New York Law Review

Tag: reasonable accommodation

  • Jacobsen v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824 (2014): Employer’s Duty to Engage in Interactive Process for Disability Accommodation

    22 N.Y.3d 824 (2014)

    An employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process to explore reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee generally precludes summary judgment in the employer’s favor on disability discrimination claims under New York State and City Human Rights Laws.

    Summary

    William Jacobsen sued New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), alleging disability discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws after he was terminated following a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis. Jacobsen requested accommodations, including a transfer to a less hazardous location and respiratory equipment. HHC moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that HHC’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding Jacobsen’s requested accommodations created a triable issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. The court emphasized that employers must consider an employee’s proposed accommodations and engage in a dialogue about their feasibility.

    Facts

    William Jacobsen worked for HHC as a health facilities planner since 1979. His job involved site visits to construction projects. In 2005, he was transferred to a location with more frequent site visits and was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis due to asbestos exposure. Jacobsen requested a three-month medical leave and, upon his return, requested accommodations including protective respiratory equipment and a transfer back to the central office where he had previously worked with less exposure to construction sites. These requests were largely unmet, and he was eventually placed on unpaid medical leave and then terminated.

    Procedural History

    Jacobsen filed a complaint alleging disability discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws, as well as gross negligence. The Supreme Court granted HHC’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding a disabled employee’s request for reasonable accommodation precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.
    2. Whether an employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding a disabled employee’s request for reasonable accommodation precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under the New York City Human Rights Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the employer must demonstrate it considered the requested accommodation and engaged in interactions revealing deliberation on its viability to obtain summary judgment on a State HRL claim.
    2. Yes, because the City HRL provides broader protections against disability discrimination, unquestionably foreclosing summary judgment where the employer has not engaged in a good faith interactive process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that both the State and City Human Rights Laws require employers to engage in a good faith interactive process when an employee requests a reasonable accommodation. The court emphasized the individualized standard required by the State HRL, meant to move away from generalized assumptions about disabilities. The court cited the legislative intent behind the HRL amendments, which sought to encourage fair-minded discussion and voluntary integration of disabled employees into the workplace. The court held that HHC failed to demonstrate that it engaged in such a process with Jacobsen. Regarding the City HRL claim, the court noted the employer bears the burden to show the unavailability of any safe and reasonable accommodation. The court pointed to conflicting evidence regarding Jacobsen’s ability to perform his job duties at the central office, and HHC’s failure to adequately consider his request for a respirator. The court stated, “The relevant inquiry is whether the employee was capable of performing the core functions of the employee’s position at the time that the employer refused to accommodate the employee’s disability.” The court concluded that, at the very least, a material issue of fact existed as to whether HHC reasonably accommodated Jacobsen’s disability.
    The Court rejected the argument that Jacobsen’s eventual total disability relieved HHC of liability, stating that the statutes are designed to protect workers from being forced to choose between their health and their livelihood. While the court acknowledged the burden of proof at trial would be on Jacobsen to prove a reasonable accommodation existed under the State HRL, HHC had not met its burden on summary judgment of showing, as a matter of law, that no such accommodation was available. The court explicitly rejected an interpretation of Phillips v City of New York that a good faith interactive process is an independent element which, if lacking, automatically compels summary judgment for the employee. The lack of such a process is a factor in determining whether an accommodation was available.

  • Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881 (2013): Indefinite Leave and Differing Disability Standards in State and City HRL

    Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881 (2013)

    Under the New York State Human Rights Law, a request for indefinite leave is not considered a reasonable accommodation, but the New York City Human Rights Law provides broader protections and places the burden on the employer to prove undue hardship and that the employee could not perform essential job functions with reasonable accommodation.

    Summary

    Giuseppe Romanello, an executive at Intesa Sanpaolo, was terminated after informing his employer of his severe and disabling illnesses and an “indeterminate” return-to-work date. He sued, alleging disability discrimination under both the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL). The Court of Appeals held that while the State HRL claim was properly dismissed because indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation under that statute, the City HRL claim should be reinstated because the City HRL places the burden on the employer to prove that no reasonable accommodation would allow the employee to perform the job’s essential functions.

    Facts

    Giuseppe Romanello, an executive with Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa), became ill and unable to work, diagnosed with major depression and other disorders. After nearly five months of paid leave, Intesa inquired about his return. Romanello’s counsel responded that his return date was “indeterminate” due to his ongoing illnesses. Intesa then terminated his employment, even as he sought and received long-term disability payments under Intesa’s policy.

