New York Law Review

Tag: Prosecutorial Delay

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Romeo, 12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008): Prosecutorial Delay & Speedy Trial Rights

    12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008)

    A lengthy post-indictment delay, caused by the prosecution’s decision to defer to a foreign prosecution and failure to seek extradition, can violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    Romeo was indicted in New York for murder in 1987. He fled to Canada and killed a police officer there. Instead of seeking Romeo’s extradition on the New York murder charge, the prosecution deferred to Canadian authorities. Romeo was convicted in Canada and imprisoned. Twelve years after the indictment, Romeo moved to dismiss the New York indictment on speedy trial grounds. He was eventually brought back to New York, convicted of manslaughter, and appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision to dismiss the indictment, holding that the prosecution’s delay in pursuing the case violated Romeo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, based on the five factor test from People v. Taranovich.

    Facts

    In November 1985, a fatal shooting occurred in Suffolk County, New York. A gun belonging to Romeo was identified as the murder weapon. In February 1987, Romeo was ordered to provide a DNA sample. Before providing the sample, Romeo fled to Canada. In Canada, he killed a police officer. He was apprehended and held on a Canadian warrant. Suffolk County authorities obtained hair and blood samples from Romeo, which matched evidence from the New York crime scene.

    Procedural History

    Romeo was indicted in Suffolk County, NY in March 1987. He demanded a speedy trial. The Suffolk County Court denied Romeo’s application to be produced for arraignment before extradition to Canada, suggesting any delay could be addressed later. Romeo was extradited to Canada, convicted, and sentenced. In 1999, Romeo moved to dismiss the NY indictment based on speedy trial grounds; this was denied. In 2005, he was brought back to Suffolk County. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s lengthy postindictment delay occasioned by delaying their prosecution in favor of a Canadian prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution, coupled with their failure to make a good-faith effort to extradite Romeo, resulted in an excessive delay that prejudiced Romeo’s ability to defend himself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the five-factor balancing test from People v. Taranovich to determine if Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense. The Court found the 12-year delay between indictment and the speedy trial motion to be extraordinary. The primary reason for the delay was the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution and their failure to seek extradition. The Court noted that while the underlying charge of murder was serious, it didn’t excuse the delay. While Romeo was incarcerated, it was due to the Canadian charges. However, the Court found it highly likely that the delay impaired Romeo’s ability to defend himself, especially given his incarceration in a foreign prison. The Court emphasized that the People had been warned that deferring prosecution could cause a speedy trial violation. The Court distinguished this case from others where extradition would clearly be futile, stating, “The fact that a defendant is incarcerated outside of the state makes it incumbent upon the People to make diligent, good faith efforts to secure his presence in the state for arraignment and trial.” Because the People failed to make such efforts, Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated.

  • People v. Romeo, 636 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1994): Balancing Due Process Rights with Prosecution Delay Justification

    People v. Romeo, 636 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1994)

    A lengthy delay in prosecution does not automatically violate a defendant’s due process rights if the delay is justified by good cause, such as witness fear and difficulty in obtaining evidence, and the defendant has not suffered undue prejudice as a result.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the extensive delay in prosecuting Romeo for a 1981 double murder did not violate his due process rights. The court found that the prosecution established good cause for the delay, citing witness fear related to organized crime connections, a key witness fleeing or hiding, and another witness recanting their identification. Balancing the reasons for the delay against the nature of the charges, the lack of pretrial incarceration, and the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the defense, the court concluded that Romeo’s due process rights were not abridged. The court emphasized that a good-faith delay for sufficient reasons does not deprive a defendant of due process, even if some prejudice exists.

    Facts

    In 1981, two bar owners were murdered in Queens. The defendant, Romeo (aka “Pepe”), along with Frank Riccardi (aka “Frankie the Geech”) and Ronald Barlin (aka “Ronnie the Jew”), were suspects, all allegedly linked to organized crime. Despite 20-25 people being present, nearly all denied witnessing the crime. A key witness fled the jurisdiction or hid, refusing to cooperate with police. Another witness recanted her identification of Barlin, leading to the dismissal of his indictment. Riccardi was never located.

