New York Law Review

Tag: Prosecutorial Misconduct

  • Taylor v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 856 (1994): Claimant’s Conduct Preventing Unjust Conviction Relief

    Taylor v. State, 84 N.Y.2d 856 (1994)

    A claimant seeking damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they did not cause or bring about their own conviction through their own conduct.

    Summary

    Bruce Taylor sought damages from the State of New York for unjust conviction and imprisonment after his drug conviction was vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Claims denied his claim, finding he failed to prove he did not cause his conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed as well, holding that Taylor’s untruthful testimony and direction to his attorney not to call his wife as a witness (to protect her, not to help his case) demonstrated he contributed to his conviction, barring recovery under Court of Claims Act § 8-b.

    Facts

    Bruce Taylor was convicted in 1974 for selling a controlled substance. He served over five years in jail and four years on probation. The conviction was vacated under CPL 440.10 due to prosecutorial misconduct, specifically false testimony by the arresting officer and failure to disclose information about the informant. Taylor then sued the State under Court of Claims Act § 8-b for unjust conviction and imprisonment.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims denied Taylor’s claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims decision. Taylor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Taylor proved by clear and convincing evidence that he did not cause or bring about his own conviction, as required by Court of Claims Act § 8-b(5)(d), despite his conviction being vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct.

    Holding

    No, because Taylor’s less-than-candid testimony at trial regarding his involvement in the drug transaction and his decision to prevent his wife from testifying to protect her, contributed to his conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ findings that Taylor failed to prove he did not contribute to his conviction. The court noted that Taylor’s trial testimony was not entirely truthful regarding his role in the drug sale. More importantly, the court highlighted that Taylor instructed his attorney not to call his wife as a witness, not to help his own defense, but rather to shield her from potential legal repercussions related to the crime. This action, the court reasoned, constituted conduct that contributed to his conviction, thus precluding him from recovering damages under the unjust conviction statute. The court distinguished this case from situations involving mere trial strategy, stating that the decision to prevent his wife’s testimony was made to protect her, not to advance his own cause. As the court stated, “There is evidence in the record that supports the findings below that Taylor directed his attorney not to call his wife to testify in order to protect her, rather than to advance his own cause. Thus, the court’s consideration of that decision was not impermissible consideration of trial strategy.”

  • People v. Batista, 89 N.Y.2d 683 (1997): Clarifying Grand Jury Testimony Rights

    People v. Batista, 89 N.Y.2d 683 (1997)

    A prosecutor’s questioning of a defendant before a Grand Jury does not warrant dismissal of charges unless the defendant was deprived of a fair opportunity to testify or the integrity of the proceedings was impaired.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order upholding an indictment, finding that the prosecutor’s examination of the defendant before the Grand Jury did not deprive him of a fair opportunity to testify. The Court reasoned that the defendant was permitted to make a full narrative statement and that the prosecutor’s questions were aimed at clarifying the defendant’s statements and ensuring he wasn’t being forced to take sole responsibility for the crime. The Court held that the prosecutor’s actions did not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings.

    Facts

    The defendant appeared before a Grand Jury concerning an incident involving a gun in a car. The defendant made a statement and suggested the Grand Jury “should check the fingerprints.” The prosecutor questioned the defendant regarding this statement. The prosecutor asserted that the defendant “was taking all the responsibility for the gun.” The defendant then stated that he had been informed by a police officer that he would be forced to take responsibility if the other occupants did not “talk.”

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an appeal regarding the prosecutor’s conduct during the Grand Jury proceedings. The Appellate Division’s order, which upheld the indictment, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s examination of the defendant before the Grand Jury warranted dismissal of the charges on the ground that the defendant was deprived of a fair opportunity to testify or that the integrity of the proceedings was impaired.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was permitted to make a full narrative statement of his version of events, and the prosecutor’s questions were properly aimed at clarifying the defendant’s statements and ensuring he wasn’t being forced to take sole responsibility. The prosecutor’s isolated statement did not deny the defendant a full and fair opportunity to testify or impair the integrity of the proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 190.50(5) and precedent from People v. Karp and People v. Darby. The Court found that the defendant was allowed to give a full account before being questioned. The prosecutor’s questions aimed at clarifying whether the defendant knew of exculpatory fingerprint evidence were deemed proper. While the prosecutor’s statement about the defendant taking responsibility might have implied guilt, the questions were mainly to ensure the defendant wasn’t being coerced. The defendant’s immediate response to the Grand Jury, clarifying he was told he’d be forced to take responsibility, further negated any prejudice. The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s actions did not impair the Grand Jury’s integrity or deny the defendant a fair chance to testify. The Court stated: “Thus, the prosecutor’s isolated statement cannot be said to have denied defendant a full and fair opportunity to testify or to have impaired the integrity of the proceedings”.

