Tag: psychiatric expert

  • People v. Caban, 25 N.Y.3d 503 (2015): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Presentation of Expert Testimony

    People v. Caban, 25 N.Y.3d 503 (2015)

    Defense counsel’s strategic decisions regarding the information provided to an expert witness do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless they fall below prevailing professional norms and prejudice the defendant’s case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division decision, ruling that defense counsel’s decision to withhold certain information (photographs of the victim’s injuries and the prosecution’s theory of retaliation) from an expert witness did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that such strategic choices are not subject to second-guessing with hindsight. The court found that the defense counsel provided the expert with substantial information and that the withheld information was not critical to the expert’s ability to form an opinion. The court deferred to counsel’s tactical decisions, highlighting the importance of meaningful representation, even if the strategy was not ultimately successful.

    Facts

    A 15-year-old defendant was convicted of attempted murder and assault for repeatedly stabbing a 12-year-old victim. The defense argued justification and lack of intent, claiming that the defendant experienced a psychotic episode. Defense counsel retained a psychiatric expert who testified that the defendant suffered from schizophreniform disorder. The expert was provided with extensive information, including the defendant’s medical and psychiatric records, but was not given photographs of the victim’s wounds or informed of the prosecution’s theory of the motive. The expert acknowledged that this omitted information would be ‘useful and important.’ On cross-examination, the prosecutor highlighted the expert’s lack of knowledge about the victim’s injuries and the alleged ‘snitching’ motive. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the withholding of information from the expert was a strategic decision that allowed the prosecutor to undermine the expert’s testimony. The New York Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to provide the psychiatric expert with photographs of the victim’s injuries and information about the prosecution’s theory of the case.

    Holding

    1. No, because the strategic decision to withhold information from the expert did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring a showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. The court found that counsel’s performance was not deficient. The court deferred to counsel’s strategic choices, noting that hindsight should not dictate trial strategy. The court emphasized that the expert was provided with substantial information, and it was unclear if there was a prevailing norm regarding the information forensic experts require. The court distinguished this case from those where counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did not investigate the case and failed to prepare witnesses. Furthermore, the court concluded that, as counsel had a legitimate basis for withholding the information (it was potentially inflammatory), the Appellate Division erred by finding ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance to defense attorneys about the scope of effective assistance of counsel concerning the preparation of expert witnesses. It underscores the following points:

    • Counsel’s decisions regarding the information provided to an expert are generally considered strategic and are given considerable deference by appellate courts.
    • Counsel is not required to provide an expert with every piece of information that could possibly aid in forming an opinion.
    • The relevant inquiry is whether counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on the totality of the circumstances.
    • The attorney must provide a sufficient basis for the expert to form an opinion on the critical issues of the case.
    • Attorneys should document the rationale for strategic choices to justify their decision.

    This case indicates that courts will generally avoid second-guessing attorneys’ tactical decisions, particularly when the record does not show that the failure to provide certain information to an expert fell below accepted professional standards. Attorneys should be aware that they must still prepare an expert witness adequately to assist in the defense of the case.

  • People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.2d 231 (1971): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Independent Psychiatric Expert

    People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.2d 231 (1971)

    An indigent defendant who has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and found competent to stand trial is not constitutionally entitled to the appointment, at state expense, of an independent psychiatrist to assist in their defense, absent a showing of partiality or incompetence of the court-appointed experts.

    Summary

    Brown was indicted and, pursuant to statute, examined by court-appointed psychiatrists who found him competent to stand trial. Brown’s counsel challenged the report, citing a prior accident that allegedly changed Brown’s behavior, but did not request a hearing or another psychiatric exam. Brown pleaded guilty. On appeal, Brown argued he was entitled to an independent psychiatrist at state expense. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Constitution does not require the state to furnish an independent psychiatrist where the defendant has been examined by impartial, competent court-appointed experts.

    Facts

    Brown sustained a cerebral contusion in an automobile accident 16 months before his indictment. Court-appointed psychiatrists examined Brown and reported he was not insane or an imbecile, understood the charges and proceedings, and could make his defense. The report noted Brown’s accident recovery and found no symptoms of organic brain injury. They observed his evasiveness during later interviews but did not attribute it to the accident or mental illness. At sentencing, Brown’s counsel argued the accident changed Brown’s behavior but did not allege insanity or incompetence, and declined a competency hearing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court confirmed the psychiatrist’s report and accepted Brown’s guilty plea. At sentencing, Brown’s counsel reiterated objections and stated that Brown would seek another examination if he had funds. Brown appealed, arguing the court should have inquired further and appointed an independent psychiatrist. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and found competent to stand trial is constitutionally entitled to the appointment, at State expense, of an independent psychiatrist to assist with the preparation and presentation of his defense?

    Holding

    No, because the court-ordered psychiatric examination adequately protected Brown’s rights, and under these circumstances, Brown had no additional constitutional right to the appointment of another psychiatrist for his exclusive benefit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, stating the Constitution imposes no duty upon the State to provide an independent psychiatrist when the defendant has been examined by court-appointed psychiatrists and had a hearing on the sanity issue. The court acknowledged the interplay of constitutional rights to counsel, a fair trial, and equality might require the State to pay expert witness fees in some cases where expert testimony is crucial to an indigent’s defense. However, this case did not present such a situation because Brown was examined by two court-appointed experts, whose report was available to defense counsel, and whose professional standing, competence, and impartiality were not questioned. The court declined to constitutionally mandate a “battle of experts” by supplying defense counsel with funds to seek a “psychiatric advocate” for the defendant. The court emphasized that there was no question about the impartiality of the appointed psychiatrists. As such the court found no need to provide additional resources for the defendant.