Tag: Real Property Law

  • Pappas v. Garber, 21 A.D.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964): Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Absent a Common Plan

    Pappas v. Garber, 21 A.D.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964)

    A restrictive covenant is only enforceable by a landowner against another landowner in a subdivision if there is clear and definite evidence of a common plan or scheme of development demonstrating that the covenants were intended for the mutual benefit of all grantees.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, landowners in a subdivision, sought to enforce a restrictive covenant against the defendant, a neighboring landowner, to prevent the conversion of a barn into a second residence. The covenant, included in the defendant’s deed, restricted the property to a single residence. The court held that the plaintiffs could not enforce the covenant because they failed to prove the existence of a common plan or scheme of development indicating that the covenant was intended for the mutual benefit of all grantees in the subdivision. The absence of a filed map, lack of evidence that purchasers relied on a common scheme, and inconsistent advertising materials undermined the claim of a general plan.

    Facts

    Garber Lake Realty Corp. acquired a tract of land in 1946 without restrictions. Between 1947 and 1955, Garber conveyed approximately 20 parcels, including those owned by the plaintiffs. All but one of these conveyances contained a restrictive covenant limiting the property to a single residence. The defendant purchased a plot from Garber in 1957, with a similar covenant in the deed. The defendant began converting a barn on their property into a second residence, prompting the plaintiffs to sue to enforce the restrictive covenant. A map plotting numerous parcels existed but was never filed or shown to purchasers. The defendant conveyed the portion of her land with the barn to her son after the lawsuit began.

    Procedural History

    The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, enforcing the restrictive covenant. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the existence of a common plan of development necessary to enforce the covenant against the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs, as landowners in a subdivision, can enforce a restrictive covenant contained in the defendant’s deed, when the plaintiffs are not parties to the deed and allege a common plan of development.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to prove that a common plan or scheme of development existed indicating that the restrictive covenants were intended for the mutual benefit of all grantees in the subdivision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plaintiffs, as strangers to the deed containing the covenant, had the burden of proving that the similar covenants in the deeds from Garber Realty were intended for the mutual benefit of all grantees, not just for the grantor, Garber. Absent an explicit provision in the covenant stating it was for the benefit of other grantees (creating third-party beneficiary status), the plaintiffs needed to show that the parcels were part of a general plan of development. The court found the evidence lacking to support this claim. The court emphasized that no map was ever filed or shown to prospective purchasers, and no testimony indicated that any grantee bought with knowledge of or reliance on a uniform scheme of restrictions. The court noted that only four of the deeds gave any indication of a plan, stating the property was intended for first-class residential use, but even these deeds lacked uniform, mutually binding restrictions. The court stated, “[T]here is simply a complete failure of proof that a uniform scheme of restrictions was ever made manifest to all parties, and most certainly a failure of proof that this defendant, a purchaser for value, had notice, actual or constructive, of any such common scheme.” The advertisement for the liquidation sale further undermined the claim, boasting of the area’s recreational potential and suitability for various uses, including subdivision for private homes, summer camps, or dude ranches, which is inconsistent with a uniform residential scheme. The court also found significant that other parcels sold at the same sale included language subjecting them to existing restrictions, which was absent from the defendant’s deed, indicating no intent to bind the defendant’s parcel to the same restrictions. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant had notice, actual or constructive, of any common scheme.

  • Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370 (1917): Lessor’s Liability for Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment After Transferring Title

    Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370 (1917)

    A lessor who covenants for quiet enjoyment is liable for breach of that covenant even after transferring title to the property, particularly if the breach results from the lessor’s failure to take necessary measures, such as paying interest on an existing mortgage.

    Summary

    Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. leased property from Kernochan, who later conveyed the property to another party. The lease contained a covenant for quiet enjoyment. When the new owner defaulted on the mortgage, the plaintiff, Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co., was evicted. The court addressed whether Kernochan was liable for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment despite no longer owning the property. The Court of Appeals held that Kernochan was liable, emphasizing that the covenant was not conditional on continued ownership and that a lessor cannot simply abandon their obligations by transferring title. The Court reasoned that the lessor’s failure to protect the lessee from foreseeable risks, like mortgage foreclosure, constituted a breach.

    Facts

    1. Kernochan owned premises in New York City and mortgaged them.
    2. Kernochan conveyed the property to the defendant.
    3. Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co., knowing about the mortgage, leased part of the building from Kernochan for five years with an option to renew for another five. The lease included a covenant for quiet enjoyment.
    4. Kernochan paid the mortgage interest while he owned the property.
    5. Kernochan conveyed the property to another party.
    6. The new owner defaulted on the mortgage.
    7. The mortgage was foreclosed, and Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. was evicted.

    Procedural History

    Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. sued Kernochan for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The trial court directed a verdict against Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. The judgment was affirmed by the appellate division. Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a lessor who covenants for quiet enjoyment remains liable for a breach of that covenant after conveying title to the property, when the breach arises from a pre-existing mortgage on which the new owner defaults.

    Holding

    Yes, because the lessor’s covenant for quiet enjoyment is a continuing obligation that survives the transfer of title, and the lessor is responsible for taking measures to ensure the lessee’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises for the term of the lease.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the covenant for quiet enjoyment was unconditional. Kernochan promised that Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. would “peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy the said demised premises for the term aforesaid.” The court stated, “His promise was not conditional upon his retention of title, nor upon the lessee’s ignorance of the existence of the mortgage nor upon refusal to pay rent to the grantee. Without qualification the compact was made. Its obligation has not been fulfilled.”

    The court distinguished this case from Wagner v. Van Schaick Realty Co., noting that the facts were different. The court stated, “When a lessor covenants for quiet enjoyment, he is bound to take such measures in relation to the mortgage as will enable him to accomplish the purpose of his covenant. His promise survives his divestment of title. If he is at fault in failing to provide payment of interest on the mortgage, even after he has ceased to hold title to the premises, he must answer for his fault. His interest in the lease continues to the extent of his covenant and he will not be allowed to abandon the obligations which he has assumed. He is liable for the loss of the bargain.”

    The court cited Mack v. Patchin and Friedland v. Myers, establishing that the lessor is liable for damages when at fault for failing to protect the lessee’s rights under the covenant. The court recognized exceptions to the ordinary rule of damages, especially when the lessor fails to remedy defects in title or refuses to incur expenses to fulfill the contract.