New York Law Review

Tag: reasonable suspicion

  • People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015): Reasonable Suspicion for Stop and Frisk Based on Flight and Prior Knowledge

    People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred by ruling that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain individuals, Brown and Thomas, where the officers observed them running in a high-crime area, knew of their prior criminal activity in the area, and knew that Brown had been previously instructed by police to leave that location.

    Summary

    The case concerns the standard for reasonable suspicion necessary for a police stop. Officers in Times Square observed Brown and Thomas running and looking over their shoulders. The officers knew Brown had a history of fraudulent accosting in the area and knew Thomas associated with people involved in similar scams. Within a short time, the officers had a robbery victim identify the two as the perpetrators. The trial court found reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding the reversal was not “on the law alone” but held that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and prior knowledge of the individuals. The dissent disagreed with the majority and would have reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the cases to that Court for a review of the facts.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours in Times Square, officers of the “cabaret unit” saw Brown, whom they had previously arrested for fraudulent accosting, and instructed him to leave the area. Three hours later, the officers, in an unmarked van, observed Brown and Thomas running down Broadway, looking over their shoulders. The officers stopped them, and a robbery victim identified them as the perpetrators. The victim’s Rolex and cash were recovered from Thomas.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the identification. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Brown and Thomas based on their observations and prior knowledge.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom failed to satisfy the minimum showing necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. Therefore the case was dismissed, and the Appellate Division’s decision was reversed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the stop under the standard of reasonable suspicion, stating that this standard is met when an officer has “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” (People v. Cantor). The court found that the officers’ observations of the defendants running and looking back, combined with their knowledge of Brown’s history of fraudulent accosting and Thomas’s associations, provided reasonable suspicion. The Court found that the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and Thomas and that the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they not done so.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of officers’ prior knowledge in establishing reasonable suspicion, especially in high-crime areas. It suggests that flight, when combined with other specific circumstances such as prior knowledge of criminal activity or associations, can give rise to reasonable suspicion. This ruling guides law enforcement in determining when a stop and frisk is justified, balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of individual rights. This case also illustrates how a court may assess actions in their totality, rather than dissecting each individual act by the police. The case also shows how a court must not be too quick to second-guess police on the street.

  • People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014): Anonymous Tips and Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Argyris, 23 N.Y.3d 177 (2014)

    An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability under the totality of the circumstances or satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for police stops based on anonymous tips. The Court of Appeals considered three separate cases with similar fact patterns. In Argyris and DiSalvo, the Court upheld the vehicle stops based on a 911 call reporting a gun in a car. In Johnson, the court suppressed evidence from a stop initiated by a 911 call about a possible intoxicated driver. The key issue was whether the anonymous tips provided reasonable suspicion for the stops. The majority found the Argyris/DiSalvo tip reliable but the Johnson tip unreliable, though different justices disagreed on the appropriate standard to apply (totality of the circumstances vs. Aguilar-Spinelli). The decision underscores the complexities of relying on anonymous tips for law enforcement action and the ongoing debate in New York regarding the proper legal framework for assessing the reliability of such tips.

    Facts

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: An anonymous 911 caller reported seeing men put a gun in a black Mustang. Police located the car and stopped it, finding weapons. </p>
    <p>Johnson: An anonymous 911 caller reported a possible intoxicated driver in a blue BMW. A deputy stopped the car after observing a minor traffic violation outside his jurisdiction.</p>

    Procedural History

    <p>Argyris/DiSalvo: The trial court initially granted a motion to suppress but reversed itself on reargument. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
    <p>Johnson: The Town Court denied a motion to suppress. County Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the suppression motion, and dismissed the accusatory instrument.</p>

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion for a vehicle stop.

    2. What standard should be used to determine the reliability of an anonymous tip: totality of the circumstances or the Aguilar-Spinelli test?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the tip had sufficient indicia of reliability (Argyris/DiSalvo) but no, because the tip was unreliable (Johnson).

    2. The court did not come to a consensus. Four judges found reasonable suspicion, agreeing that the tip in Argyris/DiSalvo was reliable and the tip in Johnson was not; Smith and Pigott, JJ., favored the totality of the circumstances test and Abdus-Salaam and Graffeo, JJ., favored the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Read, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion stating, essentially, the anonymous tips must contain “predictive information”. Rivera, J., dissented (in Argyris/DiSalvo) in an opinion emphasizing that predictive information must be provided in the tip.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority memorandum opinion stated that regardless of whether they apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, record support exists for the lower courts’ findings that the stops were lawful in Argyris and DiSalvo. They stated that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants’ vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. The absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability under these circumstances.

