New York Law Review

Tag: Race discrimination

  • People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992): Preserving Batson Challenges Based on Combined Race and Gender Discrimination

    People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317 (1992)

    A Batson challenge based on the exclusion of a cognizable group defined by the intersection of race and gender must be explicitly raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve his Batson challenge for appellate review. The defendant argued that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike African-American women from the jury based on a combination of their race and gender. The Court of Appeals found that this specific argument was not explicitly raised at trial; the defense’s objections focused primarily on race, with only descriptive, not categorical, references to gender. Therefore, the defendant was foreclosed from raising this combined race and gender argument for the first time on appeal, underscoring the importance of clearly articulating the basis of a Batson challenge at the trial level.

    Facts

    During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude several African-American women from the jury. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s strikes, arguing that they were racially motivated in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. While defense counsel occasionally mentioned the gender of the excluded jurors, the primary focus of the objection was on the exclusion of black jurors, both male and female. The defendant was subsequently convicted.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to the New York Court of Appeals after conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case to determine whether the Batson challenge was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Batson challenge based on the discriminatory exclusion of a cognizable group defined by the intersection of race and gender is preserved for appellate review when the objection at trial focused primarily on race and not explicitly on the combined characteristics of race and gender?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s Batson claim, based on a combination of race and gender, was never articulated as such and never presented to the trial court in those terms. The trial court understood the claim to be grounded solely in the race of the excluded jurors, and defense counsel did not clarify otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that arguments must be properly preserved at the trial level to be considered on appeal. The Court found that while defense counsel mentioned the gender of the excluded jurors, the primary objection was based on race. The court stated, “Although defense counsel alluded on occasion to the gender of the excluded members of the venire, it is clear that his use of gender terms was purely descriptive, not categorical.” The Court further noted that the motion for a mistrial was based solely on the race of the excluded jurors. The court applied the general rule requiring a defendant to preserve claims for appellate review, even claims involving constitutional rights. The court cited *People v. Iannelli, 69 N.Y.2d 684*, stating this general rule applies to claims of error involving state and federal constitutional rights. Because the defendant failed to explicitly argue at trial that African-American women constituted a separately cognizable group for Batson purposes, the Court held that this argument was not preserved for appellate review.

  • Matter of Easton v. Con Edison, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986): Establishing Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence

    Matter of Easton v. Con Edison, 68 N.Y.2d 66 (1986)

    A finding of discrimination by the State Commissioner of Human Rights must be confirmed if supported by substantial evidence, which may include circumstantial evidence demonstrating that similarly situated individuals were treated differently based on race or sex.

    Summary

    Pamela Easton, a Black woman, alleged Con Edison discriminated against her based on race and sex by denying her promotions in favor of less-qualified white men. The Commissioner of Human Rights sustained her complaint. The New York Court of Appeals found substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination. Con Edison’s inconsistent application of job qualifications, its failure to seriously consider Easton’s application, and its promotion of less-experienced white males constituted sufficient evidence of discrimination. The Court reinstated the Commissioner’s order, which included offering Easton a comparable managerial position with back pay and damages for mental anguish. The Court emphasized it could not substitute its judgement for that of the Commissioner if his decision was supported by substantial evidence.

    Facts

    Pamela Easton, a Black woman, worked in Con Edison’s calendaring unit since 1975. She consistently met high standards and aided the assistant supervisor. In 1978, Charles Gallagher, a white male, was assigned to the unit, trained by Easton, and quickly promoted. When Easton returned from maternity leave in 1982, she learned Gallagher had been promoted to assistant supervisor and then supervisor, without her being considered. After Gallagher’s promotion to supervisor, Con Edison advertised for an assistant supervisor. Easton, meeting the listed qualifications, applied, but Daniel Mercado, a white Hispanic, was selected after a pro forma interview of Easton.

    Procedural History

    Easton filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. The Commissioner of Human Rights reversed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, finding discrimination. Con Edison challenged the Commissioner’s order. The Appellate Division initially annulled the determination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Commissioner’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commissioner’s finding of discrimination is supported by substantial evidence?

    2. Whether the complaint was timely filed?

    3. Whether the relief ordered by the Commissioner is sustainable?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record indicates that Easton, because of her race and sex, was never given more than perfunctory consideration for management level positions within the calendar unit while white male employees with less experience were considered and promoted.

    2. No, because Easton filed her complaint within one year of learning about Gallagher’s promotion to assistant supervisor.

    3. Yes, because the remedial provisions of the Division order are authorized by statute and supported by credible evidence in the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination. It noted Easton’s delayed promotion compared to Gallagher’s rapid advancement, despite her training him. The Court highlighted that Easton was not seriously considered for the supervisory positions, while less-experienced white males were promoted. The Court rejected Con Edison’s argument that the successful candidates were more qualified, pointing out that the stated job qualifications were inconsistently applied. The court emphasized the importance of looking at the totality of the circumstances.

    The Court determined the complaint was timely because it was filed within one year of Easton learning about Gallagher’s promotion. The Court referenced precedents stating that the statute of limitations begins to run when the complainant learns of the discriminatory act.

    Regarding the relief granted, the Court emphasized the broad discretion granted to the Commissioner under the statute. The order requiring Con Edison to notify supervisory employees about nondiscrimination laws, offer Easton a comparable position with back pay, and pay compensatory damages was deemed appropriate. The court stated, “an award of back pay to a proven victim of discrimination ‘would seem to be a rather normal sanction to be imposed’”. The Court also found the $10,000 award for mental anguish was within the range of previously approved awards. The court explicitly stated that “the effects of the discrimination were, as the Commissioner notes, renewed every working day when complainant reported to white males petitioner had promoted over her.”