New York Law Review

Tag: proprietary function

  • Turturro v. City of New York, 27 N.Y.3d 474 (2016): Municipal Liability for Roadway Design and the Proprietary Function Exception

    <strong><em>Turturro v. City of New York</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 474 (2016)</em></strong>

    A municipality’s failure to adequately study or implement roadway design changes to address a known speeding problem constitutes a proprietary function, subjecting it to ordinary negligence standards, even if the underlying cause of the accident is driver negligence.

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the City of New York acted in a proprietary or governmental capacity when it failed to conduct a comprehensive traffic study and implement traffic calming measures on a Brooklyn roadway, despite repeated complaints of speeding. The court held that the City’s actions fell under its proprietary function because they concerned roadway design and safety. Thus, the plaintiffs did not need to prove a special duty to establish liability. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding the evidence supported the jury’s findings on proximate cause and that the City was not entitled to qualified immunity.

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>

    Anthony Turturro, a 12-year-old bicyclist, was struck by a speeding vehicle on Gerritsen Avenue in Brooklyn. The City had received multiple complaints about speeding on the road, including requests for traffic studies and signals. The City’s Intersection Control Unit (ICU) conducted several studies at specific intersections along the road, finding speeding issues, but did not undertake a comprehensive study of the entire roadway or implement traffic calming measures. The driver, Pascarella, was speeding and subsequently pleaded guilty to assault. Anthony suffered severe injuries. The plaintiffs sued the City, Pascarella, and the vehicle owner, alleging negligence in the City’s failure to address the speeding problem.

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

    The trial court found the City, Pascarella, and Anthony were negligent and apportioned liability. The City’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the City acted in a proprietary capacity and rejecting the City’s claims of governmental function immunity. The Court of Appeals granted the City leave to appeal.

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

    1. Whether the City acted in a proprietary or governmental capacity when it failed to address speeding complaints.
    2. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings on proximate cause.
    3. Whether the City was entitled to qualified immunity.

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>

    1. Yes, because the City’s actions regarding roadway design and safety are considered a proprietary function.
    2. Yes, because the jury’s finding of proximate cause was supported by the evidence.
    3. No, because the ICU studies did not address the overall speeding problem, thus the City was not entitled to immunity.

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>

    The court differentiated between a municipality’s proprietary and governmental functions. Highway design and maintenance are generally considered proprietary. The court emphasized that “the determination of the primary capacity under which a governmental agency was acting turns solely on the acts or omissions claimed to have caused the injury” (World Trade Ctr.). The court found the City’s failure to address speeding through traffic studies and measures related to its proprietary duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition. The court noted that the City’s response to speeding complaints did not constitute the exercise of police power, a governmental function. The court referenced Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283 (1986), which established qualified immunity where a municipality has studied a dangerous condition and developed a reasonable plan. But, because the ICU studies were not intended to address the generalized speeding along the roadway, the court found that they were not a reasonable response to complaints, and the City could not claim immunity. The Court referenced the statement in Tomassi v. Town of Union, 46 N.Y.2d 91 (1978) that the government has a duty to make its highways “reasonably safe for people who obey the rules of the road.” However, the court did not hold this to mean a municipality is absolved of liability when a collision involves speeding; rather, the court found that the City needed to use available design methods to account for speeding, and that the City’s failure was a proximate cause of the accident.

    <p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

    This case clarifies the boundary between a municipality’s proprietary and governmental functions in roadway safety cases. It emphasizes that a municipality must take appropriate action when aware of dangerous conditions, and that a cursory or inadequate study is not sufficient to claim qualified immunity. It establishes that failure to study the speeding problem adequately and implement proper traffic calming measures could establish liability. The court also clarifies that even if the direct cause of an accident is driver negligence, a municipality can still be liable if its negligence in roadway design contributed to the accident. This case emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to roadway safety, considering all relevant factors to determine if traffic calming measures are necessary. Attorneys should consider this case when evaluating the city’s response to complaints of hazardous road conditions and failure to employ proper traffic calming methods.

  • Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013): Distinguishing Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions in Municipal Liability

    Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013)

    When a municipality’s employee is negligent while performing an act integral to a proprietary function, such as road repair, the municipality can be held liable under ordinary negligence principles, even if the specific negligent act resembles a governmental function like traffic control.

