New York Law Review

Tag: property law

  • Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012): Conveyance of Land Bordering Water Includes Submerged Land Absent Clear Intent Otherwise

    Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012)

    A conveyance of land on a pond or stream includes the land under the pond or stream to the center of the water, unless a contrary intention is made clear in the deed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the question of whether a deed conveying waterfront property also conveys the land under the adjacent water. The plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the submerged land under Perch Pond adjacent to the defendant’s property. The dispute arose from the interpretation of two 1973 deeds. The Court of Appeals held that the conveyance of land along the edge of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, unless the deed contains a clear expression to the contrary. The Court emphasized the importance of clear and express language to reserve rights to underwater land, clarifying that using terms like “edge” or “shore” is insufficient.

    Facts

    The defendants owned land on the shore of Perch Pond. Plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the land under the pond adjacent to the defendants’ waterfront land, thus disputing the rights to use that part of the pond. The Furlanos previously owned both the waterfront and submerged land. In 1973, the Furlanos conveyed land “along the waters [sic] edge of Perch Pond” and “along the edge of Perch Pond” to the defendants’ predecessors in title. In 1993, the Furlanos conveyed their remaining waterfront property to the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, including “all remaining lands of Grantors.” The plaintiffs argued the 1973 deeds only conveyed the land next to the water, not under it, and therefore the submerged land passed to them via the 1993 deed.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the defendants from using the underwater property. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the 1973 deeds set the boundaries at the “edge” of the pond, touching the land but not the water. The Court of Appeals granted defendants leave to appeal, bringing up for review the Appellate Division’s earlier order on summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a deed conveying land “along the edge” of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, absent an express reservation of rights to the underwater land in the deed.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York law presumes that a conveyance of land on a pond includes the land under the pond to the center of the water unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York law and policy considerations to support its holding. The court cited precedent, including Gouverneur v National Ice Co., Seneca Nation v Knight, Stewart v Turney, and White v Knickerbocker Ice Co., to highlight the longstanding rule that a purchase of waterfront property is presumed to include the adjacent underwater land. The Court emphasized that the value of small, non-navigable lakes and ponds is mainly in their relation to the adjacent lands, supporting the presumption that a grantor intends to convey ownership under the water. The Court stated, “If the grantor desires to retain his title to the land . . . underneath the water the presumption must be negatived by express words or by such a description as clearly excludes it from the land conveyed.”

    The Court addressed inconsistent dictum in prior cases that suggested small changes in the words of a deed could create a reservation of underwater rights. The Court explicitly rejected these dictums, stating that “The effect of a grant should not turn on such fine distinctions as that between ‘side’ and ‘edge.’” To make a plain and express reservation of rights to underwater land, a grantor must do more than use the word “edge” or “shore” in a deed; they must clearly state that the land under water is not conveyed. The Court found no intention to withhold underwater lands in the Furlanos’ 1973 conveyance. Therefore, the deeds were read as conveying such land to the center of the pond to the defendants’ predecessors.

  • Bloomingdales, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 13 N.Y.3d 65 (2009): Statute of Limitations for Continuing Trespass and Nuisance Claims

    Bloomingdales, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 13 N.Y.3d 65 (2009)

    When a trespass or nuisance is continuous, resulting in successive causes of action, the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the initial act but accrues as long as the trespass or nuisance persists, until it ripens into a prescriptive right.

    Summary

    Bloomingdales sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for trespass and nuisance after a contractor, Janus Industries, cut Bloomingdales’ drainpipe during excavation and installed a conduit in its place, causing flooding. The NYCTA argued the suit was time-barred under Public Authorities Law § 1212 and General Municipal Law § 50-i, as it was filed more than one year and 90 days after the drainpipe was severed. The Court of Appeals held that the placement of the conduit constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance, meaning the statute of limitations had not yet run, as the damages stemmed from the ongoing encroachment, not solely from the initial severance of the pipe.

    Facts

    In September 1999, Janus Industries, working on a NYCTA project, cut Bloomingdales’ drainpipe, mistakenly believing it to be a “dead” water main. Janus installed a concrete-encased conduit in its place. Bloomingdales experienced flooding and, in February 2002, discovered the cut drainpipe and the conduit. Bloomingdales then installed a new drainpipe above the conduit at a cost exceeding $165,000.

