New York Law Review

Tag: reasonable suspicion

  • People v. Benjamin, 65 N.Y.2d 841 (1985): Automobile Search Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Benjamin, 65 N.Y.2d 841 (1985)

    Under the Fourth Amendment, a limited search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is permissible if the police have reasonable suspicion that the occupants are dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon inside the vehicle.

    Summary

    Police officers received a tip about individuals with guns in a black car who were about to commit a robbery. Upon locating the car, officers searched a suspect, then the car, finding nothing initially. After a second tip specified a “man in yellow,” the officers ordered the occupants out of the car, performed another pat-down, and then searched the vehicle, discovering a gun under the driver’s seat. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the search, finding it permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the occupants were dangerous and might access a weapon upon re-entering the vehicle. The court emphasized that the search was limited to areas where a weapon could be hidden.

    Facts

    Early one morning, a motorist informed police officers that individuals, including one dressed in yellow, in a black car near 119th Street and Lenox Avenue, possessed guns and were planning to rob a store. The officers located the described vehicle and initially searched a black male near the car but found nothing. Joined by other officers, they observed the car begin to move. A second anonymous tip specified, “Men with guns, the detective was searching the wrong person, man in yellow walking away from car, about to commit a robbery.” The officers then ordered the occupants, including the defendant who was wearing yellow, out of the car and patted them down, again finding nothing. Officer Pirozzi then searched the vehicle and found a gun under the driver’s seat. The defendant subsequently admitted to finding the gun and placing it under the seat, and asked the police to release his friends.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with possession of a weapon. The suppression court upheld the police conduct after a Mapp hearing, finding reasonable suspicion to stop the car and that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. The defendant was convicted of attempted possession of a weapon after a guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the search based on Fourth Amendment grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, given the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the occupants were armed and dangerous?

    Holding

    No, because the search was limited to areas where a weapon could have been placed and the officers possessed an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the occupants were potentially dangerous and might gain immediate control of a weapon upon reentering the car.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming the defendant had standing to contest the search, the court reasoned that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the occupants were dangerous and might gain immediate control of a weapon. The court relied on Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983), stating that a search is permissible when officers “possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the [occupants were] potentially dangerous” and might access a weapon in the vehicle. The court emphasized that the search was limited to areas where a weapon could have been placed or hidden. The court also noted that the defendant did not argue any violation of the New York State Constitution.

  • People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988): Anonymous Tip Justifying a Stop and Frisk

    People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869 (1988)

    An anonymous tip, corroborated by independent observations, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, coupled with the presence of the suspect in a high-crime area at night, can establish a sufficient predicate for a police officer to conduct a pat-down frisk for weapons.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, holding that the arresting officer’s frisk, which revealed a .22 caliber revolver, was justified. The officer acted on an anonymous tip describing a black male with a gun at a specific location, wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon hooded sweatshirt. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer found the defendant, who matched the description, among a group of people. The court reasoned that the corroborated tip, combined with the circumstances (nighttime in a high-crime area), provided reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk for the officer’s safety and the safety of others.

    Facts

    An anonymous tip was received describing a black male with a gun at the intersection of South Fifth Avenue and West Third Street in Mount Vernon. The tipster stated that the man was wearing a long beige overcoat and a maroon sweatshirt with a hood. The arresting officer arrived at the location and observed approximately 25 people. The defendant was the only person who matched the description provided in the anonymous tip. The officer approached the defendant and directed him to place his hands on the hood of a nearby car. The officer then conducted a pat-down frisk of the defendant’s outer clothing, which resulted in the discovery of a .22 caliber revolver.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after pleading guilty. The defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer’s frisk was not justified. A suppression hearing was held where the circumstances of the arrest and frisk were examined. The trial court upheld the search and seizure. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police observation, providing a specific description of a suspect and their location, is sufficient to justify a police officer’s pat-down frisk of the suspect for weapons, particularly when the suspect is found in a high-crime area at night.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the anonymous tip, and the encounter occurred at night in a high-crime area, creating a reasonable basis to believe the suspect was armed and posed a threat to the officer and others in the vicinity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals weighed the degree of intrusion against the circumstances. The court cited People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, emphasizing that any inquiry into police conduct must balance the intrusion against the precipitating and attending circumstances. The court also cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, which holds that a frisk for weapons is permissible when an officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed. The court emphasized the officer’s duty to investigate the report, citing People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 374, and People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 270. The court highlighted the corroboration of the anonymous tip through the officer’s independent observations, referencing People v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832. The court noted the late hour and the location being a high-crime area, citing People v. Bronston, 68 N.Y.2d 880, 881, and People v. McLaurin, 43 N.Y.2d 902. The court stated that because there was evidence to support the hearing court’s finding that there was a sufficient predicate for the officer’s interference with the defendant to secure the safety of the officer and others, the court’s review process was at an end, citing People v. Jones, 69 N.Y.2d 853, 855. The court determined that, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s actions were reasonable and justified to ensure safety, therefore affirming the lower court’s decision to allow the evidence.

