Tag: Public Funds

  • Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enterprise Development Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 488 (1994): Defining ‘Agency’ Under New York’s Freedom of Information Law

    Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enterprise Development Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 488 (1994)

    A not-for-profit local development corporation that channels public funds into the community and possesses many attributes of public entities can be considered an “agency” subject to the disclosure requirements of New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Summary

    Buffalo News sought access to financial records from Buffalo Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDC) regarding discharged or forgiven loans, arguing BEDC was an “agency” under FOIL. BEDC refused, claiming it was not an agency. The New York Court of Appeals held that BEDC, a not-for-profit local development corporation using public funds for economic development, qualified as an “agency” under FOIL, requiring disclosure of the requested records (subject to any exemptions). The Court emphasized FOIL’s broad scope and the need for liberal construction to ensure public access to governmental information.

    Facts

    BEDC, a not-for-profit corporation, was created to stimulate economic growth in Buffalo. It administered loan programs funded by federal and state governmental entities, assisting local businesses. Membership in BEDC was limited to those residing or doing business in Buffalo. The Mayor of Buffalo and other city officials served on BEDC’s Board of Directors. Buffalo News requested financial records concerning BEDC’s nonperforming loans that had been discharged or forgiven. BEDC provided limited data but refused access to the requested records.

    Procedural History

    Buffalo News filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding BEDC was not an “agency” under FOIL. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding BEDC acted as a governmental agency and was subject to FOIL. The case was remanded for an in camera inspection to determine if exemptions applied and whether attorney’s fees should be awarded. The Supreme Court then ordered disclosure of certain documents but denied attorneys’ fees. BEDC appealed to the Court of Appeals based on a two-Justice dissent in the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Buffalo Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDC), a local development corporation, constitutes an “agency” as defined by Public Officers Law § 86(3) and is therefore subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Holding

    Yes, because BEDC performs a governmental function by channeling public funds into the community to stimulate economic growth and possesses many attributes of public entities, thus falling within the definition of an “agency” under FOIL.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the broad purpose of FOIL: “that government is the public’s business and that the public, individually and collectively and represented by a free press, should have access to the records of government.” FOIL is to be liberally construed, and its exemptions narrowly interpreted, to grant maximum access to government records. The Court stated that the term “agency” under FOIL must be given its “natural and most obvious meaning” and must be “liberally construed” to further FOIL’s general purpose. Public Officers Law § 86(3) defines an “agency” as “any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof.

    BEDC was created by and for the City of Buffalo to attract investment and stimulate growth. As a city development agency, it is required to publicly disclose its annual budget. BEDC also describes itself as an “agent” of the City of Buffalo. The Court rejected BEDC’s reliance on federal precedents requiring substantial governmental control over daily operations, finding it too narrow. The Court found BEDC’s purpose undeniably governmental and that a constricted construction of “agency” would contradict the expansive public policy dictates underpinning FOIL. Ultimately, the Court concluded that BEDC should be deemed an “agency” within FOIL’s reach in this case, based on its function and connection to the City of Buffalo. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and the Supreme Court’s judgment to disclose the requested records, subject to FOIL exemptions.

  • Matter of Haggerty v. Rensselaer County, 84 N.Y.2d 918 (1994): Authority of Special District Attorney to Hire Staff

    Matter of Haggerty v. Rensselaer County, 84 N.Y.2d 918 (1994)

    A Special District Attorney, like a District Attorney, must obtain prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring additional legal staff at public expense.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of a Special District Attorney’s authority to hire staff and receive compensation for their services. The Court of Appeals held that a Special District Attorney, possessing powers coextensive with those of a District Attorney, must obtain prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring additional legal staff at public expense. Because the Special District Attorney in this case failed to obtain such approval, the County Court lacked the authority to order compensation for services rendered by anyone other than the Special District Attorney himself. This ruling reinforces the principle that the power to appoint a Special District Attorney should be invoked sparingly and not interpreted expansively.

    Facts

    An attorney was appointed as Special District Attorney pursuant to County Law § 701. He sought compensation for hours billed by associates in his law firm and for the services of a law clerk. The County Court authorized payment for these services. However, the Special District Attorney had not obtained prior approval for compensation to members of his staff. The County Attorney objected to payment for anyone other than the Special District Attorney himself.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially authorized payment for the services of the Special District Attorney’s staff. The County Attorney objected. The Appellate Division rejected the County’s argument that only the appointed attorney could be compensated but reduced the award, finding the hourly rates excessive. The Special District Attorney appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the reduction in compensation and arguing for broader hiring powers.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a Special District Attorney has the authority to hire additional staff (associates and law clerks) and receive public compensation for their services without prior approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors.

    Holding

    1. No, because a Special District Attorney’s powers are coextensive with those of a District Attorney, and a District Attorney requires approval from the County Court or Board of Supervisors before hiring legal staff at public expense; absent such approval, the County Court lacked authority to order compensation for services rendered by persons other than the Special District Attorney.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that County Law §§ 700, 701, 702, and 703 place strict limitations on a District Attorney’s power to hire staff, requiring approval from the County Board of Supervisors or County Judge depending on the position. Because a Special District Attorney possesses all the powers and duties of a District Attorney regarding the matter for which they were appointed, they are similarly constrained in their ability to hire staff at public expense. The court emphasized that a Special District Attorney’s powers are “coextensive with those of a District Attorney.” The Court cited People v. Leahy, stating that legislative authorization to appoint a Special District Attorney should be invoked sparingly and not interpreted expansively. The court declined to recognize broader hiring powers for a Special District Attorney than those conferred upon elected District Attorneys. Because the Special District Attorney did not obtain prior approval for compensating his staff, the County Court lacked the legal authority to order compensation for their services.