New York Law Review

Tag: public employee strikes

  • Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314 (1983): Private Right of Action Under the Taylor Law

    59 N.Y.2d 314 (1983)

    The Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees, does not create a private right of action for damages resulting from illegal strikes, nor does it preempt existing common-law remedies, although the elements of those common law torts must still be proven independently.

    Summary

    Two law firms sued unions for damages caused by an illegal transit strike, alleging causes of action including violation of the Taylor Law, prima facie tort, public nuisance, and interference with business. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law does not create a private right of action, as the legislative intent was to provide public remedies and maintain labor peace, not to create new avenues for private lawsuits. However, the Court also determined that the Taylor Law did not preempt common-law tort claims, but the plaintiffs failed to adequately state claims for prima facie tort (lack of disinterested malevolence), public nuisance (damages not distinct from the public at large), and intentional interference with business (interference was incidental).

    Facts

    In April 1980, a transit strike occurred in New York City, violating the Taylor Law and a preliminary injunction. Two law firms, Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer (“Burns Jackson”) and Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman (“Jackson, Lewis”), separately sued the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and other related unions and officers, seeking damages for losses sustained due to the strike. Burns Jackson filed a class action seeking $50 million per day in damages, alleging prima facie tort and public nuisance. Jackson, Lewis sued TWU, seeking $25,000 in damages, alleging violation of the Taylor Law, prima facie tort, intentional interference with business, willful injury, conspiracy, and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary.

    Procedural History

    The Jackson, Lewis action was moved to Queens County and consolidated with the Burns Jackson action. The defendants moved to dismiss both actions for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motions, except for the Jackson, Lewis contract claim. The Appellate Division modified the order, dismissing both complaints entirely. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Taylor Law either preempts common-law private damage actions for injuries caused by public employee strikes or creates a new private right of action for such damages?

    2. Whether the complaints adequately state a cause of action for (a) prima facie tort, (b) public nuisance, (c) intentional interference with business, or (d) breach of plaintiffs’ rights as third-party beneficiary of defendants’ contracts with NYCTA or MABSTOA?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Taylor Law was intended to be cumulative, not exclusive, and it was not intended to establish a new private cause of action.

    2. No, because (a) the plaintiffs failed to allege disinterested malevolence for the prima facie tort claim, (b) the damages alleged for the public nuisance claim were not distinct from those suffered by the public at large, (c) the interference with business was merely incidental, and (d) the contracts had expired before the strike, and the plaintiffs were merely incidental beneficiaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that legislative intent is paramount in determining whether a statute creates a private right of action or preempts existing remedies. The Court found no explicit statement in the Taylor Law regarding exclusivity or intent to create a private cause of action. Examining the legislative history, the Court concluded that the Taylor Law was intended to be cumulative, not exclusive, and was not meant to create a new cause of action. The Court emphasized that implying a private action would impose a crushing burden on unions and employees, undermining the legislative goal of defusing tensions in public employer-employee relations and maintaining labor peace. The Court noted that the elaborate enforcement provisions within the Taylor Law suggested that the Legislature provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.

    Regarding the common-law claims, the Court held that the prima facie tort claim failed because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants’ sole motivation was “disinterested malevolence.” The Court clarified that a malicious motive must be unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to the injury of another. The public nuisance claim failed because the damages alleged were not “of a different kind from that suffered by other persons exercising the same public right.” The injury was common to the entire community. The intentional interference with business claim failed because the interference was an incidental result of the strike, and the Court declined to recognize a common-law cause of action for such incidental interference where the Legislature has established a comprehensive labor plan. Finally, the third-party beneficiary claim failed because the underlying contracts had expired before the strike, and the plaintiffs were merely incidental beneficiaries of those contracts.

    The Court cited Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 for the principle of not permitting a wrongdoer to shift responsibility for their actions onto their victim, but distinguished that case as being predicated on a comprehensive legislative scheme for redressing labor disputes.

  • Matter of Public Employees Federation v. Cuomo, 62 N.Y.2d 450 (1984): Enforcing Statutory Time Limits for Penalizing Striking Public Employees

    Matter of Public Employees Federation v. Cuomo, 62 N.Y.2d 450 (1984)

    The statutory requirement that penalties for striking public employees be deducted from their wages within a specific timeframe (30-90 days) is mandatory, not directory, and the state cannot make such deductions after the 90-day period has expired, even to correct prior errors.

