New York Law Review

Tag: Public Trust Doctrine

  • Matter of Glick v. Harvey, 26 N.Y.3d 1177 (2016): Establishing Implied Dedication of Public Parkland

    26 N.Y.3d 1177 (2016)

    Implied dedication of land to public use requires unmistakable intent by the owner to dedicate the land and acceptance of the land by the public.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether four parcels of land in Greenwich Village had been impliedly dedicated as public parkland, thus requiring legislative approval before they could be used for a university expansion. The court held that the petitioners failed to prove the city’s “unmistakable” intent to dedicate the land as parkland. The court examined the city’s actions and documents, which indicated temporary uses and maintained the city’s control. Since the city’s actions were not unequivocally indicative of a permanent dedication, the court ruled against the petitioners, affirming the Appellate Division’s decision. This case underscores the high standard required to prove implied dedication, particularly regarding municipal property.

    Facts

    The City Council approved New York University’s (NYU) expansion plan involving four parcels: Mercer Playground, LaGuardia Park, LaGuardia Corner Gardens, and Mercer-Houston Dog Run. Petitioners, opposing the plan, argued the parcels were impliedly dedicated public parkland. Mercer Playground was developed by the Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) under a temporary permit. LaGuardia Park was developed under the Greenstreet program, with a memorandum of understanding stating it would remain DOT property. LaGuardia Corner Gardens was managed by a non-profit under a license from the DOT. The Mercer-Houston Dog Run was constructed and operated by NYU and a nonprofit, respectively. The City’s actions related to the parcels, including permits and agreements, indicated temporary use and maintained the City’s control.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action against the City and related agencies. The Supreme Court granted the petitioners’ claim, declaring the City unlawfully alienated the land and enjoining the construction. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition, ruling that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the City’s intent to dedicate the parcels as parkland. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City’s actions and declarations manifested a present, fixed, and unequivocal intent to dedicate the parcels as public parkland.

    Holding

    1. No, because the City’s actions did not demonstrate an unequivocal intent to dedicate the parcels as permanent parkland.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the public trust doctrine, which prevents alienation of impliedly dedicated land without legislative approval. To establish implied dedication, the party must prove the owner’s unmistakable intent to dedicate and the public’s acceptance. The court focused on the City’s intent. It found the City’s actions, such as the temporary permits and agreements, were not an unequivocal manifestation of intent to dedicate the parcels for permanent park use. The court cited the language in the permit and memorandum of understanding which explicitly recognized that the City’s management of the parcels by the DPR was understood to be temporary and provisional. The court emphasized that the City retained control of the property, with the possibility of future alternative uses. The court cited previous case law to reinforce the standard that “the owner’s acts and declarations should be deliberate, unequivocal and decisive, manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon his property to the specific public use.”

    Practical Implications

    This case sets a high bar for establishing implied dedication, particularly for municipal property. Attorneys must carefully assess the owner’s actions and declarations for any ambiguity regarding the intent to dedicate land to public use. A municipality’s temporary or conditional use of land, even if enjoyed by the public, does not automatically constitute an implied dedication. This case would be cited in similar matters involving attempts to prevent the alienation of public land based on the claim of implied dedication. The case also suggests that clear documentation and specific language are critical to maintaining control of land intended for temporary public use, mitigating the risk of future claims of implied dedication. Further, the case reinforces the need for municipalities to formally dedicate property via legislative action if permanent dedication is intended.

  • Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 21 N.Y.3d 631 (2013): Applying the Continuing Wrong Doctrine to Public Trust Violations

    Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 21 N.Y.3d 631 (2013)

    The continuing wrong doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for ongoing violations of the public trust doctrine related to unauthorized non-park use of dedicated parkland.

    Summary

    The Village of Kings Point sought to build a Department of Public Works (DPW) facility on a portion of dedicated parkland. Residents and the State of New York sued, alleging violations of the public trust doctrine. The Village argued the statute of limitations had expired because the non-park use of the land began decades earlier. The Court of Appeals held that the continuing wrong doctrine applied, allowing the challenge to proceed despite the passage of time because the ongoing non-park use constituted a continuous violation of the public trust.