    Procedural History

    Bloomingdales sued the NYCTA in January 2003, alleging negligence, trespass, and nuisance. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the NYCTA and third-party defendants, dismissing the complaint based on the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the trespass and nuisance claims, holding it was a continuing tort. The NYCTA appealed, and the Appellate Division certified the question of whether its order was properly made to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the placement of a concrete conduit in place of a severed drainpipe constitutes a continuing trespass and nuisance, such that the statute of limitations for those claims begins to run from the cessation of the encroachment, rather than the initial act of severing the pipe?

    Holding

    Yes, because the placement of the concrete conduit interfering with Bloomingdales’ access to its drainpipe constitutes a continuous trespass and nuisance, giving rise to successive causes of action for which the statute of limitations had not yet run.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Public Authorities Law § 1212 (2) and General Municipal Law § 50-i require actions for property damage to be commenced within one year and 90 days after the event, this period does not apply to continuous trespasses or nuisances. Citing 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., the Court emphasized that a trespass that unlawfully encroaches on a plaintiff’s property is considered a continuous trespass, giving rise to successive causes of action. The statute of limitations only bars suits after the time required to create an easement by prescription or change of title. Here, the conduit’s presence interfered with Bloomingdales’ access to its drainpipe and the city sewer, forcing the installation of a new pipe. The Court stated that “[t]hus, for purposes of the statute of limitations, suits will only be time-barred by the expiration of such time as would create an easement by prescription or change of title by operation of law.” The Court found the actual damages arose from the need to install a new drainpipe in a different location due to the conduit. The Court considered the nuisance claim another way of characterizing the trespass, subject to the same statute of limitations analysis. Thus, the Appellate Division’s order was affirmed.

  • Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228 (2006): Adverse Possession Claim Not Defeated by Knowledge of True Owner

    Walling v. Przybylo, 7 N.Y.3d 228 (2006)

    An adverse possession claim is not automatically defeated simply because the adverse possessor knows that someone else holds legal title to the property.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an adverse possession claim can succeed even if the adverse possessor knows that another party holds legal title to the land. The Wallings sued to quiet title, claiming adverse possession of a strip of land on the border of their property with the Przybylos. The Wallings had openly and continuously maintained the land for over ten years, treating it as their own. The Przybylos argued that the Wallings’ knowledge of their ownership defeated the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating that the Wallings’ actions demonstrating a claim of right were sufficient, despite their knowledge of the Przybylos’ title. This case clarifies that actions demonstrating a claim of right prevail over mere knowledge in adverse possession claims.

    Facts

    The Wallings purchased lot 22 in 1986. The Przybylos purchased adjacent lot 23 in 1989 but did not move in until 1994. Starting in 1987, the Wallings bulldozed, deposited fill, and topsoil on a portion of the Przybylos’ lot. They installed a PVC pipe to carry water onto the disputed parcel and constructed an underground dog fence. The Wallings continuously mowed, graded, raked, planted, and watered the disputed grassy area. In 1992, they erected a post with a birdhouse on the land. In 2004, a survey revealed the disputed land belonged to the Przybylos, prompting the Wallings to file a quiet title action.

    Procedural History

    The Warren County Court initially granted summary judgment to the Wallings, quieting title in their favor. The court then modified its decision, denying summary judgment based on new evidence suggesting the Wallings knew the true owners before making improvements. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Wallings, holding that knowledge of legal title does not defeat an adverse possession claim. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adverse possession claim fails as a matter of law when the adverse possessor has actual knowledge of the true owner’s legal title at the time of possession.

