New York Law Review

Tag: Public Authority

  • Carey Transportation, Inc. v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority, 38 N.Y.2d 545 (1976): Tolls and Governmental Enterprises

    38 N.Y.2d 545 (1976)

    A public authority operating tunnels and bridges can set toll rates to achieve its economic and public policy goals, differentiating among users as long as there is no invidious discrimination or arbitrary action unrelated to legitimate objectives.

    Summary

    Carey Transportation, a franchised airport bus line, sued the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, challenging the higher toll rates it was charged compared to “general purpose” buses. The Authority differentiated between general purpose (mass transit) and special purpose (airport, recreation) buses. Carey argued this was discriminatory. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling in favor of Carey, holding that the Authority has broad discretion to set tolls to meet economic and policy goals, including encouraging mass transit, as long as classifications are not invidious or utterly arbitrary. The Court likened the authority to an entrepreneur, not a regulated utility.

    Facts

    The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (Authority) operates bridges and tunnels in New York City. Since 1936, the Authority has charged reduced toll rates to certain franchised public carriers. Since 1962, its regulations distinguished between “general purpose” and “special purpose” buses. General purpose buses, engaged in general transportation, qualified for lower rates. Special purpose buses, like Carey’s airport buses and buses to beaches or stadiums, paid higher tolls. Tolls charged to special purpose buses were generally about twice those of general purpose buses.

    Procedural History

    Carey sued the Authority in Supreme Court, seeking a declaratory judgment and monetary damages, arguing that the differential toll rates were unlawful. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Carey, awarding damages. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Authority appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Authority, in setting toll rates for its facilities, can distinguish between general purpose and special purpose franchised bus operations, charging higher tolls for special purpose buses.

    Holding

    No, because the Authority possesses broad discretion in setting tolls to achieve its economic and public policy goals, including encouraging mass transportation, provided the classifications are not invidious or utterly arbitrary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Authority is a governmental enterprise operating on economic principles, similar to a private entrepreneur. Its toll-fixing power is broad, subject only to legislative correction for abuse. Unlike privately owned utilities, publicly owned authorities are not subject to the same rate-fixing standards. The Legislature granted the Authority an unlimited toll-fixing power, even anticipating that surplus funds might subsidize mass transit.

    The Court rejected Carey’s argument that tolls must relate solely to the physical use of the facilities. Distinguishing between general and special purpose buses is permissible because special purpose buses are often associated with recreational travel or high-cost interurban travel. These buses serve a “special purpose, most often without periodicity and at separated irregular time intervals” while general purpose buses are a form of mass transportation used daily. While the classification might not be perfect, the Court emphasized, “A definition of class is not required to be so perfect that some members of the class may not depart from its definitional norms”.

    The Court noted the City of New York negotiates differential franchise fees with private bus lines, showing differential treatment is acceptable. The Court emphasized that toll is triggered by the *use* of the authority’s facilities, but offers no basis for inferring that the toll is to be cost related to the *physical use*.

    Judge Cooke’s concurrence emphasized that the Authority is subject to the Equal Protection Clause, which requires classifications to be relevant to their purpose. He justified the classification based on the need to encourage mass transportation and reduce congestion during peak hours, and lessen disadvantages for commuters.

    In conclusion, the court found the issues reduced to misclassifications of the problems addressed and a logomachy over definitions.

  • Barchet v. New York City Transit Authority, 20 N.Y.2d 1 (1967): Tolling Statute of Limitations When Court Leave Is Required

    Barchet v. New York City Transit Authority, 20 N.Y.2d 1 (1967)

    When a plaintiff must obtain leave of court to file a late notice of claim against a public authority, the statute of limitations is tolled from the commencement of the proceeding seeking such leave until the order granting the relief takes effect.

    Summary

    Elizabeth Barchet sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries sustained due to alleged negligence. The NYCTA moved to dismiss because the action was brought after the one-year statute of limitations under Public Authorities Law § 1212. Barchet argued the statute was tolled while she sought leave to file a late notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations was tolled during the period when Barchet was required to obtain leave of the court, reversing the Appellate Division’s dismissal and reinstating the Special Term’s order.

    Facts

    Elizabeth Barchet was injured on December 23, 1963, allegedly due to the NYCTA’s negligent operation of its transit lines.
    Almost a year later, on December 18, 1964, Barchet sought leave of court to serve a late notice of claim, with a motion returnable on January 18, 1965, and submitted on January 22, 1965.
    On February 15, 1965, an order was signed granting Barchet leave to file a late notice of claim, giving her ten days from February 19, 1965 (when the order appeared in the New York Law Journal) to file.
    Barchet filed the late notice of claim on February 23, 1965, and commenced the action on March 22, 1965.

    Procedural History

    Barchet commenced an action against the NYCTA.
    The NYCTA asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, arguing the action was time-barred.
    Special Term granted Barchet’s motion to dismiss the NYCTA’s defense.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s order and dismissed the complaint.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which the plaintiff was required to obtain leave of the court to bring her action, pursuant to CPLR 204(a)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute was tolled from the time the plaintiff commenced the proceeding to obtain leave of the court to file a late notice of claim until the order of Special Term granting that relief appeared in the New York Law Journal, the date upon which it was to take effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 204(a) tolls the statute of limitations when the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court. While filing a notice of claim within 90 days is typically a condition precedent within the plaintiff’s control, Barchet couldn’t comply due to legally recognized reasons, necessitating court leave. Obtaining court leave was a prerequisite effectively prohibiting the action until consent was granted. The court distinguished this from simply alleging 30 days elapsed since serving the notice of claim; both prescribe procedures affecting prosecution.

    The court rejected tolling from the 90th day’s passing, presuming Barchet’s disability prevented filing the notice and commencing the action. Once the disability ceased, obtaining court leave became the impediment. The court stated, “From the date when she commenced the proceeding for leave to file a late notice of claim, December 18, 1964, until the order granting the relief requested appeared in the New York Law Journal… the plaintiff was prohibited from commencing her action and, by virtue of the provisions of CPLR 204 (subd. [a]), the Statute of Limitations was tolled for that period.”

    A contrary ruling would limit the one-year period to obtain leave, disadvantaging plaintiffs with legally recognized disabilities. The court distinguished Christian v. Village of Herkimer, emphasizing it involved a different question. The court emphasized that when the proceeding to file a late notice of claim was commenced on December 18, 1964, five days remained in which to commence the action. The order granting leave took effect February 19, 1965, so the Statute of Limitations then commenced to run again. The notice was filed on February 23, 1965, within the five-day period remaining. Once the notice was filed, the plaintiff was entitled to an additional 30 days in which to commence the action. The action was timely commenced on March 22, 1965.