  • People v. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d 215 (1995): Improperly Drawing Inferences from Witness’s Fifth Amendment Invocation

    People v. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d 215 (1995)

    It is reversible error for a prosecutor to call a witness knowing they will invoke the Fifth Amendment and then argue that the witness’s silence implies the defendant’s guilt.

    Summary

    Vargas was convicted of murder based on circumstantial evidence. A key witness, Arlequín, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about his involvement and knowledge of the crime. The prosecutor, despite knowing Arlequín would plead the Fifth, repeatedly questioned him on matters he refused to answer and then argued in summation that Arlequín’s silence implied Vargas’s guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Vargas’s conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s actions prejudiced Vargas’s right to a fair trial and that a curative instruction was insufficient to mitigate the damage.

    Facts

    Lourdes Caban was murdered in her car. Police investigation led to Anthony Arlequín, Vargas’s cousin, who initially implicated Vargas in a statement to the police. At trial, Arlequín, after initially stating his prior statement was a lie, was called as a witness by the prosecution. He invoked his Fifth Amendment right in response to most questions about his involvement and Vargas’s role in the murder. The prosecutor continued to question him on these matters in front of the jury, despite knowing he would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.

    Procedural History

    Vargas was convicted of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the prosecutor improperly used Arlequín’s Fifth Amendment invocation to prejudice the jury against him. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless due to the trial court’s limiting instruction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor committed reversible error by calling a witness who she knew would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and then using that invocation to argue the defendant’s guilt.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prosecutor deliberately elicited the witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment and then used it to build an impermissible inference of the defendant’s guilt, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves. The court stated, “When the People question a witness knowing the witness will respond by invoking the Fifth Amendment, and then compound the prejudice to defendant by expressing in closing argument that the witness’s claim of the testimonial privilege was evidence of defendant’s guilt, defendant is deprived of a fair trial.” It also cited Namet v. United States, establishing the framework for evaluating challenges related to a witness pleading the Fifth Amendment at trial. Key factors include the prosecutor’s conduct, the significance of the questions, whether inferences were drawn in closing arguments, the witness’s relationship to the defendant, and jury instructions.

    The court found that the prosecutor received clear indication of what the witness would not discuss and the court directed the prosecutor not to question him on those matters. The court found that the prosecutor’s repeated questioning and summation arguments were designed to create the inference that Arlequín was protecting Vargas. The court noted the absence of direct evidence linking Vargas to the murder, making the unfavorable inference irresistible. The limiting instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudice. The court concluded, “Defendant was irreparably prejudiced when the prosecutor purposely called a witness knowing full well that the witness would invoke the Fifth Amendment and then seized on the witness’s silence in summation to bolster the People’s case against defendant.” The People cannot justify the approach employed in this case on the ground that defendant might have been entitled to a missing witness charge if Arlequín did not testify.

  • People v. Lancaster, 85 N.Y.2d 203 (1995): Scope of Defendant’s Testimony Before Grand Jury

    People v. Lancaster, 85 N.Y.2d 203 (1995)

    A prosecutor may interrupt a defendant’s grand jury testimony to focus the testimony on relevant matters without impairing the integrity of the proceedings, as long as the defendant is given a fair opportunity to present their version of events.

    Summary

    Lancaster was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of marihuana. The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding that the prosecutor interfered with Lancaster’s testimony before the Grand Jury. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the prosecutor’s interruptions were permissible because they sought to focus Lancaster’s testimony on the relevant issue of whether she sold drugs or acted as an agent, and did not deprive her of a fair opportunity to present her version of events. The court emphasized that testimony before the Grand Jury should concern “relevant and competent evidence concerning the case under consideration.”

    Facts

    On December 17, 1992, an undercover officer approached Lancaster, who asked if he was “looking to get nice.” After the officer indicated he was looking for “two nickels,” Lancaster led him to a location, took $10 from him, and returned with one vial of alleged “crack” cocaine. The officer, who had requested “two nickels,” asked for the other vial, but Lancaster stated that “they only had dimes.” Another officer then arrested Lancaster, and a search revealed small quantities of cocaine and marihuana.