    Summary

    Several state employees engaged in an illegal strike. The state began wage deductions as penalties, but a federal court temporarily limited the amount that could be deducted per pay period. After the federal stay was lifted and the state believed it completed the deductions, an audit revealed errors. The state attempted to correct these errors by resuming wage deductions, but some employees argued that this was illegal because the 90-day period prescribed by Civil Service Law § 210(2)(g) had passed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 90-day requirement is a mandatory limitation on the state’s power to collect penalties and that deductions outside that window are impermissible.

    Facts

    In 1979, New York State employees, primarily within the Department of Correctional Services, participated in an illegal strike.

    On July 2, 1979, the State Director of Employee Relations formally declared the strike illegal.

    On July 20, 1979, striking employees received notice that penalties would be imposed via wage deductions.

    Deductions began on September 5, 1979.

    A federal court temporarily restrained the state from deducting more than two days’ pay per biweekly pay period.

    On January 10, 1980, the federal court dismissed the action and lifted the restraining order.

    A subsequent audit revealed deduction discrepancies, leading the state to make refunds for over-deductions and resume deductions in approximately 300 cases of under-deductions.

    Procedural History

    The union and individual employees initiated actions challenging the legality of the resumed deductions, arguing that they fell outside the 90-day period mandated by Civil Service Law § 210(2)(g).

    The trial courts ruled in favor of the employees, finding the 90-day period to be a Statute of Limitations.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting.

    The State appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the provision in Civil Service Law § 210(2)(g) mandating that penalty deductions for striking public employees be made “[n]ot earlier than thirty nor later than ninety days following the date of such determination” is a Statute of Limitations that bars the state from making additional deductions after the 90-day period has expired.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory time requirements are an integral part of the legislative scheme designed to deter strikes by public employees through swift punishment, and the Legislature considered time to be of the essence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court rejected the State’s argument that the 90-day rule should not be “literally” applied. The Court emphasized that the statute was designed to ensure penalties are imposed swiftly and fairly, deterring future strikes. Public employees have standing to challenge the State’s collection of penalties beyond the 90-day limit, as the limit functions as a Statute of Limitations.

    The Court distinguished between mandatory and directory statutes, noting that time limits related to the “essence and substance of the act to be performed” are not merely directory. The Court reasoned that the Taylor Law’s penalty provisions were expressly designed to provide “more effective deterrents against strikes” and establishes “a new procedure for the expeditious determination of participation in a strike and the imposition of penalties—well defined in advance so that a public employee will be fully aware of the individual consequences of his action and the certainty that penalties will be fairly imposed without unreasonable delay.” The Court highlighted the mandatory nature of the procedures under the statute, which require officials to act with dispatch.

    The Court cited Matter of Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 NY2d 547, emphasizing the “overriding governmental and public interest in the deterrence of strikes by public employees as aided by the swiftly imposed penalty provisions.”

    The Court concluded that the time requirements are “an integral and central part of the statutory scheme” and that “the Legislature considered time of the essence.” It distinguished the case from situations where strict compliance with the statute is impossible, indicating that such cases may warrant a different interpretation.

  • City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175 (1968): Constitutionality of Public Employee Strike Bans

    City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175 (1968)

    A state statute prohibiting strikes by public employees does not violate due process or equal protection clauses of the U.S. or state constitutions because the prohibition is reasonably related to a valid state policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York’s Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes by public employees. When New York City sanitation workers went on strike, the city sought and obtained an injunction against the strike. The union and its president, De Lury, were found in criminal contempt for violating the injunction. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Taylor Law, finding that the prohibition against public employee strikes does not violate due process or equal protection, as it serves a valid state policy of ensuring uninterrupted government services. The court emphasized the differences between public and private employment and the unique need to maintain governmental functions without disruption.

