New York Law Review

Tag: Readiness for Trial

  • People v. Williams, 90 N.Y.2d 894 (1997): Defining ‘Readiness for Trial’ under Speedy Trial Rules

    90 N.Y.2d 894 (1997)

    A prosecutor’s declaration of readiness for trial applies to all charges for which they are prepared to proceed, even if a related felony charge is pending procedural reduction to a misdemeanor.

    Summary

    Defendant Williams was convicted of criminal mischief and petit larceny. The case originated with a felony charge that the People sought to reduce to a misdemeanor. While the reduction was pending, the People declared their readiness for trial. The defendant argued that the delay in formally reducing the felony charge meant the People’s declaration of readiness was untimely under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the People’s readiness extended to the misdemeanor charges, and delays were also attributable to the defendant’s pretrial motions and changes of counsel. The procedural delay in reducing the felony charge did not negate the readiness for the misdemeanor charges.

    Facts

    On March 13, 1996, the People initiated an action against Williams for criminal mischief in the third degree (a felony) and petit larceny (a misdemeanor). Williams was arraigned on March 29, 1996.

    Procedural History

    On May 14, 1996, the People stated they were ready for trial and moved to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor. The defendant and the court consented, but the reduction wasn’t properly executed under CPL 180.50. The charge was formally reduced on October 15, 1996, with the People reiterating their readiness. The County Court affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s declaration of readiness for trial on May 14, 1996, was ineffective due to the pending procedural reduction of the felony charge, thus violating CPL 30.30’s speedy trial requirements?

    Holding

    No, because the People’s readiness for trial included the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny, which was unaffected by the procedural mechanics of CPL 180.50, and delays were attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People’s statement of readiness on May 14, 1996, encompassed the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny. The court emphasized that the procedural delay in reducing the felony charge did not invalidate the People’s readiness regarding the already existing misdemeanor charge. The court also noted that the defendant’s numerous pre-trial motions and five changes of attorney contributed to the delay, making it unreasonable to charge six months to the People under CPL 30.30 (4)(a), (f). The court implicitly applied the principle that a declaration of readiness should be evaluated in light of the actual preparedness to proceed on at least some of the charges. The court concluded: “when the People answered ready on May 14, 1996, their readiness included the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny. That unreduced charge was unaffected by the procedural mechanics of CPL 180.50.”

  • People v. Chavis, 91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998): Statement of Readiness for Trial Requires Actual Trial Preparation

    91 N.Y.2d 500 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for a pre-trial hearing, such as a Huntley hearing, does not equate to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, and therefore, delays due to court congestion before a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the prosecution.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested and charged with attempted murder. The People announced readiness for a Huntley hearing but never declared readiness for trial. After multiple adjournments, mostly due to court congestion, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules (CPL 30.30). The People argued that their readiness for the Huntley hearing should count as trial readiness. The Court of Appeals held that readiness for a pre-trial hearing does not satisfy the requirement of readiness for trial, and pre-readiness delays caused by court congestion are chargeable to the prosecution. Thus, the indictment was properly dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendants were arrested on March 14, 1994, and arraigned the following day. On April 7 and 8, 1994, the defendants were arraigned on an indictment charging them with attempted murder and related offenses. A Huntley hearing was set for October 17, 1994. The People stated they were ready for the hearing on that date, but it was adjourned to January 17, 1995, at the request of the defense. On January 17, the People were not ready due to an unavailable witness. The hearing was adjourned four times over 203 days. The People never stated they were ready for trial or filed a certificate of trial readiness.

    Procedural History

    In September 1995, defendants moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), arguing that the People exceeded the 184-day speedy trial limit. The trial court granted the motion, rejecting the argument that readiness for a hearing equaled readiness for trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the People were ready for trial before January 17. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s statement of readiness for a Huntley hearing is equivalent to a statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30?

    2. Whether delays caused by court congestion prior to a declaration of trial readiness are chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes?

    Holding

    1. No, because a pretrial suppression hearing is not the equivalent of a trial, and readiness for one does not demonstrate readiness for the other.

