New York Law Review

Tag: Psychiatric Examination

  • People v. Griffin, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996): Admissibility of Psychiatric Examinations of Complainants in Rape Cases

    People v. Griffin, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996)

    A defendant seeking a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness must demonstrate a compelling need to ensure a fair trial, and the denial of such a motion is proper where the defendant’s psychiatrist can render an opinion based on the complainant’s records.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the complainant in a rape case. The defendant failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the examination, as his attorney’s affidavit was premised solely on the complainant’s use of psychotropic medications at the time of the rape. Furthermore, the defendant’s psychiatrist was able to testify about the complainant’s mental condition based on her psychiatric records, making a personal examination unnecessary. The court did not decide whether a trial court even has the power to compel such an examination.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to compel the complainant to submit to a psychiatric examination. The motion was supported by an affidavit from the defendant’s attorney, asserting that the complainant was taking Prolixin and Lithium, psychotropic medications, at the time of the rape. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that the defendant had not demonstrated a compelling need for the examination.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the complainant. The defendant was subsequently convicted of rape in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that the trial court lacked the authority to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to compel the complaining witness in a rape case to submit to a psychiatric examination.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate a compelling need justifying a psychiatric examination of the victim, and the defendant’s psychiatrist was able to testify about the complainant’s mental condition using her psychiatric records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision without definitively ruling on whether a trial court possesses the power to order a complaining witness to undergo a psychiatric examination. The Court assumed, arguendo, that such power exists but found that the defendant failed to provide sufficient justification for the examination in this particular case. The Court emphasized that the defendant must show “record support for his claim that such an examination is compelled to ensure a fair trial.” In this case, the sole basis for the motion was the complainant’s use of psychotropic medications at the time of the rape. The court found that this was insufficient to meet the standard for compelling such an examination. Further supporting their decision, the Court noted that the defendant’s psychiatrist was able to offer expert testimony regarding the complainant’s mental health history, including her propensity for delusions when not medicated, based solely on her psychiatric records. The Court stated, “Moreover, defendant’s psychiatrist, utilizing complainant’s psychiatric records, testified at length concerning complainant’s history of mental illness, including her propensity to become delusional when not taking her medications. The psychiatrist also indicated that he was able to render an opinion concerning complainant’s mental condition without having examined her.” This ability to provide expert testimony without a personal examination of the complainant further weakened the defendant’s argument for compelling the examination. The decision aligns with the principle that such examinations should only be ordered when absolutely necessary to ensure a fair trial and when less intrusive means of obtaining the necessary information are insufficient.

  • Matter of Alexander L., 457 N.E.2d 332 (1983): Right to Counsel During Psychiatric Exam in Parental Rights Termination

    Matter of Alexander L., 60 N.Y.2d 329, 457 N.E.2d 332 (1983)

    A parent facing a court-ordered psychiatric examination in a parental rights termination proceeding is entitled to have their attorney present during the examination, unless there is a specific showing that the attorney’s presence would impair the validity and effectiveness of that particular examination.

    Summary

    This case addresses the right to counsel during a psychiatric examination in a parental rights termination proceeding. The mother, facing termination of her parental rights based on mental illness, was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination. When she appeared with her attorney, the psychiatrist refused to conduct the examination with counsel present, citing a policy against third-party presence. The Family Court later admitted the psychiatrist’s report and testimony, which were based on a limited observation and review of hospital records. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mother had a statutory right to have her counsel present, and that the burden was on the petitioner or the court to demonstrate that the attorney’s presence would impair the examination’s validity.

    Facts

    The Cardinal McCloskey Children and Family Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her son, Alexander, alleging that her mental illness prevented her from providing adequate care. Alexander had been in foster care since shortly after his birth in 1978. The Family Court ordered the mother to undergo a psychiatric examination as mandated by Social Services Law § 384-b(6). The designated psychiatrist, Dr. Sheinkman, refused to examine the mother in the presence of her attorney, citing the Bureau of Mental Health Services’ policy. The mother then refused to proceed without her counsel present.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court admitted the psychiatrist’s report and testimony, which were based on a limited observation of the mother and review of her hospital records. The Family Court found clear and convincing evidence of the mother’s mental illness and terminated her parental rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parent is entitled to have their attorney present during a court-ordered psychiatric examination in a proceeding to terminate parental rights based on the parent’s alleged mental illness.

