New York Law Review

Tag: Public Disturbance

  • People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011): Establishing Disorderly Conduct with Risk of Public Disturbance

    People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011)

    A person can be convicted of disorderly conduct if their actions, though not directly causing public disturbance, recklessly create a risk of such disturbance, considering the time, place, conduct, and potential impact on the public.

    Summary

    Tony Weaver was convicted of disorderly conduct for yelling obscenities at his wife and a police officer in a public area. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Weaver’s actions recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if no actual disturbance occurred. The Court emphasized that the potential for public disruption, rather than actual disruption, is sufficient for a disorderly conduct conviction, considering factors like the time and location of the incident and the presence of other people.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant House encountered Weaver yelling at his wife in a parking lot outside a hotel. Weaver then entered a mini-mart gas station. Upon exiting, he resumed yelling obscenities at his wife in a loud and aggressive manner. Sergeant House warned Weaver to calm down, but he responded with further obscenities directed at her. The incident occurred near a hotel and mini-mart that were open for business, with customers present.

    Procedural History

    Weaver was indicted for assault, resisting arrest, and two counts of disorderly conduct. A jury acquitted him of assault but convicted him of the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the disorderly conduct convictions, specifically whether Weaver’s behavior recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

    Holding

    Yes, because Weaver’s conduct, considering the time, place, and nature of his actions, recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, satisfying the elements of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20 (1), (3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 240.20 (1) and (3), which define disorderly conduct as engaging in fighting or violent behavior, or using obscene language in a public place, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. The Court emphasized that the disruptive behavior must be of a public, rather than individual, dimension, citing People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980). The Court stated that a person may be guilty of disorderly conduct even if the action does not result in actual public disturbance, if the conduct recklessly creates a risk of such disruption. Factors considered included the time and place of the incident, the nature of the conduct, the number of people in the vicinity, and whether they were drawn to the disturbance.

    The court noted, “[D]isorderly conduct is a statutory creation. Intended to include in the main various forms of misconduct which at common law would often be prosecuted as public nuisances…a common thread that ran through almost all of this legislation was a desire to deter breaches of the peace or, more specifically, of the community’s safety, health or morals.” (People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769, 773-774 [1997]).

    Here, the Court found that the incident occurred in a public place during early morning hours, with people nearby. Weaver’s conduct escalated despite warnings from the police, and his loud, aggressive, and obscene behavior created a risk of public disturbance. The Court concluded that “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a jury could have found that his conduct reached the point of ‘a potential or immediate public problem’.” (Munafo, 50 NY2d at 331).

  • People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769 (1997): Constitutionality of New York’s Disorderly Conduct Statute

    People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769 (1997)

    New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), is constitutional because it applies to words and conduct that create a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes that regulate pure speech.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), affirming the defendant’s conviction. The defendant was arrested after uttering obscenities at a police officer, shoving him, and then engaging in a scuffle with bar patrons after attempting to re-enter a bar. The Court found that the statute, which prohibits the use of abusive or obscene language with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, is not overbroad or vague because it targets conduct creating a risk of public disorder, not protected speech. The court distinguished this statute from the one struck down in People v. Dietze, emphasizing the requirement of a culpable mental state and the focus on preventing public disturbances.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Tichenor outside a bar. Tichenor uttered an obscenity at the officer and spat on the ground near his feet. Tichenor then shoved the officer while continuing to use obscene language. As the officer attempted to arrest Tichenor, a group of people gathered in the doorway of the bar, yelling at the officer. Tichenor then pulled away and re-entered the bar. The officer followed, and a scuffle ensued with bar patrons joining in. Tichenor was eventually arrested after other officers arrived.

    Procedural History

    Tichenor was convicted in Saratoga Springs City Court of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. He was acquitted of harassment. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Tichenor leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 240.20(3), the disorderly conduct statute, is unconstitutional under the State and Federal Constitutions for violating free speech, and being vague or overbroad.
    2. Whether the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Tichenor because his confrontation with the officer was a private encounter and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the disorderly conduct statute applies to words and conduct creating a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes regulating pure speech.
    2. No, because the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Tichenor intended to cause and incite a public disturbance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the disorderly conduct statute is constitutional, reaffirming prior decisions upholding similar statutes. The Court distinguished People v. Dietze, where a harassment statute was struck down, by emphasizing that the disorderly conduct statute requires intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. This requirement, coupled with the objective standard of public disturbance, narrows the statute’s scope and prevents it from being applied to pure speech. The Court stated that “the statutory requirement that the defendant possess an intent ‘to cause, or recklessly create a risk of, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, narrows the definition, so that no inadvertent * * * act may be punished’.” The Court also rejected Tichenor’s argument that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to him, finding that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that he intended to cause a public disturbance, noting that “[d]isorderly conduct occurs when a person, with intent to cause a public annoyance or alarm in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language (Penal Law § 240.20 [3]).” The Court emphasized that the events leading to the arrest, including the gathering of bar patrons and the ensuing scuffle, supported the inference that Tichenor intended to incite a public disturbance. The court further reasoned that “the fact that the defendant slipped away from the officer’s grasp and reentered the bar after the street confrontation further supports a ready inference that the defendant intended to cause a ‘public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.’”