New York Law Review

Tag: Public Assistance

  • Lascaris v. Wyman, 31 N.Y.2d 386 (1972): Public Assistance Eligibility for Striking Workers

    Lascaris v. Wyman, 31 N.Y.2d 386 (1972)

    Striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet all other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance under New York Social Services Law § 131, as being “unable to maintain themselves,” and receiving such assistance does not violate the state’s policy of neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law preemption principles.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether striking workers are eligible for public assistance in New York State. The Onondaga County Commissioner of Social Services sought to deny public assistance to striking workers, arguing that they were not “unable to maintain themselves” as required by Social Services Law § 131. The New York Court of Appeals held that striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance. The court reasoned that the state’s long-standing administrative policy allowed such assistance and that the legislature had not clearly prohibited it. Furthermore, providing public assistance to strikers does not violate the state’s neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law.

    Facts

    Members of the Communication Workers of America went on strike against the New York Telephone Company in 1971. Certain members of local unions applied for public assistance from the Onondaga County Department of Social Services. As required by Social Services Law § 131(4), the applicants registered with the local employment agency of the Department of Labor. Their applications were denied by the County Commissioner.

    Procedural History

    The County Commissioner brought an action against the State Commissioner seeking confirmation of his decision to deny assistance. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing collateral estoppel and res judicata based on a prior case, Lascaris v. Wyman (61 Misc.2d 212). The Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled in favor of the County Commissioner. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the State Commissioner and directing the county to pay public assistance to eligible striking workers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether striking workers who register with the Department of Labor and meet all other eligibility requirements are entitled to public assistance under New York Social Services Law § 131.

    Holding

    Yes, because the state’s long-standing administrative policy allows such assistance, the legislature has not clearly prohibited it, and providing public assistance to strikers does not violate the state’s neutrality in labor disputes or federal labor law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of Social Services Law § 131(1), which states that social services officials have a duty to provide for those “unable to maintain themselves.” Subdivision 4 of the law stipulates that assistance should not be given to an “employable person” who has not registered with the Department of Labor or has refused to accept suitable employment. The court reasoned that a person on strike does not necessarily “refuse” employment merely by going on strike. Citing Strato-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 Ill. App. 2d 480 and ITT Lamp Div. of Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, the court noted that other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion under similar statutes. The court also noted the 1971 amendment to subdivision 4 which defined “employable” person. The court suggested that the amendment could be considered legislative approval of the State Commissioner’s long-standing construction of the statute.

    The court addressed the argument that providing welfare benefits to strikers is equivalent to state subsidization of the strike, violating the state’s policy of neutrality. The court stated that such a policy is often an “admirable fiction.” It argued that the State may not be acting neutrally if it allows strikers to obtain public assistance, but it also may not be neutral if it denies them benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. The court quoted ITT Lamp Div. of Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 994-995, that welfare programs address a more basic social need than unemployment compensation. The court concluded that if the legislature considers the current policy impermissible, it should manifest its design in clear and unmistakable terms. Until then, the court will construe the statute as it stands and has been administered.

    The court rejected the argument that a striking worker should be deemed ineligible for assistance because they will likely return to their “struck” employer, thus “refusing to accept any other employment.” The court pointed out that the applicants in this case have registered for other employment and that there is no evidence that they failed to attend job interviews or refused referrals.

    Finally, the court dismissed the argument that granting public assistance to strikers constitutes an unconstitutional interference with federal labor law. The court stated that the State’s interest in providing welfare to its needy citizens is substantial, and it will not assume that Congress has deprived the State of the power to serve that interest absent a clear expression of congressional intent.

  • People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170 (1967): Criminal Liability Under Social Welfare Law Requires Fraudulent Intent

    People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170 (1967)

    A conviction under Section 145 of the Social Welfare Law for a “wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public assistance” requires proof of fraudulent intent, not simply a refusal to accept employment.

    Summary

    Pickett, a recipient of Temporary Aid to Dependent Children, was convicted of violating Section 145 of the Social Welfare Law after refusing a job referral. The New York Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that Section 145 requires proof of fraudulent intent to obtain undeserved welfare payments. The court reasoned that the statute’s language, legislative history, and consistent administrative interpretation indicated that it was intended to penalize fraudulent acts, not simply refusals to accept employment. Interpreting the statute otherwise could lead to constitutional issues of vagueness and involuntary servitude.

    Facts

    Pickett was unemployed and receiving Temporary Aid to Dependent Children. The New York State Employment Service referred him to a landscaping job paying $1.50 an hour, above the minimum wage. Pickett refused the job, stating it “wasn’t enough money” and that he wanted to look for work on his own. He asked to postpone the referral to investigate a possible construction job. The Welfare Department, upon learning of this, terminated his welfare assistance, though payments to his wife and children were later resumed. Pickett was then criminally charged with violating Section 145 of the Social Welfare Law.

    Procedural History

    The City Court of Niagara Falls found Pickett guilty of violating Section 145 of the Social Welfare Law and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The Niagara County Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Pickett then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction under Section 145 of the Social Welfare Law for committing “any wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public assistance and care” requires proof of fraudulent intent, or whether a simple refusal to accept a job referral is sufficient.

    Holding

    No, because the Legislature meant to provide penal sanctions only for acts motivated by fraudulent intent in seeking welfare benefits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the legislative history of Section 145, noting that the language prohibiting a “wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public assistance” originated in a section titled “Penalty for fraud; false representation and false swearing.” The court found no indication that the Legislature intended to effect a substantive change when it later shortened the title to simply “Penalties”. The court also emphasized the consistent interpretation of Section 145 by public officials charged with administering the welfare law, who only discussed criminal prosecutions under Section 145 in connection with fraud. Research also revealed that almost all prosecutions under Section 145 involved some element of fraud. The court stated, “Although the statutory language of section 145 is exceedingly broad, we believe that the Legislature meant to provide penal sanctions only for acts motivated by fraudulent intent.” The court also invoked the principle that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional doubts. Without a requirement of fraudulent intent, Section 145 might be unconstitutionally vague or sanction involuntary servitude. The court quoted Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, stating that a statute “‘should be construed when possible in a manner which would remove doubt of its constitutionality.’” Judge Van Voorhis concurred in the result, finding Section 145 ambiguous and thus an insufficient foundation for a criminal charge.