    Facts

    The Village of Kings Point acquired Kings Point Park in the 1920s. In 1938, the Village leased the park to the Great Neck Park District. In 1946, the Village amended the lease to exclude the “Western Corner” of the park, intending to use it for a pistol range and storage. The Village renewed the lease with this exclusion. The Village erected structures, including a garage and a Quonset hut, on the Western Corner. In 2008, the Village proposed building a 12,000-square-foot DPW facility on the Western Corner, involving deforestation, regrading, and fencing.

    Procedural History

    Residents sued the Village in 2009 to enjoin the DPW project and current use of the Western Corner. The State of New York filed a similar suit. Supreme Court denied the Village’s motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Division affirmed. After discovery, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the residents and the State, permanently enjoining the DPW project and ordering the removal of materials from the Western Corner. The Appellate Division modified the order, deleting the award of attorney’s fees, and affirmed. The Village appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations barred the action challenging the proposed DPW facility, given the Village’s prior non-park use of the land.

    2. Whether the continuing wrong doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations for the Village’s ongoing non-park use of the Western Corner.

    3. Whether laches barred the claims brought by the plaintiffs and the State.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proposed DPW facility was a substantial change in the nature and scope of the existing non-park use.

    2. Yes, because the ongoing non-park use of parkland constitutes a continuous violation of the public trust doctrine.

    3. No, because laches does not apply to the State acting in a governmental capacity, nor does it apply when plaintiffs allege a continuing wrong.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that the proposed DPW facility was not merely a change in the scope of existing non-park use but a substantial new intrusion. Therefore, the cause of action challenging the facility was not time-barred. Regarding the ongoing non-park use, the Court applied the continuing wrong doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations when the harm is not traced exclusively to the initial objectionable act but is ongoing. The Court stated that “[t]he harm sustained by the public when structures having ‘no connection with park purposes . . . encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly conferred’ . . . cannot be traced exclusively to the day when the illegal encroachment began” (quoting Williams v Gallatin, 229 NY 248, 253 [1920]). Because the Village’s violation of the public trust doctrine was continuous, a new cause of action accrued with each successive day, allowing the plaintiffs to challenge the use despite the passage of time. The Court also rejected the Village’s laches defense, noting it did not apply to the State acting to protect a public interest, nor to ongoing wrongs. The court emphasized the unreasonableness of expecting ordinary citizens to know whether a municipality has obtained legislative approval for parkland uses. The court explicitly distinguished this case from a one-time event like the sale of parkland, leaving that issue for another day.

  • Union Square Park Community Coalition, Inc. v. New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, 22 N.Y.3d 64 (2013): Restaurant in Park Does Not Violate Public Trust Doctrine

    Union Square Park Community Coalition, Inc. v. New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, 22 N.Y.3d 64 (2013)

    Operating a seasonal restaurant in a public park under a license agreement with significant governmental control does not violate the public trust doctrine if the restaurant serves a valid park purpose, and the agreement is a license, not an unauthorized lease.

    Summary

    The Union Square Park Community Coalition challenged the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation’s agreement to allow a restaurant to operate in Union Square Park, alleging violations of the public trust doctrine. The New York Court of Appeals held that the restaurant served a valid park purpose and the agreement was a license, not a lease, and therefore did not violate the public trust doctrine. The court emphasized the broad discretion of the Parks Commissioner in determining valid park purposes and the importance of a termination clause in defining a license versus a lease.

    Facts

    The New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (the Department) entered into a “License Agreement” with Chef Driven Market, LLC (CDM) to operate a seasonal restaurant in the pavilion of Union Square Park for 15 years. The restaurant was to operate from mid-April to mid-October, daily from 7:00 a.m. to midnight. CDM agreed to pay an annual license fee and make significant capital improvements. The Department retained extensive control over the restaurant’s operations, including menu approval, pricing, and hours. The agreement required CDM to use Union Square Park Greenmarket vendors and offer community programs. The agreement contained a termination clause allowing the Department to terminate the license at will, provided such termination was not arbitrary and capricious.

    Procedural History

    The Union Square Park Community Coalition, Inc. and others sued the Department, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming the restaurant violated the public trust doctrine. The Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction against the city, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the operation of a restaurant in Union Square Park constitutes a nonpark purpose, requiring legislative approval under the public trust doctrine?

    2. Whether the agreement between the Department and CDM constitutes a lease, which would be an improper alienation of parkland, or a license?

    Holding

    1. No, because the restaurant serves a valid park purpose and the Parks Commissioner has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a park purpose.

