New York Law Review

Tag: Property Damage

  • People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966): Intent Requirement for Criminal Mischief

    People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966)

    To be guilty of criminal mischief under Penal Law § 1433, a defendant must have intended to damage the property, or at least intended to damage property, not merely committed an intentional act that resulted in unintended damage.

    Summary

    Washington was adjudged a youthful offender for malicious mischief after a trash can thrown by his codefendant, Cannon, damaged a parked car. The evidence suggested Cannon intended to hit the car’s occupants, not the car itself. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Penal Law § 1433, concerning willful property damage, requires intent to damage property, not merely an intentional act resulting in unintended damage. The court also found insufficient evidence to establish Washington as an accomplice.

    Facts

    The complaining witness, Williams, stopped his car to let a passenger out. Washington, Cannon, and another man were nearby. Washington shouted an epithet at Williams and swung at Williams’ companion. Williams exited the car on the other side. Cannon threw a litter basket at Williams, but it hit Williams’ car, causing damage. Washington then threw a pipe at Williams, striking him, but nothing thrown by Washington struck the car.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York found Washington guilty of malicious mischief. The Appellate Term affirmed by a 2-1 vote. A dissenting Justice cited People v. Hackley, arguing that intent to injure a person is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Penal Law § 1433. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 1433, which penalizes a person who “unlawfully and wilfully destroys or injures any real or personal property of another,” requires proof that the defendant intended to damage the property, or whether it is sufficient to show that the defendant willed the act that caused the damage, even if the damage was not intended.
    2. Whether, given that Cannon threw the litter basket that damaged the car, there was sufficient evidence to find Washington an accomplice to the crime of damaging the automobile.

    Holding

    1. No, because in the context of § 1433, “wilfully” includes and requires the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.
    2. No, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “wilfully” in § 1433 requires intent to cause the damage, or at least an intent to damage property. The court noted the severe penalties associated with the statute, including a long term of imprisonment for damages exceeding $250 and liability for treble damages in a civil action. The court found it unlikely that the legislature intended such severe penalties for unintentional acts where the perpetrator intended to assault someone but missed and damaged property. The court stated, “In its context in section 1433 the word ‘wilfully’ would seem to include and require the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.” The court suggested that the appropriate remedy for unintentional damage in such a situation is a civil action for damages.

    Regarding Washington’s potential liability as an accomplice, the court stated that Washington could only be criminally liable if there was enough proof to justify finding him an accomplice. The court referenced People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating that accomplice liability requires showing that the defendant has taken a guilty part in the commission of the crime. However, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington, the court declined to definitively rule on the accomplice issue.

    Judges Scileppi and Keating concurred in the reversal, but solely on the ground that Cannon alone caused the damage and there was insufficient evidence to prove that Washington was Cannon’s accomplice. They explicitly stated their disapproval of the holding in People v. Hackley, indicating that if there had been sufficient proof of accomplice liability, they would have voted for affirmance, notwithstanding the Hackley decision.

  • Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 N.Y.2d 792 (1960): Establishing Standing to Challenge Zoning Ordinances

    Blumberg v. Feriola, 8 N.Y.2d 792 (1960)

    A party challenging a zoning ordinance must demonstrate a direct and substantial injury as a result of the ordinance to establish standing; a prior ruling on a variance does not automatically confer standing in a subsequent challenge to a related ordinance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standing requirement for challenging zoning ordinances. The plaintiffs, seeking to invalidate a city ordinance regarding a parking area adjacent to a supermarket, had previously been involved in a case concerning a zoning variance for the supermarket itself. The Court of Appeals held that the prior ruling on the variance did not automatically grant the plaintiffs standing in the current challenge to the parking ordinance. The court emphasized that to have standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate a direct and substantial injury, specifically, that their properties were materially damaged in pecuniary value by the ordinance. Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately prove such damage in the present case, the dissenting opinion argued that the lower court’s decision finding a lack of standing should be upheld.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, property owners near a supermarket, challenged a city ordinance relating to a parking area for the supermarket.
    An earlier proceeding (Matter of Blumberg v. Feriola) involved the same plaintiffs and a challenge to a zoning variance that allowed the supermarket to extend 21 feet into a restricted lot.
    The Appellate Division had reversed the Special Term’s decision in the prior proceeding, finding that the supermarket owner knew of the restriction when purchasing the property.
    The ordinance under review in this case specifically concerned the parking area adjacent to the supermarket.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially determined that the plaintiffs had not established they were damaged by the parking ordinance.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the plaintiffs’ standing was established in the earlier Article 78 proceeding.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order without opinion, leading to Justice Bergan’s dissenting opinion addressing the standing issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior ruling granting standing in a zoning variance case automatically confers standing in a subsequent case challenging a related, but distinct, zoning ordinance.
    Whether plaintiffs challenging a zoning ordinance must demonstrate direct and substantial injury (material damage in pecuniary value to their property) to establish standing.