    2. Yes, because in the absence of a statement of readiness to proceed to trial, any delay due to court congestion is chargeable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 30.30 (1)(a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months. “‘Ready for trial’ comprises two elements: (i) ‘either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court…or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk’ and (ii) the People must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness” (quoting People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337). The court stated that a Huntley hearing determines narrow issues of admissibility, not the same as a trial. A statement of readiness for a hearing is only “an expectation of future readiness,” not a present readiness. Because the People never declared readiness for trial, the 92-day delay from court congestion was chargeable to them, exceeding the 184-day limit. The Court reiterated that the People could have avoided the delay by filing a certificate of readiness, assuming actual readiness. The Court stated the People waived their right to argue certain periods should have been excluded because they conceded those points before the motion court. The Court concluded that the People failed to meet their speedy trial obligation.

  • People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995): Commencement of Criminal Action for Speedy Trial Purposes After DAT Issuance

    People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995)

    For speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences when a defendant appears in court in response to a desk appearance ticket (DAT), regardless of whether an accusatory instrument has been filed; however, a subsequent statement of readiness can toll the speedy trial clock during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Summary

    Anderson was arrested and issued a DAT. He appeared in court as directed, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. It was eventually filed months later. After delays, Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules. The New York Court of Appeals held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when the defendant first appears in court in response to the DAT. However, the Court also clarified that a subsequent statement of readiness by the prosecution can halt the running of the speedy trial clock during an adjournment, even if the adjournment was initially caused by the prosecution’s unreadiness.

    Facts

    Anderson was arrested on December 23, 1992, for fraudulently endorsing a check and was issued a DAT directing him to appear in court on January 22, 1993.
    He appeared on January 22, 1993, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. He was instructed to return on March 4. Anderson returned on that date, and again on April 16, when the police detective signed the felony complaint. It was not filed until May 4, 1993, when Anderson was arraigned.

    Procedural History

    The People announced readiness on July 19, but post-readiness delays occurred. Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment 15 months later, on October 31, 1994.
    Supreme Court granted the motion, finding 214 days chargeable to the People.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding 219 days chargeable to the People.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, under CPL 30.30 (5)(b), a criminal action commences for speedy trial purposes when a defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, even if an accusatory instrument has not been filed.
    2. Whether a subsequent statement of readiness by the People can stop the speedy trial clock from running during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 30.30(5)(b) specifically states that a criminal action is “deemed” to have commenced when the defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, regardless of the filing of an accusatory instrument.
    2. Yes, because a notice of readiness constitutes a commitment to proceed, satisfying the People’s duty and tolling the speedy trial clock, even if the adjournment was initially due to the People’s lack of readiness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the commencement of the action, the Court reasoned that CPL 30.30(5)(b) creates an exception to the general rule that a criminal action commences upon the filing of the accusatory instrument. The legislative history of CPL 30.30(5)(b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended the speedy trial clock to begin running upon the defendant’s physical appearance in court in response to the DAT.

    The Court stated, “[T]he logical sanction for delay in filing a criminal complaint is simply to deem the criminal action commenced once the defendant has appeared in the local criminal court in compliance with the instructions contained in the DAT, solely for the purpose of calculating the time from which the prosecutor must become ready for trial.”

    Regarding the 48-day period of adjournment, the Court acknowledged that the People bear the burden of explaining adjournments. However, the Court found that the People’s notice of readiness, served during the adjournment, served to toll the speedy trial clock from running. The court distinguished between court congestion and delays caused by the People’s own laxity. Since the defendant did not contest the People’s actual readiness as reflected in the notice, only the time before the notice of readiness was chargeable to the People.

    The court emphasized that “a notice of readiness is the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People’s duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the ‘speedy trial clock’ from running for the remainder of that adjournment period.”

  • People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Declarations

    People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792 (1996)

    A pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 if it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to proceed within the statutory speedy trial period, and the delay is not solely attributable to the People’s conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30. The Court held that such a declaration is valid if the defendant could have been arraigned and the trial commenced within the six-month statutory period, distinguishing People v. England where the People’s actions made timely arraignment impossible. The Court clarified that the responsibility for scheduling arraignments rests with the court, not the prosecution, and post-readiness delays caused by the court are not charged against the People. The indictments were improperly dismissed because the People had declared readiness within the statutory period.