    Facts

    On February 2, 1968, almost all sanitation workers in New York City failed to report for work, initiating a nine-day strike. De Lury, the union president, addressed striking workers, encouraging them to ensure the strike was “effective 100%.” The strike resulted in a massive accumulation of garbage (10,000 tons per day), creating significant health and fire hazards in the city. The City obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering the strike to end and De Lury to instruct his members to return to work. De Lury did not comply and admitted he took no actions to end the strike.

    Procedural History

    The City initiated an action to enjoin the strike and sought a preliminary injunction. The trial court granted the injunction and subsequently found De Lury and the Union guilty of criminal contempt for disobeying the order. De Lury was sentenced to 15 days in jail and fined $250; the Union was fined $80,000, and its right to dues check-off was forfeited for 18 months. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Taylor Law, prohibiting strikes by public employees, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the state constitution?

    2. Whether the Taylor Law violates the equal protection clause by treating public employees differently from private employees regarding the right to strike?

    3. Whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial in the criminal contempt proceeding?

    Holding

    1. No, because the prohibition against strikes by public employees is reasonably designed to effectuate a valid state policy.

    2. No, because there are reasonable justifications for the disparate treatment between public and private employees regarding the right to strike.

    3. No, because the New York Court of Appeals had already determined that a jury trial in such circumstances is not required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to strike is not absolute and can be restricted when it conflicts with a valid state policy. It emphasized that a state can prohibit strikes if the prohibition is reasonably calculated to achieve a valid state policy in an area open to state regulation. The court found that preventing strikes by public employees serves a valid state policy of ensuring the orderly and uninterrupted operation of government. It argued that allowing public employee strikes would undermine the legislative process by enabling unions to coerce disproportionate gains at the expense of the public. The court cited prior cases and the Taylor Report, which found that the right of public employees to strike “is not compatible with the orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative government.” Regarding equal protection, the court highlighted the differences between public and private employment, such as the absence of market constraints in the public sector. It stated that “legislative differentiation between public and private employees, insofar as restrictions on their right to strike… are concerned, is reasonable.” Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ claim to a jury trial, citing its recent decision in Rankin v. Shanker. The court also found that De Lury’s actions constituted willful disobedience of the court’s order, especially considering that he actively encouraged the strike to be “effective 100%.” The court quoted Justice Frankfurter from United States v. Mine Workers, emphasizing the importance of obedience to the law and the role of the judiciary in ensuring it: “In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping of specialists or in the service of any special interest… If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.”

  • Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111 (1968): No Right to Jury Trial in Public Employee Strike Contempt Cases

    Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111 (1968)

    Public employees and their unions do not have a statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating no-strike provisions, distinguishing them from private sector employees.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s prohibition against strikes. The Court of Appeals held that neither statutory nor constitutional provisions grant this right. The court reasoned that historical precedent and policy considerations justify treating public and private sector employees differently regarding the right to strike and jury trials for related contempt charges. Prompt resolution of public sector strike-related contempt is crucial to prevent severe disruption of essential services.

    Facts

    The Corporation Counsel of New York City sought an order to punish the defendants (public employees and their unions) for criminal contempt. The claim was that they willfully disobeyed a temporary injunction issued by the Supreme Court restraining them from striking. The defendants demanded a jury trial, arguing they were entitled to it by statute and the Constitution. Special Term rejected their demand, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction against the strike.
    2. Defendants violated the injunction.
    3. Corporation Counsel sought criminal contempt charges.
    4. Special Term denied the defendants’ request for a jury trial.
    5. Appellate Division affirmed the denial.
    6. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether public employees and their unions are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of statutory right under Judiciary Law § 753-a or Labor Law § 808 in criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Taylor Law’s no-strike provisions.
    2. Whether denying public employees and their unions a jury trial in such proceedings violates the equal protection clauses of the United States or New York State Constitutions.
    3. Whether the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution mandate a jury trial in these circumstances.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Taylor Law was not intended to provide jury trials in contempt enforcement proceedings, and the reference to Labor Law § 807 does not create a right to a jury trial under § 808.
    2. No, because a legitimate distinction between public and private employment is constitutionally permissible regarding the right to strike and jury trials for violations.
    3. No, because the potential penalties for contempt are not “serious” enough to trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that sections 807 and 808 of the Labor Law, and Judiciary Law, § 753-a, are successors to a provision enacted in the 1930s, New York’s Little Norris-LaGuardia Act and that for decades, these provisions have been held inapplicable to public employees. The court stated that the Legislature would have explicitly granted a right to a jury trial if it had intended to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that statutes which divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.