    Procedural History

    Romanello sued Intesa, alleging disability discrimination under the State HRL and City HRL. The Supreme Court dismissed both claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals from so much of the Appellate Division order as affirmed the dismissal of the severed first and second causes of action.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff stated a claim for disability discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) when he requested an indefinite leave of absence.

    2. Whether the plaintiff stated a claim for disability discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL) when he requested an indefinite leave of absence.

    Holding

    1. No, because under the State HRL, a “reasonable accommodation” does not include indefinite leave; thus, the first cause of action was properly dismissed.

    2. Yes, because the City HRL provides broader protections for discrimination plaintiffs, and the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee could not perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between the State HRL and City HRL. Under the State HRL, a disability is “limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held” (Executive Law § 292 [21]). The Court stated that indefinite leave is not considered a reasonable accommodation under the State HRL, citing Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 176 (1st Dept 2009). Because Romanello requested an “indeterminate” leave, he failed to state a claim under the State HRL.

    However, the Court emphasized the broader protections of the City HRL, stating that its provisions “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof” and “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible” (Albunio v City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477-478 [2011]). The City HRL does not define disability with reference to reasonable accommodation, as the State HRL does (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-102 [16]). Instead, it requires employers to “make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job,” and it is the employer’s burden to prove undue hardship and that the employee could not, with reasonable accommodation, perform the job (Administrative Code § 8-107 [15] [a]; Phillips, 66 AD3d at 183). Since Intesa did not attempt to meet this burden, the City HRL claim should not have been dismissed.

  • Louis Harris & Associates, Inc. v. deLeon, 84 N.Y.2d 698 (1994): Impact of Agency Delay on Discrimination Claims

    84 N.Y.2d 698 (1994)

    An agency’s failure to promptly investigate a discrimination complaint, as directed by statute, does not automatically warrant dismissal absent a showing of substantial prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay.

    Summary

    Louis Harris & Associates was accused of disability discrimination. The New York City Commission on Human Rights took almost six years to issue a probable cause determination and over seven years to reach a final decision. Harris argued the delay prejudiced its defense. The court held that while lengthy delays are concerning, they don’t automatically invalidate agency decisions. The party claiming prejudice must demonstrate actual, substantial harm caused by the delay. Since Harris failed to show how the delay specifically hindered its ability to defend itself, the Commission’s finding of discrimination was upheld. The court emphasized that antidiscrimination laws serve an important public policy, and delay alone is insufficient to overturn a decision absent concrete prejudice.

    Facts

    Jay Leventhal, who is blind, interviewed with Louis Harris & Associates for a telephone polling position in 1984. Despite Leventhal’s experience and suggestions for accommodations, he was told he wouldn’t be hired because Harris couldn’t reasonably accommodate his disability. Leventhal filed a complaint with the NYC Commission on Human Rights. After an initial response from Harris, the Commission took almost four years to contact Harris again regarding the complaint.

    Procedural History

    Leventhal filed a complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights in 1984. The Commission issued a probable cause determination in 1990 and held a hearing in 1991. The Commission found Harris guilty of discrimination in December 1991. Harris then filed a special proceeding to annul the Commission’s determination. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then granted Harris leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commission’s excessive delay in processing Leventhal’s complaint prejudiced Harris as a matter of law, requiring dismissal without inquiry into actual prejudice?
    2. Whether the Commission erred in placing the burden on Harris to prove it was unable to reasonably accommodate Leventhal’s disability?

    Holding

    1. No, because mere lapse of time in an administrative determination, standing alone, does not constitute prejudice as a matter of law. Actual prejudice must be demonstrated.
    2. No, because the Commission’s practical construction of the statute, placing the burden on the employer to prove undue hardship, is reasonable and consistent with federal antidiscrimination laws.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that prior cases established that administrative delay, by itself, is insufficient to establish prejudice. The Court cited Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Home v Axelrod, outlining factors to assess the reasonableness of administrative delay: the private interest compromised, actual prejudice, the causal connection between the parties’ conduct and the delay, and the underlying public policy. The Court found the public policy advanced by anti-discrimination laws is of utmost importance. While Harris wasn’t responsible for the delay, it also didn’t demonstrate “repetitive, purposeless and oppressive” action by the Commission. The court noted that a lack of resources often contributes to agency inaction. Harris argued its ability to defend itself was compromised due to witness memory loss (Holden). However, the Commission’s finding of discrimination was based on Stacpole’s (another Harris employee) actions, not Holden’s. Harris didn’t call Stacpole as a witness. The court emphasized Harris was aware of the allegations and could have taken steps to preserve evidence. Regarding the burden of proof for reasonable accommodation, the Court deferred to the Commission’s interpretation of the statute, as it was not unreasonable. The court reasoned that it is rational to place the ultimate burden on the employer who is in the better position to assess the feasibility of possible accommodations and to know how they will impact its business operations. The court also cited the importance of interpreting statutes by according meaning to all words within the statute.