    Holding

    Yes, because the parent has a statutory right to counsel in such proceedings, and the burden rests on the party opposing counsel’s presence to demonstrate that it would impair the examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Family Court Act § 262(a)(iv), which explicitly grants a parent the right to assistance of counsel in proceedings under Social Services Law § 384-b. The court stated that the mother’s right to counsel during the psychiatric examination, a critical phase of the litigation, was beyond question given this legislative action. The court emphasized that there was no prohibition against counsel’s presence in the order directing the examination. The court rejected the argument that the mother had a duty to demonstrate that her attorney’s presence would not impair the examination, stating, “The predicate for such a restriction however may not be the failure of the parent to demonstrate a negative — i.e., the absence of the prospect of impairment — but must be a positive showing, usually by the examining expert on the initiative of the petitioner or the court, that there is justification in a particular case for exclusion of the third person or restrictions on his or her conduct during the examination.” The court found that the psychiatrist’s statement of the Bureau of Mental Health Services’ blanket policy was insufficient to justify excluding counsel. The court emphasized the importance of the right to counsel and that any restriction must be justified by a specific showing of impairment in the particular case, quoting the statute directly: “Each of the persons described below in this subdivision has the right to the assistance of counsel. When such person first appears in court, the judge shall advise such person before proceeding that he has the right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing * * * and of his right to have counsel assigned by the court in any case where he is financially unable to obtain the same… (iv) the parent…in any proceeding under…three hundred eighty-four-b…of the social services law”.

  • People v. Wood, 393 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1977): Evidence of Insanity and Defendant’s Refusal to Cooperate

    People v. Wood, 393 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. 1977)

    A defendant who refuses to cooperate with psychiatric examinations may be precluded from introducing psychiatric testimony to support an insanity defense; non-psychiatric evidence of insanity, standing alone, is insufficient to create a jury question when the defendant declines to raise the insanity issue.

    Summary

    Wood was convicted of homicide. He attempted to present an insanity defense, but refused to cooperate with psychiatric evaluations. The trial court then precluded him from presenting psychiatric testimony regarding his insanity. Wood argued that his “bizarre” courtroom behavior and the “motiveless” nature of the crime constituted enough evidence to warrant consideration of his insanity by the jury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly precluded the psychiatric testimony and removed the insanity issue from the jury because Wood refused psychiatric evaluations and offered no direct evidence of insanity.

    Facts

    Wood was accused of committing homicide. During the trial, his counsel sought to present a defense of insanity. Wood stated that he did not want to raise the insanity defense and refused to cooperate with both the defense and prosecution psychiatrists. Wood’s courtroom behavior was described as “bizarre.” One of the homicide victims had used a racial slur against Wood, and the other victim attempted to stop Wood from fleeing the scene.

    Procedural History

    The trial court precluded Wood from introducing psychiatric testimony to support his insanity defense. The trial court instructed the jury that the presumption of sanity had not been overcome. Wood appealed, arguing that his courtroom behavior and the nature of the crime were sufficient evidence of insanity. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Wood then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from introducing psychiatric testimony to support his insanity defense, given his refusal to cooperate with psychiatric evaluations?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant refused to cooperate with psychiatric examinations and presented no direct evidence of insanity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Matter of Lee v County Ct. of Erie County, 27 NY2d 432, 443, which held that a defendant cannot offer psychiatric evidence about their sanity if they refuse to submit to an examination by a prosecution psychiatrist. The court distinguished between psychiatric and non-psychiatric evidence. The court acknowledged that non-psychiatric evidence, such as the defendant’s courtroom behavior and the nature of the crime, *may* be relevant to the defendant’s sanity if the issue of sanity has been raised. However, it held that this type of evidence, standing alone without other proof, is not enough to create an issue of fact for the jury when the defendant declined to raise the issue himself. The court noted that, although the defendant may introduce competent nonpsychiatric evidence bearing on his sanity, the prosecution can then reply with nonpsychiatric evidence or with psychiatric testimony based on observations of the defendant in the courtroom. For example, the prosecution could have presented medical testimony that the appellant’s courtroom behavior was feigned. Because there was no direct evidence of insanity and the defendant declined to raise the issue, the trial court acted properly.