    Facts

    In People v. Goss, a felony complaint was filed against Goss on July 19, 1993. An indictment was filed on January 14, 1994, and the People declared readiness, notifying Goss of a January 24, 1994 arraignment. Goss failed to appear, and was arraigned on February 7, 1994. In People v. Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, a felony complaint was filed on October 19, 1993, and an indictment was filed on April 14, 1994, with the People declaring readiness and setting arraignments for April 22, 1994. Gaymon was arraigned on April 25, 1994.

    Procedural History

    In Goss, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on CPL 30.30, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Avery, Gaymon, and Cole, the trial court also granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pre-arraignment declaration of readiness for trial is valid under CPL 30.30 when it was possible for the defendant to be arraigned within the six-month statutory period.

    Holding

    Yes, because the critical factor is whether arraignment and trial could have occurred within the statutory period, and delays caused by the court in scheduling arraignments are not attributable to the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its holding in People v. England, where the People’s delay in securing an indictment until the last day of the statutory period made a timely arraignment impossible. The Court emphasized that England created a narrow exception applicable only when the People’s actions make timely arraignment impossible. The Court reaffirmed the principle that delays between indictment and arraignment, by themselves, do not prevent the People from being ready for trial, quoting People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930, 931, noting that “[d]elays between indictment and the arraignment * * * do not prevent the People from being ready for trial”.

    The Court emphasized that arraigning a defendant is exclusively a court function, citing CPL 210.10. The court has a “nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant.” Therefore, any delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the prosecution. The Court stated, “Where, as in these cases, a felony complaint was previously filed in local criminal court, the Criminal Procedure Law imposes a nondelegable duty on the trial court to arraign the defendant. Neither local practice violative of CPL 210.10 (2) nor consent of the parties can divest the court of this responsibility.” Because the People declared readiness before the expiration of the six-month period and the delay in arraignment was attributable to the court, the dismissals were in error.

  • People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995): Adequacy of Readiness Statements for Speedy Trial

    People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995)

    A statement of readiness for trial is sufficient for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30(1)(a) if the prosecution communicates its readiness on the record and is, in fact, ready to proceed at that time.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Appellate Division had previously reversed the initial conviction and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution’s statement of readiness, made within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal, satisfied the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Court clarified that a valid statement of readiness must be communicated on the record and reflect actual readiness, not merely a prediction of future readiness. Here, the prosecution secured the complainant’s cooperation, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was originally convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial. On March 22, 1990, following the reversal, the prosecution stated, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward.” The defendant subsequently argued that the People violated his right to a speedy trial by not being ready within six months as required by CPL 30.30(1)(a).

    Procedural History

    1. The defendant was initially convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial.
    2. On the defendant’s second appeal, the Appellate Division remitted the case to County Court for a CPL 30.30 hearing.
    3. After the hearing, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction.
    4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s statement, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward,” was a sufficient indication of readiness to satisfy the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a) for speedy trial purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution communicated their readiness on the record within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the initial conviction, and possessed the ability to proceed with trial at that time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied CPL 30.30(1)(a), which requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. In this case, the relevant date for calculating the six-month period was the date of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s first conviction. The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, which established a two-pronged test for a valid statement of readiness: (1) the People must communicate their state of readiness on the record, and (2) the People must, in fact, be ready to proceed when they proclaim readiness.

    The Court found that the first element of Kendzia was satisfied by the prosecution’s on-the-record statement to the court. As to the second element, the Court emphasized that CPL 30.30 requires actual readiness, “and not a prediction or expectation of future readiness.” The court found that the People met this standard because they had secured the complainant’s cooperation for retrial, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant. The statement was therefore deemed a valid declaration of readiness, and the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The Court distinguished the facts from situations where the prosecution merely expresses a hope or expectation of future readiness, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to have taken concrete steps demonstrating their preparedness to proceed to trial. The Court agreed with the prior courts’ determination that the statement sufficiently indicated the People’s readiness for trial.

  • People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994): Actual Readiness Required for Speedy Trial

    84 N.Y.2d 1 (1994)

    A valid statement of readiness for trial requires the People to be actually ready to proceed at the time the statement is made, and readiness is not established where the People’s own conduct has made it impossible for the defendant to be arraigned within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint on June 24, 1992. Six months later, on December 24, 1992, the Grand Jury handed up an indictment, and the People filed a notice of readiness for trial. England moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People were not ready for trial within the six-month statutory period under CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People’s delay in securing an indictment, making arraignment impossible within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness illusory.