  • Matter of McAnuff v. New York City Transit Authority, 56 N.Y.2d 141 (1982): Reasonable Accommodation and Disability Discrimination

    Matter of McAnuff v. New York City Transit Authority, 56 N.Y.2d 141 (1982)

    Under New York’s Human Rights Law, an employer cannot discriminate against an employee with a disability if the employee can perform the essential functions of the job in a reasonable manner, even if the employee cannot perform the duties in a perfect manner.

    Summary

    McAnuff, a railroad clerk, was appointed to a supervisory position with the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) subject to a probationary period. After being hospitalized for a heart condition, he was initially cleared to return to “full duty status,” but later deemed unable to perform the full duties of his supervisory role due to stair climbing restrictions. His probation was terminated, and he was demoted. McAnuff sued, alleging disability discrimination. The Court of Appeals held that the Authority must demonstrate that McAnuff’s condition prevents him from performing the job’s essential functions in a reasonable manner, not perfectly, to justify the termination.

    Facts

    In 1971, McAnuff became a railroad clerk with the Authority after passing a competitive exam.
    In 1975, he passed the exam for assistant station supervisor and was placed on the eligibility list.
    On November 10, 1979, he was appointed assistant station supervisor, subject to a one-year probationary period.
    In 1980, he was hospitalized multiple times for a heart condition and was absent from work from September 20 to October 20.
    On October 20, 1980, the Authority’s cardiac consultant cleared him for “full duty status.”
    On October 27, 1980, the same doctor found him “not qualified to do full duty” as a supervisor due to stair climbing limitations, but cleared him to work as a railroad clerk.
    On November 6, 1980, his probation was terminated, and he was demoted back to railroad clerk.

    Procedural History

    In January 1981, McAnuff commenced an Article 78 proceeding, claiming disability discrimination and seeking reinstatement with back pay.
    The Authority moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, citing unsatisfactory probationary service and the cardiac consultant’s finding that McAnuff was unfit for full duty.
    The trial court granted the motion to dismiss without a hearing, finding that the medical finding meant McAnuff could not perform the job reasonably.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Authority discriminated against McAnuff in violation of the Human Rights Law by terminating his probationary appointment due to his heart condition.
    Whether, under the amended Human Rights Law, the Authority must demonstrate that McAnuff is incapable of performing the essential functions of the supervisory position in a reasonable manner, not perfectly, to justify termination.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Authority may have discriminated against McAnuff based on his disability.
    Yes, because the statute bars discrimination against an impaired individual who is reasonably able to do what the position requires. The employer must show the employee’s condition precludes them from performing the job to that extent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that while a probationary employee can be terminated without a hearing or stated reasons, the termination cannot be for reasons prohibited by law, such as discrimination based on disability.
    The Court reviewed the evolution of the Human Rights Law, noting that prior to 1979, a disability was defined as a condition “unrelated to the ability to engage in the activities involved in the job.”
    The 1979 amendment broadened the definition to include conditions that “do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought.”
    The Court stated, “Under the current statute, then, it is not enough for the employer to show that the employee’s physical impairment is somehow related to the duties he must perform in the position sought. Nor is it sufficient to show that the impairment precludes the employee from performing the duties in a perfect manner.”
    The court emphasized that “the determinative question under the amended statute is whether the petitioner is incapable of performing the duties required by the supervisory position in a reasonable manner and nothing submitted thus far by either side eliminates this as a factual question.”
    The Court concluded that the motion to dismiss should have been denied, and the Authority should be required to answer the petition, addressing the discrimination issue. The court must then determine if a hearing is needed to determine (1) if the termination was due to McAnuff’s physical condition, and (2) if the restrictions imposed by that condition justify a conclusion that he cannot perform the job in a reasonable manner.