  • People v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167 (1975): Psychiatric Evaluation Requirements and Waiver of Competency

    People v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167 (1975)

    Once a trial court has reason to believe a defendant may be incompetent, strict adherence to the statutory procedure for determining competency is required, and a defendant cannot waive their right to a competency hearing by pleading guilty.

    Summary

    Armlin was indicted on burglary and rape charges. Defense counsel, possessing medical information indicating Armlin suffered from schizophrenia and delusions, moved for a competency examination. The trial court ordered psychiatric examinations, but these orders were not fully followed, with only one psychiatrist examining Armlin. Armlin later pleaded guilty. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s failure to adhere to the statutory requirements for determining competency, specifically failing to obtain reports from two psychiatrists, deprived Armlin of a full determination of his mental capacity. The court further held that a defendant cannot waive their right to a competency hearing by pleading guilty.

    Facts

    Armlin was charged with burglary and rape. His counsel had medical records suggesting Armlin was a chronic schizophrenic with delusions. Prior to arraignment, Armlin’s attorney moved for a psychiatric examination to determine his competency to stand trial. The trial court initially ordered the Superintendent of Utica State Hospital to have two qualified psychiatrists examine Armlin. A subsequent order committed Armlin to Utica State Hospital for treatment, observation, examination, and a report on his mental condition. Instead of compliance with those orders, Armlin was examined by only one psychiatrist at a local mental health clinic. The psychiatrist concluded Armlin was competent, and Armlin later pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    The Fulton County Court accepted Armlin’s guilty plea and convicted him. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Armlin waived his right to insist on compliance with the psychiatric examination procedure by pleading guilty and not objecting to the noncompliance. One justice dissented, arguing that once the competency procedure is invoked, the court must adhere to the statutory provisions and that a defendant cannot waive the right to a competency determination. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Having found reasonable ground to believe the defendant was incapacitated, did the County Court’s failure to provide the defendant with an examination by two qualified psychiatrists, as required by CPL 730.20 (subd 1), deprive the accused of his right to a full and impartial determination of his mental capacity to stand trial?
    2. By his plea of guilty, did the defendant waive his right to the proceedings mandated by CPL article 730?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once the trial court has reason to believe a defendant may be incompetent, strict adherence to the statutory procedure for determining competency is required.
    2. No, because a defendant cannot knowingly or intelligently waive the right to a court determination of their capacity to stand trial if they are, in fact, incompetent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while a defendant is not automatically entitled to a competency hearing, the trial court has a duty to direct an examination if there is reasonable ground to believe the defendant is incapable of understanding the proceedings. The court highlighted that the trial court’s initial orders for psychiatric examinations demonstrated sufficient concern about Armlin’s fitness. The failure to obtain reports from two qualified psychiatrists, as mandated by CPL 730.20 (subd 1), was a significant error, especially considering Armlin’s history of mental illness. Quoting People v. Smyth, 3 NY2d 184, 187, the court stated, “If at any time before final judgment in a criminal action it shall appear to the court that there is reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is in such a state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense, it is the duty of the court to direct him to be examined in these respects.”