    Procedural History

    Lancaster was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of marihuana. She moved for court inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal of the indictment. The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding prosecutorial interference with Lancaster’s testimony, with leave for the District Attorney to re-present the matter to the Grand Jury. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a prosecutor’s interruptions of a defendant’s Grand Jury testimony, in an effort to focus the testimony on relevant matters, constitute an impairment of the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because a defendant must be given an opportunity to give her version of the events, but that testimony should be regarding “relevant and competent evidence concerning the case under consideration.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s interruptions did not deprive Lancaster of the opportunity to make her statement regarding the charges against her. The court cited CPL 190.50 (5) (b), which states that a defendant must be permitted to testify before the grand jury and give any relevant and competent evidence concerning the case under consideration. The court found that Lancaster spoke at length about her past and drug addiction, and the prosecutor sought to focus her attention on whether she was acting in concert or as an agent of the buyer. The court reasoned that requesting Lancaster to confine her statements to facts relevant to whether she sold drugs or acted as an agent did not abridge her right to make a statement about a matter relevant to the case. As such, “To request that defendant not continue the narrative about her childhood, or delve into her living situation does not abridge defendant’s right to make a statement about a matter relevant to this case before the Grand Jury.” The court distinguished between a fair opportunity to present one’s version of events and unfettered license to introduce irrelevant testimony. The court emphasized that the focus should be on “relevant and competent evidence.”

  • People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 208 (1995): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Impeachment Evidence

    People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 208 (1995)

    A prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland extends to evidence impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness, especially if that witness’s testimony may be determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of murder and robbery based largely on informant testimony. After his conviction, he sought to vacate the judgment, presenting affidavits from informants recanting their testimony and alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying a hearing on whether the prosecution failed to disclose information that could have impeached a key witness. The court emphasized that prosecutors must disclose evidence affecting witness credibility, and the failure to do so may warrant a new trial.

    Facts

    Regina Carter was killed during a robbery. Defendant was arrested based on statements from four police informants alleging he confessed to the crime. Two informants, Washington and McKinney, testified at trial. Years after his conviction, Defendant sought to vacate the judgment, submitting affidavits: Washington and McKinney recanted their trial testimony and Youmans, another informant who did not testify at trial, stated he told the prosecutor that Washington’s statement was false and induced by police promises. The prosecutor did not disclose Youmans’ recantation to the defense before trial.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the motion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for a hearing on the Brady issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s failure to disclose that a potential witness, Youmans, had informed the prosecutor that another witness, Washington, had fabricated his testimony constituted a violation of Defendant’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, warranting a hearing on Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, including evidence that could impeach the credibility of a key prosecution witness, and Youmans’ statement to the prosecutor suggested that Washington’s testimony was fabricated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Youmans’ affidavit, stating he informed the prosecutor that Washington’s testimony was false, constituted potential Brady material. The court emphasized that a prosecutor’s duty extends to disclosing evidence that impeaches the credibility of a prosecution witness, particularly when that witness’s testimony is crucial to the case. The court cited Giglio v. United States, noting that the “good faith” of a prosecutor is not a valid excuse for nondisclosure. The court stated, “A prosecutor’s duty of disclosing exculpatory material extends to disclosure of evidence impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness whose testimony may be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Because the People’s papers did not concede the truth of Youmans’ averments, and Youmans’ statements were not conclusively refuted, a hearing was required to determine whether Youmans communicated undisclosed Brady material to the prosecution. The Court directed the hearing court to determine whether the undisclosed evidence created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. If so, the conviction must be vacated and a new trial ordered; otherwise, the motion to vacate should be denied.

  • People v. Adames, 83 N.Y.2d 92 (1993): Double Jeopardy After Vacated Verdict Due to Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. Adames, 83 N.Y.2d 92 (1993)

    When a trial court vacates a jury verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct that does not intentionally provoke a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial.

    Summary

    Adames was convicted of drug sale and possession. His first trial ended with a guilty verdict, but the trial court vacated it due to prosecutorial misconduct. Adames argued that retrying him violated double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his second conviction, holding that double jeopardy did not apply because the prosecutorial misconduct, while improper, did not force him to seek a mistrial and was more akin to trial error correctable on appeal. The court emphasized that Adames received a verdict from his initial jury, satisfying his right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal.

