People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645 (1979)
A prospective juror’s professional and personal relationship with the prosecuting attorney can disqualify them from serving on a jury if the relationship is likely to preclude them from rendering an impartial verdict, regardless of the juror’s declaration of impartiality.
Summary
Defendants Vernon and Vraden Branch were convicted of murder and robbery. During jury selection, a prospective juror, Scott, revealed he was a part-time police officer who had worked closely with the prosecutor and had socialized with him. The defense challenged Scott for cause, arguing his relationship with the prosecutor would compromise his impartiality. The trial court denied the challenge after Scott stated he could be impartial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, holding the denial was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling Scott’s relationship with the prosecutor made him unsuitable for jury service, and an expurgatory oath was insufficient to overcome this disqualification.
Facts
James Scott, a prospective juror, was a part-time police officer in Poestenkill for three years.
In his capacity as a police officer, Scott worked in conjunction with the Rensselaer County District Attorney’s office, including the trial attorney in the case.
Scott and the prosecutor had developed a personal relationship, occasionally socializing together.
Despite these relationships, Scott stated he could render an impartial verdict.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted of murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree in a joint jury trial.
On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendants argued the trial court erred in denying their challenge for cause to excuse a venireman from the jury.
The Appellate Division reversed the judgments of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the denial of the challenge for cause constituted reversible error.
The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Scott, a part-time police officer with a personal relationship with the prosecutor, to participate as a juror in the case.
Holding
Yes, because Scott’s professional and personal relationship with the People’s trial attorney rendered him unsuitable for jury service under CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]), and the expurgatory oath is unavailable where this statutory provision disqualifies a juror.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals analyzed CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [c]), which disqualifies a juror if “he bears some other relationship to any such person [e.g., the defendant or either counsel] of such nature that it is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict.”
The court found that Scott’s relationship fell squarely within this provision. As a part-time police officer who had direct contact with the District Attorney’s office and had worked directly with the prosecutor, their professional contact had grown into a personal relationship. This established, as a matter of law, that the nature of this relationship was “likely to preclude [Scott] from rendering an impartial verdict.”
The court rejected the People’s argument that Scott’s expurgatory declarations allowed the court discretion in allowing him to serve, explaining that under the prior law, an expurgatory oath was not available where “implied bias” was shown. The court reasoned that the risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship between the prospective juror and one of the key participants in the trial was so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint.
The court noted that the trial court should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, stating, “Nothing is more basic to the criminal process than the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury…unless those who are called to decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence are free of bias.”