New York Law Review

Tag: rebuttable presumption

  • People v. Mojica, 96 N.Y.2d 226 (2001): Rebuttable Presumption of Intoxication Based on Breathalyzer Results

    People v. Mojica, 96 N.Y.2d 226 (2001)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c) establishes a rebuttable presumption that a person with a blood alcohol level between .07% and .10% is not intoxicated, but the prosecution can overcome this presumption with other evidence of intoxication.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was entitled to rebut the statutory presumption in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c), which states that a blood alcohol level between .07% and .10% is prima facie evidence of non-intoxication. The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated after a breathalyzer test showed a blood alcohol level of .08%. Despite this result, the court found that the accusatory instrument contained sufficient factual allegations, such as the defendant’s erratic driving, physical appearance, failed sobriety tests, and admission of drinking, to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Defendant was stopped for a traffic infraction (driving without head or tail lights). Upon stopping the vehicle, the arresting officer observed that the defendant had glassy eyes, impaired speech and motor coordination, and smelled of alcohol. The defendant failed four field sobriety tests, including a “Finger Count Test,” in which he could not correctly count his fingers. The defendant admitted to drinking five to six beers before driving and acknowledged that he should not have been operating the vehicle. A breathalyzer test, administered 45 minutes after the stop, indicated a blood alcohol level of .08%.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), common-law driving while intoxicated. The County Court reversed the City Court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument’s supporting documentation, indicating signs of intoxication, are sufficient to allow the People to rebut the presumption established by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c) despite a breathalyzer reading between .07% and .10%.

    Holding

    Yes, because the accusatory instrument contained sufficient factual allegations to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), entitling the People to an opportunity to rebut the presumption at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2) (c) establishes a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar to prosecution. The court emphasized the importance of considering all evidence presented. In this case, the supporting documentation contained factual allegations sufficient to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). These allegations included: erratic driving (driving without lights), physical manifestations of intoxication (glassy eyes, impaired speech, smell of alcohol), failure of field sobriety tests (including the finger count test), and the defendant’s admission to drinking and acknowledgment that he should not have been driving. The Court explicitly disapproved of People v. Gingello, to the extent that it held to the contrary. The court determined that the People were entitled to an opportunity to rebut the section 1195 (2)(c) presumption at trial, based on the totality of the evidence presented. The Court emphasized, “[e]vidence that there was more than .07 of one per centum but less than .10 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in such person’s blood shall be prima facie evidence that such person was not in an intoxicated condition.”

  • W.R. Grace & Co. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 88 N.Y.2d 306 (1996): Rebuttable Presumption of Disqualification for Large Law Firms

    W.R. Grace & Co. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 88 N.Y.2d 306 (1996)

    In cases involving large, departmentalized law firms, the presumption that a firm is disqualified from representing a client against a former client is rebuttable upon a showing that the attorneys currently handling the matter possess no confidential information from the prior representation.

    Summary

    W.R. Grace sought to disqualify the Stroock law firm from representing plaintiffs in an asbestos contamination case, arguing that Stroock had previously represented Grace in a similar matter. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a strict irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences applies to smaller firms, in large, departmentalized firms, the presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating that the attorneys handling the current case possess no confidential information from the prior representation. The court reasoned that the ethical concerns underlying the per se disqualification rule are less compelling in large firms and can be outweighed by policies favoring client choice and attorney mobility.

    Facts

    Stroock & Stroock & Lavan represented plaintiffs in an asbestos contamination case against W.R. Grace. Prior to this, Stroock, specifically attorney Barbara Billauer, had represented Grace in a similar asbestos case, City of Enterprise v. Grace & Co. Billauer had since left Stroock. Grace moved to disqualify Stroock, arguing that the firm’s prior representation created a conflict of interest.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Grace’s motion to disqualify Stroock, finding that Stroock had demonstrated that its current attorneys had no access to Grace’s confidential information. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that an irrebuttable presumption existed that all attorneys in the firm had knowledge of confidential information, disqualifying Stroock. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences within a law firm, which disqualifies the firm from representing a client against a former client in a substantially related matter, applies to large, departmentalized law firms even when the attorney who handled the prior representation has left the firm and the remaining attorneys possess no confidential information.