    Facts

    Adames was arrested in a narcotics buy-and-bust operation. No drugs or buy money were found on him at the time of arrest. At his first trial, a co-defendant testified, offering an alibi. The prosecutor improperly cross-examined the co-defendant about his post-arrest silence, asking if he had told anyone he didn’t commit the crime. The trial judge sustained objections but the prosecutor persisted. During summation, the prosecutor repeatedly stated the facts were “uncontroverted,” which the court cautioned against. The trial court ultimately vacated the guilty verdict due to the prosecutor’s misconduct during cross-examination and summation.

    Procedural History

    1. First Trial: Adames was convicted, but the trial court vacated the verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct.
    2. Motion to Dismiss: Adames moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds; the motion was denied.
    3. Second Trial: Adames was retried and convicted.
    4. Appellate Division: The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting the double jeopardy claim.
    5. Court of Appeals: The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a trial court vacates a guilty verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct, when the misconduct did not intentionally provoke a mistrial.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutorial misconduct was not so egregious as to warrant a double jeopardy bar, especially since the defendant received a verdict from his initial jury. The vacatur of the verdict was more akin to a reversal on appeal for trial error, for which retrial is the appropriate remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. Since Adames received a jury verdict in his first trial, this right was satisfied, even though the verdict was later vacated. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a mistrial is granted due to prosecutorial misconduct designed to provoke a mistrial, referencing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The court stated that the vacatur was “more analogous to a reversal on appeal for relatively ordinary trial error. In such instances, the double jeopardy bar to retrial should not attach and the correct and proportionate remedy should allow for retrial.” The court emphasized that the misconduct in this case, while improper, did not rise to the level of egregious conduct that would bar retrial. They stated, “Some prosecutorial error may be so egregious or provocative as to warrant the interposition of the double jeopardy bar, even when no mistrial is granted, but that is not this case.”

  • People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36 (1984): Prosecutorial Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to Grand Jury

    People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36 (1984)

    Prosecutors have a limited duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury when that evidence is essential to allow the grand jury to make an informed decision about whether to indict.

    Summary

    Valles was indicted for manslaughter. She argued that the prosecutor erred by not presenting her full statement to the Grand Jury, which included her claim that the victim attacked her with a knife first. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor did not violate their duty, because although prosecutors have a duty of fairness to present exculpatory evidence, that duty only applies when the evidence is so essential that withholding it would prevent the grand jury from making an informed decision. Because Valles’s other statements presented to the grand jury already suggested a possible defense, the omission of the full statement did not rise to that level.

    Facts

    Valles stabbed her husband during a domestic dispute. Following her arrest, Valles gave a detailed statement to the police indicating that the victim had been stabbed during a struggle initiated when the victim brandished a knife. At the Grand Jury proceeding, the prosecutor presented evidence that Valles made jealous remarks and showed no signs of injury, suggesting she was the aggressor. The prosecutor also presented evidence that Valles had stated, “I stabbed him because he tried to beat on me,” and that she had screamed at the precinct that she stabbed and killed her husband. However, the prosecutor did not present Valles’s full statement, which included her claim that the victim attacked her with a knife first.

    Procedural History

    Valles was indicted by the Grand Jury for manslaughter. She moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the prosecutor erred by not presenting her full statement. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s failure to present Valles’s complete statement to the Grand Jury, including her claim of self-defense, impaired the Grand Jury’s ability to make an informed decision, thus violating the prosecutor’s duty of fairness.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s duty to present exculpatory evidence only arises when the evidence is so essential to a complete understanding of the case that its omission prevents the Grand Jury from functioning as an intelligent and informed decision-making body. Here, other evidence presented to the grand jury hinted at a possible justification defense, so not presenting the full statement was not a violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that prosecutors have a duty of fairness to the Grand Jury. The Court emphasized that “a prosecutor serves a dual role as advocate and public officer [and is] charged with the duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is done.” However, this duty is not unlimited. Prosecutors are not obligated to search for evidence favorable to the defense or to present all evidence in their possession that might be favorable to the accused. The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence only arises when the evidence is essential to a complete understanding of the case. The court distinguished this case from situations where the prosecutor presents a distorted view of the evidence. Here, Valles’s statements suggested a motive, and the fact that she showed no signs of injury implied there was no struggle. Additionally, her statement, “I stabbed him because he tried to beat on me,” already suggested a claim of self-defense. The court concluded that even without the full statement, the Grand Jury had sufficient information to evaluate the case and make an informed decision. The dissent argued that the full statement was essential because it presented the only eyewitness account suggesting self-defense, and without it, the Grand Jury could not properly evaluate the possibility of justification, especially since the People bear the burden of disproving justification beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the dissent emphasized that the prosecutor presented other evidence in a way that made Valles look more culpable, thus exacerbating the prejudice from the omission.