    Procedural History

    The case remained unresolved for over a decade. The prosecution eventually moved forward with the case against Romeo. The trial court ruled on the speedy trial/due process issue. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s ruling that the delay was justified, and the Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an extensive delay in prosecuting a defendant for murder violates the defendant’s due process right to a prompt prosecution, despite the prosecution’s claim of good cause based on witness fear and difficulty in obtaining evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution established good cause for the delay, and the defendant did not demonstrate undue prejudice resulting from the delay. The determination of good cause by the Appellate Division had support in the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 (1975): the extent of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the nature of the charge, whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and whether the defense has been impaired by the delay. The court acknowledged the extensive delay but emphasized the underlying double murder charge. It noted the absence of pretrial incarceration and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to the defense. The court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding of witness fear, which supported the prosecution’s claim of good cause for the delay. The court emphasized that “we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards” when dealing with delays in prosecution (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 253). Even with some prejudice to the defendant, “a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process.”

  • People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986): People’s Delay and ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Under Speedy Trial Law

    People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986)

    Delays attributable to the prosecutor’s vacation are chargeable to the People and do not constitute exceptional circumstances excusing speedy trial violations, even if the defendant caused other delays in the case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The court held that the lengthy post-readiness delays caused by the trial assistant’s planned European vacation were not an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3) (b) sufficient to excuse the delay. The court emphasized that only the People’s delay is considered, unless the delay directly results from the defendant’s actions. Even though the defendant caused substantial delays, the People were also responsible for delays exceeding the statutory limit, requiring dismissal.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted and the People declared their readiness for trial. However, the trial was significantly delayed. The defendant was responsible for a substantial portion of post-readiness delay, totaling approximately 17 months. The trial assistant was scheduled for a European vacation, which resulted in a 28-day adjournment. The People argued that the defendant’s delays constituted exceptional circumstances that excused the delay caused by the trial assistant’s vacation.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the Appellate Division, which presumably affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered the indictment dismissed, finding a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether lengthy post-readiness delays attributable to the trial assistant’s planned vacation constitute an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3)(b) sufficient to excuse adjournments chargeable to the People?
    2. Whether the defendant’s post-readiness delays, even if substantial, constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3)(b) in the absence of a causal relationship to the People’s delay?

    Holding

    1. No, because a prosecutor’s planned vacation does not constitute an exceptional circumstance, especially when another trial assistant could have been substituted.
    2. No, because under CPL 30.30(3)(b), it is the People’s delay alone that is considered, unless the delay directly results from action taken by the defendant, and there was no causal relationship between the defendant’s delays and the prosecutor’s vacation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 28-day adjournment due to the trial assistant’s vacation was chargeable to the People, citing precedent that shortages of personnel and illness of the prosecutor are chargeable to the People. The court found that the vacation did not qualify as an “exceptional fact or circumstance” that would excuse the delay, especially since a substitute trial assistant could have been assigned. The court further clarified the interpretation of CPL 30.30 (3) (b), stating that “[I]t is the People’s delay alone that is to be considered, except where that delay directly ‘results from’ action taken by the defendant.” Because the defendant’s post-readiness delays were not causally related to the trial assistant’s vacation, and the People were chargeable with more than six months of delay (164 days of prereadiness delay plus the 28-day vacation delay), the court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975): Establishing Speedy Trial Rights Based on Length of Delay and Prejudice

    People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated when an extended pre-trial delay, coupled with pre-trial incarceration and potential prejudice to the defense, outweighs the justification offered for the delay, even if the delay is partly attributable to institutional factors like prosecutorial caseload.