    Summary

    Rhonda Wittorf sued the City of New York for injuries sustained while bicycling through a Central Park underpass. A Department of Transportation supervisor, Bowles, had told Wittorf it was “okay to go through,” despite knowing about dangerous depressions in the roadway. The jury found Bowles negligent, apportioning 60% fault to the City. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing Bowles was performing a governmental function (traffic control) and thus immune from liability. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Bowles’s actions were integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Facts

    On November 5, 2005, DOT supervisor Donald Bowles and his crew arrived at Central Park’s 65th Street transverse to repair roadway defects. Bowles closed the west entrance to vehicular traffic. Rhonda Wittorf and Brian Hoberman arrived on bicycles and asked if they could proceed. Bowles said it was “okay to go through.” While riding through an underpass, Wittorf encountered a depression, attempted to avoid it, hit another, and fell, sustaining injuries. The roadway was dark and the depressions were difficult to see.

    Procedural History

    Wittorf sued the City of New York. The jury found the roadway unsafe but also that the City lacked prior written notice of the condition. It also found that the City did not cause or create the condition by an affirmative act of negligence. However, the jury found Bowles negligent and apportioned fault. The Supreme Court granted the City’s motion to set aside the verdict, finding Bowles was performing a governmental function. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted plaintiff leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York was engaged in a proprietary function when its Department of Transportation supervisor, in preparation for roadway repairs, told a bicyclist it was “okay to go through” a closed roadway containing dangerous conditions, such that the City can be held liable for the supervisor’s negligence under ordinary negligence principles.

    Holding

    Yes, because the supervisor’s action was integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the governmental/proprietary function test outlined in Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., noting that a municipality is subject to ordinary negligence rules when engaged in a proprietary function, defined as activities that “essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises.” The Court distinguished governmental functions as those undertaken for public safety under general police powers. Historically, road maintenance has been performed by both private entities and local governments and is therefore typically a proprietary function. The court cited precedents establishing a municipality’s duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition and to provide adequate warnings of hazards. While prior written notice laws can limit liability, the nature of the function remains proprietary when performed by highway maintenance personnel. The Court distinguished Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., where police traffic control at an accident scene was deemed governmental. In Balsam, there was no proprietary duty to maintain the property. Here, Bowles’s actions were directly connected to the impending road repair, a proprietary function. The court emphasized that Bowles’ act of closing the entry to vehicular travel was integral to the repair job. Therefore, the jury could assess the City’s conduct under ordinary negligence rules. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to consider the weight of the evidence.

  • Karedes v. Colella, 100 N.Y.2d 45 (2003): Enforceability of Municipal Contracts and the Proprietary Function Exception

    Karedes v. Colella, 100 N.Y.2d 45 (2003)

    A municipality may enter into contracts that bind successor boards when acting in its proprietary capacity, such as operating a business enterprise for revenue generation, as opposed to performing a governmental function.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a village’s contract with a golf club manager was enforceable against successor village boards. The Village of Endicott contracted with Karedes to manage its golf club, a revenue-generating facility. A subsequent mayor refused to sign a contract extension, arguing it improperly bound future boards. The Court of Appeals held that because the village operated the golf club in a proprietary capacity, akin to a private business, the contract was enforceable and not subject to the term limits doctrine that restricts a municipal body from binding its successors in matters of governance. The key determination was whether the Village was acting as a business or performing a traditional government function.

    Facts

    The Village of Endicott owned and operated the EnJoie Golf Club, which included an 18-hole golf course, pro shop, and restaurant. The Club hosted the B.C. Open, a PGA tour event, and the Village leased portions of the Club to third parties for rent.
    John Karedes was initially hired by the Village Board of Trustees in 1996 as an independent contractor to manage the Club. His responsibilities included personnel matters, budget preparation, and facility maintenance. His initial contract was for one year, later renewed for three years. In 2000, the Board approved a four-year extension to Karedes’s contract, which significantly increased his compensation. The new mayor, Michael Colella, refused to sign the agreement, deeming it contrary to taxpayers’ interests.