  • People v. Blair, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988): Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Promises of Leniency

    People v. Blair, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988)

    A prosecutor has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject, even if the trial assistants were unaware of the specific promises made by a superior within the same office.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon based largely on the testimony of Tony Malloy, a witness with a criminal history and pending charges. Prior to trial, the defense requested disclosure of any promises made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony. While the prosecution revealed some arrangements, it failed to disclose an agreement between an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and Malloy’s attorney that Malloy would avoid prison on his pending charges if he testified against the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals held that this nondisclosure was a Brady violation requiring a new trial, emphasizing the prosecutor’s duty to disclose promises of leniency and correct false testimony, regardless of internal knowledge within the prosecutor’s office.

    Facts

    Tony Malloy was the prosecution’s primary witness against the defendants, identifying them in connection with the death of Maxine Peterson.
    Malloy had a history of drug use and prior felony convictions, and at the time of the trial, he had three open felony charges pending against him.
    Before trial, the defense requested any promises of leniency made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony.
    The prosecution disclosed that it had purchased airplane tickets to Virginia for Malloy and his girlfriend, paid their first month’s rent, and gave Malloy $1,500 in cash.
    The pending charges against Malloy were adjourned until after the defendants’ trial.
    At trial, Malloy testified that no promises of leniency had been made regarding his pending charges, despite admitting that he had spoken with ADA McCarthy multiple times.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree in the trial court.
    During trial, the defense learned of an agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, Jonathan Latimer, that Malloy would avoid incarceration if he testified truthfully.
    The defendants moved for dismissal or a new trial based on the Brady violation (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence).
    The trial court ruled that a Brady violation occurred but determined it did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement required a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, promising leniency to Malloy in exchange for his testimony, constituted a Brady violation requiring a new trial.
    Whether the Brady violation was excused because the defense learned of the agreement during trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject. The studied effort by the prosecution to avoid these accepted standards of conduct and to undermine the rule of Savvides cannot be condoned.
    No, because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor here. The court and defense counsel were kept in ignorance of what the material is.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s dual role as an advocate and a public officer, requiring fairness to the accused and candor with the courts.
    The Court cited Brady v. Maryland, highlighting the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, including promises of leniency to witnesses.
    ADA McCarthy’s deliberate attempt to shield the trial assistants and Malloy from knowledge of the agreement undermined the purposes of the Brady and Savvides rules.
    “In the final analysis, however, it does not matter whether the trial assistants were genuinely unaware of the arrangement or not. A prosecutor’s obligations to correct false testimony given by prosecution witnesses and to disclose Brady material are duties exercised by individual prosecutors and shared by the prosecutor’s office as a whole.”
    The trial assistants were chargeable with knowledge of McCarthy’s promises to Malloy’s attorney, and they had a responsibility to clarify the record after Malloy testified that no deal for leniency had been struck.
    “After Malloy had testified that no deal for leniency had been struck, the trial assistants, as representatives of their office, had the responsibility of clarifying the record by disclosing all the details of what had actually transpired between their office and Malloy and his attorney.”
    The Court rejected the argument that disclosure during trial obviated the Brady violation because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor. The harm was not harmless, as Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was pivotal. “The error cannot be said to be harmless (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237). Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was a pivotal consideration.”

  • People v. Carey, 73 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Evaluating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Summation

    People v. Carey, 73 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    A prosecutor’s remarks during summation warrant a new trial only if they demonstrate a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, and even then, they must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial, including the defense’s summation.

    Summary

    Defendant Carey was convicted of multiple counts of sodomy and endangering the welfare of a child based on testimony from teenage boys. He appealed, alleging prosecutorial misconduct during summation and inappropriate consideration of community sentiment during sentencing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks did not demonstrate a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, especially considering the defense’s own summation, and that the sentencing statement, read in context, was unobjectionable. The court also rejected the defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the age of consent.