    Holding

    No, because an adverse possessor’s actions demonstrating a claim of right can establish adverse possession even if the possessor knows of another’s legal title; conduct prevails over mere knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to establish adverse possession, possession must be: (1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) continuous for the statutory period (at least 10 years in this case). The court found that the Wallings possessed the disputed parcel openly, notoriously, and continuously for 20 years, hostile to the Przybylos’ interests. The court stated, “The ultimate element in the rise of a title through adverse possession is the acquiescence of the real owner in the exercise of an obvious adverse or hostile ownership through the statutory period.” The Przybylos failed to assert their rights for nearly 10 years after moving in and almost 15 years after purchasing the property. The court clarified that while a claim of right is adverse to the title owner, longstanding precedent dictates that knowledge of the true owner does not automatically defeat the claim. The court distinguished Van Valkenburgh v Lutz, noting that any inconsistent language in that case was non-binding dictum and did not overturn the established principle that conduct prevails over knowledge. The court quoted Humbert v Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of Trinity Church: “Possession by the defendant with a claim of title for twenty years, can no more be answered by averring that he knew he was wrong…”

  • Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443 (1998): Landowner’s Right to Relocate an Easement

    Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443 (1998)

    A landowner burdened by an express easement of ingress and egress may relocate it, without the easement holder’s consent, so long as the easement holder’s right of access and ingress is not impaired.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a landowner can relocate an easement holder’s right of way without consent. The New York Court of Appeals held that a landowner can relocate a right of way for ingress and egress, provided the easement holder’s right of passage is not impaired. Roger Lewis sued Neda Young, seeking to compel her to restore a driveway to its original location. The court reversed the lower court’s order to restore the driveway and remitted the case to the trial court to determine factual issues about impairment of the easement.

    Facts

    Roger Lewis and Neda Young owned adjacent parcels originally owned by the Browns. In 1956, the Browns divided their land, granting easements to the parcels sold, as they lacked direct road access. The Jaffe deed (later acquired by Lewis) included a right of way over the Brown’s driveway. Young purchased the Brown property in 1990, planning renovations that included a tennis court partially situated on the existing driveway. Young relocated the driveway, and Lewis objected, leading to the lawsuit.

    Procedural History

    Lewis sued Young seeking a declaration of rights and an injunction to restore the original driveway. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Lewis, ordering Young to restore the driveway. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the easement’s location was fixed by 37 years of use. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner, absent explicit prohibition in the easement agreement, can relocate an easement holder’s right of way over the burdened premises without the easement holder’s consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because in the absence of a demonstrated intent to provide otherwise, a landowner can move a right of way for ingress and egress, as long as the change does not frustrate the parties’ intent, increase the burden on the easement holder, or significantly lessen the utility of the right of way.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that express easements are defined by the parties’ intent. When an easement grants only ingress and egress, it’s the *right of passage*, not the physical passageway itself, that is granted. Quoting Grafton v. Moir, 130 NY 465, 472, the court stated that “‘A right of way along a private road belonging to another person does not give the [easement holder] a right that the road shall be in no respect altered or the width decreased, for his right * * * is merely a right to pass with the convenience to which he has been accustomed.’” Therefore, landowners can narrow, cover, gate, or fence off easements, so long as the easement holder’s passage is not impaired. The court established a balancing test: landowners can relocate a right of way if they bear the relocation expense and the change doesn’t frustrate the easement’s purpose, increase the burden, or lessen its utility. The court found no intent in the original deed to deny the landowner’s right to relocate the driveway. The indefinite description of the right of way suggested an allowance for relocation. The court remitted the case to determine if the relocation impaired Lewis’s right of ingress and egress.

  • Morrison v. Piper, 77 N.Y.2d 165 (1991): Right of First Refusal and the Rule Against Remote Vesting

    77 N.Y.2d 165 (1991)

    A right of first refusal in a deed conveying residential property is subject to the rule against remote vesting (EPTL 9-1.1[b]), but the presumption is that the creator intended the estate to be valid; therefore, courts should construe the instrument to avoid violating the rule if possible.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a right of first refusal created in a deed between private parties violates New York’s rule against remote vesting. The Court of Appeals held that the rule generally applies to such rights, but that the specific right in this case did not violate the rule. The deed created mutual rights of first refusal between an aunt and nephew for adjacent residential parcels. The court emphasized that the right was explicitly limited to the lifetimes of the original parties, and subsequent language further restricted who could exercise the right. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision, stressing the presumption that the grantor intended a valid conveyance.

