New York Law Review

Tag: Prosecutorial Readiness

  • People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995): Adequacy of Readiness Statements for Speedy Trial

    People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995)

    A statement of readiness for trial is sufficient for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30(1)(a) if the prosecution communicates its readiness on the record and is, in fact, ready to proceed at that time.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Appellate Division had previously reversed the initial conviction and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution’s statement of readiness, made within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal, satisfied the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a). The Court clarified that a valid statement of readiness must be communicated on the record and reflect actual readiness, not merely a prediction of future readiness. Here, the prosecution secured the complainant’s cooperation, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was originally convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed this conviction and remanded for a new trial. On March 22, 1990, following the reversal, the prosecution stated, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward.” The defendant subsequently argued that the People violated his right to a speedy trial by not being ready within six months as required by CPL 30.30(1)(a).

    Procedural History

    1. The defendant was initially convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial.
    2. On the defendant’s second appeal, the Appellate Division remitted the case to County Court for a CPL 30.30 hearing.
    3. After the hearing, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction.
    4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s statement, “we have been in contact with the victim. Our intentions are to go forward,” was a sufficient indication of readiness to satisfy the requirements of CPL 30.30(1)(a) for speedy trial purposes.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution communicated their readiness on the record within six months of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the initial conviction, and possessed the ability to proceed with trial at that time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied CPL 30.30(1)(a), which requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. In this case, the relevant date for calculating the six-month period was the date of the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s first conviction. The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, which established a two-pronged test for a valid statement of readiness: (1) the People must communicate their state of readiness on the record, and (2) the People must, in fact, be ready to proceed when they proclaim readiness.

    The Court found that the first element of Kendzia was satisfied by the prosecution’s on-the-record statement to the court. As to the second element, the Court emphasized that CPL 30.30 requires actual readiness, “and not a prediction or expectation of future readiness.” The court found that the People met this standard because they had secured the complainant’s cooperation for retrial, possessed a valid accusatory instrument, and had produced the defendant. The statement was therefore deemed a valid declaration of readiness, and the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The Court distinguished the facts from situations where the prosecution merely expresses a hope or expectation of future readiness, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to have taken concrete steps demonstrating their preparedness to proceed to trial. The Court agreed with the prior courts’ determination that the statement sufficiently indicated the People’s readiness for trial.

  • People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59 (1990): Prosecutorial Readiness and Delays in Producing Grand Jury Minutes

    76 N.Y.2d 59 (1990)

    A delay in producing Grand Jury minutes necessary for a court to decide a defendant’s pretrial motion constitutes a direct impediment to the commencement of trial and impacts the People’s readiness under CPL 30.30.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault. The People declared readiness but then delayed producing Grand Jury minutes needed for the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on evidentiary insufficiency. The Court of Appeals held that the People’s five-month delay in producing the minutes, after declaring readiness, was chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30. Because the delay directly impeded the trial’s commencement, it negated the People’s claim of readiness. The Court rejected arguments that the defendant should have withdrawn his motion or sought other remedies. The conviction was reversed, and the indictment dismissed.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with felony assault. The accusatory instrument was filed on March 17, 1985. The People declared their readiness for trial on June 26, 1985. On August 1, 1985, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for evidentiary insufficiency (CPL 210.30). The People filed a written response but did not provide the Grand Jury minutes needed for the court to decide the motion. The Grand Jury minutes were transcribed and delivered to the District Attorney’s file room on June 25, 1985, but were not retrieved until December 2, 1985, and not delivered to the court until January 3, 1986.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on CPL 30.30, finding the People’s ability to proceed to trial was unaffected by the delay. The defendant was convicted of the charged counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s failure to produce Grand Jury minutes necessary for a court to decide a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, within the statutory speedy trial period, constitutes a delay chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    Yes, because the delay in producing the Grand Jury minutes directly impeded the trial’s commencement and therefore impacted the People’s readiness under CPL 30.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 30.30 requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action involving a felony. The court distinguished this case from People v. Anderson, where delays in producing Rosario material did not impact the People’s readiness. Here, the People’s failure to provide Grand Jury minutes was a “direct, and virtually insurmountable, impediment to the trial’s very commencement.” The court stated that “the People can hardly claim to be ‘ready’ when they have not done all that is required of them to bring the case to the point where it may be tried.” The Court rejected the People’s argument that the defendant could have withdrawn his motion or sought other remedies, stating that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial cannot be conditioned on waiving the right to test the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury. Furthermore, the Court stated that the readiness should be evaluated from the perspective of the preparedness to present their own case. The court found that the defendant’s presence is a constitutionally and statutorily mandated condition precedent to the commencement of trial. The court concluded that the five-month delay, when added to other chargeable delays, exceeded the statutory limit, requiring dismissal of the indictment. The court stated, “First, there must be a communication of readiness by the People which appears on the trial court’s record. * * * [Second,] the prosecutor must make his statement of readiness when the People are in fact ready to proceed.”

