New York Law Review

Tag: Prohibition

  • Doe v. Kuriansky, 55 N.Y.2d 166 (1982): Limits on Prohibition Against Prosecutorial Investigations

    Doe v. Kuriansky, 55 N.Y.2d 166 (1982)

    Prohibition does not lie to prevent a prosecutor from carrying out investigative functions, as opposed to quasi-judicial functions, even when there is a claim that the prosecutor is acting in excess of his authority.

    Summary

    A nursing home employee sought to prohibit a Special Prosecutor from presenting additional evidence to a Grand Jury regarding an investigation into the Brunswick Nursing Center without prior judicial approval. The first grand jury disbanded due to delays, without taking any action. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition does not lie to prevent a prosecutor from performing investigative functions, as opposed to quasi-judicial ones, even if the prosecutor’s actions are allegedly in excess of their authority. The court emphasized the distinction between the investigative and accusatory roles of a prosecutor.

    Facts

    The Special Nursing Home Prosecutor commenced an investigation into possible rebate and kickback schemes at the Brunswick Nursing Center. The first Grand Jury investigation faced significant delays due to motions to quash subpoenas, recalcitrant witnesses, and missing or destroyed records. The Grand Jury ultimately disbanded without taking action, primarily due to impatience with the delays, not a belief that no crime had occurred. A second Grand Jury was convened, and the investigation into Brunswick resumed. A Brunswick employee, whose bank records were subpoenaed, then initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the Special Prosecutor from continuing the investigation.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term dismissed the petition, holding that prohibition was not justified. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that prohibition was available to prevent the prosecutor from acting in excess of his powers. The Appellate Division further found that the Special Prosecutor had exceeded his authority by reviving the Brunswick investigation before a second Grand Jury without first obtaining judicial approval. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition is available to prevent a prosecutor from presenting additional evidence to a Grand Jury in connection with an ongoing investigation when there is no claim that the subject matter of his investigation is beyond the scope of his prosecutorial authority.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s actions in this case related to investigative functions, not quasi-judicial functions; thus, prohibition does not lie.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right and only when the body or officer acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. The Court emphasized the distinction between the investigative and quasi-judicial roles of a public prosecutor. The Court acknowledged that a public prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer subject to prohibition under certain circumstances. However, the Court drew a distinction between a prosecutor’s role in representing the state in bringing accused individuals to justice (quasi-judicial) and the investigation of suspicious circumstances (executive). When a prosecutor is performing a purely investigative function, their actions are considered executive and cannot be the object of a writ of prohibition. The Court noted that the Special Prosecutor’s investigation had not yet progressed to a stage where individual wrongdoers had been identified or discrete charges of criminality raised. "At this point, the role of the Special Prosecutor is limited to investigating the circumstances surrounding Brunswick’s financial transactions and gathering testimony for the purposes of ascertaining whether a crime has been committed." The court stated that the petitioner’s remedy lies in a traditional motion to quash the subpoena. The Court also distinguished prior cases where prohibition was deemed appropriate, emphasizing that those cases involved acts logically inseparable from the acts of a court or matters that had progressed beyond the investigative stage.

  • Matter of Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 582 (1979): Availability of Prohibition Against Administrative Agencies

    Matter of Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 582 (1979)

    Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and does not lie to interfere with proceedings before an administrative agency, like the State Division of Human Rights, when the agency has jurisdiction and the claim is merely of erroneous exercise of authority.