  • People v. Bennett, 68 N.Y.2d 891 (1986): Investigatory Stops and the Requirement for Miranda Warnings

    People v. Bennett, 68 N.Y.2d 891 (1986)

    When an investigatory stop remains at the level of a stop and frisk, and does not amount to a restraint on freedom of movement associated with a formal arrest, Miranda warnings are not required before questioning.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s drug conviction, holding that a state trooper’s questioning of the defendant during an investigatory stop did not constitute custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on a report of a car accident and observation of plastic bags in plain view, commonly used to store drugs. Because the stop was investigatory and did not rise to the level of a formal arrest, the incriminating statements made by the defendant were admissible, providing probable cause for arrest and subsequent search.

    Facts

    State troopers responded to a report of a one-car property damage accident potentially involving an intoxicated driver. At the scene, they found two cars, one of which was the defendant’s, parked near the intersection. The defendant was standing outside his vehicle, talking to the driver of the other car. Upon the trooper’s approach, the defendant returned to his car and sat in the driver’s seat. The trooper observed a roll of clear, zip-lock plastic bags on the dashboard in plain view. The defendant admitted to having no license and that the car was not registered in his name. When asked about the bags, the defendant stated he used them for coin collecting. The trooper, familiar with such bags being used for drug storage, asked the defendant to exit the vehicle and questioned him about a black pouch on the dashboard. The defendant then revealed a bag containing a white powdery residue, admitting it was speed, leading to his arrest and further search revealing more drugs.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the evidence should have been suppressed due to an illegal search and seizure and that probable cause was obtained through custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trooper’s questioning of the defendant constituted a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.

    2. Whether the search of the defendant’s person and vehicle was justified as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because the investigatory inquiries made by the trooper did not constitute custodial interrogation to which Miranda v. Arizona applies.

    2. Yes, because there existed probable cause for the defendant’s arrest and justification for the subsequent search of the defendant’s person and vehicle incident to an arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trooper had a justifiable basis for approaching the defendant’s vehicle to investigate the reported accident. The observation of the plastic bags in plain view provided reasonable suspicion to detain and question the defendant briefly, citing People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). The Court emphasized that the encounter remained an investigatory stop and did not escalate to the level of a formal arrest requiring Miranda warnings. The court distinguished the seizure from custodial interrogation, stating that “[w]hen a seizure of a person remains at the stop and frisk inquiry level and does not constitute a restraint on his or her freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest, Miranda warnings need not be given prior to questioning” (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-440 (1984)). Once the defendant made incriminating statements, probable cause existed for the arrest, justifying the subsequent search of his person and vehicle incident to that arrest, citing People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49 (1982). The court’s decision underscores the distinction between a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and “custody” for Miranda purposes, clarifying when Miranda warnings are necessary during police encounters. The focus remains on the degree of restraint placed on the individual’s freedom of movement.

  • People v. McLaurin, 70 N.Y.2d 779 (1987): Passenger’s Rights During Lawful Traffic Stops

    People v. McLaurin, 70 N.Y.2d 779 (1987)

    When a vehicle is lawfully stopped, an officer’s decision to order a passenger out of the vehicle must be justified by a reasonable suspicion directed at the passenger, based on specific and articulable facts, or by concerns for the officer’s safety based on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    McLaurin was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the conviction. The key issue was whether the officer’s order for the passenger (McLaurin) to exit a vehicle, lawfully stopped for speeding, was a violation of the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that the officer’s actions were justified given the totality of circumstances which included the late hour, desolate location, the car’s suspicious movements (speeding then driving slowly without headlights), and the officer’s concern for safety. The court declined to rule on whether the Mimms rule applies automatically to passengers.