    Facts

    Lilian Maier conveyed a 2.3-acre parcel to her nephew, Robert Morrison, in 1977, retaining a contiguous 30-acre parcel. The deed created mutual rights of first refusal: Maier had the right to match any offer for Morrison’s land, and Morrison had the right to match any offer for Maier’s land. These rights were intended to bind the parties, their heirs, and assigns, but only during the life of the other party and those who directly took by gift or inheritance, continuing until the donees or beneficiaries conveyed the property or died. In 1979, Maier died, leaving her property to her sisters. In 1987, Owens and Whelehan (two of Maier’s sisters) received an offer from the Pipers to purchase their land. Morrison was not given the opportunity to exercise his right of first refusal, and the property was sold to the Pipers.

    Procedural History

    Morrison sued to enforce his right of first refusal. The Supreme Court denied Morrison’s summary judgment motion, holding that the preemptive right violated EPTL 9-1.1(b). The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the defendants, agreeing that the right contravened the rule against remote vesting. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s rule against remote vesting (EPTL 9-1.1[b]) applies to a right of first refusal created in a deed conveying noncommercial, residential property between private parties.

    Whether the specific right of first refusal in this case violates the rule against remote vesting.

    Holding

    Yes, the rule against remote vesting generally applies to such rights because the holder of a right of first refusal has an interest in land that vests, if at all, in the future.

    No, the specific right in this case does not violate the rule because the deed limited the rights to the lives of the original grantor and grantee, and the court must presume that the grantor intended the estate to be valid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that while a right of first refusal differs from an option, both involve future interests in land that could vest beyond the permissible period. However, the Court distinguished this case from *Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp.*, where it held that the rule against remote vesting did not apply to preemptive rights in a commercial context. The court emphasized that the *Bruken* exception was limited to commercial and governmental transactions serving a public interest, unlike the private residential transaction here. Because the parties to this transaction are individuals, the time limitations in EPTL 9-1.1(b) are relevant.

    Regarding the validity of the specific right, the Court noted EPTL 9-1.3(a), which directs that unless a contrary intention appears, it shall be presumed that the creator intended the estate to be valid. The Court interpreted the language of the deed as creating a right of first refusal limited to the lives of Morrison and Maier, with subsequent clauses merely restricting who could exercise that right to direct donees or beneficiaries. The Court reasoned that reading the deed as a whole demonstrated an intent to narrowly circumscribe the group of people permitted to exercise the right. By adopting the construction urged by defendants, the courts below did exactly what the statutory presumption was designed to prevent. The Court stated that “an instrument should not be interpreted as violating the rule against remote vesting ‘unless (it) shows beyond mistake that such was the intent.’” Given that the conveyance was between an aunt and nephew for adjacent property, the Court found it reasonable to limit exercise of the right to immediate family members. Therefore, the Court reversed, finding that the right of first refusal did not violate EPTL 9-1.1(b).

  • Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989): Extinguishment of Easement by Adverse Possession

    Spiegel v. Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622 (1989)

    An easement, once definitively located and developed through use, can be extinguished by adverse possession without a prior demand for the removal of obstructions, provided the adverse use is exclusive, open, notoriously hostile, and continuous for the prescriptive period.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extinguishment of a granted easement by adverse possession. Spiegel sued to enjoin Ferraro’s tenant, Ernie’s Auto Body (Ernie’s), from obstructing an easement on Ferraro’s property that benefitted Spiegel’s land. Ernie’s had fenced off and used the easement for parking wrecked cars for over ten years. The Court of Appeals held that Ernie’s adverse use of the easement, which was open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than ten years, extinguished the easement, even without a prior demand from Spiegel to remove the obstructions. The Court distinguished easements definitively located and used from ‘paper’ easements, where a demand might be required.

    Facts

    In 1954, the Masone brothers sold a parcel of land with a non-exclusive easement for access to Broadway. In 1970, Jerry Spiegel acquired this parcel along with the easement. In 1964, Frank Boni and Michael Pavone bought the servient parcel and later sold it to Nicholas and Stephan Ferraro in 1982. In 1966, Boni and Pavone leased the servient premises to Ernie’s Auto Body, Inc. Ernie’s erected gates, regraded and paved the easement, installed lights, used guard dogs, and parked wrecked cars on the easement, effectively blocking Spiegel’s access. Spiegel did not use the easement after Ernie’s tenancy began.

    Procedural History

    In 1977, Spiegel demanded Ernie’s remove the obstructions. In 1982, Spiegel sued to enjoin Ernie’s from obstructing the easement. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding the easement extinguished by Ernie’s adverse possession. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the prescriptive period did not begin to run until Spiegel demanded the easement be opened in 1977. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an easement that has been definitively located and developed through use must have a demand for removal of obstructions before it may be extinguished by adverse possession?

