Purdy v. Kreisberg, 47 N.Y.2d 354 (1979)

A police department regulation prohibiting officers from using their official power in aid of or against any political entity is constitutional and enforceable, and dismissal for violating such a regulation is not disproportionate if supported by substantial evidence.

Summary

Purdy, president of the Greenburgh Police Association, was dismissed for violating a departmental rule prohibiting the use of official power in political activities. He campaigned against the town supervisor, Veteran, using the association’s stationery and shield, implying official endorsement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Board of Police Commissioners’ determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the penalty of dismissal was not excessive. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the departmental rule, emphasizing the need to maintain police neutrality in political matters. This case highlights the permissible restrictions on political activities of law enforcement officers to ensure impartiality.

Facts

Purdy, as president of the Greenburgh Police Association, initiated a campaign against Town Supervisor Anthony Veteran’s re-election. He distributed letters to fellow officers urging political involvement to defeat Veteran. He sent a follow-up letter stating 70% of officers supported opposing Veteran. At a police association meeting, he offered to donate his $4,000 retirement benefit to the anti-Veteran campaign. A letter, signed by Purdy and printed on police association stationery with the association’s shield, was mailed to town residents accusing Veteran of political interference and causing a rise in crime.

Procedural History

The Board of Police Commissioners found Purdy guilty of violating departmental rules and dismissed him. Purdy filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul or modify the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division annulled the Board’s determination and directed Purdy’s reinstatement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Board’s determination.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Board of Police Commissioners’ determination to dismiss Purdy was supported by substantial evidence.
2. Whether the penalty of dismissal was unduly harsh given the violation involved.
3. Whether chapter 9.5.14 of the departmental rules, prohibiting officers from using their official power in political activities, is constitutional.

Holding

1. Yes, because there was a rational basis to support the Board’s findings that Purdy used his official power as a police officer directly in aid of or against a candidate for political office.
2. No, because the dismissal was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.
3. Yes, because the rule prohibits a policeman from utilizing his status and authority as a law enforcement officer as the means to aid or to hinder a political entity and is thus constitutional.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court held that a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency if the agency’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Court found a rational basis for the Board’s finding that Purdy was the moving force behind the police association’s political activity. The Court emphasized the implication of Purdy’s actions, stating, “By printing the letter distributed to the town residents on police association stationery with the shield of the association prominently displayed and by labeling the same as ‘An Important Message from your Police Association’, it is the inescapable conclusion that such letter, signed by petitioner, both embodied and reflected the full strength and power of police authority.”

Regarding the penalty, the Court stated, “Once it is determined that there is substantial evidence to support an administrative body’s determination, the sanction imposed by that body will not be set aside unless the measure of punishment is ‘”so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.”’” The Court emphasized the dangers inherent in allowing police officers to use their official power in partisan politics.

Addressing the constitutionality of the departmental rule, the Court quoted McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, stating, “[The petitioner] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” The Court recognized the importance of removing police personnel from active politics to maintain discipline and integrity within the police department. The Court found that the rule was evenhanded, without differentiation as to political cause or otherwise, and does not prevent a police officer, as a private citizen, from expressing his or her political views.