New York Law Review

Tag: Quo Warranto

  • Delgado v. Sunderland, 98 N.Y.2d 420 (2002): Exclusive Remedy for Voting Machine Malfunctions in General Elections

    Delgado v. Sunderland, 98 N.Y.2d 420 (2002)

    The exclusive remedy for challenging the results of a general election based on voting machine malfunctions and contesting title to public office is a quo warranto action brought by the Attorney General, not a summary proceeding under the Election Law or a declaratory judgment action.

    Summary

    Following a general election, Delgado contested the results, alleging a voting machine malfunctioned, costing him votes. The Supreme Court converted the Election Law proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and ordered a new election in one district. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a city-wide election. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a quo warranto action, commenced by the Attorney General, is the exclusive remedy for challenging general election results based on alleged voting machine malfunctions. This prevents uncertainty in office holding and ensures an initial investigation by the Attorney General.

    Facts

    In the November 6, 2001, general election for City of White Plains Common Council seats, a voting machine in the 18th Election District jammed. Delgado, a candidate, alleged the malfunction cost him votes, placing the election of Hockley, who finished ahead of Delgado, in doubt. After a recount, Hockley was ahead by 47 votes.

    Procedural History

    Delgado initiated an Election Law article 16 proceeding seeking impoundment and recount. After the recount favored Hockley, Delgado moved to be declared the winner or for a new election. Hockley moved to dismiss, arguing for a quo warranto action. The Supreme Court denied the motion, converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, and ordered a new election in the 18th District only. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a city-wide election between Hockley and Delgado. The Court of Appeals then reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a summary proceeding under Election Law article 16 or a declaratory judgment action is a proper vehicle for challenging the results of a general election based on voting machine malfunctions and contesting title to the public office, or whether a quo warranto action is the exclusive remedy.

    Holding

    No, because the proper vehicle for challenging the results and contesting title to the public office of the purported winner where a voting machine malfunctioned is a quo warranto action, now codified in Executive Law § 63-b.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that any action taken by the Supreme Court regarding a general election challenge must be expressly authorized by the Election Law. The Court stated, “[Supreme Court’s] only powers are (1) to determine the validity of protested, blank or void paper ballots and protested or rejected absentee ballots and to direct a recanvass or correction of any error in the canvass of such ballots * * * and (2) to review the canvass and direct a recanvass or correction of an error or performance of any required duty by the board of canvassers.” Because the voting machine malfunction created a disputed issue of fact not resolvable by recanvassing, a quo warranto action, initiated by the Attorney General, is the exclusive remedy. The Court reasoned that this process allows for an investigative and screening function by the Attorney General. The Court also highlighted policy concerns of leaving a contested office vacant during protracted litigation. The Court distinguished lower court decisions and clarified that a declaratory judgment is not an available alternative remedy in this context. The court cited Matter of Mullen v Heffernan, affirming that “The remedy for a failure of a voting machine to record votes cast * * * is vested solely in this court in a plenary action brought by the People of the State… [The candidate] has a remedy in quo warranto and it is [the] only remedy”.

  • Matter of Hoch v. Board of Elections, 64 N.Y.2d 582 (1985): Limits on Summary Proceedings in Election Disputes

    Matter of Hoch v. Board of Elections, 64 N.Y.2d 582 (1985)

    A court lacks jurisdiction in a summary proceeding to remove successful candidates from office or order a new election; such relief is available only in a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto.

    Summary

    Petitioners initiated a summary proceeding to invalidate a village election, remove the winning candidates, and mandate a new election. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that summary proceedings under Section 15-138 of the Election Law cannot be used to remove elected officials or order new elections. Such remedies are only available through a plenary action, specifically a quo warranto proceeding. The court clarified that Section 15-138 doesn’t expand the Supreme Court’s summary jurisdiction in election matters and reaffirmed that a plenary action is required for the requested relief.