    Smith, J., concurring, argued that the Aguilar-Spinelli test needlessly complicates reasonable suspicion analysis and that a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable.

    Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring, advocated for the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, suggesting that hearsay information cannot provide an officer with probable cause unless the hearsay report reveals a reliable basis for the informant’s knowledge and shows that the informant is generally credible. Furthermore, the determination of whether a tip provides the police with probable cause or reasonable suspicion depends on the quality of the tip’s description of the crime itself, as opposed to its statements regarding the suspect’s physical appearance and non-criminal conduct.

    Read, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, emphasized the importance of predictive information in anonymous tips. She stated, “We have held that an anonymous tip supplies reasonable suspicion only if it ‘contains predictive information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’ (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006]; see generally Rivera dissenting op at 14-18 [discussing Moore]).”

    Rivera, J., dissenting in Argyris and DiSalvo, argued that anonymous tips must contain predictive information to justify forcible stops and that the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring the informant is reliable and there is a basis for the knowledge of the informant’s tip, should be used. "[A]n anonymous tip must ‘contain[] predictive information — such as information of criminal behavior — so that the police can test the reliability of the tip’" (

  • People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013): Limits on Reopening Suppression Hearings for the Prosecution

    People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287 (2013)

    The People are not entitled to reopen a suppression hearing to bolster their evidentiary or legal position unless they demonstrate they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present their case initially.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which the prosecution can reopen a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals held that a trial judge cannot reopen a suppression hearing to allow the prosecution to strengthen its case unless the prosecution demonstrates it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence initially. The Court reasoned that allowing the prosecution a “second bite at the apple” after failing to adequately present its case would undermine the principles of fairness and finality, and would give the prosecution an unfair advantage.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Gungor and Indiviglio, were patrolling a subway platform following a recent robbery. They observed Kevin W. and his brother acting suspiciously. The officers followed them onto a train and then off at a subsequent station. The officers stopped the brothers, identified themselves, and attempted to question them. Kevin W. resisted, and during the encounter, he discarded a bag. After a chase, the officers apprehended Kevin W.’s brother. Another officer retrieved Kevin W.’s bag, searched it, and found a loaded pistol. Kevin W. was arrested and charged with weapon possession and resisting arrest.

    Procedural History

    Kevin W. moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag. At the initial suppression hearing, Officer Gungor testified. The JHO recommended suppression, finding Gungor’s testimony insufficient to justify the stop. The Supreme Court adopted the JHO’s recommendation and granted suppression. The People moved to reargue, but the Supreme Court, instead of ruling on the reargument motion, reopened the hearing to allow the People to call Sergeant Indiviglio. Based on Indiviglio’s testimony, the JHO then recommended denying suppression, which the Supreme Court adopted. Kevin W. was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, granted suppression, and dismissed the indictment, holding that reopening the hearing was improper under People v. Havelka. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can reopen a suppression hearing at the prosecution’s request to allow the introduction of additional evidence when the prosecution has not demonstrated that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its case at the initial hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the People had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence at the initial suppression hearing. Permitting the reopening of the hearing without such a showing undermines the principles of fairness and finality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Havelka, which held that the People are not entitled to a second chance to succeed where they previously failed, absent a showing that they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on dispositive issues at the initial hearing. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Crandall, where a second hearing was permitted because the initial denial of suppression was based on a legal error that prevented the People from presenting an alternative basis for the search. Here, the Court found no such error. The JHO’s initial ruling concluded that Officer Gungor’s testimony was “sketchy” and “undeveloped,” not that the People were legally precluded from presenting other evidence. The Court noted that the People were aware of Sergeant Indiviglio’s relevant information before the first hearing. The Court emphasized that allowing the reopening here would give the People an unfair advantage, allowing them to tailor their presentation based on the court’s initial assessment of the case. The Court stated, “[i]t is impossible to know if he would have testified in the same vein if he had been called at the first hearing. But the nature of his later testimony underscores the risk of presentations shaped, whether deliberately or subconsciously, by hindsight.”

