New York Law Review

Tag: Public Employee Strike

  • Matter of Plummer v. Klepak, 48 N.Y.2d 486 (1979): Defining the ‘Determination’ Date for Taylor Law Payroll Deductions

    Matter of Plummer v. Klepak, 48 N.Y.2d 486 (1979)

    Under New York’s Taylor Law, the ‘determination’ date triggering the timeline for payroll deductions from striking public employees is when the chief executive officer identifies the specific employees who violated the law and provides them with notice, not when a general determination of a strike is made.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of the Taylor Law regarding payroll deductions for striking sanitation workers in New York City. The city initially determined that a strike had occurred but failed to individually notify 370 sanitation workers. The city attempted to serve these workers later, but the workers argued that the 90-day window for deductions had already passed, calculated from the initial determination date. The Court of Appeals held that the ‘determination’ date, for the purpose of calculating the deduction window, is when individual employees are identified and notified of their violation, ensuring they have an opportunity to object.

    Facts

    Between June 27 and July 2, 1975, members of the New York City sanitation workers’ union engaged in a job action. On October 10, 1975, a report was submitted to the Mayor, and most sanitation men who violated the Taylor Law were notified. However, 370 sanitation workers (the petitioners) were not initially served with notice. On March 17, 1976, the Commissioner of Sanitation directed that duplicate notices be distributed to these 370 workers who had not yet been served.

    Procedural History

    The 370 sanitation workers commenced a proceeding, arguing that the city was time-barred from imposing payroll deductions. Special Term and the Appellate Division agreed, holding that the ‘determination’ was made on October 10, 1975, and the 90-day period had expired. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the ‘determination’ date under Civil Service Law § 210(2)(g), which triggers the 30- to 90-day period for payroll deductions, is the date when the chief executive officer generally determines a strike occurred, or the date when individual employees are identified and notified of their violation.

    Holding

    No, because the statute requires the ‘determination’ to identify the individual strikers by name, and the 30- to 90-day period begins when those individuals are identified and notified, allowing them the opportunity to object.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted Civil Service Law § 210, emphasizing that the statute contemplates a two-stage process: first, a determination that a violation (i.e., a strike) occurred; and second, a determination of the names of the violators. The court highlighted that under § 210(2)(d), “[s]uch determination shall not be deemed to be final until the completion of the procedures provided for in this subdivision.” This includes notifying individual employees and giving them a chance to object. The court cited Matter of Sanford v Rockefeller, 35 NY2d 547, 553-554, noting the intent of the Legislature to require some form of notice before penalties are imposed. The court further emphasized that § 210(2)(e) requires notice to each employee “forthwith.” The court stated, “The plain language of the statute is to the effect that the ‘determination’ identify the strikers by name.” Therefore, the initial determination of October 10, 1975, was not final as to the 370 workers until they were individually identified and notified. This interpretation ensures fairness and provides employees with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the determination before deductions are made. The Court cautioned against unreasonable delays by the municipality in providing the required notice, referencing the “forthwith” requirement in the statute. While this issue was not raised in this case, the court acknowledged its importance.

  • Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 547 (1974): Due Process and Penalties for Striking Public Employees

    Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 547 (1974)

    The Taylor Law’s procedures for penalizing public employees who strike, including fines and probationary status, satisfy due process requirements because they provide adequate notice, an opportunity to object, and judicial review, balancing the employee’s rights with the government’s interest in preventing public service disruptions.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York Civil Service Law § 210 (the Taylor Law), which penalizes public employees for striking. The Court of Appeals held that the law’s procedures, which allow for fines and probationary status based on a determination by the chief executive officer, subject to the employee’s right to object and seek judicial review, satisfy due process requirements. The court emphasized the balance between protecting employee rights and the government’s need to maintain essential public services and deter strikes. It found that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards and opportunities for review, even if a pre-penalty hearing is not always required.

    Facts

    Following failed contract negotiations, a large number of New York State employees did not report to work on April 1 and 2, 1972. The Director of Employee Relations, pursuant to Civil Service Law § 210, notified these employees that they were deemed to be on strike and would face penalties, including fines and a year of probationary status. Employees were informed of their right to object within 20 days by submitting a sworn affidavit stating why the determination was incorrect.

    Procedural History

    More than 7,800 employees received notice, with approximately 3,400 filing objections. The Director sustained about 500 objections. Approximately 694 objections raised factual questions warranting a hearing, while 2,300 were deemed without merit. Several employees initiated Article 78 proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Taylor Law. Special Term upheld the constitutionality of most of the law but found issues with the summary fine provisions. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Taylor Law’s procedures satisfied due process. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the Appellate Division, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Arnett v. Kennedy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the procedures outlined in Section 210 of the Civil Service Law (the Taylor Law) for disciplining public employees who participate in a strike, specifically the imposition of fines and probationary status without a pre-penalty hearing, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

    Holding

    No, because the statutory procedures relating to notice, hearing (if a factual question is raised), penalties, and review provide an adequate degree of due process, balancing the employee’s rights with the government’s interest in maintaining essential public services and deterring illegal strikes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Taylor Law provides sufficient procedural safeguards. The chief executive officer makes an initial determination based on investigation and affidavits. The employee receives notice and can object with a sworn affidavit and supporting documentation. The officer then has options: sustain the objection, dismiss it, or appoint a hearing officer if a factual dispute exists. If a hearing is held, the employee bears the burden of proof. The determination is subject to Article 78 judicial review. The court found that while a pre-penalty hearing is not always required, the availability of judicial review ensures due process. The court addressed concerns about the burden of proof being on the employee by stating, “the statutory presumption, clearly rebuttable, in the practical realities of a strike situation does have a “supporting foundation in the probabilities”. The court distinguished this case from cases like Goldberg v. Kelly, noting that the penalties under the Taylor Law (temporary suspension of tenure and loss of pay) are less severe than the termination of welfare benefits, and the government’s interest in preventing public employee strikes is significant. The court also considered Arnett v. Kennedy and Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., which support the view that a pre-termination or pre-penalty hearing is not always required when the government has a strong interest and adequate post-deprivation remedies are available. The court emphasized that the Taylor Law offers a screening process and judicial review, balancing fairness with the practical challenges of handling mass concerted action by public employees. The court noted the absence of “irreversible or irreparable harm” to the employee, given that penalties are reversible and the employee retains their position while seeking redress.