    Facts

    Around midnight, in a desolate area of the Bronx known for high crime, police officers in an unmarked car observed a red car speeding. The car made a sudden turn onto a street lined with abandoned buildings, and officers saw it rolling slowly along the curb with no headlights. The officers stopped the car. The officer asked the passenger, McLaurin, what they were doing, and McLaurin replied that they had just stopped for a moment. The officer then asked McLaurin to step out of the car. As McLaurin opened the car door, the officer saw the bulge of a small caliber revolver tucked into McLaurin’s jacket. McLaurin was arrested.

    Procedural History

    McLaurin was convicted upon his guilty plea of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, after the denial of his motion to suppress the weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. McLaurin appealed, arguing that the officer’s order for him to exit the vehicle was an unlawful intrusion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during a lawful traffic stop, an officer can order a passenger to exit the vehicle without any reasonable suspicion directed at the passenger, based solely on the driver’s unlawful conduct.

    Holding

    No, not necessarily because the court found additional factors beyond the driver’s conduct justified the officer’s actions in this specific case. While the Court declined to establish a blanket rule, it held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer was justified in ordering McLaurin out of the car due to concerns for the officers’ safety, based on the desolate location, the late hour, and the vehicle’s suspicious behavior.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, which allows an officer to order the driver out of a vehicle lawfully stopped for a traffic infraction, based on the inherent danger to the officer. However, the Court explicitly stated that it did not need to decide whether the Mimms rationale automatically applies to passengers. The Court emphasized that the “reasonableness is the touchstone of our inquiry into the propriety of police conduct” and that the degree of intrusion must be weighed against the conditions confronted. The Court found that the additional factors beyond the traffic violation—the abandoned area, late hour, and the car’s slow movement without headlights—created sufficient suspicion to justify the officer’s concern for safety. The court reasoned that ordering McLaurin out of the car was a minimal intrusion necessary to allow the officers to investigate the driver’s credentials safely. The court cited People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 475, quoting People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 in its analysis. The court determined that the officer was justified to ensure the safety of both officers given the de minimis intrusion.

  • Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 50 (1987): Warrantless Urinalysis Requires Reasonable Suspicion

    Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 50 (1987)

    A public school district’s policy requiring probationary teachers to submit to mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis for drug testing violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    The Patchogue-Medford School District required all probationary teachers eligible for tenure to submit to urinalysis to detect potential drug abuse. The teachers’ union challenged the policy, arguing it violated the teachers’ constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of probationary teachers constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution. The court reasoned that while the school district has a legitimate interest in ensuring teacher fitness, it must have reasonable suspicion before requiring such an intrusive test.

    Facts

    The Patchogue-Medford School District had a collective bargaining agreement with its teachers’ union requiring probationary teachers to undergo a physical examination in their first and final probationary years.

    In May 1985, the school district notified 22 probationary teachers that they must submit to urinalysis to determine illegal drug use as a condition for tenure recommendation.

    There was no resolution by the Board of Education requiring these tests, nor was there a policy statement or directive from either the Board or the Superintendent.

    Teachers were informed that the Superintendent would not recommend for tenure any teacher who refused to provide a urine sample.

    Procedural History

    The teachers’ union commenced a proceeding to prohibit the examination, arguing it was unauthorized and an unreasonable search and seizure.

    The trial court granted the petition, finding the test was not part of the authorized medical examination and required reasonable suspicion.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the test was an investigatory search requiring reasonable suspicion.

    The School District appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public school district’s policy requiring all probationary teachers to submit to urinalysis to detect potential drug abuse constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of probationary teachers constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution, as it infringes upon the teachers’ reasonable expectation of privacy without sufficient justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the urinalysis constituted a search and seizure under both the State and Federal Constitutions, emphasizing that these provisions protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted governmental intrusion. The court reasoned that requiring a person to urinate for inspection is inherently private and can reveal personal information. The court acknowledged that while teachers have a diminished expectation of privacy due to their role, the school district’s policy was still unreasonable.

    The court distinguished this case from permissible checkpoint stops, noting that a urinalysis is a greater intrusion on individual privacy than a brief roadside inquiry. It emphasized the absence of evidence indicating drug abuse among teachers in general or within the specific school district, and the lack of a formal policy or regulation from the School Board regarding the tests.