  • In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009): Establishing Factual Disputes for Suppression Hearings in School Searches

    In re Elvin G., 12 N.Y.3d 832 (2009)

    A suppression hearing is required in juvenile delinquency proceedings when the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved to determine if evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Summary

    Elvin G. was subject to a school search. He moved to suppress a knife found during the search, alleging the dean ordered all students to empty their pockets. The presentment agency countered that Elvin voluntarily removed the knife. The New York Court of Appeals held that a suppression hearing was necessary because the conflicting factual accounts created a material dispute regarding the constitutionality of the search. The Court reasoned that the record was insufficiently developed to determine whether a search occurred and, if so, if it was reasonable under the circumstances. The dissent argued that the dean’s actions were justified due to a classroom disruption and were reasonably related in scope to finding the source of the disruption.

    Facts

    While in class, a cell phone or other electronic device disrupted the class.
    According to Elvin G., the school dean ordered all students to stand and empty their pockets to find the device.
    According to the presentment agency, the dean asked students to place their bags on their desks, and Elvin G. voluntarily removed a knife from his pocket.
    A knife was recovered from Elvin G.

    Procedural History

    Elvin G. moved to suppress the knife, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
    The Family Court denied the motion for a suppression hearing.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter to Family Court for a suppression hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suppression hearing is required when there is a factual dispute regarding the circumstances of a search in a school setting, specifically whether the student voluntarily revealed the weapon or whether it was discovered pursuant to an order to empty pockets.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a factual dispute on a material point – whether the dean ordered students to empty their pockets (as alleged by Elvin G.) or whether Elvin G. voluntarily removed the knife (as claimed by the presentment agency) – that needed to be resolved to determine if the evidence was obtained constitutionally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 710.60 and Family Court Act § 330.2 (1), stating that a suppression hearing is required if the accused raises a factual dispute on a material point that must be resolved before the court can decide the legality of obtaining the evidence.
    The court cited People v. Burton, 6 N.Y.3d 584, 587 (2006), emphasizing that a hearing is needed to resolve factual disputes relevant to constitutional permissibility.
    The Court applied the People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993) factors, noting the record was insufficiently developed to properly determine whether a search occurred and, if so, whether it was reasonable under the circumstances, referencing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993).
    The Court emphasized that if the dean recovered the knife because it was in “plain view,” the constitutional question would be academic, highlighting the importance of resolving the factual dispute.
    The dissent argued that the dean was justified in directing students to empty their pockets due to the classroom disruption and the search was reasonably related to finding the offending article, citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The dissent also noted that Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588 (1993), supports the idea that a search may be reasonable without individualized suspicion when privacy interests are minimal and governmental interests are significant.

  • People v. Estrella, 10 N.Y.3d 945 (2008): Reasonableness of Traffic Stop Based on Objective Belief of Violation

    People v. Estrella, 10 N.Y.3d 945 (2008)

    A police officer’s reasonable belief that a vehicle’s window tint violates state law justifies a traffic stop, even if the tint is legal in the state where the vehicle is registered.

    Summary

    Luis Estrella was stopped by a police officer in Rochester, New York, who believed the tint on his car windows violated New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. During the stop, cocaine was discovered in the vehicle. Estrella moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unlawful. The lower courts denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer’s reasonable belief of a violation justified the stop, regardless of whether the tint was legal in Georgia, where the car was registered. The Court emphasized the objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief based on New York law.

    Facts

    A police officer stopped Luis Estrella’s car in Rochester, New York.
    The officer believed the car’s window tint was too dark, violating New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (3).
    During the stop, the officer discovered cocaine in the car.
    The car was registered in Georgia, where the window tint might have been legal.

    Procedural History

    Estrella was charged with drug offenses, and moved to suppress the cocaine evidence.
    The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the suppression motion.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer’s objectively reasonable belief that a vehicle’s window tint violates state law justifies a traffic stop, even if the tint is legal in the state where the vehicle is registered?