    Holding

    No, because where an easement has been definitively located and developed through use, there is no requirement that its owner demand the removal of obstructions blocking the easement before it may be extinguished by adverse possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an easement created by grant can be extinguished by adverse possession if the use is adverse, under a claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for 10 years. The court distinguished this case from situations involving “paper” easements (easements not definitively located or used), where a demand to open the easement might be required before adverse possession can begin. Here, the easement was definitively located and had been used prior to Ernie’s obstruction. Ernie’s actions (erecting gates, parking cars, etc.) were sufficient to put Spiegel on notice of the adverse claim. The court emphasized that Ernie’s exclusive use of the easement, affirmed by lower courts and supported by the record, demonstrated a claim of right that was open and notoriously adverse to Spiegel’s interest for over 10 years. The court stated that “an easement may be lost by adverse possession if the owner or possessor of the servient estate claims to own it free from the private right of another, and excludes the owner of the easement, who acquiesces in the exclusion for [the prescriptive period]”. Finally, the Court stated that Ernie’s use of the easement was not an assertion of an interest hostile to its landlord. By statute such a use could not be deemed adverse (see, RPAPL 531). Rather, Ernie’s use is adverse only to plaintiff and that use satisfied the requirements of adverse possession and operated to extinguish that easement.

  • Seaview Association of Homeowners, Inc. v. Williams, 69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987): Implied Contract to Pay Homeowners’ Association Fees

    Seaview Association of Homeowners, Inc. v. Williams, 69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987)

    When a purchaser buys property in a community knowing that a homeowners’ association provides services and facilities, the purchase can create an implied-in-fact contract obligating the purchaser to pay a proportionate share of the association’s costs, regardless of actual usage.

    Summary

    The Seaview Association of Homeowners sued the Williams family to recover unpaid assessments for community services. The Williamses owned seven houses in Seaview, a private Fire Island community, but refused to pay assessments, arguing they were not association members and did not use the recreational facilities. The trial court found an implied contract existed based on the Williamses’ knowledge of community conditions when purchasing the properties. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that purchasing property with knowledge of the association’s services can manifest acceptance of the obligation to pay for those services, creating an implied-in-fact contract.

    Facts

    The Seaview Association of Homeowners maintained streets, walkways, beaches, and provided various community services in Seaview, Fire Island. The Association assessed property owners to cover these costs. The Williams family owned seven houses in Seaview and had lived in the adjoining community before purchasing their first house in Seaview in 1963. Two of the three family members were in the real estate business. They refused to pay the homeowners’ assessments, claiming they were not members of the association and did not use the recreational facilities. The Association then sued to recover assessments from 1976-1984.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of the Seaview Association of Homeowners, finding an implied contract existed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision based on the trial court’s reasoning, with one Justice dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the purchase of property in a private community with knowledge that a homeowners’ association provides services and facilities for the benefit of residents constitutes an implied-in-fact contract to pay a proportionate share of the association’s costs.

    Holding

    Yes, because where there is knowledge that a private community homeowners’ association provides facilities and services for the benefit of community residents, the purchase of property there may manifest acceptance of conditions of ownership, among them payment for the facilities and services offered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an implied-in-fact contract arises when a purchaser buys property knowing that a homeowners’ association provides services and facilities. This knowledge manifests acceptance of the conditions of ownership, including the obligation to pay for those services. The obligation extends to a proportionate share of the full cost of maintaining the facilities and services, not just the reasonable value of those actually used by the resident. The court emphasized the factual nature of the issues regarding notice and knowledge. They deferred to the lower courts’ findings that the Williamses knew the nature of the Seaview community and impliedly accepted the conditions of ownership through their purchases, particularly their successive purchases. The court stated: “Where there is knowledge that a private community homeowners’ association provides facilities and services for the benefit of community residents, the purchase of property there may manifest acceptance of conditions of ownership, among them payment for the facilities and services offered.” Because the issues of notice and knowledge were factual and had been affirmed by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals found the issue beyond their review. The court cited Sea Gate Assn. v Fleischer as precedent.