    Facts

    On June 24, 1992, Crystal England was arrested on a felony complaint. She was arraigned in Town Court and released under supervision. On December 24, 1992, six months after the initial complaint, the Grand Jury issued an indictment. The People filed a notice of readiness for trial along with the indictment on the same day. England had not yet been arraigned on the indictment as of December 24th.

    Procedural History

    England moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with CPL 30.30. The County Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can validly declare readiness for trial when, as a result of their own delay in obtaining an indictment, the defendant cannot be arraigned and thus trial cannot commence within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Holding

    No, because the People’s statement of readiness was meaningless when arraignment within the statutory period was impossible due to the People’s delay in securing an indictment. A valid declaration of readiness requires actual readiness, not just a pro forma announcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30 requires dismissal of a felony indictment if the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action. The statutory period began with the filing of the felony complaint on June 24, 1992, and expired on December 24, 1992.

    The Court emphasized that “trial readiness in CPL 30.30 means both a communication of readiness by the People on the record and an indication of present readiness.” People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337. The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried. The Court distinguished delays caused by court congestion, which do not affect the People’s readiness, from delays caused by the People’s own inaction.

    The Court reasoned that because a defendant cannot be brought to trial before arraignment (CPL 1.20[9]), the People’s failure to secure an indictment in a timely manner, thereby preventing arraignment within the statutory period, rendered their statement of readiness meaningless. “Where the trial court and Appellate Division have found the relevant period to be entirely chargeable to the unexplained laxity of the People, the announcement of trial readiness before defendant was even brought before the court can only be an empty declaration, insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30.”

    The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling effectively shortens the six-month period provided by CPL 30.30, requiring the People to ensure not only that they are ready for trial but also that the defendant can be arraigned within that period. The dissent contended that the People had performed all the tasks required of them within the 183 days and that the delay in arraignment was the court’s responsibility. The dissent viewed the majority’s decision as improperly blending the analyses for pre-readiness and post-readiness delay.

  • People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993): Establishes Clear Requirements for Prosecutorial Readiness Under Speedy Trial Rules

    People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993)

    Under New York’s speedy trial statute, the prosecution must affirmatively communicate readiness for trial on the record, and any delays caused by the court or the prosecution’s inability to proceed are chargeable to the prosecution unless a valid certificate of readiness has been filed.

    Summary

    The case clarifies the prosecution’s obligation to demonstrate readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, New York’s speedy trial statute. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution is charged with any delay beyond the adjournment date they requested unless they affirmatively state their readiness for trial on the record or file a certificate of readiness. The defense’s rejection of the original date or the defense counsel’s unavailability does not automatically exclude that time from being charged to the prosecution. The case emphasizes the need for a clear, objective record of prosecutorial readiness to avoid ambiguity and ensure defendants’ speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this decision. The appeal concerns only the issue of whether the prosecution met its obligation to be ready for trial within the statutory timeframe stipulated by CPL 30.30. The prosecution requested adjournments, but the defense either rejected the proposed dates or defense counsel was unavailable on those dates.

    Procedural History

    The lower court dismissed the charges against the defendant, finding that the prosecution had exceeded the allowable time under CPL 30.30 to be ready for trial. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s requested adjournment date and the date the case was actually adjourned to, due to defense counsel’s unavailability, should be charged to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.
    2. Whether defense counsel’s unavailability or rejection of the prosecution’s initial adjournment date constitutes consent to the delay, thereby relieving the prosecution of responsibility for that portion of the delay.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution never stated their readiness for trial on the record or filed a certificate of readiness; therefore, the entirety of the adjournment periods are chargeable to the prosecution.
    2. No, because adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay, and defense counsel’s failure to object or appear does not constitute consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the two-pronged test for determining prosecutorial readiness established in People v. Kendzia, requiring both a communication of readiness on the trial court’s record and actual readiness to proceed at that time. The Court stated, “‘ready for trial’ [pursuant to] CPL 30.30 (1) encompasses two necessary elements”. The Court noted that delays caused by the court do not excuse the People from timely declaring their readiness. To avoid being charged with delays, the prosecution can file a certificate of readiness. The Court reasoned that a clear statement or filing objectively establishes the date on which the prosecution can proceed and avoids the need for courts to determine to whom adjournment delays should be charged. Regarding defense counsel’s unavailability, the Court held that consent to adjournments must be “clearly expressed” and that mere failure to object does not constitute consent. The Court highlighted that the adjournments were initially caused by the People’s failure to be ready for trial, and the defense never formally consented to the specific adjournment dates. The court reiterated, “Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay. Defense counsel’s failure to object to the adjournment or failure to appear does not constitute consent”.

