New York Law Review

Tag: reasonable expectation of privacy

  • People v. Schreier, 21 N.Y.3d 494 (2013): Interpreting “Surreptitiously” in Unlawful Surveillance Cases

    People v. Schreier, 21 N.Y.3d 494 (2013)

    The term “surreptitiously” in New York’s unlawful surveillance statute means conduct done by stealth or clandestinely, requiring an effort to conceal the conduct or escape detection, but not necessarily complete imperceptibility to all members of the public.

    Summary

    Schreier was convicted of unlawful surveillance for filming his neighbor, naked, in her bathroom. He argued the recording wasn’t “surreptitious” because he was standing in public view, and that the victim had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that “surreptitiously” means acting stealthily to avoid detection, which Schreier did by filming early on Christmas Eve morning with a small camera and adjusting the angle. The court also found the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bathroom.

    Facts

    The defendant, Schreier, stood outside his neighbor’s townhouse at 7:30 a.m. on Christmas Eve and filmed the complainant, his neighbor, while she was naked in her second-floor bathroom. The complainant had just exited the shower and opened the bathroom door to allow steam to dissipate. The defendant used a compact video camera and its zoom feature to record her for several minutes. The complainant noticed a red light and a black-gloved hand holding a camera outside her front door. The bathroom was almost directly in line with the front door. The defendant was six feet, two inches tall. An investigator testified he had to hold the camera over his head to obtain images of the bathroom through the window.

    Procedural History

    Schreier was convicted in County Court of unlawful surveillance in the second degree after a nonjury trial. County Court denied his motion for a trial order of dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the recording was made “surreptitiously” within the meaning of Penal Law § 250.45(1)?

    2. Whether the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her bathroom under Penal Law § 250.45(1)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant’s conduct was furtive and stealthy, attempting to obtain the video without being discovered.

    2. Yes, because a reasonable person would believe they could fully disrobe in privacy in their own bathroom, and the complainant had no reason to believe she could be seen from outside.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of “surreptitiously,” noting the statute doesn’t define it. The court applied the common meaning: something done “by stealth” or “clandestinely.” The court emphasized that the statute requires the perpetrator to make an effort to conceal their conduct or escape detection. Although the defendant was potentially exposed to public view, it was 7:30 a.m. on Christmas Eve, and he was holding a small black camera in a black-gloved hand, and had to hold the camera over his head to get the angle right. This, the court reasoned, was enough to show he was acting in a stealthy manner.

    Regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy, the court cited Penal Law § 250.40(1), which defines it as “a place and time when a reasonable person would believe that he or she could fully disrobe in privacy.” The court stated, “One’s own bathroom must certainly be the quintessential example of a location where an individual should expect privacy.” The fact that the complainant had the bathroom door open was not dispositive, as she had no indication she could be seen from outside. The court rejected the argument that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be used, stating that the legislature expressly defined “reasonable expectation of privacy” for the purposes of the statute, and that the Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusion.

    The court emphasized the intent of Stephanie’s Law to combat “video voyeurism” and the need to protect individuals in places where they expect privacy. As the court stated, “It cannot be that the legislature intended New Yorkers to have to shutter their own residences completely in order to garner the protection of this Penal Law provision.”

  • People v. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 970 (2013): Establishing a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

    People v. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 970 (2013)

    A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained from a search must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.

    Summary

    Defendant Leach sought to suppress a gun found in his grandmother’s apartment, arguing an illegal search. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the suppression motion, holding that Leach failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the specific bedroom where the gun was found. The court emphasized that the grandmother testified the room was reserved for other visiting grandchildren, and Leach had his own separate bedroom. Because there was record support for the lower courts’ finding that Leach lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to suppress.

    Facts

    Two shooters, identified as Tawond Leach and his brother, fired at an SUV occupied by three brothers. The victims identified the Leach brothers, noting they grew up together. Defendant Leach allegedly used a silver gun. The police arrested the Leach brothers at their grandmother’s apartment. A loaded silver gun was recovered from a bedroom in the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Leach was charged with attempted murder, attempted assault, reckless endangerment, and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Leach was convicted on several counts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant met his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the guest bedroom of his grandmother’s apartment, such that the search yielding the gun violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

    Holding

    No, because there was record support for the lower courts’ determination that the defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the guest bedroom, given the grandmother’s testimony that the room was reserved for other grandchildren and the defendant had his own separate bedroom.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. This requires showing a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Citing People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 (1996), the court stated: “A legitimate expectation of privacy exists where defendant has manifested an expectation of privacy [a subjective component] that society recognizes as reasonable [an objective component].” The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings if supported by the record. In this case, the grandmother’s testimony indicated that the defendant had his own bedroom, and the guest bedroom was specifically for other visiting grandchildren. The record was silent as to whether the defendant ever used the guest bedroom. The Court acknowledged that a contrary finding might have been reasonable but emphasized the availability of record support to uphold the lower courts’ determination. The court essentially found that the defendant failed to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a space that his grandmother explicitly stated was for other family members, even though the space was within her home. This case turns on the specific facts regarding access and control of the premises searched.

