New York Law Review

Tag: Publication

  • Anderson v. New York Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746 (1974): Telephone Company’s Liability for Subscriber’s Defamatory Messages

    Anderson v. New York Telephone Co., 35 N.Y.2d 746 (1974)

    A telephone company is not liable for defamatory messages transmitted by a subscriber using its equipment, even if the company has notice of the content of the messages, because the company acts as a passive conduit and does not “publish” the defamatory material.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a telephone company can be held liable for defamatory messages recorded and disseminated by one of its subscribers using equipment leased from the company. The plaintiff, a Bishop, sued the New York Telephone Company after a subscriber broadcasted defamatory accusations about him via recorded telephone messages. The Court of Appeals held that the telephone company was not liable, reasoning that it did not “publish” the defamatory material. The court likened the telephone company’s role to that of a passive conduit, similar to a company that leases typewriters or photocopy machines, and emphasized the company’s obligations as a public utility to provide service without censoring legal content.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was a Presiding Bishop. Defendant leased equipment to Donald L. Jackson, who broadcasted defamatory messages about the plaintiff through recorded telephone messages. Callers would hear accusations against plaintiff, including claims of illegitimate children. Plaintiff informed the phone company about the defamatory messages and provided proof that these claims were unfounded. The phone company’s area manager indicated he would try to get Jackson to terminate the recordings, but the messages continued, with Jackson adding further allegations.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the New York Telephone Company for defamation. The defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Special Term initially focused on qualified privilege, ruling a factual question existed. Following a trial, the court granted judgment for the defendant, specifically finding that the New York Telephone Company did not publish the scandalous material. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial, focusing on the phone company’s potential reckless disregard. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the original judgment dismissing the complaints.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a telephone company, by providing equipment used to transmit defamatory messages, can be considered to have “published” the defamatory material and thus be liable for defamation, even when it has notice of the content of those messages.

    Holding

    No, because in order to be deemed to have published a libel a defendant must have had a direct hand in disseminating the material whether authored by another, or not. The telephone company’s role is merely passive and no different from any company which leases equipment to another for the latter’s use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a telephone company is a public utility with an obligation to provide service for legal uses. It cannot be considered a publisher of defamatory material simply because its equipment is used to transmit such material. The court distinguished the telephone company’s role from that of media outlets with editorial functions, such as newspapers or telegraph companies (where employees actively aid in the transmission of messages). The telephone company’s role is passive, similar to a company leasing typewriters or photocopy machines, which would not be liable for libelous content produced using their equipment. The court stated that: “He who furnishes the means of convenient circulation, knowing, of having reasonable cause to believe, that it is to be used for that purpose, if it is in fact so used, is guilty of aiding in the publication and becomes the instrument of the libeler” does not apply to telephone companies. The court emphasized that imposing liability on the phone company would create an undue burden, requiring them to censor content and potentially violating subscribers’ rights. The Court concluded that Jackson published the libel and the equipment from defendant did not change that.

  • Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Moss, 26 N.Y.2d 80 (1970): Mandatory Nature of Publication and Posting for Propositions

    Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Moss, 26 N.Y.2d 80 (1970)

    Statutory requirements of notice by publication and posting for the submission of propositions to voters are mandatory conditions precedent to a valid submission, and actual notice or substantial equivalence is not acceptable as a substitute unless there has been some posting and publication to satisfy the statute.

    Summary

    This case concerns a proposition submitted to the town electors of Brookhaven regarding a change in the town board’s composition. The proposition passed by a narrow margin, but the vote was challenged due to the town’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements of notice by publication and posting. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that publication and posting are mandatory preconditions to a valid submission and cannot be substituted by actual notice or substantial equivalence. The court emphasized the importance of these requirements in ensuring a fair and transparent electoral process, regardless of the publicity surrounding a particular vote.

    Facts

    A proposition to change the composition of the Town of Brookhaven’s town board was submitted to the town electors during a general election. The proposition passed by a narrow margin of 191 votes. However, the town failed to comply with Section 82 of the Town Law, which requires notice of the proposition by publication and posting on the town signboard. There was no attempt to post or publish the notice.

    Procedural History

    The case originated as a proceeding under Section 330 of the Election Law, which was then consolidated into a plenary action for a declaratory judgment. The Special Term initially ruled in favor of the appellants. The Appellate Division reversed, nullifying the vote on the proposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory requirements of notice by publication and posting are mandatory conditions precedent to a valid submission of a proposition to the electorate.
    2. Whether actual notice or widespread publicity of the proposition can substitute for the failure to comply with the statutory requirements of publication and posting.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the precedents in this court make clear that statutory requirements of notice by publication and posting for the submission of propositions are mandatory.
    2. No, because actual notice or substantial equivalence will not be acceptable as a substitute unless there has been in fact some posting and publication to satisfy the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized a vital distinction between mandatory and directory statutory requirements in the context of elections. The Court stated, “Statutory requirements of notice by publication and posting for the submission of propositions are mandatory, and actual notice or substantial equivalences, will not be acceptable as a substitute unless there has been in fact some posting and publication to satisfy the statute. On the other hand, all other statutory requirements to make elections effective, convenient, or even just more efficient, are generally treated as directory only, with respect to which substantial equivalence will be acceptable.”

    The court relied on precedents such as Town of Cortlandt v. Village of Peekskill, Lane v. Johnson, and Burke v. Kern to support its holding. Specifically, the court quoted Burke v. Kern: “An election is void where the electors do not receive notice of the time and place of the election, and the Legislature, not the courts, must determine how each notice shall be given.”

    The court reasoned that publication and posting are not merely aimed at achieving widespread publicity, but rather serve as a definitive legal inception to the electoral process. These requirements create a publicly-accessible record of the significant political event, enabling those who monitor elections to ascertain the facts. The court likened these requirements to service of process in litigation or the public display of tax rolls.

    The court also noted that the closeness of the vote in this case made the invalidation less problematic than it might otherwise have been. However, it emphasized that legal rules must be applied generally to like situations, regardless of the specific outcome in a particular case.

    The court distinguished Salducco v. Etkin, noting that in that case, the publication extended to the whole county, which satisfied the mandate for lesser publication only in the city of Schenectady.