New York Law Review

Tag: public assistance eligibility

  • Melendez v. New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, 11 N.Y.3d 839 (2008): SSI Recipient Exclusion from Public Assistance Calculations

    11 N.Y.3d 839 (2008)

    New York Social Services Law § 131-c(1) mandates the exclusion of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients from family groups when determining eligibility and grant amounts for public assistance, but this can be superseded by specific language in state budget appropriations.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a minor receiving SSI benefits should be included in the family group when determining eligibility for public assistance, specifically the Emergency Shelter Allowance (ESA). The Court of Appeals held that Social Services Law § 131-c(1) generally excludes SSI recipients from such calculations, aligning with federal law at the time of enactment. However, the Court also found that the state legislature can supersede this exclusion through explicit language in budget appropriations, as it did in the 2006-2007 budget regarding the ESA. Thus, the lower court erred in calculating retroactive benefits owed after April 1, 2006.

    Facts

    Zoraida Melendez, residing in the Bronx with her spouse and three children, received public assistance, including an ESA due to her HIV-related illness. Her daughter, Chastity, received SSI benefits due to a disability. Initially, Chastity was not included in the household for public assistance calculations. However, HASA (NYC HIV/AIDS Services Administration) began using software that included Chastity and her SSI income when calculating Melendez’s ESA, reducing Melendez’s monthly benefits by $480.

    Procedural History

    Melendez requested a fair hearing to contest HASA’s determination, which the Commissioner of OTDA upheld. Melendez then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was denied. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that 18 NYCRR 352.3(k) conflicted with Social Services Law § 131-c(1). Supreme Court then granted Melendez’s petition, directing the exclusion of Chastity and ordering back payments. The Commissioner of OTDA appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Social Services Law § 131-c(1) requires the exclusion of minors receiving SSI from the family group when determining eligibility for and the amount of public assistance payable.
    2. Whether the Legislature, through its appropriation for the ESA in the 2006-2007 fiscal year, superseded the requirements of Social Services Law § 131-c(1).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Social Services Law § 131-c(1) was intended to mirror federal law, specifically the filing-unit and invisibility rules under the AFDC program, which excluded SSI recipients from household income calculations.
    2. Yes, because the 2006-2007 budget included specific language directing OTDA to consider applicants’ and their family members’ SSI benefits as income when budgeting ESAs, thereby superseding any inconsistent provisions of state law, including section 131-c(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Social Services Law § 131-c(1) was enacted to align with federal law regarding AFDC, which mandated the exclusion of SSI recipients from family income calculations. The legislative history of both the federal Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) and the state law supports this interpretation. The Court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the statute merely granted discretion to exclude SSI recipients. The Court emphasized that the state statute had to conform with federal law to receive federal reimbursement. However, the Court also recognized that the ESA exists solely by virtue of an annual appropriation in the State budget. The Court highlighted that while the ESA appropriation language had varied over the years, the 2006-2007 budget explicitly directed the inclusion of SSI benefits in calculating ESA eligibility, superseding any conflicting state laws. As the court stated, “This language clearly supersedes any inconsistent provisions of state law — which necessarily includes section 131-c (1).” The court noted that Congress had repealed the federal invisibility rule in 1996.

  • New v. New, 417 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1980): Establishing Intent Behind Asset Transfers Before Applying for Public Assistance

    New v. New, 417 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1980)

    When determining eligibility for public assistance, transfers of assets made close to the time of application are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, but this presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing the transfer was for another legitimate purpose.

    Summary

    This case concerns the denial of public assistance to Mary New based on asset transfers to her son, Gunther, shortly before applying for assistance. Gunther claimed the money was always his, held in his mother’s name for protection. The court held that while the commissioner could have found the money was Gunther’s and not transferred to qualify for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered a statutory presumption that it was for that purpose. The court found substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s decision to deny assistance, given the account forms, commingled funds, and lack of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses.

    Facts

    Mary New applied for public assistance. Prior to her application, she transferred funds to her son, Gunther. Some of the funds deposited were hers, some accounts were in her name in trust for Gunther, and some were in their joint names. Gunther claimed all the money was his and he controlled the bank books. He stated his mother’s name was on the accounts to protect her if he died or became incapacitated. All accounts were transferred to Gunther’s name alone within two months of the application for assistance. Mary New had received reparations and Social Security payments in her own right over the years, and her funds and those of her son were commingled.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner denied Mary New’s application for public assistance. The lower court reversed the Commissioner’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, confirming the Commissioner’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted further review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner’s determination to deny public assistance was supported by substantial evidence, considering the statutory presumption regarding asset transfers made shortly before applying for assistance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the transfer of accounts to Gunther’s name alone was made within two months of the application, triggering the statutory presumption that the transfer was to qualify for assistance. Furthermore, the form of the accounts, the commingling of funds, and the absence of proof regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses provided substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the statutory presumption that transfers made within two months of applying for assistance are presumed to be for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance. While the commissioner could have found that the money, or most of it, was in fact Gunther’s and that it was not transferred for the purpose of qualifying for assistance, the timing of the transfer triggered the statutory presumption. The court reasoned that the form of the accounts (some in trust, some joint), the fact that Mrs. New received her own reparations and Social Security payments, the commingling of funds, and the lack of documentation regarding Mrs. New’s living expenses all supported the Commissioner’s decision. The court emphasized that the Commissioner was not required to accept the petitioner’s account and was not denied any procedural right. The court held that the Appellate Division did not err in confirming the Commissioner’s determination because it was supported by substantial evidence.