    Facts

    Carey was accused of showing pornographic films to teenage boys in his home. The teenagers testified that Carey masturbated before them, solicited sex from them, and engaged in sodomy with two of them. Based on this testimony, Carey was convicted on five counts of sodomy in the third degree and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. He was subsequently sentenced to five consecutive prison terms.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction in Chemung County Court, Carey appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing prosecutorial misconduct during summation and inappropriate sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Carey then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation had a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, thus warranting a new trial.
    2. Whether the sentencing judge inappropriately considered community sentiment and religious beliefs in imposing the sentence.
    3. Whether the age of consent established by the Legislature is unconstitutional.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in the context of the entire trial and the defense summation, fell within the latitude afforded to attorneys in advocating their cause, and any potential prejudice was cured by a curative instruction.
    2. No, because the sentencing statement, when read in context, was unobjectionable.
    3. No, the court found no merit to the defendant’s contention that the age of consent established by the Legislature is unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in People v. Ashwal, requiring the defendant to show that the prosecutor’s remarks had “a decided tendency to prejudice the jury.” The court emphasized that the prosecutor’s closing statement must be evaluated in light of the defense summation, which had put into issue the complainants’ character and credibility. The court found that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s failure to testify was followed by a curative instruction, mitigating any potential prejudice. The court quoted Williams v. Brooklyn El. R.R. Co., noting that attorneys are afforded latitude in advocating their cause. Regarding the sentencing, the court found no evidence that the judge inappropriately considered community sentiment or religious beliefs, distinguishing the case from United States v. Bakker. The court summarily dismissed the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the age of consent. The court stated that the prosecutor’s portrayal of the complainants in the closing statement, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, fell within the latitude afforded to attorneys in advocating their cause. “Moreover, the prosecutor’s closing statement must be evaluated in light of the defense summation, which put into issue the complainants’ character and credibility and justified the People’s response.”

  • People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992): Scope of Immunity and Prosecutorial Misconduct Before Grand Jury

    People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992)

    A prosecutor’s mere possession and review of a defendant’s immunized statement during the defendant’s grand jury testimony does not automatically constitute an unconstitutional “use” of the statement requiring dismissal of the charges, absent a showing of actual prejudice or impairment of the grand jury proceeding’s integrity.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a prosecutor’s possession and review of a police officer’s immunized statement during his grand jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement, warranting dismissal of assault charges. The Court of Appeals held that while the practice was disfavored, it did not warrant dismissal because there was no indication that the prosecutor used the statement to elicit testimony, control the witness, or impair the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, and sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. This ruling emphasizes the necessity of demonstrating actual prejudice to justify dismissing charges based on potential prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was working security at a restaurant. He confronted a group of young men drinking alcohol, leading to an argument with one, Bihn Nguyen. After police arrived, the defendant allegedly grabbed Nguyen by the throat, bent him over a car trunk, and struck him with a flashlight. The Police Department conducted an internal investigation, obtaining a compelled statement from the defendant under threat of dismissal. Subsequently, the matter was presented to a Grand Jury.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney filed an information charging the defendant with assault. The Town Court dismissed the information, concluding the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s involuntary statement. The County Court affirmed, finding dismissal warranted despite the existence of other admissible proof. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the information and remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s possession and review of the defendant’s immunized statement during his Grand Jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement under the Fifth Amendment and the New York Constitution.

    2. Whether, assuming such conduct constituted a prohibited “use,” dismissal of the information was the appropriate remedy.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no showing that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information, to control the witness, or that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement.

    2. No, because the defendant was not inhibited from exercising his right to testify, the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings was not impaired, and ample independent evidence existed to sustain the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that a statement made under threat of dismissal is automatically immunized. While the People bear the burden of proving that any evidence used was derived independently of the statement, the court found no evidence that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information or to control the witness. The prosecutor’s questions were generally non-specific, and the defendant was given wide latitude in his testimony. CPL 210.35(5) allows dismissal only when the Grand Jury proceeding fails to conform to CPL 190 requirements, impairing its integrity and potentially prejudicing the defendant. Here, there was no indication that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement, and his testimony was not inhibited. The court cautioned against the practice of possessing immunized statements during Grand Jury presentations but held that dismissal was not warranted in this specific instance because sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. The court emphasized that “[a] defendant’s guarantee of immunity as well as his or her rights to testify before the Grand Jury must be scrupulously protected.”