  • People v. Diaz, 101 A.D.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984): Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public Restroom Stalls

    People v. Diaz, 101 A.D.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)

    An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public restroom stall, but that expectation can be overcome by probable cause to believe criminal activity is occurring.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights within a public restroom stall. The Court of Appeals held that while a person generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy inside a closed toilet stall, this expectation is not absolute. When a police officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is taking place within the stall, a limited intrusion to investigate is permissible. The court found that the officer’s observations and inferences, based on the totality of the circumstances, provided the requisite probable cause to justify his actions. The defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance was therefore upheld.

    Facts

    On March 4, 1981, a Port Authority Police Officer, William Gray, received a tip about two men in a toilet stall at Kennedy Airport. Upon investigation, the officer heard two low male voices and, unable to see clearly through the gaps in the stall door, he climbed into the adjoining stall and observed the defendant and another man with an open envelope containing white powder. The defendant then dropped the envelope into the toilet. A subsequent search revealed 19 bags of heroin on the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied. He pleaded guilty to the crime and was sentenced to five years’ probation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer’s actions in looking into the toilet stall constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights?

    Holding

    No, because based on the articulated, objective facts before Officer Gray, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, it was “more probable than not” that criminal activity was taking place inside that stall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by acknowledging the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable government intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy, citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1, 7. It emphasized that this protection extends to places where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a public telephone booth or a closed toilet stall. The court reasoned that a toilet stall exists precisely to ensure privacy and shield its occupant from public view.

    However, the court also noted that the Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable intrusions. Suspicion of criminal conduct alone is insufficient to negate one’s privacy interest, but particular circumstances may justify an intrusion. The court distinguished this case from situations where a general warrant or indiscriminate search is conducted.

    In this specific instance, the officer was working in airport security and investigating a tip. The officer, based on his experience and senses, reasonably concluded that two men were using a single toilet stall in a manner inconsistent with its intended purpose. The absence of any indication of a disability or illness further supported his suspicion. The Court reasoned that Officer Gray had a reasonable basis for suspecting a drug crime or a sex crime was in progress. The court noted, “His suspicions heightened by what he saw and heard from afar, the officer was not compelled to turn heel and leave the rest room, but could properly look through the spaces at the sides of the door in an effort to learn what was going on inside. When those observations served only to enhance his suspicion of illicit activity, he properly entered the adjoining stall and looked over the partition.”

    The court explicitly rejected the argument that probable cause requires proof to a mathematical certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it adopted a “more probable than not” standard, citing People v. Carrasquilla, 54 NY2d 248, 254. The Court found that the officer’s articulated, objective facts and reasonable inferences met this standard, justifying his intrusion.

  • People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981): Dog Sniffs and Fourth Amendment Rights

    People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981)

    The use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Leonard Price was arrested after a trained dog alerted police to the presence of drugs in his luggage at an airport. Price argued that the dog sniff was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and thus the subsequent warrant obtained based on the dog’s reaction was invalid. The New York Court of Appeals held that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it does not intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court reasoned that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air. This case establishes an exception to the warrant requirement based on the limited and non-intrusive nature of a canine sniff.

    Facts

    Leonard Price and Carl Parsons were observed at the Los Angeles airport exhibiting nervous behavior and carrying large sums of cash while purchasing tickets for a flight to Buffalo shortly before departure.

    Detective Kaiser, suspicious of their behavior, alerted other officers who brought a trained narcotics detection dog named Frog to the airline’s baggage area.

    Frog alerted to the presence of controlled substances in the defendants’ luggage.

    Based on the dog’s reaction and Detective Kaiser’s observations, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was contacted, who then relayed the information to the New York State Police.

    The State Police obtained a search warrant for the defendants and their luggage.

    After the defendants claimed their baggage at the Buffalo airport, drug enforcement agents stopped and searched them, finding a large amount of heroin in one of the suitcases.

    Procedural History

    Price was indicted on charges related to criminal possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.

    Price moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniff in Los Angeles was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and that the subsequent warrant in New York was therefore invalid.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

    Price pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air in a public place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy, citing Terry v. Ohio and Katz v. United States.

    While acknowledging that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of closed luggage (United States v. Chadwick), the court distinguished this from the act of a dog sniffing the air surrounding the luggage.

    The court stated, “Since the dog does nothing more than smell the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect odors emanating from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the luggage. Defendant must assert a reasonable expectation that the air surrounding his luggage and the odor apparent in that surrounding air will remain private. In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment affords no protection.”

    The court relied on analogous precedent regarding items in plain view and odors noticeable to the public, noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in plain view of an officer lawfully in the position from which he observes the item (Harris v. United States), and that “there can be no reasonable expectation that plainly noticeable odors will remain private.”

    The court cited federal cases that have considered the use of drug-sniffing dogs and concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air surrounding one’s possessions (e.g., United States v. Fulero, United States v. Venema, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Solis, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court reasoned that “once one releases something into the open air, there can be little reasonable expectation of asserting one’s claims of privacy in either the item itself or in the surrounding air.”

    The court compared the use of a dog to track contraband to the use of dogs to track escaped criminals or lost persons, as well as the use of a flashlight to enhance an officer’s vision (People v. Cruz, People v. Sullivan).

    The court also noted that airline passengers surrender some expectation of privacy by entrusting their luggage to a common carrier responsible for ensuring passenger safety, referencing airport searches (People v. Kuhn, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court concluded that the police acted properly by seeking a warrant to search the luggage after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs (United States v. Chadwick), finding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant based on the defendants’ behavior, the large amount of cash they carried, and the dog’s reaction and training.