    Summary

    Johnson was incarcerated for 18 months awaiting trial for murder and weapon possession. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter, claiming the delay caused a key defense witness to become unavailable. The delay stemmed from a shortage of prosecutors. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The court emphasized the length of the delay, pre-trial incarceration, potential prejudice to the defense, and the state’s failure to adequately justify the delay. The court balanced these factors and found that the delay was not excusable, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Fred Womack was fatally stabbed outside Johnson’s apartment on December 7, 1971. Johnson was arrested on January 7, 1972, and indicted for murder and weapon possession on January 27. He pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on February 18, asserting self-defense. Johnson requested an investigator in March. The case was set for trial on April 11, 1972, but the trial was repeatedly adjourned due to the prosecutor’s unavailability, purportedly due to a heavy caseload. Johnson remained incarcerated due to bail he couldn’t afford. During the delay, a crucial defense witness moved away and became unlocatable. Johnson pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree on July 2, 1973, citing the lost witness as a primary reason.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was indicted in January 1972. He moved for a speedy trial, which was effectively denied through numerous adjournments. He sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, which was denied for failure to exhaust state remedies. He then sought habeas corpus in state court, which was denied on the condition that the trial proceed on December 4, 1972, a condition which was not met. He eventually pleaded guilty and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction without opinion. Johnson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 18-month delay between the defendant’s arrest and guilty plea, primarily due to prosecutorial backlog, violated the defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial, warranting dismissal of the indictment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the length of the delay, the defendant’s pre-trial incarceration, potential prejudice to the defense due to a missing witness, and the State’s inadequate justification for the delay (prosecutorial backlog) outweighed the seriousness of the charge, thus violating the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the factors established in People v. Taranovich to assess the speedy trial claim: the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charge, the extent of pre-trial incarceration, and impairment to the defense. The court found the 18-month delay significant, with only a 30-day adjournment attributable to the defendant. The court acknowledged that while the serious nature of the charge allows for more thorough preparation, the delay here was not preparation-related. The court distinguished this case from People v. Ganci, where a 16-month delay due to inadequate facilities was deemed excusable. However, here, the delay was coupled with the defendant’s incarceration and the loss of a key witness, prejudicing his defense. The court stated, “[t]he speedy trial guaranteed by statute and the Federal Constitution serves three primary purposes: ‘It protects the accused, if held in jail to await trial, against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him of the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and finally, like statutes of limitation, it prevents him from being exposed to the hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time that the means of proving his innocence may not be within his reach.’” The court also noted that while delays due to institutional factors like prosecutorial backlog weigh less heavily against the state than intentional delays, they do not automatically excuse a violation of speedy trial rights, especially when combined with other factors such as lengthy incarceration and prejudice to the defense. The court emphasized the State’s duty to allocate resources to ensure prompt trials. Ultimately, the court found that the combination of factors demonstrated a violation of Johnson’s speedy trial right, requiring reversal and dismissal of the indictment.

  • People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971): Speedy Trial Rights and Delays Due to Incarceration

    People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 370 (1971)

    A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is violated when the prosecution fails to make a diligent effort to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial, absent a showing of good cause for the delay.

    Summary

    Minicone, incarcerated in federal prison, was indicted in New York. Despite knowing his location, the District Attorney took no action to secure his return for 11 months. Minicone moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay violated Minicone’s rights because the prosecution failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay, and his incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The court emphasized the prosecution’s duty to actively pursue bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial.

    Facts

    On February 2, 1966, while Minicone was in federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, a New York Grand Jury indicted him for robbery, grand larceny, and assault for crimes allegedly committed in 1963.
    He had also been indicted in 1964 for other, unrelated crimes. In May 1966, Minicone inquired about the status of the 1964 indictment, but the District Attorney did not mention the 1966 indictment.
    In November 1966, after Minicone moved to dismiss the 1964 indictment, the District Attorney sought to have him produced in New York for the 1964 charges.
    A warrant for the 1966 indictment was lodged in Georgia in December 1966, but Minicone had already been transferred to New York City. He was arraigned on both indictments in January 1967.

    Procedural History

    Minicone moved to dismiss the 1966 indictment, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny.
    He appealed the conviction based on the denial of his speedy trial rights to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an 11-month delay between indictment and arraignment, during which the defendant was incarcerated in federal prison and the prosecution took no action to secure his presence in New York, violates the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution failed to show good cause for the delay, and the defendant’s incarceration did not excuse the inaction. The District Attorney knew where the defendant was incarcerated but did nothing to secure his return to New York to face the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial are discretionary, the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay. Minicone’s incarceration in federal prison did not, in itself, constitute good cause. The court emphasized that the District Attorney was aware of Minicone’s location but neglected to take steps to bring him to trial. The court distinguished this case from situations where delays are justified by extraordinary circumstances or the defendant’s actions. The court noted that the defendant’s attorney answering “ready” to calendar calls indicated a desire for a prompt trial, not a waiver of speedy trial rights. Because the delay was solely due to the District Attorney’s inaction and the People failed to offer any valid excuse, the Court held that Minicone was denied his right to a speedy trial. As the court stated, the fact of incarceration “affords neither explanation nor excuse”. The court found the delay unreasonable under the specific circumstances of the case.