    The court emphasized that random searches without reasonable suspicion are generally only permitted when privacy interests are minimal, the government’s interest is substantial, and safeguards are in place to prevent unregulated discretion. The court found these requirements were not met in this case.

    The court stated, “By restricting the government to reasonable searches, the State and Federal Constitutions recognize that there comes a point at which searches intended to serve the public interest, however effective, may themselves undermine the public’s interest in maintaining the privacy, dignity and security of its members.”

    The court concluded that while the school district has a legitimate interest in ensuring teacher fitness, requiring a urinalysis without reasonable suspicion violated the teachers’ constitutional rights. The previously agreed-upon physical examinations were not considered a waiver of the right to be free from unreasonable searches, as the urinalysis was a new test not contemplated by the original contract.

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Appellate Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact in Vehicle Stops

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    Appellate courts have limited review power over mixed questions of law and fact, especially when lower courts independently assess the facts to determine if reasonable suspicion existed for a vehicle stop.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of appellate review concerning a County Court’s decision on the legality of a vehicle stop. The suppression court initially found no probable cause for the stop. The County Court affirmed, using a reasonable suspicion standard but stated that no reasonable suspicion existed “as a matter of law.” The Court of Appeals held that because the County Court independently assessed the facts, its determination of this mixed question of law and fact was beyond the Court of Appeals’ review powers, affirming the lower court’s decision to suppress the evidence.

    Facts

    Police stopped the defendant’s van for alleged traffic infractions. The exact nature of these alleged infractions is not specified in the Court of Appeals decision. The suppression court initially ruled that there was no probable cause to justify the stop. The People appealed this decision to the County Court.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court ruled in favor of the defendant, suppressing evidence obtained from the vehicle stop. The People appealed to the County Court, which affirmed the suppression order, stating that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. The People then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court’s determination that no reasonable suspicion existed for the vehicle stop is reviewable by the Court of Appeals, given that the determination involved a mixed question of law and fact and the County Court independently assessed the facts.

    Holding

    No, because the County Court independently assessed the facts in determining that no reasonable suspicion existed. This rendered the issue a mixed question of law and fact, which is beyond the review powers of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the legality of a vehicle stop based on reasonable suspicion is generally a mixed question of law and fact. Citing People v. Harrison, the court reiterated that such questions are “rarely…resolved as a matter of law.” The court emphasized that while the County Court stated its determination was “as a matter of law,” it was evident the County Court independently assessed the facts to reach its conclusion. Because the County Court engaged in an independent assessment of the facts, the Court of Appeals found itself bound by the County Court’s findings. The Court of Appeals noted that it lacks the power to review such mixed questions of law and fact when a lower appellate court has made its own factual assessment. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, upholding the suppression of the evidence. The court did not delve into the specific facts that led the County Court to find a lack of reasonable suspicion, focusing instead on the limitations of its appellate review function. The decision underscores the importance of the factual record and the assessments made by lower courts in determining the outcome of search and seizure cases.

  • People v. Mejia, 69 N.Y.2d 853 (1987): Admissibility of Evidence Based on Reasonable Suspicion and Consent

    People v. Mejia, 69 N.Y.2d 853 (1987)

