New York Law Review

Tag: prostitution

  • People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990): Entrapment Defense Requires More Than Opportunity to Commit a Crime

    People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990)

    Merely providing a defendant with the opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment; the defendant must demonstrate active inducement or encouragement creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to do so.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for patronizing a prostitute, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court reasoned that the evidence presented, even when viewed most favorably to the defendant, did not reasonably support the defense. The interaction between the undercover officer and the defendant merely presented an opportunity to commit the crime, which is insufficient to establish entrapment. The defendant failed to demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by law enforcement.

    Facts

    An undercover police sergeant, dressed as a woman, was standing on a street corner in Syracuse. The defendant drove up to the curb and the officer approached the car. The officer asked if the defendant was looking for a date and the defendant replied affirmatively. After a brief negotiation about price and services, the defendant agreed to pay $25 for oral sodomy. The officer directed the defendant to drive around the corner, where he was arrested by backup units. An undercover lieutenant overheard and corroborated the conversation. The defendant testified that the officer approached him and offered oral sodomy for money, but he did not respond. He denied agreeing to exchange money for sex.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in Syracuse City Court of patronizing a prostitute. The Onondaga County Court affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment, where the evidence showed that an undercover officer offered the defendant the opportunity to engage in prostitution.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by a public official creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Merely providing an opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to establish entrapment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a trial court must charge entrapment if the evidence, viewed favorably to the defendant, reasonably supports the defense. The defendant bears the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, showing: (1) active inducement or encouragement by a public official; and (2) a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. The court emphasized that the officers merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, which is insufficient for entrapment. “Merely asking a defendant to commit a crime is not such inducement or encouragement as to constitute entrapment.” The Court cited Penal Law § 40.05 and People v. Thompson, 47 N.Y.2d 940, 941 (1979), to support this conclusion. The court distinguished between providing an opportunity and actively inducing someone to commit a crime they were not predisposed to commit. The court noted that denying the crime doesn’t automatically support or defeat an entrapment defense. Quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 US 58, 62, the court acknowledged this allowance. The critical factor was the lack of evidence suggesting the defendant was actively persuaded or coerced into committing the offense.

  • Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143 (1983): Declaratory Judgments and Challenges to Criminal Court Rulings

    Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143 (1983)

    A declaratory judgment attacking a criminal court’s interlocutory ruling may be granted when the controversy concerns the validity of a statute, without resolving factual disputes, and the ruling has broad implications extending beyond the specific case.

    Summary

    The District Attorney of New York County sought a declaratory judgment against a criminal court judge’s ruling that prostitution defendants were entitled to a jury trial, despite a statute (CPL 340.40(2)) denying jury trials for offenses punishable by six months or less. The Court of Appeals held that declaratory relief was proper in this instance, as the issue concerned the statute’s validity and had broad implications. The Court found that prostitution, with a maximum sentence of three months, is a “petty” offense and does not trigger Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. The Court emphasized that a purely objective standard based on sentence length is necessary to ensure predictability in criminal procedure.

    Facts

    Two women charged with prostitution in New York City Criminal Court moved for a jury trial. The presiding judge, William Erlbaum, granted the motion, finding that CPL 340.40(2), which denies jury trials for offenses punishable by six months or less, was unconstitutional as applied to prostitution. Judge Erlbaum reasoned that prostitution was a “serious” crime despite the minimal sentence. The District Attorney then initiated a proceeding to prevent Judge Erlbaum’s order from taking effect.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney initially sought a writ of prohibition under CPLR Article 78. The proceeding was converted to an action for declaratory judgment. Special Term declared CPL 340.40(2) constitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an action for declaratory relief is procedurally proper to collaterally attack a criminal court’s ruling.

    2. Whether CPL 340.40(2) violates the Sixth Amendment by denying a jury trial for prostitution charges.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in specific circumstances, particularly when the validity of a statute is challenged, a declaratory judgment action is an appropriate way to address a criminal court ruling when it does not require resolving any factual disputes and the criminal court’s ruling has an obvious effect extending far beyond the matter pending before it.

    2. No, because prostitution, punishable by a maximum of three months’ imprisonment, is considered a “petty” offense and does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished declaratory relief from prohibition, noting its broader application and non-coercive nature. While prohibition is an extraordinary remedy limited to instances where a court acts without jurisdiction, declaratory judgment is a remedy sui generis that is used to declare the rights between parties. The Court acknowledged policy concerns about interfering with criminal proceedings but found declaratory relief appropriate here because the issue involved the validity of a statute and had broad implications. It would also recur in other prosecutions and the criminal court would decide it in the same way. It emphasized that declaratory relief should be used cautiously and is appropriate when challenging rulings on how a trial is to be conducted. However, mere evidentiary rulings would not be proper subjects for declaratory judgement.

    Regarding the Sixth Amendment issue, the Court emphasized the Supreme Court’s focus on sentence length as the primary factor in determining the seriousness of an offense. Quoting Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, the Court stated: “[O]ur decisions have established a fixed dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty crimes.” Because prostitution carries a maximum sentence of three months, it is a petty offense not requiring a jury trial.

    The Court rejected a subjective standard for determining the seriousness of an offense, citing the potential for inconsistency and the usurpation of the legislative function. “To allow a Judge to weigh these same criteria and reach a different conclusion as to a crime’s seriousness would be to permit an improper usurpation of the legislative function.” The court also noted that it was improper for Supreme Court to have heard the action as against the defendants in the criminal action, as that controversy had already been decided.