  • People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992): Consenting to Adjournment and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992)

    A defendant’s consent to an adjournment of a trial must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel to relieve the People of responsibility for that portion of the delay when considering speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30; and post-readiness, the People bear the burden of clarifying the basis for adjournments on the record.

    Summary

    Defendant Liotta was indicted for hindering prosecution. The People declared readiness, but Liotta moved to dismiss, claiming a speedy trial violation under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s consent to adjournment must be explicitly stated to be valid. Additionally, after the People declare readiness, they must clarify the reasons for adjournments on the record, or the delay will be charged to the People. Since the People failed to obtain express consent for one period and clarify the reasons for adjournment for another, those periods were charged to them, violating Liotta’s speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    Defendant Liotta was indicted on November 2, 1988, for hindering prosecution in the first degree. The People filed a notice of readiness on March 23, 1989. Liotta moved to dismiss the indictment in October 1989, claiming the People violated his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30. Two periods of delay were at issue: February 27, 1989, to March 23, 1989 (pre-readiness), and May 17, 1989, to June 14, 1989 (post-readiness).

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment at the trial level, arguing that the People had violated his speedy trial rights. The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, agreeing with the defendant. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision, finding that the delays were chargeable to the People and that the defendant’s speedy trial rights had been violated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s failure to object to an adjournment or defense counsel’s failure to appear constitutes consent to the adjournment, relieving the People of responsibility for the delay under CPL 30.30.

    2. Whether, after the People have announced readiness for trial, the burden rests on the People to clarify the basis for adjournments on the record, such that failure to do so results in the adjournment being charged to the People under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    1. No, because consent to an adjournment must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay.

    2. Yes, because the People must clarify the basis for adjournments on the record after announcing readiness so the court can determine who should be charged with the delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to a speedy trial is not contingent on the defendant expressing readiness for trial, citing People v. Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934. Consequently, mere failure to object to an adjournment or absence of defense counsel does not equate to consent. The court emphasized that consent must be “clearly expressed.”

    Regarding post-readiness delay, the Court placed the onus on the People to ensure the record clearly indicates the reason for adjournments. By failing to do so, the People forfeit the ability to argue later that the delay should not be attributed to them. The court stated that “where, as here, the court grants adjournments after the People have announced the indictment ready for trial, the burden rests on the People to clarify, on the record, the basis for the adjournment so that on a subsequent CPL 30.30 motion the court can determine to whom the adjournment should be charged. Inasmuch as the People failed to do so in this case, the adjournment must be charged to them.” This rule prevents ambiguity and ensures accurate calculation of chargeable time.

    There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930 (1991): Arraignment Delay Not Excluded from Speedy Trial Calculation

    People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930 (1991)

