Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc. , 67 N.Y.2d 120 (1986)

In medical malpractice cases involving prosthetic devices, the cause of action accrues upon the implantation of the device, not when the injury manifests.

Summary

Robert Goldsmith sued Dr. Chitranjan Ranawat for malpractice after a hip implant broke eight years after implantation. The suit was filed in 1983. The court addressed whether the statute of limitations began at implantation or injury. The court held the cause of action accrued upon implantation, barring the claim. The court reasoned that while products liability actions against manufacturers differ, in medical malpractice, the statute of limitations begins at the time of the alleged malpractice to provide repose for defendants, a principle that outweighs the potential for actions being foreclosed before injury manifestation.

Facts

In 1973, Robert Goldsmith underwent a total hip replacement performed by Dr. Chitranjan S. Ranawat.
The femoral component of the hip implant, manufactured by Howmedica, Inc., fractured in 1981, eight years after implantation.
Goldsmith filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Ranawat in 1983, alleging negligence related to the implantation of the device.
Goldsmith’s wife also sued for loss of consortium.

Procedural History

Special Term granted Dr. Ranawat’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint based on the statute of limitations.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision but granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether, in a medical malpractice action involving a prosthetic device, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of implantation or at the time the injury caused by the device’s malfunction occurs.

Holding

No, because the general rule is that a cause of action accrues and the Statute of Limitations begins to run at the time of the commission of the alleged malpractice.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the general rule that a medical malpractice action accrues at the time of the alleged malpractice, citing Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257, 259. The court acknowledged two exceptions to this rule: the continuous treatment doctrine and the foreign object exception, neither of which applied here.
The court distinguished Martin v. Edwards Labs., 60 N.Y.2d 417, which allowed claims against prosthetic device manufacturers within three years of injury. The court stated that products liability actions differ from medical malpractice actions, as there is no cause to complain against a manufacturer until the device malfunctions. “Products liability actions are vastly different from medical malpractice actions in this context, because until the device malfunctions, there is no cause to complain against, or privity to, the manufacturer of a prosthetic device.”
The court noted the legislative intent behind CPLR 214-a, which excludes prosthetic aids from the definition of “foreign object” in medical malpractice cases. Although CPLR 214-a did not govern this case, the court considered the legislative intent not to broaden the foreign object exception. “Although this case is not governed by CPLR 214-a and plaintiffs do not urge that a prosthetic device is a foreign object, we cannot ignore the clearly expressed legislative intent that the present exception to the general time of commission accrual rule not be broadened beyond its existing confines”.
The court addressed the argument that requiring an action within three years of implantation effectively forecloses a claim before injury occurs. The court weighed this detriment against the impact of potentially open-ended claims on defendants and society, concluding that the statute of limitations must run from the time of the act. The court stated that this determination was appropriate until the legislature directs otherwise. “In each, we weighed the detriments of such a result against the effect of potentially open-ended claims upon the repose of defendants and society, and held that the Statute of Limitations must run from the time of the act until the Legislature decrees otherwise”.