New York Law Review

Tag: Public Works

  • Guercio v. Gerosa, 15 N.Y.2d 142 (1965): Prevailing Wage Laws and Actual Work Performed

    Guercio v. Gerosa, 15 N.Y.2d 142 (1965)

    Under New York Labor Law § 220, the prevailing wage rate for public works laborers must be based on the specific type of work they actually perform, even if they share the same civil service title.

    Summary

    Laborers employed by the City of New York filed complaints to have their wages fixed according to the prevailing rate under Labor Law § 220. The Comptroller subclassified the laborers into groups (A-E) based on their duties, recognizing different tasks merited different pay. However, when fixing the “prevailing rate,” the Comptroller considered rates for all laborers in outside employment, regardless of the actual work performed, and fixed an average rate for all city laborers. The Court of Appeals held that the Comptroller must fix separate rates commensurate with the work actually performed, even within the same civil service title. The case was remitted for further proceedings consistent with this principle.

    Facts

    Five groups of laborers employed by the City of New York filed verified complaints pursuant to Labor Law § 220(7) to have their wages fixed by the Comptroller according to the prevailing rate. The Comptroller subclassified the laborers into five groups (A through E) based on their assigned duties, which ranged from common labor to specialized tasks like highway maintenance, water repair, and sewer work. The Comptroller fixed a “prevailing rate” for Group A laborers and recommended wage differentials for Groups B through E, acknowledging different duties warranted different pay. The Comptroller determined the prevailing rate by considering rates of all laborers in outside employment, regardless of their specific tasks. The laborers in Groups C, D, and E argued that separate rates should have been computed for each group based on rates paid to laborers performing similar tasks in outside employment.

    Procedural History

    The laborers filed complaints under Labor Law § 220(7). The Supreme Court, New York County, consolidated the proceedings. After a hearing, the Comptroller determined the sub-classifications and corresponding wage rates. The laborers appealed, arguing that the Comptroller erred in not fixing separate rates for each group based on the specific work performed. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Comptroller, in fixing prevailing rates of wages for laborers under Labor Law § 220, must fix separate rates commensurate with the work actually performed within the civil service title, or whether it is sufficient to fix a single rate based on the general civil service classification of “Laborer”.

    Holding

    Yes, the Comptroller must fix and pay prevailing rates of wages based on the work actually performed within the civil service title because individuals, though in the same generic employment, may not be in the same “trade or occupation” as defined by Labor Law § 220(5).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the key inquiry is whether laborers performing different tasks (e.g., sewer laborers, highway maintenance laborers) are engaged in the same “trade or occupation” under Labor Law § 220(5). While the laborers all share the same civil service title, the nature of the work actually performed is the pivotal question. The court cited Matter of Watson v. McGoldrick, 286 N.Y. 47 (1941), emphasizing that differences in the field in which work is performed can divide workers performing similar tasks into different “trades and occupations.” The Comptroller himself recognized a distinction in duties by classifying laborers into groups and establishing wage differentials. The court also noted the policy underlying Labor Law § 220 is to ensure those on public works receive the prevailing wage paid to those doing the same work in the private sector. The court dismissed the argument that this was an attack on the civil service classification, stating that the laborers were not challenging their inclusion in the “Laborer” classification, but rather asserting that those doing different tasks on the outside are paid different wages. As the State Comptroller has concluded: “All laborers employed by a village must be paid at least the prevailing rate of wage in the locality for the particular type of work they are performing.” The court held that the Comptroller must fix prevailing rates of wages based on the work actually performed within the civil service title.

  • Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27 (1904): Governmental Immunity for Street Improvements

    Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N.Y. 27 (1904)

    A municipality is not liable for consequential damages to abutting landowners resulting from changes to street grades or construction of viaducts when acting under legislative authority for a public purpose, provided the work is performed without negligence.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, an owner of property abutting 155th Street in New York City, sought to enjoin the city from maintaining a viaduct and recover damages, alleging it impaired access, light, and air to his property. The viaduct was constructed to connect 155th Street over a bluff. The New York Court of Appeals held that the city was not liable because the viaduct was a public improvement authorized by the legislature and constructed on a public street, for which abutting landowners are presumed to have been compensated when the street was initially established. The court emphasized that governmental entities are generally immune from liability for consequential damages resulting from public works projects undertaken with legislative authorization and without negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff owned property at the corner of Eighth Avenue and 155th Street, where he operated a business. The City of New York owned 155th Street and Eighth Avenue. 155th Street ran west towards a 70-foot bluff. The city constructed a viaduct along 155th Street to connect the street over the bluff. The viaduct in front of the plaintiff’s property was 50 feet above the original street level. The street below the viaduct remained open to the public but was partially obstructed by the viaduct’s supports. Plaintiff claimed the viaduct impaired his property’s value and access. Prior to the plaintiff acquiring the land the city had already acquired the fee simple to the lands included within the lines of Eighth Avenue and One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Street.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued in equity seeking an injunction to remove the viaduct and damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the City of New York, denying the injunction and damages. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York is liable to an abutting landowner for consequential damages resulting from the construction of a viaduct on a public street, authorized by the state legislature, when the construction impairs the landowner’s access, light, and air.