    Summary

    Eber Bros. sought to prohibit the State Division of Human Rights from proceeding with a complaint, arguing the Division failed to meet statutory deadlines. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition was inappropriate because the Division had jurisdiction over discrimination complaints, and the failure to meet deadlines, if true, was an error in exercising that authority, not an excess of jurisdiction. The proper remedy was administrative review followed by judicial review under Executive Law § 298. The court emphasized that prohibition is reserved for instances where an agency acts outside its jurisdiction, not when it makes errors within its jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Nancy Smith filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights against Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp., alleging discrimination. Eber Bros. argued that the Division was precluded from proceeding with the complaint because it failed to adhere to the statutory timetable for processing such complaints. Eber Bros. then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Division from continuing the proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted a default judgment against the State Division of Human Rights, preventing it from proceeding with Smith’s complaint. The Appellate Division vacated the default judgment, finding excusable default and merit to Smith’s contention that the Division should be allowed to proceed. The Appellate Division also held that prohibition did not lie in this case. Eber Bros. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment against the State Division of Human Rights.
    2. Whether the remedy of prohibition lies to interfere with proceedings before the State Division of Human Rights based on the Division’s alleged failure to observe statutory deadlines.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in vacating the default judgment, finding excusable default and merit to Smith’s claim.
    2. No, because the Division had jurisdiction to investigate complaints of discrimination, and the alleged failure to meet statutory deadlines constitutes an erroneous exercise of authority, not an excess of jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the Appellate Division’s decision to vacate the default judgment. The court then addressed the prohibition issue, stating that the employer’s claim of the Division failing to meet statutory deadlines, even if valid, was an erroneous exercise of authority, not an excess of jurisdiction. The court relied on Union Free School Dist. No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 NY2d 371, 381. The court emphasized that the Division had statutory jurisdiction to investigate discrimination complaints. The proper remedy for errors of law within that jurisdiction is administrative review, followed by judicial review under Executive Law § 298. The court stated that prohibition is an “ancient and just” writ reserved for instances where an entity acts outside its jurisdiction, citing Matter of Board of Educ. v State Div. of Human Rights, 38 AD2d 245, affd 33 NY2d 946 and La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575. The court declined to address the effect of the Division’s failure to adhere to the statutory timetable, given its conclusion that prohibition was not the appropriate remedy. The court emphasized the distinction between an agency acting outside its jurisdiction, which would warrant prohibition, and an agency making errors within its jurisdiction, which would not.

  • Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 16 (1976): Limits on Special Prosecutor Jurisdiction

    Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 16 (1976)

    A Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction, when superseding a District Attorney, is limited to the scope defined by the Governor’s Executive Order, and does not extend beyond the explicitly stated subject matter, such as the criminal justice system.

    Summary

    Dondi, an attorney, was indicted by a Grand Jury of the Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the Supreme Court in Queens County for bribery. He allegedly offered a police officer money to alter testimony in a civil case. Dondi sought to prohibit the Special Prosecutor from trying him, arguing the prosecutor lacked jurisdiction because the alleged bribe was unrelated to the enforcement of law or the administration of criminal justice. The Court of Appeals held that the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction, as defined by the Executive Order, was limited to corruption within the criminal justice system, and thus did not extend to Dondi’s alleged actions in a civil matter. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s judgment to allow prosecution by the Queens County District Attorney.

    Facts

    Dondi, an attorney, allegedly offered money to Police Officer Gaughn to change his testimony in a proposed civil case involving Dondi’s client, Evans. Gaughn, cooperating with the Special Prosecutor, met with Dondi and accepted funds for the altered testimony. The Grand Jury indicted Dondi for bribery, but Dondi argued the Special Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction under Executive Order 57.

    Procedural History

    Dondi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the Special Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction. The Extraordinary Term initially denied the motion. Dondi moved for reargument, and the court stood by its decision, but suggested the case would be better handled by the District Attorney. Dondi’s subsequent motion before respondent Jones was also denied. Dondi then initiated this prohibition proceeding, which the Appellate Division granted, dismissing the indictment. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Special Prosecutor had the authority under Executive Order 57 to present evidence against and prosecute Dondi for bribery when the alleged bribe related to a civil case and not to the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in the City of New York.

    Holding

    No, because Executive Order 57 limited the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction to acts connected with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice, and Dondi’s alleged attempt to bribe a witness in a civil matter did not fall within that scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether prohibition was an appropriate remedy, noting it lies only where there is a clear legal right and the body acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court considered the gravity of the harm, the availability of other remedies, and the remedial effectiveness of prohibition. The court determined that prohibition was appropriate here due to the importance of clarifying the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdictional limits. The court emphasized that it was acting within its discretion, considering the desirability of promptly settling an important jurisdictional question.

    The court then interpreted Executive Order 57, which authorized the Attorney-General to investigate and prosecute acts related to “corrupt acts or omissions by a public servant…arising out of, relating to or in any way connected with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in the City of New York.” The court reasoned that the order’s focus was on acts connected with the criminal justice system, not the judicial system in general. The court cited People v. Sam, 49 A.D.2d 732, where the court held that corrupt acts of transit authority police officers that did not relate to enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice, fell outside the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction.