    2. No, because the agreement contains a broad termination clause and the Department retained significant control over the restaurant’s operations, indicating a license rather than a lease.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that under the public trust doctrine, dedicated parkland cannot be converted to a nonpark purpose for an extended period without legislative approval. Citing 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v City of New York, the Court emphasized the broad powers of the Park Commissioner in maintaining and improving city parks, with judicial interference justified only when a total lack of power is shown. The Court stated that it is for the courts to determine what is and is not a park purpose, the Commissioner enjoys broad discretion to choose among alternative valid park purposes.

    The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument for a flexible, multifactor analysis to determine whether a restaurant serves a park purpose, stating that such an approach was eschewed in 795 Fifth Ave. The court found that, similar to the claims in 795 Fifth Ave., the plaintiffs’ disagreement with the Department’s plan did not demonstrate its illegality.

    Addressing whether the agreement constituted a lease or a license, the Court explained that a lease grants the exclusive right to use and occupy land, while a license is a revocable privilege to do temporary acts on another’s land. The Court noted that the agreement’s language, the Department’s significant control over operations, and the broad termination clause indicated a license. Quoting Miller v City of New York, the court noted that “the right to cancel whenever it decides in good faith to do so” is strongly indicative of a license as opposed to a lease.

    The Court concluded that the Department’s grant of a license to CDM to operate the restaurant was lawful and did not violate the public trust doctrine.

  • Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2000): Legislative Approval Required for Substantial Non-Park Use of Parkland

    Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2000)

    Parkland is impressed with a public trust, and any substantial intrusion on parkland for non-park purposes, even if temporary or underground with eventual restoration, requires explicit legislative approval from the state.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether New York City needed state legislative approval to build a water treatment plant under the Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park. The City argued that because the plant would be mostly underground and the parkland restored, no legislative approval was needed. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the project involved a significant, long-term (over five years) disruption of park use for a non-park purpose, it required explicit legislative approval, regardless of eventual restoration or the fact that the facility was primarily underground. This decision reinforces the public trust doctrine protecting parkland from encroachment without explicit legislative authorization.

    Facts

    New York City planned to build a water treatment plant to filter water from the Croton Watershed, a major source of the City’s drinking water. The City selected the Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park as the site. The project involved constructing a 473,000 square foot industrial facility covering 23 acres. The golf course would be closed for over five years during construction. While the plant was designed to be built underground, its roof would be between five and 30 feet above the existing ground elevation. Vents and air intake louvers would also extend above the finished grade. Construction would require demolition of existing structures and removal of a million cubic yards of soil and rock. Citizen groups and some state legislators opposed the project, arguing it was an unauthorized conversion of parkland.

    Procedural History

    The State Attorney General advised the City that legislative approval was needed. When the City did not seek approval, the State sought relief in federal district court based on a consent decree. Citizen groups also filed lawsuits in state court to enjoin construction, which were removed to federal court. The District Court granted summary judgment to the City, finding no legislative approval was required. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question of whether state legislative approval was needed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Does any aspect of the proposed water treatment plant require state legislative approval, considering it involves a non-park use of parkland, a significant construction period disrupting park access, and the placement of a substantial underground structure?

    Holding

    Yes, because the construction of the water treatment plant involves a substantial intrusion on parkland for a non-park purpose, and the public will be deprived of valued park uses for at least five years, explicit legislative approval is required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the precedent set by Williams v. Gallatin, which established that parkland is held in public trust and cannot be used for non-park purposes without clear legislative authorization. The court emphasized that legislative approval is needed when there is a substantial intrusion on parkland for non-park purposes, regardless of whether there’s an outright transfer of title or whether the parkland is ultimately restored. The court reasoned that the five-year construction period and the inhibition of future uses of the land by the underground structure constituted a significant intrusion. Even though the water treatment plant served an important public purpose, the Court reaffirmed the principle that dedicated park areas are impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the people of the State. Quoting Ackerman v. Steisel, the court stated that the use of parkland “for other than park purposes, either for a period of years or permanently, requires the direct and specific approval of the State Legislature, plainly conferred.” The court distinguished the case from situations involving de minimis exceptions to the public trust doctrine, emphasizing the magnitude of the proposed project. The court also found it unnecessary to address General City Law § 20(2), basing its decision on common law principles. The court explicitly stated that “no objects, however worthy, * * * which have no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly conferred.”