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s reasonable belief that the window tint violated New York law justified the traffic stop, regardless of the legality of the tint in Georgia.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the reasonableness of the officer’s belief at the time of the stop. The Court stated, “The record supports the finding that the officer who stopped the car reasonably believed the windows to be over-tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (3).” The Court reasoned that the officer was not required to know the laws of every state and was justified in relying on his understanding of New York law when assessing the window tint. The critical point was the objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief, not the actual legality of the tint in Georgia. The court implicitly adopted a standard where officers are not chargeable with knowledge of other states’ laws when enforcing traffic regulations within their jurisdiction, as long as their belief is reasonable based on their own state’s laws. This approach aims to balance individual rights against the need for effective law enforcement. This decision underscores the importance of officers acting on reasonable suspicion based on their understanding of applicable laws, even if subsequent investigation reveals that the perceived violation was not, in fact, a violation due to differing laws in other jurisdictions. This case is significant because it clarifies the scope of an officer’s responsibility regarding knowledge of other states’ laws during traffic stops and emphasizes the “reasonable belief” standard.

  • People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303 (2008): Warrantless Body Cavity Searches and Reasonable Suspicion

    10 N.Y.3d 303 (2008)

    A visual body cavity inspection may be conducted if the police have a factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has evidence concealed inside a body cavity and the search is conducted in a reasonable manner; however, if the visual inspection reveals the presence of a suspicious object, the police must obtain a warrant authorizing the object’s removal unless there are exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of warrantless body cavity searches following a drug arrest. Police observed Hall engaging in a drug sale. After arresting and searching him, officers conducted a visual body cavity inspection, spotting a string protruding from his rectum. They forcibly removed a bag of cocaine. The Court of Appeals held that while the visual inspection was justified by reasonable suspicion, the forced removal of the drugs without a warrant or exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. This case clarifies the line between permissible visual inspections and unlawful physical intrusions into body cavities.

    Facts

    Sergeant Burnes, observing from a rooftop, witnessed Hall hand money to Meyers, who then entered a bodega and gave something to two individuals. Burnes saw what appeared to be crack cocaine in Meyers’ hand. After arresting Hall, a clothing search revealed nothing. In a private cell, officers ordered Hall to disrobe and bend over. Burnes and Spiegel observed a string or plastic hanging from Hall’s rectum and, believing it was attached to drugs, ordered Hall to remove it. Hall refused, and officers forcibly removed a plastic bag containing crack cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Hall was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court granted Hall’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, dismissing the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the visual inspection justified and the immediate retrieval of drugs permissible. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a visual body cavity inspection of Hall without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion?

    2. Whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment by forcibly removing the drugs from Hall’s rectum without first obtaining a warrant?

    Holding

    1. Yes, but only because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe Hall was concealing evidence inside a body cavity.

    2. Yes, because absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to remove an object protruding from a body cavity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between strip searches, visual body cavity inspections, and manual body cavity searches, noting increasing levels of intrusion. Citing Schmerber v. California, the court reiterated that intrusions into the body require a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist. While Bell v. Wolfish allows visual cavity searches of pretrial detainees based on reasonableness, the court held that visual body inspections of arrestees require at least reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts. In Hall’s case, the police had reasonable suspicion based on his observed drug sale, his retreat into a building, the absence of drugs on his person, and the officer’s experience with similar cases. However, once the officers observed the string, they needed a warrant to remove the drugs. Because no exigent circumstances existed (imminent destruction of evidence or medical distress), the warrantless removal of the drugs was unlawful under People v. More, mandating suppression of the evidence. The court emphasized that blanket policies for body cavity searches are unconstitutional; individualized suspicion is required. The court also noted that inspections should be conducted in a private location by an officer of the same gender, avoiding undue humiliation to the arrestee. Quoting People v Cantor, the court stated that police need “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion.”

  • In re Victor M., 86 N.Y.2d 86 (2006): Limits on Juvenile Arrests for Violations

    In re Victor M., 97 N.Y.2d 86 (2006)

    A police officer cannot arrest a juvenile without a warrant for conduct constituting a mere violation, as opposed to a crime, and a search incident to such an unlawful arrest is also unlawful.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a search conducted after a juvenile was taken into custody for a non-criminal offense. Victor M., a 15-year-old, was observed gambling in a public place and, lacking identification, was handcuffed and brought to the police station. A subsequent search revealed narcotics. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the arrest was unlawful because it was based on a violation (loitering), not a crime, and therefore the search was also unlawful. The court emphasized that detaining a juvenile requires reasonable suspicion and that taking the juvenile to the station without attempting less intrusive means was unreasonable.