  • Seaview Assn. v. Williams, 69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987): Implied Contract to Pay Homeowners’ Association Fees

    69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987)

    When a purchaser knows that a homeowners’ association provides facilities and services for the benefit of community residents, buying property there can be seen as accepting the conditions of ownership, including paying for the services.

    Summary

    The Seaview Association, a homeowners’ association, sued the Williams family to recover unpaid assessments for community services. The Williams family owned multiple properties in the Seaview community but refused to pay assessments, arguing they were non-members and didn’t use the recreational facilities. The trial court found an implied contract existed based on the Williams’ knowledge of the community’s nature when they purchased the properties. The appellate court affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that purchasing property in a community with known homeowners’ association services implies acceptance of the obligation to pay for those services.

    Facts

    The Seaview Association of Fire Island owns and maintains streets, walkways, beaches, and various facilities in the Seaview community. They also provide services like a community manager and a rent-free home for a doctor. Property owners are assessed a share of the annual costs. The Williams family owned seven houses in Seaview and had lived in the adjoining community prior to purchasing their first house in 1963. They refused to pay assessments, claiming they were not members of the Association and did not use the recreational facilities. Two of the three defendants were in the real estate business and were among only five year-round residents.

    Procedural History

    The Seaview Association sued the Williams family to recover unpaid assessments from 1976-1984. The trial court ruled in favor of the Association, finding an implied contract existed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the purchase of property in a community with a known homeowners’ association providing services and facilities implies an acceptance of the conditions of ownership, including the obligation to pay assessments for those services.

    Holding

    Yes, because where there is knowledge that a private community homeowners’ association provides facilities and services for the benefit of community residents, the purchase of property there may manifest acceptance of conditions of ownership, among them payment for the facilities and services offered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Williams family’s knowledge of the Seaview community and its homeowners’ association, combined with their purchase of multiple properties, implied an acceptance of the conditions of ownership, including paying assessments. The court stated, “Where there is knowledge that a private community homeowners’ association provides facilities and services for the benefit of community residents, the purchase of property there may manifest acceptance of conditions of ownership, among them payment for the facilities and services offered.” The court emphasized that the issue of notice and knowledge were largely factual and were the focus of the trial court. The Court found that the trial court had sufficient evidence to determine that the Williams family knew the nature of the community. The court also cited Sea Gate Assn. v Fleischer, stating the implied contract includes obligation to pay a proportionate share of the full cost of maintaining facilities, not merely the reasonable value of those actually used.

  • Myers v. Key Bank, 68 N.Y.2d 744 (1986): Establishing Presumption of Deed Delivery Through Recording

    Myers v. Key Bank, 68 N.Y.2d 744 (1986)

    Recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery and thus valid transfer of ownership, which must be overcome by sufficient evidence to the contrary.

    Summary

    This case addresses the presumption of deed delivery when a deed is recorded. Key Bank sought to enforce a lien on property owned by Myers based on a judgment against Dolores Clark, who had guaranteed a loan. Myers had purchased the property from Clark, who had received the property via a deed from her deceased husband. Myers argued the deed to Clark was never delivered, making it void and thus preventing Key Bank’s lien from attaching. The court held that the recording of the deed created a presumption of delivery and ownership in favor of Clark, and Myers failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.

    Facts

    Dolores Clark guaranteed a loan from Key Bank to 340 Main Street Corp.
    Clark had previously included the subject property in a list of her assets provided to Key Bank as part of the loan application.
    A title search would have revealed a recorded deed transferring the property from her deceased husband, Robert Clark, to her.
    Myers purchased the property from Clark in her capacity as executrix of her husband’s estate.
    Key Bank initiated procedures to enforce a lien on the property to satisfy a default judgment against Clark.