    Evidence obtained during a street detention is admissible if the police had reasonable suspicion to justify the detention, and evidence obtained from a search of a residence is admissible if consent to enter was freely given.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction for robbery, finding that his initial street detention was justified by reasonable suspicion and that he consented to the police entry into his apartment. The court found no error in admitting testimony about a skirt the defendant discarded while fleeing, as it was relevant to identification.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, police officers investigating another crime in an area of apartment buildings observed the defendant running. They noticed two other men nearby and suspected the defendant might be the victim of a crime. The police called to the defendant, who stopped, looked at them, and then ran away, discarding a black skirt as he fled. The police pursued and questioned him, and he gave his name and address, which they verified. Later, the police entered the defendant’s apartment, where they arrested him and seized a blue jacket.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. He appealed, challenging the admission of statements made during the street detention, the observation of a fresh cut on his hand during the stop, and the seizure of a blue jacket from his apartment. The hearing court found the street detention justified and the apartment entry consensual. The Appellate Division upheld these findings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s statements, the police observations, and the discarded skirt should have been suppressed as products of an unlawful street detention.
    2. Whether the blue jacket should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful warrantless arrest in his apartment.
    3. Whether testimony about the black skirt was improperly admitted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police had an articulable reason for the initial attempt to talk with the defendant and reasonable suspicion to justify their detention while they questioned him.
    2. No, because the entry into the defendant’s apartment was made with his consent, rendering the subsequent warrantless arrest lawful, and the jacket was properly seized incident to that arrest.
    3. No, because the testimony concerning the skirt was relevant to the issue of identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the police had an articulable reason to attempt to speak with the defendant and reasonable suspicion to detain him based on his running away after being called to, and discarding the skirt. Citing People v. Leung, 68 NY2d 734 and People v. Howard, 50 NY2d 583, the court emphasized the permissibility of brief detentions based on reasonable suspicion. The court also deferred to the lower courts’ finding of consent to enter the apartment, stating, “These determinations involved mixed questions of law and fact, and because there is evidence in the record to support the hearing court’s findings, undisturbed by the Appellate Division, our review process is at an end (see, People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477).” The court found the testimony about the skirt relevant for identification, as it linked the defendant to the crime through his possession of a similar item at a closely related time, noting the victim’s testimony that her attacker was carrying something black. The skirt itself was not admitted. The court emphasized that the evidence “helped to link him to the crime.”

  • Matter of Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840 (1987): Urinalysis for Public Employees Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    Matter of Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840 (1987)

    A public agency may lawfully order an employee to undergo urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion of drug use, supported by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    This case involves challenges by a police officer (Perez) and correction officers (King) to their dismissals for refusing to comply with orders to submit to urinalysis based on reported drug use. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissals, finding that the urinalysis orders were justified by reasonable suspicion based on information from confidential informants. The court emphasized that a public agency may order urinalysis of an employee when there is reasonable suspicion of drug use, and determined that substantial evidence supported the administrative determinations in both cases. The court found the penalty of dismissal was appropriate and rejected the petitioners’ remaining arguments.

    Facts

    Regarding Perez: A reliable confidential informant, with a history of providing accurate information, reported to the police department that Perez was using heroin. Certain allegations made by the informant were verified. On the day before the urinalysis order, the informant stated that he had just witnessed Perez using heroin.

    Regarding Melvin and Henry King: A confidential informant reported the correction officers’ use of illegal drugs at specific locations. The Inspector General’s office verified certain aspects of the information. Shortly before the urinalysis order, the informant advised the Inspector General that he had observed the officers using narcotics at the specified locations.

    Procedural History

    Perez and King separately challenged their dismissals in Article 78 proceedings. The lower courts upheld the dismissals. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the orders for the police and correction officers to submit to urinalysis were lawful, given the standard that a public agency may order an employee to undergo urinalysis on reasonable suspicion of drug use?

    Holding

    Yes, because there was substantial evidence supporting the administrative determinations that reasonable suspicion existed to order the urinalysis in both cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the “reasonable suspicion” standard for ordering urinalysis was met in each case. It highlighted the reliability of the informants and the verification of certain details they provided. Regarding Perez, the court emphasized the informant’s history of reliability and the recent sighting of Perez using heroin. Regarding the Kings, the court pointed to the informant’s report of drug use at specified locations and the Inspector General’s verification of some of that information. The court concluded that these facts constituted substantial evidence supporting the administrative determinations.

    The court referenced Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, indicating that the penalty of dismissal was not erroneous under the circumstances. The court explicitly stated that the parties agreed on the applicable standard – reasonable suspicion – and therefore the court did not need to rule on what the proper standard should be, focusing instead on whether that agreed-upon standard was satisfied. The court stated: “these parties have agreed that a public agency may lawfully order an employee to undergo urinalysis on reasonable suspicion of drug use. The central issue is whether, on the facts presented, that standard was satisfied here.”

    The court dismissed the petitioners’ remaining contentions as lacking merit.

  • People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986): Permissibility of Detaining and Transporting Suspects for Identification

    People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986)

    When police have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual, they may detain and transport the suspect a short distance to a crime scene for prompt identification by eyewitnesses if the detention is brief, the crime scene is nearby, and there are no less intrusive means available.