    Facts

    Officer Recio saw Victor M. and others gambling with dice in a Bronx apartment building. Victor had no identification and was unable to provide it at the scene. Officer Recio handcuffed Victor and transported him to the police station. At the station, Victor was searched, and narcotics were discovered on his person.

    Procedural History

    In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, Victor moved to suppress the narcotics, arguing the search was unlawful. The Family Court denied the motion and adjudicated Victor a delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed. Victor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officer’s detention and subsequent search of Victor M. were lawful, given that the initial basis for detaining him was a non-criminal offense (a violation)?

    Holding

    No, because the warrantless arrest of a juvenile is authorized only where an adult could be arrested for a crime, and the offense committed by Victor M. was a violation, not a crime; thus, the subsequent search was unlawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected three arguments supporting the search. First, the Family Court’s reliance on gambling-related misdemeanors was misplaced, as those statutes did not apply to a mere player in a dice game. Second, the Appellate Division’s invocation of trespass and loitering was also insufficient, as these are violations, not crimes, and Family Court Act § 305.2(2) only authorizes warrantless juvenile arrests for conduct that would constitute a crime for an adult. The court stated that neither simple trespass nor loitering is a “crime” as the term is defined in the Penal Law (§ 10.00 [6]); each is a violation, not a misdemeanor or a felony. A warrantless arrest of a juvenile is authorized only in cases where an adult could be arrested “for a crime” (Family Ct Act § 305.2 [2]). Finally, the presentment agency’s argument that the detention was a temporary stop based on reasonable suspicion also failed. Officer Recio himself described the event as an arrest, not a temporary detention. Temporary detentions are only authorized for felonies and misdemeanors, not violations. Even if it were a valid temporary detention, transporting Victor to the station house in handcuffs was unreasonable, particularly when a less intrusive alternative (going to his apartment for identification) was available. The Court emphasized the importance of reasonableness in such situations: “Here, nothing in the record shows that it was reasonable for Officer Recio to take Victor to the station house, instead of going with him to his apartment to get his identification.” The Court thus prioritized the protection of individual liberties, especially those of juveniles, against unreasonable police actions. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that the scope of a search is tied to the justification for the initial detention and highlights the specific protections afforded to juveniles under New York law.

  • People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006): Anonymous Tip Plus Evasion Insufficient for Reasonable Suspicion

    6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006)

    An anonymous tip, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; reasonable suspicion requires predictive information or observation of suspicious conduct.

    Summary

    Police officers, responding to an anonymous tip about a Black male with a gun, approached the defendant, who matched the description and began walking away. The officers drew their guns and ordered him to stop. The defendant then reached towards his waistband, and a subsequent search revealed a firearm. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the gun should have been suppressed because the initial gunpoint stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip, lacking predictive information, and the defendant’s act of walking away did not establish the necessary level of suspicion for a forcible stop under established Fourth Amendment principles.

    Facts

    On November 12, 1997, police officers received an anonymous radio call regarding a dispute involving a Black male with a gun, described as approximately 18 years old, wearing a gray jacket and red hat.
    The officers arrived at the scene within one minute and observed the defendant, who matched the description, but no dispute was in progress.
    As the officers approached, the defendant began to walk away.
    Without any verbal inquiry, the officers drew their guns and ordered the defendant to stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the gun.
    Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s movement toward his waistband justified the frisk.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, combined with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a forcible stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because an anonymous tip lacking predictive information, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; such a stop requires a higher level of suspicion based on predictive information from the tip or independent observation of suspicious conduct by the officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the four-level test from People v. De Bour, which distinguishes between permissible police encounters based on the level of suspicion. Here, the gunpoint stop constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.
    An anonymous tip alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion unless it contains predictive information that allows police to test the tip’s reliability, as established in Florida v. J.L. and People v. William II. The Court emphasized, “[R]easonable suspicion ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
    Defendant’s act of walking away from the police, while potentially generating a common-law right of inquiry, did not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop. The Court noted that “[T]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them . . . without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (quoting People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728 (1992)).
    Elevating a common-law inquiry to a forcible stop based solely on walking away would eliminate the “right to be let alone.” Additional information or observations of suspicious conduct are necessary to justify a forcible stop.
    The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the combination of the anonymous tip and evasion created reasonable suspicion, asserting that a forcible stop requires more than just the possibility of a crime; it requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.