    The court also pointed to a joint statement by the Special Prosecutor and District Attorneys, indicating the intent of the order was to supersede only in cases dealing with corruption relating “strictly to the criminal justice process.” The court quoted Governor Rockefeller’s statement expressing approval of the agreement and stating “The scope of the Special Prosecutor’s assignment is to investigate and prosecute corruption at all levels of the criminal justice system”.

    Based on the Executive Order’s language, the intent behind its issuance (corruption in the criminal justice process), and the agreement between the Special Prosecutor and the District Attorneys, the Court concluded that the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction did not extend to Dondi’s alleged attempt to bribe a witness in a purely civil action. The court reasoned the District Attorney of Queens County should undertake prosecution.

  • Anonymous v. Andrews, 49 A.D.2d 423 (1975): Limits on Article 78 Proceedings in Criminal Matters

    Anonymous v. Andrews, 49 A.D.2d 423 (1975)

    Article 78 proceedings are generally not available to review alleged errors or defects in pending criminal actions, especially concerning prosecutorial misconduct, unless the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or exceeds its jurisdictional powers.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an Article 78 proceeding (prohibition) is an appropriate method to challenge alleged prosecutorial misconduct in a pending criminal case. The petitioner argued that the Special Prosecutor’s actions in simulating a crime to investigate corruption warranted terminating the perjury actions against him. The Court of Appeals held that Article 78 relief was inappropriate because the trial court had jurisdiction, and the alleged misconduct, while potentially relevant as a defense, did not divest the court of its fundamental power to hear the case. The Court emphasized that orderly procedure dictates that such challenges be raised within the existing criminal action, not through collateral proceedings.

    Facts

    A Special Prosecutor, investigating judicial corruption, orchestrated a simulated robbery (the “Vitale” case) without the knowledge of the court or the District Attorney. This simulation aimed to create a scenario where judges and intermediaries might solicit bribes. The petitioner was subsequently indicted for perjury based on testimony given during the investigation related to the simulated robbery. The petitioner sought to halt the perjury prosecution, arguing the Special Prosecutor’s deceptive tactics tainted the entire case.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the perjury prosecution. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, also seeking review of the denial of a motion made under Section 149 of the Judiciary Law (related to the conduct of the Grand Jury).

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is an appropriate method to review alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred outside the scope of the pending criminal action, where the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
    2. Whether the denial of a motion made pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 149 of the Judiciary Law is separately appealable.

    Holding

    1. No, because Article 78 proceedings are inappropriate to review errors or defects within a pending criminal action when the court has jurisdiction; the alleged misconduct should be raised as a defense within the criminal action itself.
    2. No, because the denial of such a motion is not separately appealable, and an Article 78 proceeding cannot be used to bypass this non-appealability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Article 78 relief (prohibition) is reserved for instances where a court acts outside its jurisdiction or exceeds its powers. Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over the perjury charges. The alleged prosecutorial misconduct, while concerning, did not affect the court’s fundamental power to hear the case. The Court emphasized the importance of orderly procedure in criminal matters, stating that challenges to evidence or prosecutorial tactics should be raised within the criminal action itself, such as through motions to suppress evidence. Allowing Article 78 proceedings in these circumstances would disrupt the established process and encourage piecemeal appeals. The court cited Matter of State of New York v. King, noting that even serious errors should be addressed through established criminal procedure. The Court also addressed the attempt to appeal the denial of the Judiciary Law motion, emphasizing that such intermediate determinations are not appealable and cannot be circumvented via an Article 78 proceeding. The court also declined to rule on the validity of a perjury prosecution where the proceeding was designed solely to produce perjury, stating this issue involved questions of fact and should be raised as a defense in the criminal action. The court acknowledged the disadvantages of delaying resolution of intermediate issues, but reiterated that criminal actions are designed to dispose of all issues within the action itself, discouraging appeals except from a final judgment. As Chief Judge Breitel stated, “[R]espect for the rule of law which would be required of the Special Prosecutor is appropriate here too. Hence, judicial restraint must be applied in this proceeding.”

  • People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977): Prohibition and Mandamus in Criminal Cases

    People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977)

    Prohibition and mandamus do not lie to review errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Summary

    In an Attica-related criminal prosecution, the trial court granted the defendants more peremptory jury challenges than allowed by statute. The prosecution sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exceeding its statutory authority. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition (and mandamus) are extraordinary remedies that do not lie to correct mere errors of law in criminal cases, even if those errors are unreviewable on appeal. Allowing such collateral review would create undue delays and undermine the policy of limiting appeals in criminal matters.

