New York Law Review

Tag: Public Health

  • Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507 (1974): Municipal Power to Revoke Building Permits Based on Public Health Concerns

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507 (1974)

    A municipality may revoke previously granted building permits based on a genuine and dire threat to public health and welfare, but not solely to appease community opposition or as a pretext for preventing development.

    Summary

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. sought to build a nursing home in New York City. After initial approvals were granted, the city revoked them due to concerns about the inadequacy of the existing sewer system. Belle Harbor sued, arguing the city succumbed to community pressure and zoning changes. The Court of Appeals held that while a municipality can use its police power to prevent conditions dangerous to public health, it must demonstrate a dire necessity, a reasonable solution, and active steps to rectify the problem. The court remanded the case to determine if the revocation was genuinely based on public health concerns or merely a pretext.

    Facts

    Belle Harbor Realty Corp. applied for a permit to construct a four-story nursing home in New York City in 1972.

    The Department of Buildings, Department of Water Resources, and the State Board of Social Welfare issued the necessary approvals between July and September 1972.

    Prior to the issuance of the written permit, local citizens filed a lawsuit to enjoin the city from issuing the permit, citing inadequate sewerage facilities. The lawsuit was dismissed.

    Following complaints of sewer backups, the city investigated the sewerage facilities at the proposed site and discovered the sewers were grossly inadequate, dating back to 1889 with six-inch pipes and open joints.

    Based on this information, the city revoked the prior approvals, citing the deteriorated condition of the sewers.

    Procedural History

    Belle Harbor initiated an Article 78 proceeding to annul the city’s revocation of approvals and compel the city to reissue approvals and permits.

    Special Term dismissed the petition, finding the revocation a reasonable exercise of police power.

    The Appellate Division reversed, directing the city to issue the approvals and permits, relying on Westwood Forest Estates v. Village of South Nyack.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the city’s revocation of building approvals was a valid exercise of its police power to prevent conditions dangerous to public health and welfare, or whether the revocation was based solely on a pretext.

    Holding

    No, the court reversed and remanded because a municipality’s police power is limited by the necessity of the situation, and it cannot be invoked merely to appease community opposition without addressing the underlying problem.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Westwood Forest Estates, noting that Westwood involved zoning power and a generalized pollution problem, while this case involves the general police power and an immediate, direct sanitation problem.

    The court recognized a municipality’s right, under its police powers, to prevent conditions dangerous to public health and welfare, citing cases such as Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden and Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles.

    However, the court emphasized that such restrictions must be kept within the limits of necessity, quoting Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher: “within the limits of necessity”.

    The court stated that a municipality may not invoke its police powers solely as a pretext to assuage strident community opposition. To justify interference with property rights, the municipality must prove: (1) a dire necessity, (2) a reasonably calculated solution, and (3) active steps to rectify the problem.

    The court emphasized the emergency nature of the general police power under such circumstances: “When the general police power is invoked under such circumstances it must be considered an emergency measure and is circumscribed by the exigencies of that emergency.”

    The case was remanded to determine whether the revocation was truly necessary to prevent a public health crisis or based on a pretext.

  • Cremonese v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.2d 22 (1966): Medical Examiner’s Authority to Perform Autopsy

    Cremonese v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.2d 22 (1966)

    A medical examiner has the statutory authority to perform an autopsy when a death occurs in an unusual manner, such as when a hospital is unable to definitively diagnose the cause of death after extensive medical tests.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of a medical examiner’s authority to order an autopsy when a patient dies in a hospital, and the cause of death remains undetermined despite medical intervention. The New York Court of Appeals held that the medical examiner acted within his statutory authority to perform an autopsy because the hospital could not provide a definitive diagnosis for the patient’s death, rendering the death “unusual.” This decision emphasizes the importance of the medical examiner’s role in protecting public health and ensuring accountability in hospital care when the cause of death is uncertain.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s wife was admitted to Coney Island Hospital with acute abdominal pain and died nine days later. Despite x-ray studies and medical procedures, the hospital staff could not determine the exact cause of her death. The hospital initially signed out the case as “peritonitis due to perforation of viscus,” but this diagnosis was considered too general and unacceptable to the Board of Health. The plaintiff refused to consent to an autopsy. Due to the obscure cause of death, the medical examiner’s office was notified, and the medical examiner decided to perform an autopsy.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging that the hospital performed the autopsy without his consent. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division reduced the damage award from $12,500 to $3,500. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the medical examiner acted within his statutory authority.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the medical examiner acted within the scope of his statutory authority in deciding to perform an autopsy on the deceased when the hospital could not provide a definitive cause of death, and the Board of Health found the hospital’s explanation unacceptable?

    Holding

    Yes, because the hospital’s inability to provide a definitive diagnosis for the patient’s death, despite extensive medical intervention, constituted an “unusual” manner of death, thereby triggering the medical examiner’s authority to perform an autopsy under the New York City Charter and Administrative Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the medical examiner’s authority, as defined by the New York City Charter § 878 and the Administrative Code § 878-3.0, permits autopsies in cases of “unusual” deaths. The court reasoned that because the hospital could not definitively determine the cause of death after extensive tests and procedures, the death was considered “unusual.” The court relied on the medical examiner’s testimony that the hospital physicians “had no definitive diagnosis” and that he himself “was unable to determine any exact cause of death.” The court stated, “The inability of physicians to diagnose the nature of her illness or to determine the cause of her death after following procedures customary in a modern hospital was an ‘unusual’ termination of life.” The court distinguished this case from cases like Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., where the allegations did not indicate an unusual manner of death. The court concluded that allowing the medical examiner to investigate such deaths protects public health and provides additional safeguards in hospital care, especially when a hospital leaves the cause of a patient’s death uncertain. The court emphasized that it is the medical examiner’s duty in the public interest to investigate when a hospital fails to provide a clear explanation of a patient’s death.