New York Law Review

Tag: railroad law

  • Carrico v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 328 (1977): Defining the Duty of Care Owed to Trespassers and Licensees on Railroad Property

    Carrico v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 328 (1977)

    Railroad companies owe a duty to refrain from willful or reckless injury to trespassers or licensees on their property, and are not liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious conditions when the injured party is aware of the risks.

    Summary

    Christine Carrico, while walking on an abandoned train platform owned by Penn Central, slipped on ice and was severely injured by a passing train. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment in favor of Carrico, holding that Penn Central did not breach any duty owed to her. The Court reasoned that Carrico was either a trespasser or a licensee, and in either case, Penn Central’s duty was limited to refraining from willful or reckless harm. The Court emphasized that the icy condition was open and obvious, and Carrico was aware of the risk. This case clarifies the limited duty of care owed by railroads to individuals on their property without invitation and highlights the importance of the obviousness of a dangerous condition.

    Facts

    The infant plaintiff, Christine Carrico, and a companion were walking on an abandoned passenger platform owned by Penn Central. The platform had not been used as a passenger station since 1959. The platform was approximately 20 feet wide and 200 feet long, and partly covered by a canopy. While not open to the public, there was testimony that members of the public used it as a shortcut. Carrico slipped on snow and ice near the edge of the platform and fell under the wheels of a passing train, resulting in the loss of both legs below the knee. The train was moving slowly, with its headlight on and bell ringing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, with two justices dissenting. The defendant, Penn Central, appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs cross-appealed on the grounds that the damages awarded were inadequate, but this cross-appeal was dismissed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penn Central breached a duty of care owed to Carrico that proximately caused her injuries, considering her status as either a trespasser or a licensee on the abandoned train platform.

    Holding

    No, because Penn Central did not breach any duty owed to Carrico, whether she was considered a trespasser or a licensee. The railroad was only obligated to refrain from willful, wanton, or intentional harm, and the evidence failed to establish any such breach.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Section 83 of the Railroad Law prohibits unauthorized individuals from walking along railroad tracks, and Section 9-103 of the General Obligations Law limits the duty of care owed by landowners to those using their property for recreational activities. Reading these statutes together, the court concluded that Carrico’s presence on the platform was either a trespass or, at best, that of a licensee. As a trespasser, Penn Central only owed her the duty not to cause willful, wanton, or intentional harm. As a licensee, Penn Central owed her a duty of reasonable care. However, the court found no evidence that Penn Central breached this duty. The condition of the platform (snow and ice) was open and evident, and Carrico, familiar with the platform, voluntarily chose to walk near the edge with knowledge of the risks. The court emphasized that “Whoever walks upon, or along, the tracks of a railroad, except when necessary to cross the same upon some street, highway, or public place, violates the law and is like a trespasser, and the company’s servants are under no other obligation than to refrain from willfully, or recklessly, injuring him.” The court found no evidence that the engineer or any of Penn Central’s employees acted in a wanton or reckless manner. The platform itself was structurally sound, and the danger arose from the snow, not from any affirmative act of Penn Central. The accident was not within the foreseeable anticipation of the defendant. Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler dissented, voting to affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.

  • Smith v. State, 35 N.Y.2d 453 (1974): Interpreting ‘Farm Crossing’ for Potential Land Use

    Smith v. State, 35 N.Y.2d 453 (1974)

    When a railroad right-of-way has been appropriated by the state, the potential use of adjacent land should be considered in determining its value if there is a reasonable probability that access could be obtained, even if the potential use extends beyond traditional agricultural purposes.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of “farm crossing” in the context of land appropriation by the state. The claimants owned landlocked properties due to a former railroad right-of-way. The central issue was whether the “farm crossing” access could be expanded to include potential industrial use when assessing the land’s value after the state’s appropriation of the right-of-way. The Court of Appeals held that if there was a reasonable probability the claimants could have obtained unrestricted access for industrial development, the land’s potential for such use should be considered when determining its value.

    Facts

    The claimants owned adjacent properties bounded by a former railroad right-of-way. Access to their properties was provided by two farm crossings, one by deed reservation and the other by statute. The railroad ceased operations in 1958, and the tracks were removed in 1962. On December 21, 1962, the State appropriated the right-of-way, effectively landlocking the claimants’ properties. Appropriation maps were filed later, but the compensation was stipulated to be determined as of the date of the de facto appropriation.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims determined that the claimants had a reasonable likelihood of purchasing the right-of-way from the railroad for access. Therefore, they valued the properties as acreage with industrial potential and added an increment to the fair market value. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that a farm crossing should include any crossing useful to the landowner and that the railroad would have been compelled to provide a crossing suitable for industrial purposes if the properties had been developed that way.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in affirming the increment allowance by deciding that the “farm crossing” could be expanded to include access for potential industrial use when determining the value of the land after appropriation.

    Holding

    Yes, because where a railroad has ceased operating and the right-of-way has been appropriated by the State, the potential use of the land should be considered in determining value if a reasonable probability of adequate access is established by competent proof.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a strict interpretation of “farm crossing” as solely for agricultural purposes would unduly restrict the use of adjoining land, especially when the railroad has ceased operations. While early cases and the Railroad Law focused on agricultural needs, the court acknowledged that the statute intended to protect landowners’ rights to use their land profitably. The court cited Buffalo Stone & Cement Co. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 130 N.Y. 152, 159, stating, “The statute does not limit the right of adjoining owners to crossings solely for agricultural purposes, but they may be ordered to enable owners to remove the natural products of the land, like stone and minerals.” The court emphasized the language “whenever and wherever reasonably necessary for the use of the owners and occupants of the adjoining lands.” It held that if a reasonable probability exists that claimants might have purchased and the railroad would have sold a crossing adequate for industrial development, then the potential for industrial use should be considered when valuing the land. The court emphasized that this determination was fact-specific, based on the evidence presented by the claimants. The court affirmed the lower courts’ findings that such a reasonable probability existed in this case, justifying the increment for potential industrial use. The court also noted Syracuse Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. State of New York (43 A D 2d 800) where it was held that the term farm crossing should be construed as including any crossing useful to the adjoining owner.