    Delays between indictment and arraignment are generally not excludable from the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, as such delays typically do not prevent the People from being ready.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals held that delays between indictment and arraignment are not excludable from the statutory speedy trial time under CPL 30.30. The People argued that these delays should be excluded because they couldn’t announce readiness for trial before arraignment, as the defendant might not have counsel or might plead guilty at arraignment. The Court rejected these arguments, stating that the lack of counsel is expressly exempted under CPL 30.30(4)(f), and the possibility of a guilty plea does not excuse the prosecution from preparing for trial within the statutory timeframe. Therefore, the delay was properly charged to the People.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The central issue revolves around the delay between the indictment and the defendant’s arraignment. The People sought to exclude this period from the time charged against them under CPL 30.30, New York’s speedy trial statute.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts found that the delay between indictment and arraignment was chargeable to the People. The People appealed this determination. The Court of Appeals reviewed the submissions and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, effectively upholding the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the delay between indictment and arraignment is excludable from the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    No, because delays between indictment and arraignment, such as court congestion, do not prevent the People from being ready for trial and therefore are not excludable under CPL 30.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that delays related to arraignment scheduling, like other forms of court congestion, do not inherently prevent the People from being ready for trial. They cited People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 417, to support this point. The Court dismissed the People’s argument that they were legally blocked from announcing readiness before arraignment due to potential lack of counsel, pointing to CPL 30.30 (4) (f), which expressly exempts periods when the defendant lacks counsel. The Court also rejected the argument that preparing for trial before arraignment was impractical due to the possibility of a guilty plea. The Court stated: “That defendant might plead guilty then or at any other time before trial should not excuse the prosecutor from taking the necessary steps to be ready for trial within the prescribed period.” The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s duty to be prepared for trial within the statutory timeframe, irrespective of potential guilty pleas. The decision underscores that administrative or logistical hurdles do not automatically excuse the People from meeting their speedy trial obligations. The opinion is a memorandum decision, providing a concise statement of the court’s reasoning without dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331 (1985): Defining ‘Ready for Trial’ Under New York’s Speedy Trial Statute

    People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331 (1985)

    Under New York’s speedy trial statute, a prosecutor demonstrates ‘readiness for trial’ only by making an affirmative record statement of present readiness, not a prediction of future readiness, when the People are, in fact, ready to proceed.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of grand larceny and related charges. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People weren’t ready for trial within the statutory time. The Court of Appeals affirmed, clarifying what constitutes a valid declaration of readiness. The Court held that a statement of readiness must be a present, on-the-record communication to the court demonstrating actual readiness, not a mere expectation or prediction of future readiness. Acquiescing to a future trial date or sending a letter stating future readiness is insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30.

    Facts

    The State Tax Department investigated defendant MacLeod’s Prescription Pharmacy, Inc. and its president, defendant Kendzia, for filing inaccurate sales tax returns. An indictment was filed on September 17, 1980. At arraignment, the court ordered the People to provide the defendants with subpoenaed documents. Some documents were turned over on October 2, 1980. The defendants filed an omnibus motion with a return date rescheduled, over objection, to January 28, 1981. A trial date of April 20, 1981, was set at an unrecorded conference on January 28, 1981. The People requested and received an adjournment of the April trial date due to a conflict. On May 6, 1981, the People sent a letter stating they would be ready for trial on May 26, 1981. The trial commenced on November 18, 1981.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictment, finding the People weren’t ready for trial within the meaning of CPL 30.30(1). The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People sufficiently demonstrated “readiness for trial” under CPL 30.30(1) by either acquiescing to a trial date set during an off-the-record conference or by sending a letter stating they would be ready on a future date?

    Holding

    No, because “ready for trial” requires an affirmative, on-the-record communication of present readiness by the People, and neither setting a future trial date without objection nor a letter predicting future readiness satisfies this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized two elements are necessary to establish “ready for trial” under CPL 30.30(1): (1) an on-the-record communication of readiness by the People, either through a statement in open court or a written notice to defense counsel and the court clerk, and (2) the prosecutor’s statement must be made when the People are, in fact, ready to proceed. The Court distinguished between a present declaration of readiness and a mere prediction or expectation of future readiness. The Court stated that the People must make an affirmative representation of readiness and “may not simply rely on the case being placed on a trial calendar.”

    The Court found that acquiescing to a future trial date during an off-the-record conference did not satisfy the on-the-record communication requirement, nor did it demonstrate present readiness. Similarly, the May 6 letter was insufficient because it merely expressed an expectation of readiness as of May 26. To accept that a letter suffices, the Court reasoned, would allow prosecutors to circumvent CPL 30.30 by simply attaching a note to the indictment stating future readiness.

    The Court cited People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, emphasizing the need for a contemporaneous communication of readiness. The Court also cited People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413, reinforcing that passively placing a case on a ready reserve calendar does not constitute a valid statement of readiness. The Court noted the People failed to meet their burden of demonstrating sufficient excludable time to bring them within the statutory time limit; therefore, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.