    Regarding the constitutional claims, the court relied on United States v. Mine Workers, stating that a distinction between public and private employment is permissible. The court noted the necessity of prompt determinations in criminal contempt proceedings under the Taylor Law to deter public strikes. The court stated that a reasonable distinction may be drawn between public and private employment. The court cited McGowan v. Maryland, stating, “The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”

    Finally, the court addressed the defendants’ argument that the Federal Constitution requires a trial by jury. Citing Bloom v. Illinois, the court stated that the decision is limited in its application to “serious” crimes in contradistinction to “petty” offenses. The court determined that the maximum punishment to which the individual defendants are subject—30 days in jail and a fine of $250—does not constitute a “serious” crime. The determination of whether a crime is serious or petty turns not on the amount of the fine which may be imposed but solely on the length of the prison sentence.

  • Sanitation Men Ass’n. v. Sanitation Com’r of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 280 (1968): Selective Enforcement of Laws and Equal Protection

    Sanitation Men Ass’n. v. Sanitation Com’r of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 280 (1968)

    The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a facially valid statute is applied in a discriminatory manner due to intentional or purposeful discrimination, not mere non-enforcement against other violators.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether the selective enforcement of New York’s Condon-Wadlin Act (prohibiting strikes by public employees) against a union of ferryboat officers violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that while the Act’s penalties had rarely been enforced, the union needed to demonstrate intentional and invidious discrimination in its enforcement, not just that others had gone unpunished. The case was remitted to the lower court for a hearing to determine if such intentional discrimination existed.

    Facts

    Over 100 ferryboat officers, employed by the City of New York, were found to have engaged in a strike in violation of Section 108 of the Civil Service Law (the Condon-Wadlin Act). The Commissioner of Marine and Aviation imposed penalties, including loss of pay, demotion, and part-time re-employment. The ferryboat officers challenged this determination, arguing that the Condon-Wadlin Act was unconstitutional and that its enforcement against them was discriminatory.

    Procedural History

    The ferryboat officers initiated an Article 78 proceeding to review the Commissioner’s determination. The Supreme Court, New York County, transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, First Department. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination without opinion. The ferryboat officers then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the application of the Condon-Wadlin Act to the ferryboat officers, when the Act was rarely enforced against other striking public employees, constituted a denial of equal protection under the law.

    Holding

    No, because to establish an equal protection violation based on selective enforcement, the ferryboat officers must demonstrate that the enforcement against them was the result of intentional and purposeful discrimination, not merely that the statute was not enforced against others similarly situated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the union’s argument that the selective enforcement of the Condon-Wadlin Act violated the Equal Protection Clause, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins. However, the court distinguished Yick Wo, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has refined the test for equal protection violations to require a showing of “intentional or purposeful discrimination.” The court stated, “[T]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”

    The court acknowledged that the Condon-Wadlin Act had rarely been enforced over a 20-year period, despite numerous strikes by public employees. However, the court stated that this mere nonenforcement was insufficient to prove an equal protection violation. Quoting Oyler v. Boles, the court noted that “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” unless the selection was based on an unjustifiable standard like race or religion.

    The court found that the union had not been afforded an opportunity to factually demonstrate such intentional and purposeful discrimination. There were factual issues requiring a hearing, such as the department’s actual motivation and the reasons for the lack of enforcement against others. The court concluded that an opportunity was required to properly determine the scope of the union’s constitutional rights and any violation thereof. The court specifically noted, “Petitioners have had no forum at which they could attempt to factually demonstrate such intentional and purposeful discrimination. And there are many factual issues requiring such a hearing: the actual motivation of the department (to comply with the law, or perhaps to favor one union over another, etc.); the actual responsibility for the decision to apply Condon-Wadlin…; the reasons for lack of enforcement against others similarly situated (mere strength of bargaining power or reasonable selectivity properly motivated), etc.”