    Procedural History

    Karedes initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to compel the mayor to execute the contract and to validate the agreement. The Village and Colella moved to dismiss, arguing the proceeding was time-barred and the contract was impermissibly binding on future boards. Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus claim as time-barred but declared the contract valid and enforceable. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the mandamus petition but modified the order, declaring Karedes’s contract void, reasoning the contract curtailed the discretionary power of future boards. Karedes appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the term limits doctrine prohibits enforcement of the Village’s four-year contract with Karedes.
    2. Whether Karedes’s request for declaratory relief is barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Village was acting in its proprietary capacity when contracting with Karedes, the term limits doctrine does not apply.

    2. No, because the substance of Karedes’s declaratory judgment claim was for contract validation, the claim is governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term limits rule generally prevents a municipal body from contractually binding its successors in areas relating to governance, unless authorized by statute or charter. However, this rule does not apply when a municipality acts in a proprietary capacity, behaving like a private business. Proprietary functions supplement traditionally private enterprises.
    Here, the Village operated the golf club to generate revenue, substituting itself for a private enterprise. The Court emphasized that the Village did not identify any public purpose for owning the Club. The Court distinguished this case from others where a municipality was performing a governmental function.
    The Court stated: “By its purchase of the Club, the Village effectively substituted itself for what is traditionally a private enterprise”.
    Regarding the statute of limitations, the Court held that Karedes’s claim was essentially a contract validation claim, subject to a six-year statute of limitations, making the action timely.

  • Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994): Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions and Proximate Cause in Negligence

    Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 84 N.Y.2d 324 (1994)

    A governmental entity is immune from liability for negligence claims when its actions are overwhelmingly governmental in nature, and a plaintiff must establish proximate cause between the alleged negligence and the injury.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was attacked in a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. She sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence in storing construction materials (a metal plate) that allowed her assailant to hide and in failing to close the tunnel despite a history of crime. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting summary judgment to the MTA. The court held that the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental, thus shielding it from liability. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries. This case highlights the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions and the importance of establishing proximate cause in negligence claims against governmental entities.

    Facts

    On March 20, 1991, the plaintiff was attacked while walking through a subway tunnel undergoing renovations. The assailant dragged her behind a large metal plate that was temporarily placed against the tunnel wall. The tunnel had a history of violent felonies, including two prior rapes. Eight months before the attack, the local community board had recommended closing the tunnel to the MTA.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), alleging negligence. The lower courts allowed the case to proceed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, granted the MTA’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the MTA’s actions in maintaining the subway tunnel constituted a governmental function, thereby shielding it from liability for negligence.
    2. Whether the plaintiff established that the placement of the metal plate was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because the MTA’s actions were overwhelmingly governmental in nature, placing the source of asserted liability well toward the “governmental function” end of the Miller continuum.
    2. No, because the plaintiff’s claim was speculative, and she failed to establish that the location of the metal plate, rather than the general lack of security, was the proximate cause of her injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined that the MTA’s actions fell under a governmental function, providing immunity from liability. The court applied the governmental/proprietary function test established in Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175. Citing Miller v. State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 511-512, the court noted the “continuum of responsibility” from proprietary acts to governmental functions, like “the maintenance of general police and fire protection.” The court found the MTA’s actions to be overwhelmingly governmental because the failure to close the tunnel or properly police it were governmental decisions. Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause. The court highlighted prior instances of violent felonies in the tunnel even without the presence of negligently placed construction materials. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was speculative on the issue of causation, requiring dismissal as a matter of law. The court referenced Matter of Crichlow v New York City Tr. Auth., 184 AD2d 395 and Khodai v New York City Tr. Auth., 176 AD2d 524 to support this conclusion. The court emphasized that “plaintiffs claim is so speculative on the issue of causation as to mandate dismissal as a matter of law”. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • duties owed to teachers

    [73 N.Y.2d 931, 537 N.E.2d 617, 539 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1989)]

    A school’s provision of security against attacks by third parties is a governmental function, and liability for negligence in performing that function requires a special duty of protection to the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A teacher injured by an intruder in a schoolyard sued the Board of Education, alleging negligence in security. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the teacher, holding that providing security is a governmental function, not a proprietary one. Because the teacher failed to demonstrate a special duty owed to him by the Board of Education, the Board was not liable for negligence. The court emphasized that the teacher’s role in securing the gate was part of the school’s overall security system.

