New York Law Review

Tag: Railroad Law Section 83

  • De Leon v. New York City Transit Authority, 50 N.Y.2d 176 (1980): Statutory Immunity Requires Strict Proof of Compliance

    De Leon v. New York City Transit Authority, 50 N.Y.2d 176 (1980)

    A railroad corporation seeking immunity from liability for passenger injuries under Railroad Law § 83 must strictly prove compliance with the statute’s requirements, including conspicuously posting required notices.

    Summary

    Jose De Leon, a minor, was injured on a New York City subway. The Transit Authority claimed immunity under Railroad Law § 83, arguing Jose violated posted regulations. The trial court instructed the jury to exonerate the Transit Authority if the regulation was conspicuously posted and violated. The jury found for the Transit Authority. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Transit Authority failed to provide sufficient evidence that the required notices were conspicuously posted in the subway car at the time of the accident, a prerequisite for claiming statutory immunity. This case underscores the need for strict adherence to statutory requirements when asserting immunity from liability.

    Facts

    On August 17, 1970, seven-year-old Jose De Leon was injured when he fell between moving subway cars. Jose’s mother sued the New York City Transit Authority, alleging negligence. The Transit Authority sought immunity under Railroad Law § 83, which shields railroads from liability for injuries to passengers violating posted regulations if there was sufficient room inside the cars. The Transit Authority presented evidence suggesting Jose was either on the platform or running between cars. Jose’s evidence indicated he was asleep inside the car and was thrown onto the platform by a sudden lurch.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially set aside a jury verdict for the Transit Authority due to prejudicial tactics by defense counsel. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the verdict. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order, focusing on the trial court’s jury instructions regarding Railroad Law § 83.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant Transit Authority presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on immunity from liability under Railroad Law § 83, specifically regarding the conspicuous posting of regulations inside the subway car.

    Holding

    No, because the Transit Authority failed to provide sufficient evidence that the required notices were conspicuously posted in the subway car at the time of the accident, a prerequisite for claiming statutory immunity under Railroad Law § 83.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Railroad Law § 83 provides a complete defense to liability, but the defendant must prove each element of the statute, including conspicuous posting of the relevant regulation. The court found that the Transit Authority’s evidence was insufficient, as the witness could only testify to current practices, not the conditions at the time of the accident. The Court stated, “In the absence of any other evidence tending to show that the required notices were posted, the Trial Judge’s decision to permit the jury to consider defendant’s claim of immunity under section 83 must be regarded as error.” The court rejected the argument that the error was harmless because the jury could have found contributory negligence, reasoning that a § 83 instruction effectively directs a finding of contributory negligence per se if the statutory conditions are met. The court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with the statute to claim immunity. The court noted that giving an instruction under section 83 removes the jury’s responsibility to determine if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of fact. It instead allows the jury to find contributory negligence per se if the statutory conditions are met. Therefore, an erroneous instruction cannot be considered harmless.

  • Meier v. Long Island R.R. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 414 (1968): Passenger’s Duty of Care While Boarding or Alighting

    22 N.Y.2d 414 (1968)

    A passenger who boards or alights from a moving train is negligent per se, unless a railroad employee’s direction or an alternative danger diverts the passenger’s attention, creating a false sense of safety.

    Summary

    This case concerns a wrongful death action against the Long Island Rail Road after the plaintiff’s testator was fatally injured while disembarking from a train. The central issues revolve around the applicability of Section 83 of the Railroad Law, which addresses injuries to passengers on car platforms, and the standard of contributory negligence when a passenger boards or alights from a moving train. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court’s instructions to the jury regarding Section 83 and contributory negligence were erroneous, warranting a new trial. The Court emphasized that passengers who board or alight from a moving train are negligent per se unless certain exceptions apply.

    Facts

    The decedent, a regular commuter on the Long Island Rail Road, missed his usual train and took a train to Mineola station. His wife was to meet him there. The train was not scheduled to stop at Mineola, but it usually slowed down in that area. The decedent was fatally injured while disembarking at the Mineola station. There was conflicting evidence about whether the train was moving when he exited and whether he was riding on the platform in violation of Railroad Law § 83.

    Procedural History

    The case began in the Supreme Court. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division after a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Railroad Law § 83 applies to a passenger preparing to leave a train at a station who enters upon the platform as the train enters the station.

    2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the standard of contributory negligence applicable to a passenger who steps or jumps off a moving train.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute prohibits entering the platform of a moving train, but it doesn’t require a passenger to remain seated until the train stops completely.

    2. No, because boarding or alighting from a moving train is negligence per se unless the passenger faced alternative dangers or a railroad employee’s direction diverted their attention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Section 83, the Court held that the statute doesn’t require passengers to remain seated until the train stops. It only prohibits entering the platform of a moving train. Citing Kettell v. Erie R.R. Co., the Court emphasized that railroads are not liable for injuries when a passenger violates posted regulations about riding on the platform. As the Appellate Division noted in Kettell, “If the statute means anything it permits this notice and exempts defendant from liability for accidents from its violation. If the prohibition in the notice means anything it prohibits the very act of the plaintiff which resulted in his injury.” (176 App. Div. 430, 435-436.) The Court reasoned that passengers should demand longer stops rather than disregard safety regulations.

    On contributory negligence, the Court cited Mearns v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J. and Soloman v. Manhattan Ry. Co., stating that the established rule in New York is that boarding or alighting from a moving train is negligence per se. There are exceptions if the passenger is faced with alternative dangers or if a railroad employee’s direction created a false sense of safety. The trial court’s instruction, allowing recovery if the train moved at an “exceedingly slow rate of speed,” was an incorrect statement of the law.

    Although the defendant’s attorney did not formally object to the charge until after the jury retired, the Court held that the issue was adequately preserved for review. The trial court had instructed counsel to raise exceptions and requests in chambers, and the objection was raised immediately after the jury retired. The Court found that requiring a formal objection before the jury retired would be “exalting useless formalism over substance” in this case.