    The court rejected the argument that Armlin’s demeanor at trial could excuse the failure to comply with CPL article 730, citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386, which held that a defendant’s demeanor cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on the issue of competency. The court also rejected the argument that Armlin waived his right to competency proceedings by pleading guilty, stating, “there is an inherent contradiction in arguing that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently waive his right to have a court determine his capacity to stand trial in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law.” The Court of Appeals modified the order and remitted the case to the County Court for a hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent at the time of sentencing (CPL 730.20).

  • People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972): Right to Counsel During Psychiatric Examinations

    People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972)

    A criminal defendant has the right to have counsel present during psychiatric examinations conducted by the prosecution’s expert to ensure effective cross-examination regarding the defendant’s sanity.

    Summary

    Michael Cerami was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. His defense was insanity, but a prosecution psychiatrist examined him pre-trial without notifying his counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Cerami was entitled to have counsel present at the psychiatric examination to make the right of cross-examination more effective. The court reasoned that the pretrial psychiatric examination is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. The failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to the lack of notice to counsel regarding the first examination was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Michael Cerami shot and killed Stanley Bohrer, his former supervisor, who had asked for Cerami’s resignation from his teaching position years earlier. Cerami claimed insanity, asserting he was a paranoid schizophrenic who believed Bohrer had wrongfully terminated him and spread rumors about him. The defense presented evidence of Cerami’s prior diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia from multiple hospitals and a psychologist. The prosecution sought to rebut this defense with the testimony of its own psychiatric expert, Dr. Pollack, who had examined Cerami twice before trial.

    Procedural History

    Cerami was indicted for manslaughter. After a jury trial in the Monroe County Court, he was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s conviction should be set aside because pretrial psychiatric examinations, conducted by the prosecution’s expert regarding the defense of insanity, occurred without notice to or the presence of defendant’s counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant is entitled to counsel’s presence at the first psychiatric examination to ensure the effective right of cross-examination, and the failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to a lack of notice to counsel was prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, which established that pretrial psychiatric examinations are a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, entitling the defendant to have counsel present to make more effective the basic right of cross-examination. The court reasoned that the prosecution’s notice of a psychiatric examination must include sufficient details (date, time, and place) to permit defense counsel to attend. The court found that the defense counsel was not given adequate notice regarding Dr. Pollack’s first examination of the defendant. The court rejected the argument that the defense waived the objection by waiting until the suppression hearing, as any prejudice to the prosecution could have been alleviated at that time. The court stated that any expert opinion based even in part upon an improper examination should be excluded. Quoting People v. Keough, the court emphasized that it is irrelevant that the psychiatrist may have properly acquired some part of the foundation for his expert opinion apart from the invalid examination.

  • People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony After Secret Examination

    People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969)

    A psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, rendering the psychiatrist’s testimony inadmissible.

    Summary

    McKinney was convicted of murdering his wife after pleading not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution, without informing McKinney’s counsel or obtaining court approval, had him examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Abrahamsen, who testified that McKinney was faking mental illness. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible because the examination violated McKinney’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The court also found error in admitting testimony that McKinney had invoked his right to counsel when initially questioned.

    Facts

    Following the murder of his wife, McKinney was arrested and informed officers he would not speak without his lawyer present. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. While jailed and awaiting a court-ordered competency evaluation, the District Attorney arranged for Dr. Abrahamsen to examine McKinney’s sanity without notifying McKinney’s attorney or seeking court approval. Dr. Abrahamsen concluded McKinney was malingering and testified to this effect at trial. At trial, a police officer testified that McKinney asserted his right to counsel upon arrest.