    Procedural History

    Myers and Dime Savings Bank brought a proceeding against Key Bank pursuant to CPLR 5239 to determine the parties’ rights in the property.
    The lower courts ruled in favor of Key Bank, upholding the validity of the lien.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by Myers was sufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed to Dolores Clark resulting from its recording, and thus invalidate Key Bank’s lien on the property.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence submitted by Myers was insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed and Dolores Clark’s record ownership of the subject property resulting from the recording of the deed to her from Robert Clark.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the established legal principle that recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery. The court cited Sweetland v Buell, 164 NY 541, 552 and Rametta v Kazlo, 68 AD2d 579, 581, affirming this principle.
    The Court stated, “The evidence submitted by petitioners is insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery of the deed and Dolores Clark’s record ownership of the subject property resulting from the recording of the deed to her from Robert Clark… together with her other conduct with respect to the property.”
    The court highlighted that along with the recorded deed, Dolores Clark acted as if she owned the property. She included the property as an asset on her loan application. This further supported the presumption of delivery.
    Since Myers failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption, the court upheld the validity of the deed to Clark. As a result, Key Bank’s lien against Clark was valid and could be enforced against the property Myers purchased.
    This case reinforces the importance of properly challenging a recorded deed with sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of delivery. Absent such evidence, the recorded deed stands as proof of ownership.

  • Matter of Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v. Lord, 60 N.Y.2d 845 (1983): Enforceability of Stipulations Regarding Easement Valuation

    Matter of Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v. Lord, 60 N.Y.2d 845 (1983)

    A stipulation between parties regarding the facts of a case, especially concerning property rights like easements, is binding and conclusive, influencing the valuation of those rights even if certain aspects are undefined.

    Summary

    This case addresses the enforceability of a stipulation regarding an easement’s scope and its impact on valuation during a condemnation proceeding. The Ossining Urban Renewal Agency (OURA) condemned an easement owned by Pine Top. A prior stipulation conceded the easement provided Pine Top’s only access to a public road, including passage over state land. The Court of Appeals held that OURA was bound by its stipulation and that the easement’s valuation should reflect this access, even if the exact route across state land was undetermined. This highlights the importance of stipulations in defining the scope of property rights in legal proceedings.

    Facts

    Elissa Lord conveyed a 13.68-acre parcel to Pine Top, granting an easement for ingress and egress. This easement was stipulated to be Pine Top’s only access to a public road. The easement purported to cross Lord’s remaining 5.5-acre parcel and state-owned land to reach Snowden Avenue. The Ossining Urban Renewal Agency (OURA) condemned the easement. Previous litigation established that the easement over Lord’s land was extinguished. The commissioners of appraisal valued the easement as providing no access to a public road due to the uncertain nature of access over state land. The renewal agency stipulated that the easement granted Pine Top was inclusive of passage over State land and the litigation proceeded on that assumption.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled on the matter. That order was reinstated by the Court of Appeals in a prior decision: Matter of Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v Lord, 39 NY2d 628. The case was then remitted to the Supreme Court to remand to the commissioners of appraisal for further proceedings to properly value the easement. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed by the Court of Appeals, who then remitted the matter to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Ossining Urban Renewal Agency was bound by its stipulation that the condemned easement provided Pine Top with access to a public road, even if the easement included passage over state land and the exact location of access was undefined.

    Holding

    Yes, because the CPLR 3222 submission constituted a stipulation between the parties of the facts stated in the submission and was conclusive of such facts as between the parties to the proceeding. Having stipulated that the easement granted Pine Top was inclusive of passage over State land, the renewal agency was bound by its concession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that stipulations are binding agreements regarding the facts of a case. The court cited Mann v Simpson & Co., 286 NY 450, noting the stipulation was conclusive of such facts as between the parties to the proceeding. By stipulating that the easement provided Pine Top’s only access to a public road, including passage over state land, OURA was bound by that concession. The court stated, “Having stipulated that the easement granted Pine Top was inclusive of passage over State land and the litigation having proceeded on that assumption and having reserved no issue concerning the effect of so much of the easement as purported to authorize Pine Top to cross State land, the renewal agency was bound by its concession that the easement gave Pine Top access to a public road.” The court also cited Campbell v State of New York, 32 NY2d 952. The fact that the exact location of access over state land was undetermined was irrelevant because the stipulation conceded that the right existed. The possibility of the State later providing access did not negate the existing stipulated right. The court concluded it was error for the commissioners of appraisal to evaluate the condemned easement on the basis that it provided no right of passage over the State’s land. Whatever the nature of Pine Top’s right to cross the State’s land, the stipulation conceded that it had such a right. It was, therefore, entitled to damages calculated on the basis of that right.