    Facts

    Two inmates were charged with murder stemming from the Attica prison riot. Prior to jury selection, the defendants moved for an order allowing them more than the 20 peremptory challenges prescribed by CPL 270.25. The trial court granted the defendants 30 peremptory challenges and denied the People an equal increase. The prosecution argued that the trial court’s action was without statutory authority and violated precedent. The prosecution also argued that the ruling would never be reviewable on appeal due to statutory limitations on appeals in criminal actions.

    Procedural History

    The People commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from granting the defendants more peremptory challenges than statutorily allowed. The Appellate Division granted the People’s petition. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition or mandamus under CPLR article 78 may lie to undo what may be assumed to be an egregious error of law in a criminal action, and which, for the purposes of the present review, may also be assumed to have been prejudicial to the rights of the People.

    Holding

    No, because the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus do not lie to correct errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies available only where there is a clear legal right, and in the case of prohibition, only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. Errors of law, even if verbalized as excesses of jurisdiction, are not a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ. Nonreviewability by appeal alone does not provide a basis for collateral review via prohibition or mandamus. The court emphasized that the right of review by appeal in criminal matters is determined exclusively by statute, reflecting a policy to limit appellate proliferation and ensure speedy trials. Allowing collateral proceedings to review errors of law would lead to undue delays and frustrate the efficient administration of justice. The Court distinguished cases where prohibition or mandamus were appropriate, noting that those cases involved an unlawful use or abuse of the entire criminal action, as opposed to an error within the proceeding related to its proper purpose. The court warned that allowing such proceedings would “make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”

  • Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 25 N.Y.2d 243 (1974): Prohibition Does Not Lie for Grand Jury Selection Challenges

    Matter of Blake v. Hogan, 34 N.Y.2d 243 (1974)

    Prohibition is not the proper procedural vehicle for reviewing an alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process, unless the court exceeded its jurisdictional powers.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition is the appropriate method to challenge defects in the Grand Jury selection process. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition is not the proper vehicle unless the court lacked the power to proceed, distinguishing between a challenge to the power to empanel a Grand Jury and a challenge to the selection process itself. The Court emphasized that defects in the selection process, even those of constitutional dimension, can be waived and do not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

    Facts

    The specific facts regarding the alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process are not detailed in the opinion, as the Court did not reach the merits of the claim. However, the petitioner sought to challenge the legality of the Grand Jury based on how it was selected.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition to challenge the Grand Jury selection. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but solely on the procedural ground that prohibition was not the proper vehicle for the challenge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an Article 78 proceeding, in the nature of prohibition, is the proper method for reviewing an alleged defect in the Grand Jury selection process.

    Holding

    No, because a determination in a criminal case is not reviewable in an Article 78 proceeding unless the court exceeded its jurisdictional powers. The power to proceed on the indictment existed; therefore, prohibition does not lie.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that prohibition is only appropriate when the court lacks the jurisdictional power to make a determination. It distinguished between a challenge to the court’s power to empanel a Grand Jury (e.g., exceeding its term, as in Matter of Seidenberg v. County Ct. of County of Rockland) and a challenge to the selection process of a properly ordered Grand Jury. The Court stated, “[A] claim that a Grand Jury was illegally impaneled because the court lacked the power to extend its term…must be distinguished from a claim that a Grand Jury, properly ordered, was illegally selected.”

    The Court emphasized that objections to the selection process can be waived, even if the alleged defect rises to constitutional dimensions (citing Davis v. United States). Therefore, the court had the power to proceed on the indictment, and prohibition was not the appropriate remedy. The Court explicitly declined to reach the merits of the underlying claim regarding the Grand Jury selection process, stating, “In view of this we need not, and do not, reach the merits.”

  • Matter of Pugach v. Supreme Court, 38 N.Y.2d 247 (1975): Prohibition Unavailable When Habeas Corpus Court Has Jurisdiction

    Matter of Pugach v. Supreme Court, 38 N.Y.2d 247 (1975)

    Prohibition, an extraordinary remedy, does not lie to restrain a court from exercising jurisdiction it possesses, especially when an adequate remedy at law, such as appeal, exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a prohibition proceeding was improvidently entertained because the habeas corpus court possessed jurisdiction to hear the writ and order a hearing in the sentencing court. Prohibition is inappropriate when the court has jurisdiction and an adequate remedy, like appeal, is available. The Court emphasized the unseemliness of using a summary proceeding to restrain habeas corpus proceedings. Additionally, the issue was mooted by a subsequent hearing finding the prisoner competent at the time of trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s judgment but on narrower grounds, avoiding the merits of the habeas corpus petition.

