Ratka v. St. Francis Hospital, 44 N.Y.2d 604 (1978)

The infancy of some of a decedent’s children does not toll the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions when other next of kin are capable of seeking appointment as estate representatives.

Summary

This case addresses whether the infancy of some of a decedent’s children tolls the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals held that the infancy of some distributees does not toll the statute of limitations when other next of kin, not under disability, could have been appointed as representatives of the estate. The court declined to create a common-law cause of action for wrongful death to circumvent the statutory limitations period, emphasizing the legislature’s established role in defining such actions and the importance of preventing stale claims.

Facts

Edward Ratka died on May 6, 1972, following surgery. He was survived by his wife, an adult daughter, another adult child, and six minor children. No action was taken to administer his estate within the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions. Almost three years after Ratka’s death, on May 2, 1975, John Ratka, one of the children who had reached the age of majority shortly after his father’s death, was appointed administrator and commenced a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice for conscious pain and suffering, and wrongful death against the defendant physicians, Gordon and White.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, relying on Caffaro v. Trayna. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the wrongful death cause of action, finding that the statute of limitations was not tolled due to the existence of next of kin not under disability at the time of death. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the infancy of some of the decedent’s children tolls the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions under EPTL 5-4.1 when other next of kin were adults and capable of seeking appointment as representatives of the estate?
2. Whether the court should recognize a common-law cause of action for wrongful death, allowing for a tolling of the statute of limitations for infant beneficiaries, despite the existing statutory framework?

Holding

1. No, because the existence of adult next of kin not under disability prevented the tolling of the statute of limitations.
2. No, because the legislature has already created a wrongful death action, and the court will not create a parallel common-law action to circumvent the existing statutory scheme.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions was not tolled by the infancy of some of the decedent’s children, as there were other adult next of kin capable of seeking appointment as representatives of the estate. The court distinguished this case from Caffaro v. Trayna, where a different provision of the CPLR was applied to overcome a statute of limitations defense. The court emphasized the need for timely appointment of a personal representative to commence the action.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s invitation to establish a common-law cause of action for wrongful death, noting that New York’s legislature has expressly authorized such claims for over a century. It distinguished Moragne v. States Marine Lines, a U.S. Supreme Court case establishing a general maritime law cause of action for wrongful death, on the grounds that the New York statute already provides for a wrongful death action. The court also declined to follow Gaudette v. Webb, a Massachusetts case that recognized a common-law cause of action for wrongful death, explaining that Massachusetts courts had viewed their wrongful death statutes as limitations on the right itself, prompting the need for a common-law remedy to avoid unfair results. In contrast, New York courts have held that the limitations period is on the remedy, not the right. “Statutes of Limitation… represent a legislative judgment that… occasional hardship is outweighed by the advantage of barring stale claims.”
The court emphasized that allowing tolling for infancy in this case would potentially permit wrongful death actions to be commenced many years after the death, undermining the purpose of statutes of limitations: “to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and the evidence has been lost”.