New York Law Review

Tag: Professional reputation

  • Cohn v. National Enquirer, 698 N.E.2d 1175 (N.Y. 1998): Defamation and Statements About Illness

    Cohn v. National Enquirer, 698 N.E.2d 1175 (N.Y. 1998)

    A statement about a person’s illness, specifically cancer, is not per se defamatory unless it reflects on their professional abilities or imputes a loathsome disease.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether publishing that a public relations consultant had cancer constitutes defamation. The plaintiff argued that the statement implied impending death, causing clients to lose confidence, or that cancer was a condition odious enough to repel clients. The court held that the statement was not defamatory because it did not reflect on the consultant’s ability to perform her job, nor did it impute a loathsome disease. The court emphasized that in today’s society, individuals with cancer often continue their professional lives without negative repercussions.

    Facts

    The National Enquirer published a statement in its August 27, 1991, issue stating that plaintiffs’ decedent, a public relations consultant, had cancer. The plaintiffs argued this was defamatory, claiming it would cause clients to lose confidence or view her condition as repulsive. The plaintiffs offered no specific proof of damages resulting from the publication.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statement that plaintiffs’ decedent had cancer is defamatory per se because it injures her in her trade, business, or profession.

    2. Whether the statement that plaintiffs’ decedent had cancer is defamatory because it imputes a loathsome disease.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statement did not reflect on her performance or ability to conduct her business.

    2. No, because cancer is not considered a loathsome disease as it is neither contagious nor attributed to socially repugnant conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that for a statement to be defamatory in a professional context, it must reflect on the person’s performance or be incompatible with the proper conduct of their business. The court stated that the statement about the decedent having cancer “did not impugn, or even relate to, any particular talent or ability needed to perform in decedent’s profession as a publicist.” The court emphasized that merely stating someone has cancer does not imply they are incompetent or unfit. The court cited Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, noting, “[p]ersons afflicted with cancer or other serious diseases, whether debilitating only or ultimately fatal, frequently carry on their personal or professional activities in today’s enlightened world in normal fashion and without any deprecatory reflection whatsoever.” Furthermore, the court held that cancer is not a “loathsome disease” because it is not contagious nor linked to socially unacceptable behavior. Because the statements were not defamatory against the decedent personally, the corporate plaintiff’s claims also failed.

  • Bickwid v. Deutsch, 645 N.E.2d 1218 (N.Y. 1994): Civil Contempt Appeal After Sentence Served

    Bickwid v. Deutsch, 645 N.E.2d 1218 (N.Y. 1994)

    An appeal from an order adjudicating a party in civil contempt is not moot simply because the resulting prison sentence has already been served, as enduring consequences may potentially flow from the order.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an appeal from a civil contempt order is moot once the jail sentence resulting from that order has been served. The New York Court of Appeals held that the appeal was not moot because the contempt adjudication could have enduring consequences for the appellant, particularly impacting his professional reputation and ability to earn a living as a forensic accountant and expert witness. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a determination on the merits, declining to address the propriety of the contempt adjudication itself.

    Facts

    Appellant, an accountant and expert witness, was divorced in 1985 and ordered to pay $1,000 per month in child support. In 1989, he sought a downward modification, while his former wife cross-moved for an upward modification. The former wife prevailed, and the appellant was ordered to pay $47,000 in arrears. He paid approximately half but claimed an inability to pay the rest. In July 1992, his former wife initiated a contempt proceeding due to his failure to pay the full amount.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court adjudicated the appellant in contempt and sentenced him to 48 days in jail, which he served. The Appellate Division later reversed the upward modification of child support in December 1993. The appellant then sought to appeal the contempt adjudication.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an appeal from an order adjudicating a party in civil contempt is rendered moot simply because the resulting prison sentence has already been served.