    Facts

    Following a general village election in Port Washington North on March 20, 1984, the winning candidates filed their oaths of office and assumed their roles as Village Trustees. Dissatisfied with the election results, petitioners initiated a summary proceeding under Section 15-138 of the Election Law, seeking to invalidate the election, remove the elected trustees, and order a new election.

    Procedural History

    The case originated as a summary proceeding in the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division’s order, affirming the Supreme Court’s decision (presumably dismissing the petition), was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in a summary proceeding under Section 15-138 of the Election Law to remove successful candidates from office and order a new election in a general village election.

    Holding

    No, because Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in a summary proceeding does not extend to removing elected officials or ordering new elections; such relief requires a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the relief sought by the petitioners—removing the elected officials and ordering a new election—is beyond the scope of a summary proceeding. The court cited precedent, including Matter of Hanington v. Coveney, to support its conclusion that a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto is required to address such issues. The court emphasized that Section 15-138 of the Election Law, a recodification of prior law, was not intended to expand the Supreme Court’s summary jurisdiction over general elections. The court stated, “Section 15-138 was not intended to enlarge the summary jurisdiction of Supreme Court over general elections; it is merely a recodification of prior law which required proceedings such as this to be brought in quo warranto.” The court explicitly disapproved of any conflicting precedent, stating, “To the extent Matter of Nicholson v Blessing is to the contrary, it is not to be followed.” The decision reinforces the principle that challenges to the legitimacy of elected officials holding office must be pursued through the more comprehensive process of a plenary action, ensuring due process and a thorough examination of the issues.

  • Matter of Carney v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 63 N.Y.2d 642 (1984): Mootness in Election Law Disputes

    Matter of Carney v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 63 N.Y.2d 642 (1984)

    An appeal concerning a candidate’s placement on the ballot becomes moot when the election has already occurred and a different candidate has been certified as the winner and assumed office.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over the validity of a designating petition for a candidate running for Superintendent of Highways. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision and dismissed the proceeding due to the failure to name and serve an indispensable party. However, by the time the appeal reached the Court of Appeals, the election had taken place, and another candidate had won and assumed office. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as academic, holding that it lacked jurisdiction in a summary proceeding to remove the elected official or order a new election, which would require a plenary action.

    Facts

    The petitioner sought to validate the designating petition of the Sewer Tax Opposition Party (STOP), naming him as a candidate for Superintendent of Highways in the Town of Babylon.

    The Suffolk County Board of Elections determined that the petition was invalid.

    A co-objector to the designating petition was not named or served in the validation proceeding.

    After the Appellate Division’s order but before the appeal was perfected, the general election took place, and another candidate was certified as the winner and assumed the office.

    Procedural History

    Special Term: Denied the motion to dismiss, annulled the Board of Elections’ determination, and ordered the petitioner’s name to be placed on the ballot.

    Appellate Division: Reversed the Special Term’s order and dismissed the proceeding because an indispensable party had not been named or served.

    Court of Appeals: Appeal dismissed as academic.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an appeal in a summary proceeding to validate a designating petition is rendered moot when the election has occurred, and a different candidate has been certified as the winner and assumed the office.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court lacks jurisdiction in a summary proceeding to remove a duly elected official or order a new election; such relief requires a plenary action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the case had become moot because the election had already been held, and another candidate had been certified and assumed office. The court emphasized its lack of jurisdiction in a summary proceeding under Section 16-102 of the Election Law to remove the successful candidate from office or order a new election. The proper remedy for challenging the election results after the election, if any, would be a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto. The court cited Sedita v Board of Educ., 43 NY2d 827, 828 to support the dismissal of the appeal as academic. They further referenced Matter of Corrigan v Board of Elections, 38 AD2d 825, 826, affd 30 NY2d 603, indicating that a challenge to the seated official would require a different type of legal action. The court stated, “This court has no jurisdiction in a summary proceeding such as this under section 16-102 of the Election Law to remove the successful candidate from office or order a new general election. Such relief can be granted, if at all, only in a plenary action in the nature of quo warranto.”