harmless if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Summary

    The defendant, a probationary police officer, was convicted of selling heroin. During cross-examination, the prosecution elicited admissions from the defendant regarding unusually large cash resources available to him. The trial court then prevented the defendant from introducing evidence to explain these admissions, citing the collateral issue rule. The Court of Appeals held that while the trial court erred in preventing the defendant from explaining his admissions, the error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including his admission that narcotics were found in his possession after his arrest and the implausibility of his explanation for possessing them.

    Facts

    The defendant, a probationary police officer, was arrested and charged with selling 50 packets of heroin to a police officer for $170.
    After his arrest, narcotics were found in his possession.
    During cross-examination, the prosecution questioned the defendant about large cash resources accessible to him, despite his limited income. The defendant made certain admissions regarding these resources.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant from offering rebuttal evidence to explain admissions made during cross-examination regarding collateral matters.
    Whether the erroneous exclusion of such rebuttal evidence constitutes harmless error where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Holding

    Yes, because the collateral issue rule should not bar a party who makes admissions on cross-examination from explaining them with rebuttal evidence.
    Yes, because in light of the all but conclusive proof of the defendant’s guilt, the error was harmless under the statutory harmless error rule (CPL 470.05, subd. 1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the collateral issue rule prevents an adversary from offering contradictory proof on a collateral matter, it should not prevent the party who made admissions on cross-examination about such a matter from explaining those admissions. The court emphasized that the excluded evidence pertained to a collateral matter—the defendant’s cash resources—which became relevant only because the prosecution raised it during cross-examination. The prosecution could not have independently disproven the defendant’s denials regarding this collateral issue. However, the trial court improperly extended the collateral issue rule to prevent the defendant from explaining his partial admissions. Even if the defendant had been allowed to introduce the excluded evidence, it would have explained only a portion of the bank accounts accessible to him, leaving a substantial amount of unexplained cash resources. Furthermore, the court pointed to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including his admission to possessing narcotics after his arrest and his implausible explanation for such possession. The court distinguished the case from situations where harmlessness is determined by merely balancing the evidence for and against the defendant, stating that “harmlessness of error is not to be found merely by balancing the evidence in favor of and against the defendant”. The court acknowledged the error, but held that the error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, combined with the limited impact the excluded evidence would have had even if admitted. The court stated, “The excluded evidence became relevant only because the prosecution in cross-examination of defendant on a concededly collateral matter educed partial admissions of a collateral fact, that is, unusually large cash resources owned or available to defendant, a person of limited income.”