    Holding

    No, because enduring consequences potentially flow from an order adjudicating a party in civil contempt, such as damage to professional reputation and credibility, thus an appeal from that order is not rendered moot simply because the resulting prison sentence has already been served.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that civil contempt adjudications, though not as severe as criminal contempt, can still have lasting negative effects. Specifically, the court highlighted the potential impact on the appellant’s professional credibility, stating that the adjudication could be used to attack his credibility in court, thereby jeopardizing his ability to earn a living. Citing *Matter of Williams v. Cornelius*, the court emphasized that many of the policy concerns motivating that decision regarding summary criminal contempt also applied to civil contempt. The court stated, “the adjudication could no doubt be used to attack [his] credibility * * * in a court of law thus jeopardizing his professional reputation and means of earning a living.” The court declined to address the merits of the contempt adjudication, remitting the case to the Appellate Division to give both parties an opportunity to address the merits of the issue. The court relied on the principle established in *Williams v. Cornelius*, which underscored the importance of allowing parties to challenge contempt adjudications even after the sentence has been served, due to the potential for long-term consequences.

  • Doe v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct, 81 N.Y.2d 1050 (1993): Confidentiality of Physician Disciplinary Proceedings

    81 N.Y.2d 1050 (1993)

    Physician disciplinary proceedings in New York are confidential to safeguard information, encourage complaints, and protect professionals’ reputations from unfounded accusations, until a final determination is reached.

    Summary

    A physician, John Doe, sought to close disciplinary proceedings against him by the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC). The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Public Health Law § 230(9) mandates confidentiality in physician disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that these proceedings should remain confidential until a final determination, balancing the need for open proceedings against the potential harm to a physician’s reputation and the encouragement of complaints. The court emphasized the legislature’s role in weighing these competing policy values.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, a physician, was subject to disciplinary proceedings before the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) within the New York State Department of Health.

    Plaintiff sought a court order to close these disciplinary proceedings to the public, arguing for confidentiality.

    The Department of Health had reversed a long-standing policy of confidential proceedings in 1983, leading to this dispute.

    Procedural History

    The physician sought an order closing the disciplinary proceedings.

    The Appellate Division ruled on the matter, and the physician appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting the physician’s request for confidentiality in the proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Public Health Law § 230(9) mandates that physician disciplinary proceedings before the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) be confidential until a final determination is reached.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute, read in conjunction with the overall policy considerations, mandates confidentiality in physician disciplinary proceedings to safeguard information, encourage complaints, and protect professionals’ reputations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Public Health Law § 230(9), which states that these “proceedings” shall not be subject to discovery, interpreting it to mandate confidentiality. The Court cited Matter of John P. v Whalen, 54 N.Y.2d 89, and Matter of Lazachek v Board of Regents, 101 AD2d 639, in support of this interpretation.

    The Court highlighted that confidential proceedings had been the long-standing policy until the Department of Health reversed this tradition in 1983.

    The Court emphasized that its construction of the statute aligns with the general policy that disciplinary proceedings involving licensed professionals remain confidential until finally determined, referencing cases involving dentists (Matter of Johnson Newspaper Corp. v Melino, 77 N.Y.2d 1), attorneys (Matter of Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549), and other medical professionals (Matter of Doe v Axelrod, 123 AD2d 21; Matter of Lazachek v Board of Regents, 101 AD2d at 641).

    The Court quoted Matter of Johnson Newspaper Corp. v Melino, 77 NY2d, at 10-11, stating that the policy of confidentiality “serves the purpose of safeguarding information that a potential complainant may regard as private or confidential and thereby removes a possible disincentive to the filing of complaints” and “evinces a sensibility to the possibility of irreparable harm to a professional’s reputation resulting from unfounded accusations.”

    The Court acknowledged reasons for favoring open disciplinary proceedings but deferred to the Legislature to weigh conflicting policy values and enact consistent provisions giving appropriate protection to the interests of the parties, witnesses, and the public interest.

    The court explicitly states that the relaxed procedures and evidentiary rules in disciplinary proceedings, where hearsay is admissible, increase the risk of harm to reputation from unfounded accusations.