  • People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985): Speedy Trial Rights and Defendant-Requested Adjournments

    66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985)

    When calculating speedy trial time under CPL 30.30, delays resulting from a defendant’s pretrial motions or adjournments requested by or consented to by the defendant are excluded, even if they occur before the conversion of a misdemeanor complaint to an information.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether delays caused by a defendant’s actions (motions, requested adjournments) before a misdemeanor complaint is converted to an information should be charged to the prosecution for speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30. The Court held that such delays are excludable. The Court reasoned that CPL 30.30 primarily addresses prosecutorial readiness and that defendants waive their right to a speedy trial regarding delays they cause for their benefit. The Court reversed the Appellate Term’s orders, reinstating the complaints against both defendants.

    Facts

    Defendant Worley was charged with assault and criminal mischief. The complaint included a count based on nonhearsay allegations. The case was adjourned multiple times for defense motions and adjournments requested by or consented to by the defendant. The People filed a supporting deposition converting the complaint to an information and announced their readiness for trial more than 90 days after the initial complaint. Defendant Hamilton was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and menacing. His case was also adjourned multiple times at his request or with his consent. The People filed a supporting deposition converting the complaint to an information and announced readiness for trial, again beyond the 90-day limit if all delays were charged to the prosecution.

    Procedural History

    In both cases, the Criminal Court dismissed the complaints on speedy trial grounds, relying on People v. Colon, holding that delays caused by the defendant before conversion were chargeable to the People. The Appellate Term affirmed those orders. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in calculating the time within which the People must be ready for trial on a misdemeanor charge under CPL 30.30, the periods of delay resulting from a defendant’s pretrial motions or adjournments requested by or consented to by the defendant before the conversion of the complaint to an information should be excluded.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 30.30 is intended to address delays caused by the People, and defendants waive their right to a speedy trial when they cause delays for their own benefit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 30.30 was enacted to address the specific problem of prosecutorial readiness and to supersede prior rules requiring the People to bring the defendant to trial within a set period. The Court emphasized the legislative intent that CPL 30.30 address only delays caused by the prosecution. The Court distinguished People v. Sturgis and People v. Colon, which held that the defendant’s absence did not toll the speedy trial clock because it did not prevent the People from obtaining an indictment or converting the complaint to an information. The Court stated that Sturgis and Colon addressed policy concerns related to absent defendants to prevent indefinite delays and prosecutorial inaction. The Court emphasized that adjournments requested by or consented to by the defendant are subject to the court’s control and are based on principles of estoppel or waiver. The Court found that a defendant’s actions in requesting or consenting to adjournments constitute an implied consent to the delay. The court quoted that “In enacting CPL 30.30 the Legislature intended to impose an obligation on the People to be ready for trial… intending its provisions to address only the problem of prosecutorial readiness”.

  • People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932 (1979): Establishing the Requirement for On-Record Communication of Readiness for Trial

    People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932 (1979)

    To comply with speedy trial requirements, the prosecution must communicate their readiness for trial on the record to the court; merely claiming readiness in response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case addresses the prosecution’s responsibility to demonstrate readiness for trial under New York’s speedy trial statute. Hamilton was charged with a felony, and more than six months elapsed between the filing of the felony complaint and the prosecution’s readiness for trial. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to adequately demonstrate its readiness for trial because it only asserted such readiness in an affidavit responding to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and not on the record to the court. Therefore, the delay was not excludable, and the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    On November 13, 1975, a felony complaint was filed against Hamilton.

    The People claim to have been ready for trial in May 1976.

    On November 26, 1976, the People were actually ready for trial, one year and 13 days after the felony complaint was filed.

    Hamilton moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing a denial of his right to a speedy trial.

    The People opposed the motion, claiming they were ready in May 1976 and offered excuses for the delay.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on a denial of a speedy trial.

    The Appellate Division order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s delay of one year and 13 days between the filing of the felony complaint and their readiness for trial violated CPL 30.30(1)(a), requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Whether the People’s assertion of readiness for trial, made for the first time in an affidavit responding to a motion to dismiss, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of communicating readiness to the court on the record.

    Holding

    Yes, because the period exceeded six months, and the delay was not sufficiently excludable under CPL 30.30(4).

    No, because to sustain an assertion of readiness, the People must communicate readiness for trial to the court on the record when ready to proceed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPL 30.30(1)(a), the People must be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action when a felony is charged. Since the delay exceeded six months, the burden shifted to the People to demonstrate that enough time was excludable under CPL 30.30(4) to bring the delay within the statutory limit.

    The only period the court found excludable was from May 10, 1976, to August 10, 1976, due to pretrial motions made by the defendant. The court rejected the People’s argument that the need for further investigation excused the delay, citing People v. Washington, 43 N.Y.2d 772 (1977).

    The court emphasized that the People’s claim of readiness in May 1976 was insufficient because they failed to communicate this readiness to the court on the record. The court explicitly stated: “To sustain such an assertion, the People must communicate readiness for trial to the court on the record when ready to proceed. It is insufficient, as a matter of law, to inform the court of such a claim for the first time in an affidavit submitted in response to a motion to dismiss the indictment.” The court cited United States v. Pierro, 478 F.2d 386, to support this proposition.

    The court also underscored that the right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30 is not contingent on the defendant’s readiness for trial or a showing of prejudice resulting from the delay. This reinforces the prosecution’s independent duty to be ready for trial within the statutory timeframe and to properly communicate that readiness to the court.