    Holding

    No, because when a municipality constructs a public improvement like a viaduct on a public street under legislative authority and for a public purpose, it is not liable for consequential damages to abutting landowners, absent negligence or direct encroachment on private property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that when the city acquired the street, it presumably compensated landowners for all future uses to which the street might be put, including changes in grade and improvements necessary for public travel. The court relied heavily on Radcliff’s Executors v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, stating that landowners must bear the burden of depreciation in property value due to street improvements as they also benefit when the value increases. The court stated, “As such owners they are subject to the right of the public to grade and improve the streets, and they are presumed to have been compensated for any future improvement or change in the surface or grade rendered necessary for the convenience of public travel, especially in cities where the growth of population increases the use of the highways.”

    The court also cited Transportation Co. v. Chicago, emphasizing that the city acts as an agent of the state when improving highways and is thus protected by the state’s sovereign immunity from suits for consequential damages. The court emphasized that the viaduct was for ordinary traffic and not for railroad purposes. Because it was constructed under legislative authority for a public purpose it was not a nuisance and the Plaintiff was not entitled to damages.

    The court distinguished between ordinary street improvements and “peculiar and extraordinary changes made for some ulterior purposes other than the improvement of the street.” It held that viaducts were part of the former category because they help adapt the street for “free and easy passage of the public.”

  • Brady v. The Mayor, 18 N.Y. 481 (1858): Discretion in Public Works Contracts and the Necessity Exception

    Brady v. The Mayor, 18 N.Y. 481 (1858)

    A municipality can authorize changes to a public works contract without competitive bidding when the changes are deemed a reasonable necessity by the head of the relevant department, especially when aesthetics and durability are significant concerns, and the added cost does not exceed the statutory limit for bidding requirements.

    Summary

    Brady, a contractor, sought payment for substituting cherry wood for pine in a restaurant being built in Central Park under a supplemental contract. The city argued that the change was unnecessary and that the cost exceeded $1,000, requiring competitive bidding, which was not done. The court held that the head of the relevant department’s certification of necessity was conclusive absent fraud or collusion. It also determined the added cost of the cherry wood, being less than $1,000, did not trigger the competitive bidding requirement because it only covered the excess value of the new materials and work beyond what the original contract already covered.

    Facts

    The City of New York contracted for the construction of a restaurant in Central Park.
    The original plans specified pine wood for the hall, vestibule, café, wine-room, newels, balusters, and rails of the principal staircase.
    A supplemental contract was made to substitute cherry wood for pine in these areas.
    The contract price for this substitution was $975.
    The head of the relevant city department certified the necessity of the change.

    Procedural History

    The contractor, Brady, sued the City of New York for payment under the supplemental contract.
    The trial court ruled in favor of Brady.
    The General Term reversed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the General Term’s reversal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the head of the relevant city department’s certification of necessity for the change from pine to cherry wood is conclusive against the city, absent fraud or collusion.
    Whether the cost of the change exceeded $1,000, thereby requiring competitive bidding.

    Holding

    Yes, the certification of necessity is conclusive because as between the contractor and the city, the certificate of the proper officer is conclusive where there is no allegation of fraud or collusion, and where the facts indicate that the necessity certified was a possible incident of the work to be done or the supply to be furnished.
    No, the cost of the change did not exceed $1,000 because the original contract already covered the cost of providing the pine fittings; the supplemental contract only covered the added cost of the cherry wood.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the certificate of necessity from the head of the appropriate department is conclusive as between the contractor and the city unless there is fraud or collusion. The court deferred to the department head’s judgment, noting that a restaurant in Central Park should be built to a high standard of aesthetics and durability. The court stated, “A restaurant in that park should not disgrace the standard of its surroundings. It was better not to build it at all than with a cheap parsimony and bad taste.”
    Regarding the cost, the court reasoned that the original contract covered the cost of the pine fittings. The supplemental contract only covered the additional expense of substituting cherry wood. Therefore, the relevant cost for competitive bidding purposes was only the $975 for the substitution, not the total cost of the cherry wood plus the original cost of the pine. The court explained, “The order made related to and covered only the excess of value due to the extra work and material. The price of the pine and its fitting went as far as it could in paying for the cherry and its fitting and the new contract began and its expenditure commenced at the point where the old one was exhausted.”