Tag: Prosecutorial Duty

  • People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996): Post-Readiness Delay and People’s Burden to Clarify Adjournments

    People v. Cortes, 88 N.Y.2d 1049 (1996)

    When the People declare readiness for trial but a post-readiness delay occurs, the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for the adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against Cortes because the People failed to be ready for trial within the statutorily prescribed six-month period. The court included a 49-day post-readiness adjournment against the prosecution. The People did not clarify on the record the basis for this lengthy adjournment. Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them. The Court held that the People’s failure to clarify the reason for the post-readiness adjournment on the record meant the delay was attributable to them, thus violating the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cortes, was indicted. The People declared readiness for trial at some point. However, a 49-day adjournment occurred from August 7 to September 25, 1992. On August 7, 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed three counts of the indictment and suggested that the People might choose to re-present those counts, and adjourned the case to September 25, 1992. At the September 25 appearance, the prosecutor did not assert the People’s readiness for trial or ask the court for an explanation for the lengthy adjournment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment against the defendant, Cortes, pursuant to CPL 30.30 because the People were not ready for trial within the statutory six-month period. The Appellate Division affirmed this dismissal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a post-readiness adjournment should be charged to the People when they fail to clarify on the record the basis for the adjournment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People bear the burden of clarifying the reason for a post-readiness adjournment on the record; failure to do so results in the delay being charged to them for speedy trial purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Liotta, 79 N.Y.2d 841 (1992) and People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d 177 (1993), which established the principle that the People must clarify the basis for an adjournment on the record. Because the prosecutor did not assert readiness or seek clarification for the adjournment on September 25, the court found the delay was properly charged to the People. The People’s argument that a statement of readiness filed four days after the August 7 adjournment cut off their responsibility for the remaining adjournment period was deemed unpreserved because it was not raised below. The Court emphasized the importance of a clear record in determining speedy trial claims, stating that the People have a duty to clarify the reasons for delays, especially after declaring readiness. The Court noted that, “Because the People failed to clarify, on the record, the basis for this adjournment, the period was properly charged to them.” The court effectively reinforced the prosecution’s obligation to maintain a clear record regarding readiness and the reasons for any subsequent delays, lest those delays be attributed to them, potentially leading to dismissal of the case.

  • People v. McLaurin, 38 N.Y.2d 123 (1975): Prosecutorial Duty to Secure Defendant’s Presence from Another State for Speedy Trial

    38 N.Y.2d 123 (1975)

    When a defendant is incarcerated in another state, the prosecution must make diligent efforts to secure the defendant’s presence for trial in New York; failure to do so may violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    McLaurin pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights due to a delay caused by his incarceration in New Jersey. The New York Court of Appeals found the record insufficient to determine if the delay was justified, specifically whether the prosecution knew of McLaurin’s out-of-state incarceration and made diligent efforts to secure his return for trial. The court emphasized the prosecution’s duty to demonstrate “good cause” for the delay and remanded for a hearing to establish these facts. The case highlights the importance of prosecutorial diligence when a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.

    Facts

    McLaurin was indicted in Bronx County, New York, on September 30, 1968, for robbery, grand larceny, and weapon possession. He was released on bail but arrested in New Jersey on December 13, 1968, on charges of kidnapping, rape, and narcotics offenses. He was convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to five to seven years. New York authorities filed a detainer. McLaurin remained in New Jersey custody until June 25, 1972, when he was returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    On October 17, 1972, McLaurin moved to dismiss the New York indictment, alleging denial of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, conditionally granted the motion, ordering dismissal if trial did not commence by January 15, 1973. McLaurin then pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. McLaurin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the delay in bringing McLaurin to trial in New York, due to his incarceration in New Jersey, violated his right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    No, the Court could not determine if McLaurin’s speedy trial rights were violated because the record was incomplete as to whether the prosecution knew of McLaurin’s incarceration in New Jersey and whether they made diligent efforts to obtain his presence for trial; therefore, the case was remitted to the lower court for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the established principle that delay due to incarceration in another jurisdiction is not automatically justified if the prosecution knows of the detention but fails to diligently seek the defendant’s presence for trial. The prosecution must demonstrate “good cause” for the delay. The Court emphasized that knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts by law enforcement is crucial and is imputed to the District Attorney’s office. The Court found the record insufficient because there was no hearing on the original motion to dismiss, McLaurin pleaded guilty, and the prosecutor was prevented from introducing evidence about when they learned of McLaurin’s New Jersey incarceration. The court noted, “A defendant ought not be penalized because of any inadequacy of internal communication within the law enforcement establishment.” The case was remanded to determine whether the prosecutor was unaware of McLaurin’s incarceration and could not, with due diligence, have discovered his whereabouts. The Court noted that documentary evidence relating to the issue of the prosecutor’s knowledge of defendant’s imprisonment in New Jersey should be presented. The court cited CPL 30.30 (subd 4, pars [c], [e]), regarding the tolling of time periods due to the absence or unavailability of the defendant or detention in another jurisdiction, although it acknowledged this statute was not directly controlling as the indictment predated the law’s enactment.