    Facts

    A New York City public school teacher, along with other teachers, was assigned to supervise a school playground. The playground, enclosed by a chain-link fence, had two gates. The teacher locked one gate but had to stand guard at the other because it was broken. He then broke up a fight and forcibly escorted one of the non-student participants out of the playground. The student returned with a baseball bat and injured the teacher.

    Procedural History

    The teacher sued the Board of Education, alleging negligence in security. A jury returned a verdict for the teacher, finding him 50% responsible, and awarded damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment for the teacher. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education’s alleged negligence in providing security at the school playground constituted a proprietary function, for which the Board could be held liable, or a governmental function, which would require a showing of a special duty owed to the teacher.

    Holding

    No, because providing security against physical attacks by third parties is a governmental function involving policymaking, and no liability arises absent a special duty of protection. The teacher failed to establish that the Board of Education had assumed a special duty to him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the teacher’s claim was based on the inadequacy of the school’s security system, which is a governmental function. The court cited prior cases establishing that providing security against third-party attacks is a governmental function involving policymaking, and liability requires a special duty of protection. The court distinguished this case from situations involving proprietary functions, such as failure to repair steps. The court stated that the teacher’s station at the gate was part of the security system: “plaintiff’s own testimony established that his station at the schoolyard’s north gate was in accordance with prior instruction, for the security of the school children, when the gate could not be locked.” The court likened the situation to a failure to maintain a key control system, which would also be considered a governmental function related to overall security. The court emphasized it was deciding the case solely on the terms presented regarding governmental and proprietary functions.

  • Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay, 24 N.Y.2d 309 (1969): Utility’s Duty to Relocate Facilities at Own Expense

    Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay, 24 N.Y.2d 309 (1969)

    A utility company must relocate its facilities at its own expense when a municipality condemns land for a governmental function, such as urban renewal or building a public school, unless the legislature expressly directs otherwise.

    Summary

    Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) sought compensation from New York City for the costs of relocating its pipes and mains after the city condemned land for an urban renewal project and a public school. The Court of Appeals held that Con Ed was not entitled to compensation. The court reasoned that the common-law rule requires utility companies to relocate their facilities at their own expense when necessitated by governmental functions. The court distinguished this case from situations where the city acts in a proprietary capacity, reaffirming that slum clearance and school construction are governmental functions.

    Facts

    New York City condemned land in lower Manhattan for the Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Plan and another parcel in the Bronx to build Public School 161. These condemnations required Con Ed to remove and relocate its subsurface infrastructure (pipes, mains, conduits) from the affected streets. The city did not offer compensation to Con Ed for these relocation expenses, citing the common-law rule that utilities bear the cost of relocating facilities in public rights-of-way when required for public projects.

    Procedural History

    In the urban renewal case (Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v. Lindsay), Con Ed initiated an Article 78 proceeding to compel the city to compensate it for relocation costs; Special Term granted Con Ed’s petition, which the Appellate Division affirmed. In the school construction case (Matter of City of New York [Public School 161]), the city sought an order compelling Con Ed to relocate its facilities at its own expense, which Special Term granted; the Appellate Division reversed. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals and were consolidated for review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a utility company is entitled to compensation from a municipality when the municipality condemns land for a governmental function, thereby requiring the utility to relocate its facilities.

    Holding

    1. No, because the common-law rule dictates that utility companies must bear the cost of relocating their facilities when required by governmental functions, such as urban renewal and school construction, unless the legislature expressly directs otherwise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the common-law rule, stating, “utility companies, which have been granted the ‘privilege’ of laying their pipes and mains in the public streets…must relocate them at their own expense ‘whenever the public health, safety or convenience requires the change to be made.’” The Court emphasized that departures from this rule are recognized “only ‘when the change is required in behalf of other public service corporations or in behalf of municipalities exercising a proprietary instead of a governmental function.’” The court determined that urban renewal and the construction of public schools constitute governmental functions. Distinguishing Matter of City of New York (Gillen Place), 304 N.Y. 215, the court clarified that Gillen Place applied only when the city acted in a proprietary capacity. The court noted that the city was not attempting to appropriate Con Ed’s pipes for its own use, but simply compelling relocation. The court stated that statutory definitions of “real property” do not override the common-law rule. “The burden and expense traditionally imposed on the public utility to remove and relocate its property may not be transferred to the taxpayer absent ‘express direction of the Legislature.’”