    Holding

    No, because the issues and defendants in the prior zoning variance case were different from those in the current case regarding the parking ordinance; the prior ruling did not automatically confer standing to challenge the subsequent ordinance.
    Yes, because standing to challenge a zoning ordinance requires a showing that the property belonging to the plaintiffs was materially damaged in pecuniary value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting Justice Bergan argued that the Appellate Division erred in assuming that the prior Article 78 proceeding automatically conferred standing in the current action. He highlighted that the issues and parties involved were distinct. The prior case concerned a zoning variance for the supermarket building itself, whereas the current case focused on a separate ordinance regulating the parking area. The defendants also differed: the prior case involved the Zoning Board of Appeals, while the current case did not.

    Bergan cited established precedent (Isen Contr. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, Buckley v. Fasbender, Brechner v. Incorporated Vil. of Lake Success, and Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck) to support the principle that plaintiffs must demonstrate substantial property damage to challenge local legislative enactments. He quoted Brechner, which relied on Marcus, stating that “the interest necessary to sustain such an action arises only when the property belonging to plaintiffs was materially damaged in pecuniary value”.

    Bergan emphasized that proving damage from the construction of a shopping center is different from proving damage specifically from the adjacent parking lot, which the ordinance permitted. He concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the requisite damage and should not be relieved of the need to prove it in this action, citing Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, and Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp.

  • De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346 (1964): Right to Pre-Verdict Interest in Intentional Tort Cases

    De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346 (1964)

    In cases of intentional tort resulting in property damage, a successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right, calculated from the date the cause of action accrued, to ensure full indemnification.

    Summary

    De Long Corp. sued Morrison-Knudsen Co. for inducing breach of contract and unfair competition. The trial court awarded damages, including pre-verdict interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that in intentional tort cases causing property damage, pre-verdict interest is a matter of right, not discretion. This principle ensures the plaintiff is fully compensated for the defendant’s wrongful actions from the time the damage occurred. The court likened the case to other intentional torts like conversion and fraud, where pre-verdict interest is routinely granted to provide complete indemnification. The decision clarifies the availability of pre-verdict interest in intentional torts affecting property rights.

    Facts

    De Long Corp. brought an action against Morrison-Knudsen Co. alleging inducement of breach of contract and unfair competition.
    The plaintiff sought damages for the harm caused by the defendant’s intentional interference with its contractual and business relations.
    The specific facts underlying the breach of contract and unfair competition claims are not detailed in this decision, as the primary focus is on the availability of pre-verdict interest.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a final judgment in favor of De Long Corp.
    The trial court also issued non-final orders adding interest to the verdict and denying a new trial.
    Morrison-Knudsen Co. appealed the final judgment and the non-final orders to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s decisions.
    The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals by leave from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in an action for inducing breach of contract and unfair competition, the successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right on the amount of recovery.

    Holding

    Yes, because in actions involving intentional torts resulting in property damage, the successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right to ensure full indemnification for the defendant’s wrongful interference with the plaintiff’s property rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that pre-verdict interest is necessary to afford a plaintiff “full indemnification” for the defendant’s wrongful interference with property rights, citing Flamm v. Noble. The court drew an analogy to other intentional torts, such as conversion, fraud, and trespass, where pre-verdict interest is recoverable as a matter of right.
    The court distinguished this case from actions involving negligent injury to property, where interest is discretionary. It emphasized that intentional torts warrant mandatory pre-verdict interest to provide complete compensation.
    The court quoted the authors of Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ. Prac., stating that CPLR 5001(a) “is phrased broadly and is designed to obliterate all distinctions that may turn on the form of the action * * *, the type of property involved, or the nature of the encroachment upon the plaintiff’s property interests.” This suggests a legislative intent to expand the right to interest in property damage actions, regardless of the specific cause of action.
    The court found no basis to differentiate the case from other intentional torts causing property damage. The focus was on the nature of the tort (intentional) and the type of damages (property-related), rather than the specific cause of action (inducing breach of contract).