    Procedural History

    McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible and that the admission of testimony regarding McKinney’s invocation of his right to counsel was also erroneous. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. Whether it is permissible to present evidence that the defendant invoked his right to counsel as evidence of guilt or to rebut an insanity defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because such an examination constitutes a secret interrogation that contravenes the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    2. No, because using the defendant’s assertion of his constitutional right as evidence against him is impermissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding, especially during interrogation. Citing People v. Waterman, the court emphasized that any secret interrogation after indictment, without counsel, violates basic fairness. While acknowledging the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Baird, which allowed court-ordered psychiatric examinations outside the presence of counsel, the court distinguished the present case. The key difference was that Dr. Abrahamsen’s examination was conducted secretly, without court permission or notice to defense counsel. The court reasoned that this secrecy deprived the defendant of the opportunity to seek a protective order to prevent the disclosure of incriminating information. The court highlighted the inherent dangers of secret examinations, where probing questions, hypnosis, or drugs could be used to extract information without proper safeguards. The court further stated, “In the absence of any notice to counsel or of judicial supervision, a ‘medical examination’ may well develop into precisely the sort of ‘secret interrogation’ which this court decried and found objectionable in People v. Waterman.” Furthermore, the court found it was reversible error to admit testimony that McKinney invoked his right to counsel when questioned, as it created an inference of guilt. The court stated: “To sanction the surreptitious examination of such a defendant, or to allow his insistence upon his constitutional rights to be used against him, would seriously impair the value of those protections.”

  • People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389 (1942): Examination of Sanity and Admissibility of Drug-Induced Testimony

    People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389 (1942)

    When a defendant pleads insanity, the court has discretion to order a preliminary psychiatric examination, including the use of drugs, to determine the defendant’s mental state, and testimony derived from such examinations is admissible to determine sanity, but not to establish guilt.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of first-degree murder after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. The key legal issues concerned the propriety of court-ordered psychiatric examinations using drugs (metrazol and sodium amytal) to assess sanity and the admissibility of psychiatric testimony based on drug-induced reactions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the preliminary psychiatric examination, including the use of drugs, was within the court’s discretion. The court reasoned that by raising the insanity defense, the defendants subjected themselves to accepted medical methods for determining mental state. However, the court explicitly stated it was not ruling on whether confessions or admissions of guilt obtained under the influence of drugs would be admissible.

    Facts

    The defendants, William and Anthony Esposito, were charged with the murder of Alfred Klausman during a payroll robbery. The defendants pleaded not guilty, claiming insanity at the time of the crime and at the time of arraignment and trial. Prior to trial, the court ordered psychiatric examinations of both defendants. During these examinations at Bellevue Hospital, the defendants were administered metrazol and sodium amytal. Psychiatrists who examined the defendants testified at trial about their observations, including reactions under the influence of the administered drugs.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of first-degree murder in the Court of General Sessions, New York County. They appealed, challenging the procedures used to determine their sanity and the admissibility of related testimony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in ordering preliminary psychiatric examinations, including the administration of drugs, to determine the defendants’ sanity to stand trial.
    2. Whether the admission of psychiatric testimony based on the defendants’ reactions and information obtained while under the influence of drugs violated their constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court has discretion to order psychiatric examinations, including the use of drugs, to determine sanity when a defendant pleads insanity.
    2. No, because the testimony was used to determine the defendants’ mental capacity to understand the proceedings and make a defense, not to elicit confessions or admissions of guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that when defendants claim insanity, they submit to accepted medical methods for determining their mental condition. The court emphasized that the trial judge has a duty to ensure that an insane person is not tried or punished, and the examinations were a means of fulfilling that duty. Quoting People v. McElvaine, 125 N.Y. 596, 608, the court reiterated that a prisoner cannot indefinitely arrest the administration of criminal law by raising collateral issues. The court stated, “Since they desired to present their claims that they were not legally responsible for their acts because of mental defect they were subject to the use of methods set up objectively by the medical profession for the proper determination of such claims. Courts, under the circumstances presented here, may not control the methods which have been determined by the medical profession to be proper means for discovering or treating mental diseases.” The court explicitly avoided ruling on whether testimony regarding confessions or admissions of guilt made under the influence of drugs would be admissible. The court noted that the questions asked were intended to determine if the defendants understood the proceedings. Proof of insanity after the commission of the crime was relevant as bearing upon the issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime, citing People v. Hoch, 150 N.Y. 291, 303, 304.