    Facts

    Pugach, a prisoner, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court determined that a hearing was needed to determine if Pugach was competent to stand trial in 1962 and ordered the sentencing court to conduct the hearing. The Supreme Court then initiated a prohibition proceeding to prevent the habeas corpus court from exercising jurisdiction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition to prevent the habeas corpus court from ordering a hearing. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but on the limited ground that it was inappropriate to entertain the prohibition proceeding in the first place, given the habeas corpus court’s jurisdiction and the availability of appeal. After the Appellate Division’s decision, the Supreme Court in Bronx County conducted the postconviction hearing and found Pugach competent to stand trial in 1962.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a habeas corpus court from ordering a hearing within its jurisdiction.

    Holding

    No, because the habeas corpus court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ and order a hearing, and an appeal was available. Prohibition is only appropriate to restrain a court from acting without jurisdiction or exceeding its powers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the habeas corpus court had jurisdiction under CPLR 7004 and the power to order a hearing by the sentencing court, citing People ex rel. Prosser v. Martin, 306 N.Y. 710, 711-712. Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy used only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its powers, as stated in Matter of Proskin v. County Ct. of Albany County, 30 Y 2d 15, 18. The Court emphasized the availability of appeal under CPLR 7011 as an adequate remedy, making prohibition inappropriate, citing Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, 27 Y 2d 432, 436-437. The court found it “unseemly to invoke a summary proceeding to restrain proceedings under the constitutional writ” of habeas corpus. Furthermore, the issue became moot because the sentencing court held the hearing and found Pugach competent. The Court stated, “Prohibition does not ordinarily lie if there be an adequate remedy by way of appeal.”

  • Matter of Martin v. County Court of Ulster County, 1 N.Y.2d 585 (1956): Availability of Prohibition to Prevent Double Jeopardy

    Matter of Martin v. County Court of Ulster County, 1 N.Y.2d 585 (1956)

    Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a public official acts clearly beyond their jurisdiction, and is not typically granted if the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during trial.

    Summary

    Martin sought prohibition to prevent his trial on a charge of violating Penal Law § 1053-a, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy after his acquittal on charges under the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition was inappropriate because it is an extreme remedy reserved for cases where an official acts unquestionably beyond jurisdiction. The court reasoned that since a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a is possible without proving Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, the defense of double jeopardy could be raised at trial if the prosecution relies on the same acts. Thus, prohibition was not warranted.

    Facts

    Martin was involved in an incident leading to charges under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, for which he was acquitted.
    Subsequently, he was indicted under Penal Law § 1053-a, related to the same incident.
    Martin then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial on the Penal Law charge, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy.

    Procedural History

    Martin applied for a writ of prohibition to the County Court of Ulster County to prevent the trial under Penal Law § 1053-a.
    The lower court denied the writ.
    Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a trial where the defendant claims it would constitute double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because prohibition is an extreme remedy reserved for instances where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction, and the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during the trial itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction. The court emphasized the restrictive nature of prohibition, stating it’s “reserved to those situations where a public official is to be restrained from the performance of an act which is clearly and unquestionably beyond his jurisdiction”.
    The court noted that a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a could be obtained without necessarily proving a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, citing People v. Decina, 2 Y 2d 133 and People v. Eckert, 2 Y 2d 126.
    The court acknowledged Martin’s right to raise the defense of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel during the trial. If the prosecution relies on the same inseparable acts used in the prior Vehicle and Traffic Law prosecution, double jeopardy would apply, citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 Y 2d 259, 264.
    Judge Burke, concurring, emphasized that prohibition should only be granted in cases of “extreme necessity.” He stated that the test for double jeopardy is whether the defendant committed inseparable acts punishable by multiple statutes, or separate and distinct acts violating different laws. The court highlights that “in view of the fundamental character of the rule that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause and the deep roots it throws into the history of the criminal law” (People v. Lo Cicero, 14 Y 2d 374, 378), the indictment must fall if the acts are the same.