New York Law Review

Tag: Psychic Trauma

  • Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505 (1975): Compensability of Psychological Injury from Psychic Trauma in Worker’s Compensation

    Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505 (1975)

    Psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma is compensable under worker’s compensation to the same extent as physical injury, provided the trauma arose out of and in the course of employment and caused disablement.

    Summary

    Diana Wolfe, a secretary, sought worker’s compensation benefits for severe depression caused by discovering her supervisor’s body after he committed suicide. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s denial of benefits, holding that psychological injury caused by psychic trauma is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The court reasoned that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between physical and psychological injuries when both result from a work-related accident. This decision eliminated the requirement of physical impact for psychological injuries to be compensable.

    Facts

    Diana Wolfe worked as a secretary for John Gorman, the security director at Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. Gorman was under intense pressure, especially during the holidays, and became increasingly agitated and nervous in early 1971. He confided in Wolfe, expressing doubts about his job performance, and relied heavily on her. On June 9, 1971, Gorman asked Wolfe to call the police to his office. Wolfe found Gorman dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Wolfe was severely traumatized, developed acute depressive reaction, and required psychiatric treatment and hospitalization. She was eventually able to return to work in mid-January, 1972.

    Procedural History

    The referee granted Wolfe’s claim for worker’s compensation, and the Workmen’s Compensation Board affirmed. The Appellate Division reversed, citing prior precedent that mental injury precipitated solely by psychic trauma is not compensable. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma, without physical impact, is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because psychological injury caused by psychic trauma is compensable to the same extent as physical injury, provided that the trauma arises out of and in the course of employment and results in disablement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Workmen’s Compensation Law is designed to shift the risk of loss of earning capacity caused by industrial accidents from the worker to industry. It should be construed liberally in favor of the employee. There is no statutory definition of accidental injury, but prior cases fall into three categories: (1) psychic trauma producing physical injury, (2) physical impact producing psychological injury, and (3) psychic trauma producing psychological injury. The Court had already recognized compensability in the first two categories. The court explicitly overruled the prior hesitancy to award benefits in the third category.

    The court found no logical distinction between physical and psychological injuries when both result from a work-related accident. The court stated, “There is nothing in the nature of a stress or shock situation which ordains physical as opposed to psychological injury. The determinative factor is the particular vulnerability of an individual by virtue of his physical makeup. In a given situation one person may be susceptible to a heart attack while another may suffer a depressive reaction.” It rejected the argument that allowing recovery would open the floodgates to unlimited liability, distinguishing the case from tort cases involving third-party witnesses. Wolfe was an active participant in the tragedy, as Gorman’s nervous condition had intensely involved her, and she was an integral part of the event by virtue of his last communication and her discovery of his body. The court also noted that its holding aligned with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States and England.

  • Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974): Recovery for Psychic Trauma Under Warsaw Convention

    Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable for a passenger’s palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma resulting from an accident, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the psychic trauma itself without physical manifestation.

    Summary

    Passengers on a hijacked flight sued Trans World Airlines (TWA) seeking damages for psychic trauma suffered during the hijacking, relying on Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the Warsaw Convention allows for recovery for physical injuries caused by psychic trauma, it does not permit recovery for purely mental injuries without physical manifestation. The court emphasized the importance of interpreting the treaty to promote uniformity in international air travel and adhering to the ordinary meaning of the term “bodily injury.”

    Facts

    Plaintiffs were passengers on a TWA flight hijacked en route from Tel Aviv to New York. The hijackers, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, diverted the plane to Jordan, where the passengers were held captive for six days. The passengers experienced fear for their lives and personal safety. Additionally, they endured physical discomforts such as confinement to their seats, extreme temperatures, and inadequate food and water. Some plaintiffs claimed to have developed physical ailments like backaches, skin rashes, weight loss, and dehydration, allegedly exacerbated by the emotional distress.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Special Term granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, but the Appellate Divisions reversed, finding triable issues of fact regarding the meaning of the French text of Article 17. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve this dispute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention encompasses purely psychic trauma, allowing for recovery of damages in the absence of any physical manifestation of injury.

    Holding

    No, because the ordinary meaning of “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention connotes a palpable, conspicuous physical injury and excludes mental injury with no observable bodily manifestations. The carrier is liable only for objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries. The trauma itself without physical injury is not compensable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined that the meaning of the Warsaw Convention’s terms is a question of law, not fact, for the court to decide. While the treaty is written in French, the court stated that where an accurate English translation is agreed upon, the court should determine the ordinary meaning of those terms. The court rejected the argument that French law should govern the interpretation of the treaty’s terms. The court emphasized that the primary objective of the Warsaw Convention is uniformity among its signatory nations. The court analyzed the term “bodily injury,” noting that in its ordinary usage, it suggests a distinction from “mental” injury. The court found the inclusion of the word “bodily” significant. The court stated, “In our view, therefore, the ordinary, natural meaning of ‘bodily injury’ as used in article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no observable ‘bodily’, as distinguished from ‘behavioral’, manifestations.” The court reasoned that allowing recovery for purely psychic trauma would undermine the goal of uniformity and deviate from the treaty’s plain language. It held that a causal link between the accident (hijacking) and a resulting objective bodily injury is required for recovery under Article 17. The court stated, “A claim for damages under article 17 arises ‘in the event of * * * bodily injury’. The claim must therefore be predicated upon some objective identifiable injury to the body. In addition, there must be some causal connection between the bodily injury and the ‘accident’.” However, once the predicate of liability – the bodily injury – is established, damages sustained as a result of the bodily injury are compensable, including mental suffering. The court quoted Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342 stating that the treaty may be afforded a liberal interpretation which tends to support the rights which plaintiffs claim under it.