    Holding

    No, because in large, departmentalized firms, the presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable, and Stroock successfully demonstrated that the attorneys handling the current case possessed no confidential information from the prior representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the importance of protecting client confidences and avoiding the appearance of impropriety, which are the foundations of the irrebuttable presumption rule. However, the court also recognized the costs of a per se disqualification rule, including limiting client choice and attorney mobility. The court distinguished its prior holding in Cardinale v. Golinello, which applied the irrebuttable presumption, by noting that Cardinale involved a small, informal firm where the sharing of information was commonplace. In contrast, Stroock was a large, departmentalized firm. The court adopted a more flexible approach, stating that “any fair rule of disqualification should consider the circumstances of the prior representation.” When the attorney responsible for the prior representation has left the firm, and the firm can demonstrate that the remaining attorneys possess no confidential information, the presumption of disqualification is rebutted. The court cited Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., noting the absurdity of assuming that every attorney in a large firm is aware of all client confidences. The court emphasized that “there are valid reasons for differentiating ‘between lawyers who become heavily involved in the facts of a particular matter and those who enter briefly on the periphery.’” In this case, the court found that Stroock had adequately demonstrated that its remaining attorneys had limited contact with the prior Grace matter and possessed no confidential information, thus rebutting the presumption of disqualification. As the court stated, “If the firm can demonstrate prima facie that there is no reasonable possibility that any of its other attorneys acquired confidential information concerning the client, a hearing should be held after which the court may determine that disqualification may be unnecessary.”

  • People v. Simmons, 32 N.Y.2d 259 (1973): Jury Instructions on Rebuttable Presumptions

    People v. Simmons, 32 N.Y.2d 259 (1973)

    When a statute provides a rebuttable presumption, the jury must be instructed that the presumption is not conclusive and can be overcome by evidence presented by the defendant.

    Summary

    Two brothers were convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle. At trial, they admitted to using the car but claimed they believed they had the owner’s permission. The trial court instructed the jury on the statutory presumption that a person using a vehicle without the owner’s consent knows they lack such consent, but failed to explain that this presumption was rebuttable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the jury instructions were incomplete and misleading because they did not inform the jury that the presumption could be rebutted by the defendants’ evidence. Because the defendants had completed their sentences, the charges were dismissed.

    Facts

    Two brothers, aged 16 and 18, were arrested and charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle. They admitted to using the car but claimed a neighborhood boy told them the car was his and gave them permission to “try it out.” They conceded the car was stolen and they lacked the true owner’s permission. The father of the defendants testified that the neighborhood boy offered to sell him the car the previous evening.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. The District Attorney conceded error in the jury charge both at the appellate term and before the Court of Appeals, but the appellate term affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction is fatally defective when it explains a statutory presumption of knowledge but fails to inform the jury that the presumption is rebuttable by the defendant’s evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the failure to inform the jury that the presumption was rebuttable was a fatal defect mandating reversal of the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s instruction on the statutory presumption, without explaining that it was rebuttable, was incomplete and misleading. The statute (Penal Law § 165.05(1)) states that “A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent.” While this gives the People the initial benefit of a presumption, it is a rebuttable one as stated in People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394. The court cited Richardson, Evidence [9th ed.], § 57, p. 35, which stated: “when ‘the rebuttal evidence presents an issue of credibility, it is for the jury to determine whether the rebuttal evidence is to be believed and, consequently, for the jury to determine whether the presumption has been destroyed’.”

    The court reasoned that failing to inform the jury that the presumption was rebuttable might lead them to believe it was a conclusive presumption. As McCormick observed, “The jury, unless a further explanation is made, may suppose that the presumption is a conclusive one, especially if the judge uses the expression, ‘the law presumes’.” (McCormick, Evidence § 317, p. 669).

    The court emphasized that the only issue for the jury was whether the defendants used the car knowing they lacked the owner’s consent. The incomplete instruction on the presumption denied the jury a full and fair opportunity to consider the evidence relevant to the defendants’ guilt. Because the defendants had already completed their sentences, the court dismissed the charges, citing People v. Scala, 26 N.Y.2d 753 and People v. Kvalheim, 17 N.Y.2d 510.