  • People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007): Justifying Minimal Intrusion During Warrant Execution

    People v. Salaman, 9 N.Y.3d 371 (2007)

    When executing an arrest warrant, a minimal police intrusion, such as asking an individual to show their hands, is justified if officers have a reasonable belief that the individual may be armed and dangerous, based on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    During the execution of arrest warrants for a probation violator, officers found the defendant in an apartment with two other men. After discovering weapons near the other two men, officers asked the defendant to show his hands because he was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on them. Upon doing so, a handgun was revealed. The New York Court of Appeals held that asking the defendant to shift his position was a minimal and justified intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a reasonable basis to believe he might be armed and dangerous. This case illustrates the balance between individual privacy rights and officer safety during warrant executions.

    Facts

    Probation officers went to an apartment to execute two felony arrest warrants against a probation violator. Upon entering the apartment, they found three men, including the probationer and the defendant. After arresting the probationer, officers found loaded handguns near the other man on the floor. The defendant was sitting on a couch, fidgeting, mumbling, and sitting on his hands. Officer Groves asked the defendant to shift his position and show his hands. The defendant initially hesitated but eventually complied, revealing a loaded 9mm handgun under his thigh.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the handgun as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the search was a reasonable and lawful security sweep. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, during the execution of arrest warrants in an apartment, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to ask the defendant to shift his position and show his hands, given that the officers had already discovered two loaded handguns near the defendant’s companions?

    Holding

    Yes, because under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable belief that the defendant could be armed and dangerous, justifying the minimal intrusion of asking him to shift his position and show his hands.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct under the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished this case from a protective sweep, stating that Maryland v. Buie did not apply because the circumstances did not involve searching for hidden individuals who posed a threat. Instead, the Court emphasized balancing the government’s interest in officer safety against the individual’s right to privacy and personal security. The court applied a dual inquiry: whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances. The court found that asking the defendant to show his hands was justified at its inception because the officers had discovered two loaded handguns near defendant’s companions, and the defendant was fidgeting and mumbling while sitting on his hands. The intrusion was minimal – merely asking the defendant to shift his position. The court deferred to the suppression court’s finding of reasonableness, stating “the determination of the suppression court with its peculiar advantages of having seen and heard” the testimony is entitled to great deference (Prochilo, 41 NY2d at 761). The Court concluded that the limited police action was reasonable, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.

  • People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion During a Vertical Sweep

    People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997)

    Police detention of a suspect during a vertical sweep of an apartment building requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

    Summary

    During a vertical sweep of an apartment building known for drug activity, police encountered the defendant under suspicious circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant’s presence near an open apartment door, his reaction to seeing the officer, and the context of a vertical sweep in a building known for drug activity, provided sufficient grounds to suspect the defendant of trespassing, which justified the brief detention. The court affirmed the conviction, also finding sufficient evidence for constructive possession of the drugs found in the apartment.

    Facts

    On March 29, 1996, NYPD officers conducted a vertical sweep of a four-story apartment building in Manhattan, pursuant to a trespass affidavit indicating the building was plagued by illegal drug trade. An officer encountered the defendant on the third floor near the open door of apartment 3D after hearing someone call out to an individual known for narcotics arrests. The defendant appeared surprised upon seeing the officer, then turned as if to knock on apartment 3C, but instead walked toward a staircase. The officer then observed coffee grounds and drug paraphernalia in plain view inside the open apartment 3D.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance based on constructive possession. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress money found during a search incident to arrest. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed after a judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant during a vertical sweep of an apartment building?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s presence outside an open apartment door in a building known for drug activity, his suspicious behavior upon seeing the officer, and the observation of drug paraphernalia inside the apartment provided reasonable suspicion that the defendant was trespassing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the principle that police seizure of a suspect must be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, citing People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 447 (1992). The court referenced People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 (1976), noting that permissible police intrusion intensifies with escalating evidence of criminal activity. It reasoned that the purpose of the vertical sweep was to apprehend trespassers, and Penal Law § 140.05 only requires illegal entry or remaining on the premises to constitute trespassing. The court determined that the defendant’s presence near the open apartment door, his reaction to the officer, and the context of the sweep provided reasonable suspicion of trespassing, justifying the brief detention. The court also found sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the apartment, supporting the constructive possession charge, citing People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 201-202 (1979). The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, which is beyond their review if supported by the record.