    Summary

    Police officers stopped two men suspected of robbery based on a radio report describing the perpetrators and their car. The men gave a suspicious explanation for their whereabouts. The officers transported the men, without handcuffs, to the robbery scene less than a minute away, where they were identified by victims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the brief detention and transportation to the crime scene for immediate identification did not constitute an unlawful arrest because the police action was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation under the circumstances to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. The Court emphasized the short duration of the detention, proximity of the crime scene, and the presence of eyewitnesses.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 a.m., police officers heard a radio report of a robbery involving two black men, about 5’5″ tall, in a green Pontiac with black trim. Minutes later, near the crime scene, they saw two black men in a grey and black Buick sedan appearing to be the described height. The men claimed to be coming from work at American Brass, which the officer knew was far away in the opposite direction. The officers told the men they matched the description and were being taken to the factory for identification, and would be released if not identified.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. He challenged the stop, detention, transportation, showup identification, and vehicle search. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, limiting the issue to the legality of the stop, detention, and transportation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of probable cause, it is permissible for the police, having made a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for possible identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the detention and transportation were a permissible incident of a lawful stop under the specific circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the radio report description, the suspects’ proximity to the crime scene, and their suspicious explanation. The Court clarified that the police action did not constitute an arrest because the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no show of force, he was allowed to park his car, the detention was brief, and he was informed of its limited purpose. The Court then reasoned that the transportation to the crime scene was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion. Key factors supporting the reasonableness of the detention were that a crime had actually been committed; the detention was less than 10 minutes; the crime scene was very close; eyewitnesses were present; and there were no significantly less intrusive means available. The Court emphasized the importance of on-the-scene identifications, stating, “A speedy on-the-scene viewing thus was of value both to law enforcement authorities and to defendant, and was appropriate here.” The Court rejected using a “totality of the circumstances” test, and instead emphasized that the findings of reasonable suspicion and reasonable detention must rest on articulable facts, credible objective evidence, and the rational inferences that flow therefrom.

  • People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986): Justification for Police Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986)

    When police observe a suspect passing what appears to be drug packaging in an area known for drug activity, and the suspect immediately flees upon being approached by police, reasonable suspicion exists to justify police pursuit.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of suspicion required for police to pursue a fleeing suspect. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car observed Leung in a high-narcotics area passing a three-by-five-inch brown envelope resembling drug packaging. When the officers identified themselves, Leung fled. He discarded a hat and a gun during the pursuit. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ observations, coupled with Leung’s flight, created reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and subsequent arrest. The recovery of the discarded gun was deemed lawful.

    Facts

    Police officers patrolling a high-crime, high-narcotics area in Queens observed Leung handing another man a brown envelope approximately three-by-five inches in size. The officers believed the envelope resembled the packaging used for drug transactions (“three dollar bags”). The officers exited their vehicle and identified themselves as police. Leung immediately fled on foot. During the pursuit, Leung discarded a hat and threw a black object under some bushes. The officers apprehended Leung approximately five houses from where the pursuit began. They recovered a loaded, operable nine-millimeter pistol from under the bushes where Leung had thrown it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after Leung was convicted on weapons charges. Leung appealed, arguing that the initial police action was an investigatory stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and that his flight did not create reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant, based on his observed actions and subsequent flight, such that the recovery of the discarded weapon was lawful.

    Holding

    Yes, because the passing of what appeared to be a drug package in a narcotics-prone area, coupled with the defendant’s immediate flight upon the officers’ approach, established reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime, thus justifying the pursuit and the subsequent recovery of the discarded weapon.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. De Bour, which established a framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court stated that the level of police intrusion must be weighed against the circumstances known to the police as the encounter unfolds. The Court determined that the officers’ initial approach was justified because observing Leung pass what appeared to be a “three dollar bag” in a high-narcotics area provided at least an “objective credible reason” for the police to approach him. The Court emphasized that Leung’s immediate flight, when coupled with the initial observation, elevated the officers’ suspicion to the level of “reasonable suspicion.” The court cited People v. Howard, stating that flight can be a significant factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. The Court distinguished the case from situations involving discarded containers where an intent to abandon the property must be proven, explaining that Leung’s attempt to discard the gun was not a direct result of unlawful police action, as the pursuit was justified. Therefore, the gun was lawfully discovered during a legitimate detention, providing probable cause for arrest on the weapons charge. The court found that the trial judge’s instruction on “possession” was an accurate statement of the law, and that claims of prosecutorial misconduct were without merit.